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Abstract
The threat posed by terrorism and the need to counter it tends to produce a cycle of action 
and reaction in which democracies often find themselves. The on-going threat 
perpetuates this cycle with the effect that more legislation is enacted, often without 
achieving increased security. Instead what tends to occur is the normalisation of 
emergency measures, the erosion of rights and liberties and ultimately the risk of the 
country becoming less democratic.
This cycle can be said to be in existence in the United Kingdom and the United States in 
seeking to deal with the current terrorist threat. This thesis examines, in a comparative 
context, the extent to which the side effects of this cycle have occurred in both countries. 
This is done through examination of the extent to which the rights and liberties of the 
individual are restricted by the response to terrorism, namely the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in the UK and the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 and the USA PATRIOT Act 2001 in the US. In so 
doing, it examines the hypothesis that with regard to the legislation in question, 
interference with the rights and liberties examined in the UK is greater than in the US due 
to the profusion of legislation enacted in response to the protracted domestic terrorist 
struggle and the subsequent erosion of these values.
Consideration is given to the previous terrorist threat and the response of each country in 
examining the condition of democratic values prior to the period under examination. 
This allows comparison with the impact of the current legislation on these values, 
whereby it can be seen that whilst some amount of restriction of fundamental rights and 
liberties has occurred in both countries, this cannot be said to be greater in the UK. The 
democratic foundation of each country remains intact, thereby providing the best form of 
protection against terrorism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
The British political and social landscape has been scarred for decades by the 
phenomenon of terrorism and its use at the hands of different actors. 
Overwhelmingly, Irish Nationalist terrorism has played the dominant part in this 
violent history, with sporadic appearances from other, less prolific organisations. 
This bloodshed has not occurred in the United Kingdom in isolation. The United 
States has also experienced violence at the hands of domestic organisations, on an 
ever present, albeit small scale and more frequently by international actors both at 
home and abroad. Recent years have witnessed the expansion of international 
terrorism, with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden becoming synonymous with the 
growth of Islamic fundamentalism. The latter part of the twentieth century and the 
early part of this saw this form of terrorism reach all parts of the globe, most
f hnotoriously, the United States, when on September 11 2001 over 3,000 people lost 
their lives in the single worst terrorist atrocity. This threat has continued with the
i L
recent events of July 7 2005 in London, which saw the use of the suicide bomber for 
the first time in Western Europe.
The response to this phenomenon varies from country to country. The United 
Kingdom has enacted various powers through specialist anti-terrorism legislation in 
an attempt to counter the threat. Indeed, in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
renewals of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA) in 
1976, 1984 and 1989 as well as the enactment of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and 
Conspiracy) Act 1998 culminated in the permanent Terrorism Act 2000. This was 
followed by the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and 
more recently by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 resulting in a comprehensive, 
and arguably draconian, body of law. Alternatively, in the United States terrorism on 
US soil was, until recently, dealt with under the ordinary criminal law, rather than by 
way of specialist legislation; indeed, the perpetrators of the World Trade Centre 
bombing in 1993 were tried and convicted under the regular federal law. It was only 
with regard to international terrorism that legislation was enacted. For example, 
jurisdiction was conferred on United States courts in cases where foreign nationals 
were involved in acts of international terrorism anywhere in the world against an
1
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American citizen by way of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act 
1986.1 The Anti-Terrorism Act 19872 dealt with the closure of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations.
The traditional approach of each country changed with the United Kingdom enacting 
permanent anti-terrorism legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000, to replace the temporary 
status of its predecessors. In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, the 
United States enacted specialist anti-terrorism legislation for the first time, the Anti- 
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 (AEDPA). However, the response 
of both countries went further than this following the events of September 11 , with 
both enacting far-reaching emergency legislation, in the form of the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) and the USA PATRIOT Act 2001.3 This 
tendency to legislate in the aftermath of a terrorist incident is similarly evident from 
the response to the July 7 attacks, where it is claimed that new legislative provisions 
are necessary despite the extensive body of law currently on the statute books.4
This abundance of legislation, as well as certain executive actions such as the 
detention of individuals as part of the war on terror, represents the current response of 
both countries to the ongoing terrorist threat. Terrorism is of course not unique to 
these nations, with attacks occurring all over the world. However, the high profile of
t hthe September 11 attacks and the position of the UK and US as leading world 
powers have placed the legislative and executive actions of each country subsequent 
to the attacks under scrutiny. Indeed, as leading democracies both countries stand as 
examples to less developed and democratic states, particularly with regard to 
upholding human rights and personal freedoms.
The values which form the basis of liberal democracy equate to the antithesis of 
terrorism. These include the notions of freedom, tolerance and pluralism; equal 
treatment, the freedom to talk and worship freely, the right to be free from 
government interference, the ability to influence change through legitimate political
1 Pub. L. No. 99-399, codified in various sections o f 22 USC.
2 22 USC 5201-5203.
3 The full title o f this legislation is the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing the 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001.
4 HC Debs. vol. 436 col. 1253 -  1254 (20th July 2005).
2
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dissent and the right to vote in democratic elections. These features help to prevent 
the growth of terrorism by providing an atmosphere which is not conducive to the 
growth of those tensions and conflicts which often incite terrorist violence. Indeed, 
maintaining the health of democracy is seen as paramount in defeating the threat 
posed by terrorism, as a means of guaranteeing fundamental rights and democratic 
values. However, attempts to protect the state against such violence through the 
enactment of legislation often result in the abrogation of these values. In this way 
terrorism not only challenges the security of the state but also threatens the fabric of 
democracy. Indeed in attempting to prevent the next attack, overcome the threat 
posed and be seen to be reacting, it is almost inevitable that the actions of democratic 
society will result in some degree of interference with the rights and liberties of the 
individual. In addition, the steps taken can have the effect of damaging those features 
of democracy, such as a free press or the opportunity to assemble and speak freely, 
which help to prevent the growth of terrorism. It is undeniable that a country must 
have the ability to defend itself in the face of such a threat so as to protect the 
mechanisms of the state, the rights of the citizenry and in this way, democracy itself. 
However, any response to terrorism must mitigate the impact on the rights and 
liberties of the individual by way of compliance, so far as possible, with recognised 
human rights standards. In addition, any resultant infringement must be justified by 
ensuring the efficacy of the measures enacted and their utility in preventing and 
punishing terrorist violence.
The nature of the threat posed by terrorism and the need to counter it tends to produce 
a cycle of action and reaction in which democracies often find themselves. This 
describes the United Kingdom’s experience with terrorist violence over the past forty 
years. As this cycle continues, more measures are undertaken and more legislation is 
enacted in an attempt to counter the threat, often without the result of increased 
security. Instead what tends to occur is the normalisation of emergency measures into 
society and the legal system, the erosion of rights and liberties and ultimately the risk 
of the country becoming less democratic in taking actions which attempt to protect the 
democratic way of life and counter terrorism.
This cycle can be said to be in existence in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States in seeking to deal with what is currently a predominantly Islamic extremist
3
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threat. This thesis seeks to examine, in a comparative context, whether, and to what 
extent, the side effects of this pattern have occurred in both countries with the result 
that the values of democracy have been curtailed. In both jurisdictions legislative 
measures play a role central to the response to the current threat. This thesis considers 
this response as an attempt to both counter the terrorist threat and protect the fabric of 
democracy in this contemporary context. This is done by examining the extent to 
which the rights and liberties of the individual are restricted by the response to 
terrorism in both countries and the extent to which an effective balance is struck with 
these values in an attempt to ensure the security of the nation through legislative 
action. This is considered in the United Kingdom by way of the Terrorism Act 2000 
and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, with some reference to the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. In the United States the legislation under analysis 
is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 and the USA PATRIOT 
Act 2001, with consideration also given to the power of executive detention utilised as 
part of the war on terror. It also examines the hypothesis that with regard to the 
legislation in question, interference with rights and liberties examined in the UK is 
greater than in the US due to the profusion of legislation enacted over the years in 
response to the protracted domestic terrorist struggle and the subsequent erosion of 
these values. An additional consideration is whether, in enacting specialised anti­
terrorism legislation, the United States has leamt from the United Kingdom’s 
experience with, and response to, a longstanding terrorist threat.
For a country such as the United Kingdom, with a long and troubled past regarding 
political violence and the appropriate response to it, it can be easy for consideration 
and analysis of the problem to be carried out from a somewhat insular viewpoint. 
Comparison with another jurisdiction provides a different perspective. In addition, 
analysis of the position in another country allows for a wider consideration of the use 
of the law in responding to terrorism. Several reasons are submitted as justification 
for the use of the United States as a comparator. Its position as a common law 
democracy allows comparison with the United Kingdom despite the differences in 
political culture between the two; indeed elected legislatures, a multiparty tradition 
and adherence to the rule of law form a foundation of political similarity. In addition, 
the derivation of the US legal system from its English predecessor results in further 
affinity, as does the strong tradition of fundamental rights and liberties. Further
4
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justifications can be advanced in the form of differences between the two. Firstly, 
each country has had a distinct experience with regard to terrorism in the past, in 
source, form and prevalence, which is set out in Chapters 2 and 3. In addition, prior 
to the US enacting specific anti-terrorism legislation in a similar vein to that in place 
in the UK, there existed a divergence in the approach taken in each country with 
regard to terrorism.
Responses to terrorism have traditionally impacted upon the rights of freedom of 
expression and association, personal liberty, and due process. The experience of the 
United Kingdom in this area, with core powers such as that of arrest without warrant, 
extended detention, internment, exclusion orders and proscription verifies this. The 
modernisation of technology, specifically in the area of communication, and the use to 
which such technology has been put by terrorist organisations has extended the list of 
rights potentially affected by legislative measures to include the right to privacy.5 It is 
against this backdrop that analysis of the legislation is carried out. Such an approach 
has been taken in order to consider the status of these rights in the face of attempts by 
democracies to counter the terrorist threat, given their existence as an intrinsic 
element of democratic society. Indeed, this allows a comparison to be drawn between 
both countries with these democratic values as the benchmark. It is this commonality 
of spirit which enables this analysis to be carried out in a comparative way. This is in 
spite of the fact that the human rights implications of legislative provisions and 
executive actions are assessed under different instruments in each country; namely the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) by way 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom and the Constitution in the 
United States.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the history of political violence in the UK, namely 
that emanating from Northern Ireland, indigenous, special interest and international 
terrorism, as the backdrop to the development of the law in this area. The chapter 
goes on to consider the main provisions of the legislation enacted between 1974 and 
2000 in the United Kingdom, namely the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1974, as re-enacted in 1976, 1984 and 1989 as well as the Criminal
5 Under article 8 ECHR, as conferred by the Human Rights Act 1998.
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Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998. In addition, consideration is given to 
internment and the suspension of the right to trial by jury utilised in Northern Ireland. 
This approach is mirrored in chapter 3 with regard to the United States. The chapter 
discusses the various waves of terrorism experienced in the US, namely left wing, 
right wing, special interest and international terrorism. The chapter then provides an 
overview of the measures utilised in the US prior to the enactment of the legislation 
under examination, namely international co-operation, the establishment of 
governmental committees, use of the military and the enactment of legislation. This 
enables consideration of the development of each country’s approach to countering 
terrorism over the years and allows a correlation to be drawn between the threat faced, 
the measures utilised and the resultant condition of democracy.
The right to privacy is the lens through which the legislation is viewed in Chapter 4. 
This considers the United Kingdom legislation in the first half of the chapter, namely 
those provisions of the ATCSA relating to the retention of communications data in 
Part XI and the disclosure of information in Part III. The latter half of the chapter 
begins with an overview of the right to privacy in the United States and the Fourth 
Amendment with particular consideration to its status with regard to electronic 
surveillance. It goes on to analyse the extensive provisions of the USA PATRIOT 
Act in the field of surveillance and access to communications data.
The same structure is applied to Chapter 5 and examination from the perspective of 
the right to freedom of expression. The provisions of concern in this regard are the 
power of proscription and related offences contained in the Terrorism Act as well as 
that related to the disclosure of information, inserted into the TA by the ATCSA. The 
chapter goes on to consider those rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in establishing the standard 
against which restrictions on freedom of expression are tested. This is utilised with 
regard to the designation of foreign organisations and related offences under the 
AEDPA as well as the deportation and exclusion of foreign nationals under the 
AEDPA and the USA PATRIOT Act.
Chapter 6 examines the liberty of the individual and the procedure applied to those 
detained under the legislation in both countries. Detention following arrest without
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warrant under the TA is considered, as is the potentially indefinite detention of non- 
British citizens under part IV of the ATCSA. This is followed by consideration of 
due process under the US Constitution. The chapter goes on to analyse the detention 
and removal under the AEDPA of aliens suspected of involvement in terrorism and 
the power of preventive detention of non-citizens, enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act 
in a similar vein to the ATCSA.
Detention and due process are discussed further in Chapter 7 in the context of 
executive action by the US government as part of the war on terror. Brief 
consideration of the “enemy combatant” classification is provided and of the use of 
this concept by the government with regard to those persons detained as part of the 
war on terror. The liberty of those classified under this label and the procedure 
applied is examined from the perspective of two such detainees, Yaser Esam Hamdi 
and Jose Padilla, both of whom are United States citizens. Hamdi was captured on 
the battlefield in Afghanistan and later transferred to detention in the US, whilst 
Padilla was seized on US soil. This chapter also considers the case of those detained 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, fourteen of whom took legal action against the US 
government. All petitioned the Supreme Court and this chapter analyses the 
arguments in relation to their cases and attempts to predict the ruling of the court. An 
addendum to the chapter details the court’s subsequent decisions in three cases and 
considers the flaws contained therein.
The concluding chapter draws together the threads of those preceding to produce a 
final consideration of the position of these fundamental rights and liberties and the 
condition of democracy in both countries, in light of both the legislative provisions 
and the executive action taken in recent years in the name of defeating terrorism. 
Following analysis of the conclusions of the antecedent chapters, consideration is 
given to wider issues. The chapter considers the use of legislation with regard to the 
current threat posed by militant Islamic fundamentalism. It contemplates the legal
i L
landscape since the attacks of September 11 2001 and the current climate following 
the events of the 7th and 21st July 2005 and their aftermath.
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The Terrorist Threat and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom
Prior to 2000
The experience of the United Kingdom with regard to terrorism has been one focused 
in the domestic arena, and dominated by the conflict in Northern Ireland. Threats 
emerged from other sources though they were never of such magnitude as to warrant 
the level of action taken in response to the violence emanating from Northern Ireland. 
Indeed the legislation enacted prior to 2000 was primarily confined to Northern Irish 
terrorism, with some later amendments taking account of other emerging threats, such 
as international terrorism. Legislative enactments dominated the United Kingdom’s 
response to terrorism and resulted in an extensive body of anti-terrorism law, which 
had the effect of affecting fundamental rights and democratic values to differing 
extents in Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Irish Nationalist Violence
Irish Nationalist violence finds its fuel in the issue of partition of Northern and 
Southern Ireland. This dates back to the reign of James I and the colonization of 
North-Eastern Ireland by Protestants in the seventeenth century. The dispossession of 
Catholic landowners in favour of Scottish Presbyterian “planters” acted as a catalyst 
for the resultant religious flavour which pervades Irish affairs to this day.1 It was the 
inequability of the situation in favour of the Protestants in terms of both land and 
politics that acted as a spark for the predecessor of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
namely the movement of United Irishmen inspired and led by Theobold Wolfe Tone. 
Their rebellion of 1798, which sought to “ break the connection with England” failed 
dismally but, where it failed in tangible achievements, it succeeded in two respects. 
Firstly, the United Irishmen succeeded in laying the foundations for the struggle for 
independence from Great Britain. Secondly, it established the concept of “physical 
force” republicanism which manifested itself at the heart of the modem republican
1 T. P .Coogan, The I.R.A. (Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1970) p. 3.
2 P. Bishop and E. Mallie, The Provisional I.R.A. (William Heinemann Ltd. 1987) p. 9.
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struggle and continues today in some dissident factions which have not yet renounced 
violence.
The 1801 Act of Union further compounded the desire for independence by extending 
British rule across all 32 counties of Ireland leaving it a weak and extremely poor 
country which faced discrimination and therefore poverty at the hands of Great 
Britain. It was this climate which inspired the birth of groups both at home and 
abroad dedicated to restoring the independence of Ireland and with that its glory. Two 
such groups were the Fenian Brotherhood and the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
(IRB) both founded in 1858 and inextricably linked across the Atlantic by their 
commitment to the use of physical force in order to secure the overthrow of British 
rule. However, despite their ready use of violence, the abortive Fenian uprising of 
1867 was a failure, albeit a majestic one.
Whilst discussions regarding Home Rule for Ireland continued over the years, to the 
extent that 1912 saw the introduction of a third Home Rule bill, it became clear to an 
extremist faction of the IRB that Ireland’s independence would only be won through 
rebellion rather than through constitutional discussion and amendment.3 It was the 
decision to mount an armed uprising whilst Britain was preoccupied with the war 
effort that continued to inspire the republican movement in to the 1990s. The uprising 
of Easter 1916 was a failure. At the time, the majority of the Irish population were 
not moved by this rebellious display of nationalism and more so were disgusted by 
this act of treason against a nation for which thousands of Irish sons were fighting. As 
a result, Irish passion for the rebels’ cause was not ignited until the British execution 
of fifteen of the leaders.
Easter 1916 is still a date of significant commemoration in the republican calendar 
and this is due to the fact that it essentially signifies the beginning of the modem 
republican stmggle with the IRA of today soon emerging under that title. The words 
of Padraig Pearse as he spoke from the dock can be seen as both a continuing 
inspiration to the republican movement and as a prophecy of the years of violence and 
stmggle which were to follow: “If you strike us down now, we shall rise again and
3 Coogan, n. 1 above p. 11.
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renew the fight.. You cannot extinguish the passion for Irish freedom. If our deed has 
not been sufficient to win freedom, then our children will win it by a better deed.”4
The Easter 1916 uprising has been described as a “springtime of rebirth for Ireland”5 
both in the renaissance of passion for the nationalist cause but also by providing fuel 
to the vehicle which was to carry this revival through to later stages, namely Sinn 
Fein. Sinn Fein had not taken part in the events of Easter 1916; indeed whilst it was 
committed to the republican cause, its primary principles were not supported by any 
coherent means to achieve them. Despite this, the years immediately following the 
rebellion produced a dramatic change in both Sinn Fein and the republican cause, 
resulting in Sinn Fein gaining a huge majority of seats in the general election of 
December 1918. This provided Sinn Fein MPs the opportunity to formulate an Irish 
National Assembly, Dail Eireann and to issue a declaration of independence on 
January 21st 1919.6 British forces were now considered to be an invading army and as 
such were the enemy against whom the newly re-titled IRA were to direct their 
attentions in an attempt to assert the independence of Ireland.
Thus began the Anglo-Irish war which raged from 1919 to 1921 and marked the 
beginning of a campaign of guerrilla warfare undertaken by the IRA in an attempt to 
achieve its objectives. During the war, the most consistent IRA successes were 
against targets chosen for their political sensitivity rather than for the amount of 
casualties which could be claimed. In this way, popular targets were such things as 
abandoned police stations as well as crushing blows dealt to the British judicial 
system by way of witness and juror intimidation.7 That is not to say of course that 
fatal blows were not struck; indeed the war can be said to have begun with the killing 
of two police officers at Solohedbeg, Co. Tipperary. Moreover, the most oft-quoted 
example of brutality on both sides occurred on November 21st 1920, commonly 
referred to as “Bloody Sunday.” The IRA struck first with the shooting of 14 
intelligence officers in their beds. In retaliation for this, the Crown forces fired upon a
4 R. Dudley Edwards, Patrick Pearse: the Triumph o f  Failure (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1977) p. 
291.
5 Lord Longford, Peace by Ordeal. The Negotiation o f  the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921 (NEL MENTOR, 
1967) p. 28.
6 The Irish Uprising 1916-1922 (CBS Legacy Collection, 1966) p. 87.
7 Ibid. p. 94.
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crowd of 15,000 spectators at an all-Ireland football match in Dublin. Twelve 
civilians were killed with eleven seriously wounded and 54 injured.
By the end of the war nearly 2,000 soldiers and civilians were dead and whilst in the 
ensuing treaty negotiations Home Rule was granted to Ireland, the fact that the island 
was to be partitioned into two states cancelled out any small points of victory gained 
by Sinn Fein. From a British point of view, it was felt that the Irish question had been 
resolved, and indeed perhaps it had been to the extent possible at the time, however 
acceptance of the treaty plunged Ireland back in to war, a civil war with battle lines 
drawn between pro and anti-treaty members of the IRA. The war raged for a little 
under a year and whilst the “Irregulars”, as the anti-treaty members became known, 
were eventually defeated the principle for which they stood continued into the twenty 
first century.
Yet, whilst the spirit of republicanism lived on, the body did not and in the 
intervening years, the republican movement became a ghost of its former self. 
Sporadic revivals occurred in the following years with the IRA engaging in various 
activities in the mistaken belief that sympathy for physical force republicanism was 
much greater than it was. Despite various upsurges in IRA activity, it was known that 
the IRA did not have the military strength for a full uprising. IRA actions even had 
the effect of reducing sympathy for the cause and making the situation worse by 
inspiring such things as the Offences Against the State Act 1939, and prompting
Q
proscription of the IRA several times over the years. Yet the IRA and the notion of a 
free Ireland were not consigned to the past. Indeed somewhat of a resurrection 
occurred placing the status of Ireland centre stage once again.
This resurrection occurred by way of a two-pronged attack with Sinn Fein enjoying 
success in the Westminster elections of 1956, which the IRA complemented with a 
military offensive, code-named “Operation Harvest.” This strategy involved the use 
of so-called “flying columns”, consisting of 25 men in each, which would move over 
the border in to the North and conduct operations by way of guerrilla warfare. The 
aim was to increase and maintain centres of IRA resistance in the North so as to force
8 Coogan, n. 1 above p. 136.
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withdrawal of enemy forces by cutting all communications and attacking military and
th thpolice barracks as well as personnel. The night of 11 /12 December 1956 saw the 
beginning of a campaign of destruction consisting of over 500 incidents which was, 
by its end six years later, to have cost over £1 million in direct damage alone as well as 
the lives of 18 people. However, despite majestic statements issued by Sinn Fein the 
uprising was in fact a failure, dogged by a lack of adequate weaponry, the absence of 
a wider political plan and perhaps more importantly by an apathetic public, tired of 
the notion of physical force republicanism.
By the time the IRA announced the end of the campaign, the prevailing view was of 
an organisation finally laid to rest. Indeed the New York Times published somewhat 
of an obituary for the republican movement: “The few young toughs who make up the 
tiny remnant that now lays down its arms used a grand and famous name for their 
organisation, but the Irish Republican Army belongs to history, and it belongs to 
better men in times that are gone. So does Sinn Fein. Let us put a wreath of red roses 
on their grave and move on.”9
The emergence of the IRA of today essentially signals the beginning of what is known 
as “the Troubles.” The years following the failed border campaign saw somewhat of 
a change in the thinking of the IRA leadership so that a more Marxist based policy, 
encompassing the social problems of the day, rather than physical force republicanism 
prevailed. This signalled a change in the fundamental thinking of an organisation 
which had based its whole ethos on the issue of partition and an independent Ireland, 
for hundreds of years. In this way following months of discontent and confrontation, 
fraction was inevitable. The final schism occurred in December 1969 and surprisingly 
was not over the failure of the IRA in defending Catholic ghettos, but rather over the 
long-held policy of abstentionism. This principle had been a stalwart of the 
republican movement from the beginning, despite the success of Sinn Fein in various 
elections, and of course the failure to recognise the legitimacy of the parliaments of 
Westminster, Dublin and Belfast went to the very core of the movement. As a result 
of the decision to abolish abstentionism, two organisations emerged, the Official IRA 
(OIRA) which involved itself in the social problems of the country, following a more
9 Ibid. pp. 343-344.
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socialist tradition and in this vein declared a ceasefire in 1972. The splinter group of 
traditionalists became known as the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and exclusive of various 
short-lived ceasefires, continued the fight for a 32 county republic by way of an armed 
struggle until 1997 when the group declared a ceasefire which continues to hold.10
1969 was essentially the dawning of a new era. In some respects the struggle 
remained traditional to the core, particularly following the split which removed those 
who were stepping away from such a long-held policy as abstentionism. In this way, 
the movement could not have been more in touch with its historical roots. However, 
in contrast to this, the next thirty years were to show that the republican cause had 
shaken off its mantle of failure to transform the IRA and Sinn Fein into formidable 
forces. Yet, throughout this time the aims of the republican movement remained 
unchanged, it was simply the means with which to achieve them which were altered. 
By far the most important aim of the organisation remained the removal of the British 
from the island and the creation of a 32 county republic. Initially, the weakened state 
of the PIRA prevented plans for a massive offensive against the British and instead 
operations took the form of what has been termed “psychological aggression”11 as
part of a campaign of sabotage against both Protestant and British power. This
1 0campaign involved 153 explosions aimed at such targets as customs offices and 
telephone exchanges, but it is notable that at this stage in the campaign it was the 
location which was the target rather than people.
The introduction of internment under section 12 of the Civil Authorities (Special
thPowers) Act 1922 on 9 August 1971 marked a turning point. Over 300 people were 
arrested as part of “Operation Demetrius” on the first day but out of date information 
meant that few of them were active in the Provisionals, with the majority belonging to 
the Official IRA and indeed several being veterans of much earlier IRA campaigns. 
The operation proved to be doubly unsuccessful in that it served to encourage a huge 
amount of new recruits to the IRA as a result of the internment process. Moreover, it 
sparked a massive increase in the level of violence in the Province; indeed in the three
10 As o f July 2005 the IRA announced the organisation’s intent to achieve its objectives using “purely 
political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means.” On 26th September 2005 
John de Chastelain announced that all IRA arms had been decommissioned. See 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/em/fr/-/l/hi/northem ireland/4283444.stm
11 Note 6 above p. 208.
12 Bishop and Mallie, n. 2 above p. 127.
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days following the beginning of internment, 22 people were killed, and in the months
i L
following 9 August, 140 people died. This stands in huge contrast to the 34 people 
who had been killed in the first eight months of the year.13
In the wake of Operation Demetrius, the PIRA shifted its attention away from the 
unarmed Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which had become the focus of the 
organisation in recent months and instead took up the offensive against the Army. An 
increase in the amount of weapons available to the Provisionals as well as the influx 
of new members had encouraged the first steps in a new chapter in the saga, that is the 
attempt to drive the British out by killing British personnel. This policy had already
| L
begun with the killing of Gunner Robert Curtis on 6 February 1971 in a riot in 
Belfast. The offensive gained momentum but much public support was lost following 
dubious tactics on the part of the IRA.14 In spite of public condemnation, the 
offensive continued and in the year 1971-1972 the IRA were responsible for the 
deaths of over 100 soldiers.
However, again the Army was to play in to the hands of the Provisionals. The setting 
for this was a civil rights march in Derry on January 30th 1972. Eye-witnesses state 
the mood to have been good-humoured as the march began with over 10,000 
participants. However, the day was to end in tragedy with 13 men shot dead and 17 
injured by the Parachute Regiment. To this day it is unknown whether the Paras were 
fired upon first, as asserted at the time, but “Bloody Sunday” was to have two lasting 
effects. Firstly, it acted as oxygen to the slow-buming flame of republicanism visible 
amongst the young men of Ireland. As a result, PIRA experienced a massive surge in 
new recruits willing to fight against the “murdering” occupiers. Secondly, it added 
legitimacy to the role of the IRA as defenders of the nationalist people. The role of 
protector was as important to the PIRA as it was to the people, particularly following 
the inability of the IRA to defend nationalists in the riots of 1969, which inspired 
widespread ridicule. In this way Bloody Sunday provided the IRA not only with a 
need to act as defender but also provided the belief that such protection was needed.
13 P. Bew and G. Gillespie, Northern Ireland. A Chronology o f  the Troubles 1968-1993 (Macmillan 
Ltd., 1993) p. 37.
14 One particular incident which caused widespread public disgust was the targeting o f three off-duty 
Highland Fusiliers, one aged 23 and two brothers aged 17 and 18, who were lured away from a Belfast 
pub with the promise o f a party and then shot dead on a remote country road.
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Another casualty of Bloody Sunday was the Northern Ireland Parliament, Stormont.
t hOn March 24 1972 Edward Heath announced the imposition of direct rule from
Westminster. Such news was seen as a victory for the IRA who felt that a united 
Ireland was now one step closer. Indeed, this was the view from the loyalist camp as 
well. Such news was particularly devastating given the inherent implication that IRA 
violence had succeeded. It seemed to give credence to the use of such weapons as the 
car bomb which had been used by PIRA for the first time only four days previously, 
killing six people with a 1001b bomb in the centre of Belfast. The IRA offensive 
continued, perhaps buoyed on by the feeling that the war was being won and that the 
British were being beaten. “Bloody Friday” was the worst day of violence since the 
imposition of direct rule. July 21st 1972 saw 22 bombs explode in Belfast, killing 
eleven people, injuring 130 and dissipating much of the support for the IRA and any 
justification for the cause gained since Bloody Sunday.
The might of the IRA was now clear. It had grown from virtual non-existence into an 
organisation with massive membership and strong connections, with its counterparts 
in the United States providing a sophisticated arms operation in a few short years. 
Indeed, its strength was tested in the year 1972-1973 by the arrests of a great number 
of figures in the PIRA leadership. Yet, rather than crumble as would probably have 
happened a few years previously, the organisation rallied and shifted its campaign 
despite the crisis point reached in its upper ranks. This showed a previously unseen 
maturity and indeed a versatility which has underlined the Provisional organisation 
throughout. Following Bloody Sunday, a widespread optimism amongst the IRA 
fuelled the belief that British withdrawal was imminent. This misconception led the 
IRA to realize that a campaign focused solely on Northern Ireland was not succeeding 
in achieving an independent Ireland. As a result of this, a new direction was taken 
with the decision to take the campaign to the mainland. The aim of the campaign was 
to hit at economic, military, political and judicial targets.15 In this vein, London was
t hchosen for both its symbolic value as well as its choice locations. On 8 March 1973, 
the chosen IRA unit placed car bombs outside New Scotland Yard, the Central Army 
Recruiting Office, the Old Bailey and the British Forces Broadcasting Services. Of
15 Bishop and Mallie, n. 2 above p. 197.
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the four, two of the bombs were defused but two exploded; 250 people were injured 
and one man died later of a heart attack. However, whilst the attack had succeeded in 
bringing the cause to the heart of Britain, all but one of the bombing team were 
arrested depriving the IRA of eight of its valuable operatives. It was not until 1974 
that the IRA would try again.
This period in the history of the Troubles is one of the most well-known for three 
reasons. Firstly, the savagery with which the IRA became synonymous, secondly 
because of the miscarriages of justice which were to underline these tragedies and 
finally because the Irish cause was brought to the forefront of the British
t hconsciousness; they were no longer simply troubles over the water. February 4 1974 
saw the first mainland attack in which civilians were killed when a coach carrying 
soldiers to Catterick military camp in North Yorkshire exploded killing nine soldiers, 
one woman and two children. The conviction of Judith Ward was overturned by the 
Court of Appeal in 1992 due to concealment of evidence by forensic scientists. This 
began somewhat of a trend with regard to such bombings and the quashing of 
convictions on appeal. October 5th 1974 saw an attack by a unit soon to become 
known as the “Guildford Four.” Two pubs in Guildford were bombed as “military” 
targets, the link being the fact that off-duty soldiers often drank there. These attacks 
saw a change in the IRA rules of engagement that off-duty soldiers were not 
legitimate targets.16 Four soldiers and a civilian were killed and 54 people injured. 
Similarly, however, the 1975 convictions were quashed in 1989 due to police 
fabrication of confessions. The most infamous attack followed just a month later
] 7when 19 people were killed and 182 injured in the Birmingham pub bombings. This 
provided the government with the opportunity to introduce the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) 1974. Whilst commonly assumed to 
have been passed solely in response to the bombings, in actual fact the bill had long 
been in the making and was indeed based on both the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1973 and further back than that, the Prevention of Violence 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1939 and the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
1922. This Act was to change the face of British anti-terrorism law and became the
16 Ibid. p. 137.
17 March 1991 saw the release o f the “Birmingham Six” after sixteen years in prison following findings 
o f possible forgery and false evidence as well as dubious forensic evidence.
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catalyst for the creation of a system of anti-terrorism law which has been said to be 
one of the most draconian in Europe.18 This “temporary” piece of legislation was 
consistently renewed until the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1984, which was ultimately replaced by the 1989 Act of the same 
name. The year 2000 saw the PTA repealed and replaced by the Terrorism Act, in an 
attempt to place British anti-terrorism law on a permanent footing.
1974 also saw the emergence of another republican terrorist group, the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA). This organisation was founded as the military wing to the 
Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) by Seamus Costello and was formed with the 
same backbone of national liberation as the IRA. However, the INLA’s aim to create 
a revolutionary socialist republic was more in keeping with the Marxist objectives of 
the Official IRA, and indeed most of the original membership stemmed from the 
OIRA, especially since its ceasefire of 1972. Despite claiming over 700 members by 
early 1975 its formative years, in terms of acts of terrorism, were quiet and it never 
held the momentum of the IRA as a terrorist organisation at the forefront of the 
liberation struggle. However, the debut of the INLA in 1979 amounted to one of the 
most notorious assassinations of the Troubles. On March 30th Airey Neave, the 
Conservative Party spokesman on Northern Ireland was murdered when a bomb 
activated by a tilt switch exploded under his car in the car park of the House of 
Commons. This led directly to the proscription of the INLA by statutory instrument 
on 2nd July, where it joined the PIRA which was proscribed with the passing of the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974.
Regardless of the convictions achieved at the time and of the subsequent reversals on 
appeal, the IRA managed to achieve their goal: the Irish cause had been brought to the 
forefront of the British consciousness. Simultaneously the ongoing campaign in both 
Northern and Southern Ireland was reinforced with Judge Ray Conaghan and 
Magistrate Martin McBimey killed as judicial targets in Belfast.19 Lord Mountbatten 
was targeted in a 501b explosion on his boat off Mullaghmore, which killed him and 
three others. On the same day, eighteen soldiers were killed by two IRA explosions at
18 J. Wadham, Have Human Rights been Relegated to Second Place After September 11th?, Cardiff Law 
School, 22nd May 2003.
19 Bew and Gillespie, n. 13 p. 93.
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Warrenpoint, Co. Down bringing about the Army’s greatest loss of life in one day of 
the Ulster Troubles. In a similar vein, the INLA was responsible for the deaths of 17 
people, eleven of them soldiers, when it bombed the “Droppin’ Well” disco in 
Ballykelly, Co. Londonderry. This incident provoked a passionate response from
Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, who described it as “ ...one of the most
0Ci
horrifying crimes in Ulster’s tragic history.” Such incidents against British 
personnel compounded the organisation’s reputation for ruthlessness which derived 
mainly from the many sectarian deaths perpetrated at its hands. One of the more 
ignominious was the 1983 Darkley massacre in which three church elders were killed 
and seven others injured when republican terrorists, claiming to belong to the Catholic
9 1Reaction Force, burst into a Pentecostal church and began randomly firing with 
automatic weapons. More recently, the INLA was responsible for the murder of 
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) leader Billy Wright inside the Maze prison in 
December 1997.
Despite the increased strength of the IRA, in comparison to the IRA of the border 
campaign and earlier, fighting two enemies began to take its toll. Sectarian violence 
has been an inherent part of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Troubles have 
been complicated further by the religious allegiances which colour the political 
waters. Sectarian killings began in 1966 and have continued beyond the 1997 
ceasefires, and coupled with the constantly updated tactics of the British as well as 
stringent security measures such as detention orders and prolonged interrogation, the 
effect on the IRA was draining. Gerry Adams captured the mood in 1986 when he 
wrote: “The tactic of armed stmggle is of primary importance because it provides a 
vital cutting edge. Without it the issue of Ireland would not even be an issue.. .armed 
stmggle has been an agent of bringing about change...At the same time, there is a 
realisation in republican circles that armed stmggle on its own is inadequate and that
99non-armed forms of political stmggle are at least as important...”
In keeping with the words of Gerry Adams, it was clear that the fight could not 
continue as it was. The IRA and Sinn Fein had been following a joint policy of the
20 HC Debs. vol. 33, col. 708 (6th December 1982).
21 One o f the synonyms used by the INLA. Others include the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and 
the People’s Republican Army (PRA).
22 P. Taylor, Provos (Bloomsbury Publishing Pic. 1997) p. 289.
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armalite and the ballot box since 1981, but following republican tradition, Adams 
refused to take up his seat when he was elected as MP for West Belfast in June 1983. 
However, by 1986 the issue of abstentionism reared its head again. Following the 
split of 1969, it remained a contentious issue and again traditionalists fought against 
its abandonment. However, it was clear to a Northern faction of the organisation, in 
particular those who had spent years thinking about the movement inside Northern 
Ireland’s most notorious prisons that abstentionism had no place in twentieth century 
politics and the pursuit of a solely military policy was making PIRA’s aims even 
harder to achieve. Again, a split was inevitable. Ironically, it was one of the founders 
of the Provisionals in 1969, Ruari O’Bradaigh, who walked out and formed 
Republican Sinn Fein (RSF). The aim of RSF is a democratic socialist republic with 
32 county elections and a federal government based on the four provinces of Ireland. 
Whilst in 1988, RSF voted to support an armed struggle to bring about achievement of 
this objective, the existence of a military wing was denied for many years. Indeed, it 
was not until the day of the PIRA ceasefire in 1994 that O’Bradaigh hinted about the 
existence of such an organisation: “...the Provisionals have no monopoly on 
resistance to British rule.”24 Yet, despite probable formation in the mid 1980s, 
Continuity IRA (CIRA) did not come to prominence until 1996.
By the 1990s, it was clear that neither side could “win”. Over twenty years of 
fighting had achieved nothing but the deaths of nearly 3,000 people. Peace was the 
next step, but on terms agreeable to all. The period preceding the Downing Street 
Declaration was one of the worst of the Troubles. The IRA carried on the war, 
perpetrating such atrocities as the bombing of the Nat West tower in London. Over a 
ton of explosives killed one person, injured over thirty and caused more than £1 
billion worth of damage. Three year old Jonathon Ball and twelve year old Timothy 
Parry were killed and 56 others injured when two bombs exploded in Warrington. 
Such public revulsion was felt that Warrington became somewhat of a high water 
mark- a Birmingham of the 1990s. In Northern Ireland an increase in sectarian 
killings meant that the peace process was fighting for survival in one of the bloodiest
22 Ibid. pp. 289-291.
24 www.ulstemation.org [22/01/03]
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periods since the 1970s. Indeed October 1993 saw 27 people killed in Northern 
Ireland, the most in a single month since October 1976.
It was against this backdrop that some sort of a peace was bom. The Downing Street 
Declaration though “not a solution” was at least a step in the right direction and 
indeed acted as a precursor to a complete cessation of military operations on the part 
of the IRA in 1994. The Troubles had been punctuated, albeit scarcely, by brief 
ceasefires since 1972. However, the 1994 ceasefire marked the start of new hope. 
The Downing Street Declaration provided real potential for peace and the longevity of 
the ceasefire allowed reconciliation to be discussed without the echoes of explosions 
colouring the situation. Furthermore, for the first time, the IRA ceasefire was
thmatched by the loyalists who announced a cessation of violence on the 13 October 
1994. The same cannot be said for the republican dissident groups. The INLA went 
as far as to announce a “no first strike” policy but it continued to act in retaliation and 
against the RUC. However, despite the steps forward, the negotiations were dogged 
from the start with the issue of decommissioning proving to be the major obstacle. A 
death knell was tolled on the talks by the decision to hold elections for a Fomm to
9 7accompany the all-party talks. February 9th 1996 saw the end of the IRA ceasefire 
by way of an explosion in Canary Wharf, London which killed two, injured over 100 
and caused £85 million worth of damage. However, the loyalist ceasefire held 
because of the realisation of the benefits of being included in the peace process.
As the peace process was crumbling, a new paramilitary group came to prominence 
following the announcement by RSF of the existence of “a reborn Irish republican 
army” known as Continuity IRA (CIRA). The emergence of CIRA and its claims to 
hold the “moral high ground” of republicanism came at a critical time in the all-party 
talks and it has been suggested that this prompted the end of the PIRA ceasefire. July 
1996 saw CIRA’s debut on to the terrorist stage when it planted a 12001b bomb at the 
Killyhelvin Hotel in Enniskillen. The building was destroyed minutes after it had 
been evacuated, and fortunately nobody was hurt, however it provided the opportunity
25 Taylor, n. 22 above p. 339.
26 T. Hennessey, A History o f  Northern Ireland 1920-1996, (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997) p. 288.
27 Taylor, n. 22 above p. 354.
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for RSF to crow that it was the “first major bomb attack in the six counties since the 
Provisionals’ unilateral ceasefire of August 1994.”
1997 saw the roots of peace planted once more. The IRA ceasefire was renewed on 
20 July 1997, and has held since then, heralding the longest period of peace from 
IRA violence since the beginning of the Troubles. However, acceptance of the 
Mitchell Principles and continued participation in the peace process was anathema for 
some members of Sinn Fein and so a split in the ranks occurred once more, which was 
mirrored by the departure of some members from the IRA. In December of that year 
the existence of a new republican organisation was announced, the 32 County 
Sovereignty Committee, which opposed the position of Sinn Fein in the peace 
process. Associated with this committee was a new republican paramilitary 
organisation, known as the Real IRA, which mainly consisted of dissident IRA 
members. In keeping with this notion of representing the true IRA, the group 
announced in early 1998 that the ceasefire was over and that terrorist attacks would 
resume. However, various bomb and mortar attacks pre-dating this announcement 
have been attributed to the group. Initially, many of the earlier incidents consisted of 
various bomb and mortar attacks, mirroring the tactics of the IRA in the mid 1980s, 
which were directed against RUC stations and security personnel. Fortunately, there 
were few injuries. However, this changed on 1st August 1998 when the Real IRA 
claimed responsibility for a 5001b car bomb which exploded in Banbridge, Co. Down, 
injuring 33 civilians and two RUC officers. This was swiftly followed two weeks 
later by an incident which was to change the dynamic of the peace process. The
thafternoon of August 15 1998 saw the single worst terrorist incident within the six
counties since the start of the Troubles. Twenty-nine people were killed (as well as 
two unborn children) and 220 were injured when a car bomb exploded in the centre of 
Omagh, Co. Tyrone. A warning was telephoned to a Belfast news agency 40 minutes 
before the explosion but misleading information meant that shoppers were directed 
towards the bomb instead of away from it.
In much the same way as occurred following the Birmingham pub bombings, the 
bombing in Omagh provoked such intense public outrage as to prompt the passing of 
more anti-terrorism legislation. The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act
1998 was rushed through Parliament on September 4th 1998 following an emergency
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sitting of just two days. It was intended to work in conjunction with existing anti­
terrorism legislation and in this way it adds another layer to British anti-terrorism law.
So strong was the disgust at this act of terrorism in Omagh that it went so far as to 
prompt a response unprecedented in its denunciation of republican terrorism from
9RGerry Adams who stated “I have condemned it without equivocation.” Furthermore, 
from the point of view of the perpetrators, a group firmly opposed to the Good Friday 
Agreement, it had the perverse effect of strengthening the peace process. Indeed, it 
was said: “We have to work politically to make the Omagh bombing the last violent 
incident in our country, the last incident of this kind. Sinn Fein believe the violence 
we have seen must be for all of us now a thing of the past, over, done with and
9Qgone.” Moreover, the revulsion felt was enough to prompt the 32 County 
Sovereignty Committee to deny association with its paramilitary wing, whilst also 
forcing the Real IRA to declare a suspension of all military activities as of September 
1998. In addition, the political wing of the INLA, the Irish Republican Socialist Party 
(IRSP), called on the INLA to declare a ceasefire, stating that in light of Omagh, the 
armed struggle was no longer justifiable.30 As a result of this, the INLA proclaimed 
the beginning of its ceasefire as of midday on 22nd August 1998.
However, since this time, there have been various incidents for which both 
organisations are thought to have been responsible. The INLA has been involved in 
several clashes of both a sectarian nature as well as relating to the internal disputes 
which have swamped the organisation for years. However, in March 2000 the IRSP 
proposed a charter for non-aggression to loyalist groups under which rival groups 
would work together to reduce sectarian tensions and protect the working class. So 
far no response has been forthcoming.31
In contrast, the Real IRA reneged on its ceasefire promises in early 2000 and since 
then is thought to have been responsible for a huge number of attacks both on the 
British mainland as well as in the six counties; indeed as many as 21 attacks between
28 Keynote Statement by Gerry Adams on the Current State o f the Peace Process, 1 September 1998 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/gal998.htm
29 Ibid.
30 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch98.htm
31 http://irelandsown.net
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the months of February and November 2000 alone. The early stages of this recent 
campaign involved such incidents as a missile attack on MI6 Headquarters in 
September 2000 as well as a series of bombings against other strategic targets in 
London such as railway stations and Hammersmith Bridge. However, more recently 
the organisation has reverted to its republican roots, by targeting Post Office depots in 
North London, in a reflection of the Easter 1916 rising when the rebels seized the 
GPO in Dublin and issued their declaration of independence on its steps. In 2001, 
Colin Powell, then Secretary of State in the United States, designated the Real IRA as 
a foreign terrorist organisation, in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act 2001.32
Whilst other republican organisations reaffirmed their commitment to the peace 
process, though some for a short time only, the CIRA campaign was gathering 
momentum. The organisation was responsible for a 4001b bomb which exploded in 
Markethill, Co. Armagh in September 1997 causing extensive damage to surrounding 
buildings; indeed this has been described as CIRA’s most high-profile attack ever.33 
This was followed by a car bomb in Enniskillen, Co. Fermanagh, in which there were 
again fortunately no injuries. However, eleven people were injured when a 5001b car 
bomb, claimed to be the work of CIRA, exploded outside the RUC station in Moira 
Co. Down. Indeed, in its short life, the CIRA has been responsible for many such 
bombings, but has not been widely blamed for any murders in the province. 
Furthermore, the failure of CIRA to mount a prolonged campaign, coupled with 
several failed bombings suggests problems of a technical nature.34 However, it is 
notable that CIRA is the only dissident republican organisation not to have declared a 
ceasefire and this has led to reports that members of both the Real IRA and the INLA 
have offered assistance to CIRA. The group was designated on the Terrorism 
Exclusion List in December 2001 by Colin Powell, then Secretary of State in the
o r
United States. It seems therefore that it is too soon to say that the Troubles are over
32 This has, inter alia, the effect o f  making it unlawful to knowingly provide "material support or 
resources" to such an organisation. It also requires any US financial institution that becomes aware that 
it has possession o f or control over funds in which a designated foreign terrorist organisation its agent 
has an interest, to retain possession o f or control over the funds and report the funds to the Treasury. 
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2003/17067.htm
33 Irish Times 17th September 1997.
34 Ibid.
35 This has the effect o f excluding members or supporters from the States and also deters collection o f  
funds in the country, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/15222.htm
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and peace remains tenuous, threatened by both the Real IRA and this slightly amateur 
yet uncompromising organisation.
Irish Loyalist Violence
In contrast to the republican desire for an independent Ireland, the roots of the first 
loyalist paramilitary organisation in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF), were planted in opposition to the likelihood of “home rule” being granted to 
Ireland. The third Home Rule Bill was introduced into Parliament in 1912 but met 
fierce opposition from both Unionists and Conservatives who attempted to defeat the 
bill by demanding that the North-East of the island be omitted from home rule on the 
grounds of the separate identity of the Ulster Protestants. In order to ensure that the 
whole of the island was not swallowed by home rule, the unionist leader Sir Edward 
Carson and Sir James Craig established the Ulster Volunteer Force in January 1913 as 
a form of military insurance against total Irish independence. The huge membership 
of this early organisation highlights the strength of feeling of the masses at the time, 
with numbers exceeding 200,000. The discipline and training of this organisation as 
well as the arms available to it gave the impression of a private army,36 as opposed to 
the later paramilitary organisation of the same name. Indeed, it was the role played by
ththe UVF as the 36 Ulster Division in the First World War, and the massive sacrifice 
made in the Battle of the Somme that was to move the government into eventually 
partitioning Ireland in 1920, in order to accommodate the Unionist desire for Ulster to 
remain British.
The Anglo-Irish war led to a revival of the UVF and further its legitimisation by the
^ 7government as part of the Ulster Special Constabulary as a means of protection 
against the campaign of guerrilla warfare undertaken by the IRA. However, the end 
of the war and the Government of Ireland Act 1920 secured the position of the 
province to the extent that the need for such a protective loyalist force was dissipated. 
Indeed this period of inactivity on the part of the UVF coincides not only with the 
years in which the IRA was a marginal organisation on the verge of disintegration, but
36 S. Bruce, The Edge o f  the Union (OUP, 1994) p. 2.
37 Ibid. p. 3.
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also with the fact the constitutional status of Northern Ireland was not threatened at 
this time. Whilst there is a certain “tit for tat” mentality with regard to republican and 
loyalist violence, it is important to appreciate that constitutional change was the 
foundation for terrorist violence in the Province. Indeed, for republicans it was the 
desire for constitutional change, whilst for loyalists the spur for violence was the 
threat to the status of the six counties. In this way, had it not been for the challenge 
posed by the civil rights movement in the late 1960s, there would have been no need 
for a revival of the UVF or indeed the creation of the Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA). This stands in direct contrast to republican terrorism, which because of the 
change it sought, overcame virtual defeat in order to continue the fight for 
independence.
A revival of the UVF occurred in 1966, led by Gusty Spence, but it met with much 
public disapproval and the resultant convictions of four of its members prompted the 
group to once again lapse in to obscurity. However, as said previously, the instability 
prompted by the 1969 civil rights campaign and its demands for, inter alia, a fair 
voting system, an end to religious discrimination, an end to gerrymandering, dispersal 
of the B-Specials and equality for all the people of the Province, threatened the 
constitutional security enjoyed by the protestants of Ulster and so allowed the UVF to 
entertain the role of protector once more. In contrast to the disciplined “army” of 
1913, this was a paramilitary organisation whose debut on the terrorist stage consisted 
of a series of bombings throughout 1969 aimed at electricity sub stations and water 
supplies.
1971 saw the emergence of what was to become the largest loyalist paramilitary 
group, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) from the amalgamation of a wide range 
of protestant vigilante groups in Northern Ireland. It was deemed that a vacuum had 
been left by the abolition of the B-Specials in April 1970 that had not been filled by 
the creation of the Ulster Defence Regiment. In light of this, the UDA was designed 
as an organisation which could be mobilised should a complete breakdown in law and
38 Ibid. p. 10.
39 Bew and Gillespie, n. 13 above pp. 39-40.
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order occur and in this way aimed to defend Ulster under the motto Cedant arma 
togae, “Let war yield to peace.”40
In contrast to republican paramilitary organisations that aim to bring about 
constitutional change and therefore must attempt to exert political influence, the 
loyalist desire to maintain the status quo has not often been threatened and has 
therefore not required political change. However, 1974 saw somewhat of a 
collaboration of the UVF and the UDA, as well as others, in protest at the power- 
sharing executive established under the Sunningdale Agreement, which was seen as 
weakening the union with Great Britain. Loyalist paramilitary groups offered support 
to politicians opposing the agreement by way of the Ulster Army Council. 
Furthermore, their participation in the combined leadership of the Ulster Workers’
t hCouncil general strike, which began on 15 May 1974, led to the collapse of the 
power-sharing executive in just fourteen days.41
In general the mainstay of the UVF’s actions can be categorised as sectarian 
assassination rather than a continuation of these early examples of political agitation. 
The political initiative of the UDA contrasts with the lack of such a direction in the 
UVF, and in acknowledgement of this, the UDA was a legal organisation from its 
birth until 1992. However, whilst it has been said that neither organisation 
specifically planned to embark on a campaign of sectarian violence, per se, this was a 
path which both organisations were inevitably to follow. Whilst its primary aim was 
protection of the Protestant population, there existed a faction for which attacking 
Catholics was also of primary importance. In order to accommodate both these aims 
as well as maintaining its place as the more acceptable face of loyalist paramilitarism, 
the UDA adopted a cover name, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), in order to claim 
responsibility for sectarian attacks.42 The UVF had no such qualms and did not use a 
nom de guerre in claiming its attacks. Indeed, the UVF bombing of McGurk’s Bar in 
North Belfast in December 1971, which killed fifteen Catholic civilians, underscored 
the brazen sectarian nature of the organisation. Loyalist paramilitary strategy was 
founded on the premise that killing members of Sinn Fein and the IRA would drive
40 Hennessey, n. 26 above p. 201.
41 Ibid. pp. 228-229.
42 S. Bruce, “The Problems o f ‘Pro-State’ Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland” in P. 
Wilkinson, Terrorism: British Perspectives (Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., 1993) p. 203.
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republicans to forsake their campaign and the notion of a united and independent 
Ireland. However, the notion of “guilt by implication” pervaded this line of attack. In 
the eyes of rank and file members of loyalist paramilitary organisations, Catholics 
became republicans and therefore legitimate targets through the Eucharist rather than 
through political persuasion, resulting in massive civilian bloodshed.
There were of course non-civilian deaths claimed by and attributed to loyalist 
paramilitaries. Over the years there were several attacks by the UFF in particular on 
members of Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP). In June 1973 
the SDLP Stormont senator, Paddy Wilson and his secretary, Irene Andrews were 
stabbed to death in Belfast by UDA/UFF member John White.43 In October 1976, the 
UFF were responsible for the horrific murder of Sinn Fein Vice-President, Marie 
Drumm, as she lay in hospital receiving treatment for cataracts. In March 1984, the 
intended victim was Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams, who was shot and wounded 
in a UFF attack in which three other Sinn Fein members were killed. Aside from 
loyalist feuding, which accounted for 56 deaths between 1969 and 2001, loyalist 
paramilitarism will long be remembered for the massive amount of civilians killed in 
the name of the Union. Indeed, sectarian violence overtook the strategy of loyalist 
paramilitaries and this is emphasised by telling figures for the period 1969-2001, 
which show that loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for the deaths of 73 
republican paramilitary personnel and nationalist/republican politicians. However, 
this contrasts markedly to the 713 sectarian killings of Catholic civilians at loyalist 
hands.44
As opposed to a great deal of republican violence which utilised bombs to a great 
extent, the vast majority of loyalist terrorism manifested itself in gun attacks, such as 
the “Castlerock killings” in March 1993 in which the UFF shot dead four Catholics 
and injured a fifth, and individual shootings. This modus operandi has been said to 
result from the notion of claiming specific “legitimate targets” rather than targeting 
many people by blowing up various locations.45 This contrast in the tactics of 
republican and loyalist paramilitary organisations is exemplified by consideration of
43 R. Cowan, (2003) Too Many Chiefs Led to Loyalist Bloodshed, The Guardian, February 4th.
44 M. Sutton, An Index o f  Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/
45 Bruce, n. 36 above p. 107.
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the events of October 1993. On October 23rd 1993, an IRA bomb exploded 
prematurely as it was planted in a fish and chip shop on the Shankill Road. Ten 
people were killed in the blast, nine of those were Protestant civilians and the tenth 
was one of the IRA bombers, 57 people were also injured. In the days that followed 
this attack, loyalist paramilitaries shot and killed five Catholic civilians, a revenge 
which culminated in the infamous “Greysteel killings” on 30th October 1993. UFF 
gunmen opened fire on Halloween celebrations in the “Rising Sun” Bar, Co. Derry, 
with one of the gunmen, Torrens Knight, shouting “Trick or Treat” before opening 
fire. Six Catholic civilians and one Protestant civilian were killed and thirteen others 
injured in what the UFF claimed was an attack on the “nationalist electorate.” 
However, large-scale bombings, whilst less common, were not unheard of. May 17th 
1974 saw the highest death toll for a single day during the Troubles when 33 civilians 
were killed and more than 250 injured in the Republic of Ireland in a series of 
bombings perpetrated by loyalists. Three car bombs exploded in Dublin killing 23 
people immediately with a further three dying subsequently from their injuries. That 
same day, a fourth car bomb was responsible for an ultimate death toll of seven 
civilians when it exploded in Monaghan. Such was the outrage at news of these 
attacks that no organisation admitted responsibility. It was not until July 1993 that the 
UVF finally admitted responsibility for what has been termed “ ...the greatest, most 
lethal crime in the history of Ireland and Britain.”46
In contrast to the blatant sectarian violence perpetrated by the UVF and UFF, and 
despite its somewhat surreptitious connection with the latter, the UDA was an 
organisation grown from political roots. In this way, distance with the UFF was 
necessary in order to maintain a degree of political credibility but it also allowed the 
UDA to play more than one role in the conflict. As stated previously, the amount of 
loyalist violence correlates with the perceived threat to the union on the part of the 
unionist and loyalist population. This “threat” was deemed to be considerably less in 
the late 1970s and 1980s and so led to a massive decline in loyalist violence. Indeed, 
the amount of killings by loyalist paramilitaries dropped from an all-time high in the 
years 1972-1976, which saw 559 deaths at loyalist hands, to 130 such deaths in the
46 J. Bowyer Bell, In Dubious Battle. The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings 1972-1974 (Poolbeg Press 
Ltd, 1996) Chpt. VIII.
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following decade.47 The relative security felt by loyalists at this time allowed the 
UDA to return to its roots and focus upon various political initiatives, as well as 
attempting to disassociate itself from the sectarian hatred of the preceding years.
The political lines along which the UDA was now working led to the establishment of 
a think tank known as the New Ulster Political Research Group (NUPRG) in January 
1978. The idea behind this was to lay down a foundation for negotiated independence 
based on the common denominator of all men as Ulstermen, rather than segregating 
the community on the basis of religion. The final document, “Beyond the Religious 
Divide”, though favourably received, ultimately made no real political impact. The 
Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party (ULDP) was established in 1981 to replace the 
NUPRG and it was clear that a step backwards had been taken by the UDA and its 
political involvement, by way of the move from a proposed constitution based on 
cross-religious co-operation to a new party which in name alone left no doubt as to its 
position and outlook. The political position of this party was that of independence for 
Northern Ireland within the EC and the Commonwealth, and in 1987 the party’s plans 
for a future political agreement were outlined in its document “Common Sense.” 
However, in similarity to its predecessor, it too achieved no political influence. In 
1989 the party adapted its name to become the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), but 
this change in nomenclature did not change the fortunes of the party.
Whilst, the policy of the NUPRG had been to reassure the Catholic population that 
sectarian violence was a thing of the past, the political climate did not aid this attempt 
at pacification. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was fiercely opposed by loyalists 
and this opposition manifested itself in increased levels of terrorist violence; indeed in 
the years 1986-1990, loyalists were responsible for on average 18.6 deaths per year as 
opposed to 8.5 deaths per year for the preceding seven years.48 This increase in 
violence continued in to the 1990s where a massive upsurge resulted in 183 deaths at 
the hands of loyalists in the years leading up to the 1994 ceasefire. The UDP played 
an instrumental role in contributing to the loyalist ceasefire of 1994, by arranging 
support for it from the loyalist population in the Maze prison. On account of this 
ceasefire, which began on October 13th 1994, the UDP gained a place in the multi-
47 Sutton, n. 44 above.
48 Hennessey, n. 40 p. 290.
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party talks which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, as did the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) which has close links to the UVF. This stands in 
contrast to Sinn Fein whose absence from the talks was due to the recommencement 
of IRA hostilities in February 1996 by the bombing of Canary Wharf. However, the 
loyalist ceasefire became increasingly fragile in the latter months of 1997 and in early 
1998, with various attacks blamed on the UVF and UFF despite claims by the political 
parties that the loyalist ceasefire remained intact. In spite of this, the UFF and UVF 
continued to play a part in this renewal of loyalist violence with a spate of sectarian 
killings. The admission by the UFF that it had been responsible for the deaths of at 
least three Catholic civilians, in the reaffirmation of its ceasefire led to the withdrawal 
of the UDP, ahead of its expulsion, from the peace talks in January 1998. Sinn Fein 
was similarly expelled from the discussions in February 1998 because of two killings 
attributed to the IRA, however both were readmitted on March 23rd 1998 following 
continued adherence to the Mitchell principles. The UDP was dissolved on 
November 28 2001 due to disagreements between it and the UDA with regard to the 
Good Friday Agreement and the involvement of the UDA/UFF in violence in spite of 
its self-proclaimed ceasefire. Arguably, this returned the UDA to a role with which it 
seemed to be more familiar: bloodshed. Indeed, it would be easy to forget the 
political foundations of the UDA given its majestic performance on the stage of 
violence.49
In the period between the 1994 ceasefires and the cessation of hostilities in 1997, and 
whilst the first tentative steps toward peace were being taken by organisations on both 
sides of the religious divide, a further loyalist paramilitary group emerged as a 
dissident faction of the UVF. The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) was established in 
February 1997 by expelled commander Billy “King Rat” Wright in order to frustrate 
any possibility of a settlement with nationalists by attacking supporters of the peace 
process, be they Catholic or Protestant. In its relatively short-lived career as an active 
paramilitary organisation, the LVF was responsible for many attacks which earned it a 
reputation as a particularly vicious group; indeed it was proscribed, along with CIRA, 
only four months after its emergence on the Northern Irish stage in June 1997. The 
majority of attacks by the LVF have had a grounding in sectarian hatred and it can be
49 Cowan, n. 43 above.
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said that the group has not shied away from any opportunity to stir up sectarian 
tension in the all too fragile climate of the time. The group’s reputation spread 
following the murder of an 18 year old Catholic girl who was shot four times in the 
head as she slept at her Protestant boyfriend’s house in Co. Antrim. This ruthlessness 
was compounded with the “Poyntzpass killings” in which two life-long friends, one 
Catholic and one Protestant, were executed in a bar in Co. Armagh.
The LVF announced a ceasefire in May 1998 and despite doubts as to the authenticity 
of the group’s intentions, it became the first and only organisation to voluntarily 
decommission a small amount of its weapons in December of that year. However, the 
violence continued as a result of a feud between the UVF and LVF which persisted 
into 2001. In September 2001, Martin O’Hagan, was the first journalist to be killed in 
Northern Ireland since the start of the Troubles when he was shot and killed in front 
of his wife as they returned to their home in Lurgan, Co. Armagh. The Red Hand 
Defenders, a cover name used by both the UDA and the LVF, claimed responsibility 
for the attack. However, it is widely believed that the LVF was responsible for his 
murder.
In October 2001, the LVF, the UDA and the UVF were all specified following 
repeated breaches of their respective ceasefires. Loyalist violence continued in terms 
of feuds against each other as well as against the Good Friday Agreement despite the 
small degree of progress that continued to be made in terms of peace. However, as of 
February 21st 2003, the UDA/UFF announced a twelve-month ceasefire in order to 
reaffirm their commitment to achieving a political solution to the Troubles. Such a 
statement will obviously be treated with caution given the past history of such groups 
in this area, and of course decommissioning remains as a seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle.50 Whether the UVF and LVF deign to follow suit remains to be seen.
50 As o f September 2005 the status o f the loyalist paramilitary groups stands as follows: the UDA/UFF 
was de-specified on 12th November 2004, though some elements continue to engage in violence. The 
LVF was specified on 12th October 2001. The UVF was specified on 14th September 2005 following 
three days of violence across Northern Ireland in September 2005. The Red Hand Defenders and the 
Orange Volunteers remain active. See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/paramilitarv.htm 
[16/09/05].
31
Chapter 2: The Terrorist Threat and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom Prior to 2000
Indigenous Terrorism
Whilst English nationalist terrorism is a very rare occurrence, there is a small but 
identifiable core of nationalist groups in both Wales and Scotland, which have turned 
to terrorism in the name of their countries. In Wales, the most well known of these 
groups is Meibion Glyndwr which, in pursuit of its aim of protecting the Welsh 
language and culture, has targeted English-owned holiday homes and businesses with 
incendiary devices and well as sending letter and parcel bombs to various political 
figures. Its campaign was taken a step further in its assassination attempt on Prince 
Charles on his return from the coronation in 1969; fortunately, the attempt was not 
successful but two members of the organisation were killed when the bomb detonated 
prematurely.
The situation in Scotland is similar. Scottish nationalist politics is dominated by the 
Scottish National Party, yet there has been for many years a small faction of marginal 
nationalist groups which have turned to violence in attempting to drive the English 
from Scotland. In the early 1970s the Army of the Provisional Government of 
Scotland, also known as the Tartan Army, rose to prominence after bombing an oil 
pipeline in protest at the English “theft” of Scottish oil, but the campaign was very 
short-lived and the group quickly dissolved.51 More recently, Scottish nationalist 
terrorism has followed similar Welsh groups in its use of violence to prevent cultural 
dilution. Whereas action by such groups as Scottish Watch and Settler Watch has 
consisted solely of poster campaigns to highlight the destruction of Scottish culture 
and language by English settlers, as well as meetings and leafleting, the Scottish 
National Liberation Army (SNLA) has gone much further than this, engaging in what
c 'y
has been termed an “unpleasant campaign of ethnic hatred.” This has consisted of 
intimidation of estate agents to prevent English immigrants finding homes north of the 
border, as well as the sending of toxic packages through the post to the Prime Minister 
and other politicians. Each envelope sent contained a bottle purporting to be a sample 
of face cream, but which was actually sodium hydroxide, a highly corrosive chemical
51 P. Wilkinson, Report o f  an Investigation into the Current and Future threat to the UK from  
International and Domestic Terrorism (other than that connected with the affairs o f  Northern Ireland) 
and the Contribution which Legislation can make to Measures to Counter that Threat (London: HMSO 
Cm. 3420 1996) p. 31.
52 Ibid. p. 35.
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which can cause scarring and blindness. The organisation has also threatened death to 
English MPs who do not leave the country within thirty days, as well as plotting to 
kill the Queen and making threats against Prince William. However, no deaths can 
be said to be attributable to the actions of either Welsh or Scottish nationalist groups.
Linked to the cultural guardianship undertaken by Welsh and Scottish nationalist 
organisations is the desire to establish respective independent republics.54 However, 
whilst this desire for constitutional change is somewhat akin to that of the Irish 
republican organisations, the fire of nationalism has not burned so strongly as in 
Ireland. Indeed whilst other Welsh nationalist groups, such as Cadwyr Cymru and 
Mydiad Amddiffyn Cymru have desired the same objectives as Meibion Glyndwr, 
such nationalism can not be said to be a mass movement in Wales. Similarly in 
Scotland it continues to be a marginal phenomenon. Furthermore, in both countries 
nationalism has a legitimate outlet in the form of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish 
National Party, the dominant nationalist political parties.55 Moreover, since 
devolution and the establishment of the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, 
it can be argued that some degree of fulfilment of the desire for an independent 
republic has been achieved and that this has dissipated Welsh and Scottish nationalist 
violence somewhat.
In contrast, non-nationalist indigenous terrorism is a much less common phenomenon. 
Over the years, there have been various short-lived campaigns by groups such as the 
Angry Brigade whose desire for anarchist revolution led to a bombing campaign in 
the early 1970s. Another example is that of the Black Liberation Front (BLF) an 
organisation which emerged following the death of a man held in police custody in 
1987. The BLF claimed responsibility for various incidents involving parcel bombs 
in the Wolverhampton area.56 The sporadic attempts at action of such groups have 
resulted in few injuries and indeed such “campaigns” have proved to be very short­
lived.
53 L. Smith and R. Ford, “Security alert for politicians after acid sent to Blair” Times Online 2nd March 
2002 .
54 Wilkinson, n. 51 above p. 31.
55 Ibid.
56 The Times, 21st December 1988 p. 2.
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Special Interest Terrorism
In comparison, the campaign undertaken by animal rights activists and liberationists 
has been underway for more than 25 years and is said to be a continuing domestic
cn
problem in the UK; indeed it has been said by a leading expert that since the IRA
c o
ceasefire, animal rights is the cause most likely to incite violence in the UK. The 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) was established in 1976 and is thought to be 
somewhat of an umbrella organisation for other groups such as the Animal Rights 
Militia, and the Justice Department. The short-term aim of the ALF is to save as 
many animals as possible and disrupt the practice of animal abuse. The long-term aim 
is to put animal abuse companies out of business thus ending animal cruelty. The 
tactics used by such organisations include freeing animals from laboratories, damage 
to property, arson, letter bombs and threats to contaminate consumer products thereby 
forcing a withdrawal of that product from sale,59 for example in 1984 activists 
claimed to have poisoned Mars Bars in a protest at dental research being carried out 
by the company. However, violent attacks have been perpetrated by such groups and 
in a way very similar to that of the UDA using the UFF as a pseudonym in order to 
carry out violent attacks, the ALF is said to use the Justice Department as a fa£ade for 
its violence. Considerable damage to property has resulted from both arson and 
bombs planted in buildings ranging from laboratories and breeding facilities to shops 
and department stores.60 In 1990, a thirteen month old baby was injured by shrapnel 
in a car bomb attack aimed at a psychologist at Bristol University and in February 
2001, the managing director of Huntingdon Life Sciences, Brian Cass, was badly 
beaten by three assailants believed to be members of the organisation Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).61 Indeed the persistence of animal rights 
groups and the increasing ferocity of their attacks led to the establishment of the 
Animal Rights National Index in 1984, which is responsible for the collection, 
evaluation and dissemination of intelligence related to animal rights terrorism. 
Furthermore, the definition of terrorism in British law has been extended to 
encompass the actions of animal rights activists. Previously the Prevention of
57 Wilkinson, n. 51 above p. 37.
58 P. Wilkinson, Are Britons Still Animal Crackers? BBC News Online 11 th March 2000.
59 Wilkinson, n. 51 above p. 31.
60 The Times, 21st December 1988 p. 1.
61 W. J. Smith, Terrorists, Too, National Review Online, 2nd October 2002.
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Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 defined terrorism simply as the "use of 
violence for political ends [including] any use of violence for the purpose of putting 
the public or any section of the public in fear." However, this definition changed 
with the passing of the Terrorism Act 2000 so that, inter alia, action which involves 
serious violence against a person or involves serious damage to property constitutes
f \ Xterrorism. This places animal rights activists firmly within the framework of anti- 
terrorism law.
International Terrorism
Aside from the United States, the UK has been a popular target with regard to 
international terrorism. However, it has often been the case that the UK has been 
chosen as a stage for terrorist attacks by one country on another, rather than being a 
direct target in itself. This is a great difference to the selection of American targets 
both at home but more commonly abroad simply because of their nationality. In 
contrast to the threat posed by terrorism connected to the affairs of Northern Ireland 
and the huge number of deaths resulting from that conflict, the threat posed by 
international terrorism to the UK is actually quite small. Indeed omitting the deaths 
caused by the destruction of Pan Am 103, international terrorism could be said to be 
responsible for only 36 deaths between 1985 and 2001.64
It has often been the case that a great deal of the international terrorism experienced 
by the UK has stemmed from affairs of the Middle East. This has been identified as 
resulting from the fact that the United Kingdom, has a large population of expatriates 
from the Middle East, a large Moslem community as well as the largest range of Arab
62 Section 20 PTA 1989.
63 Section 1 Terrorism Act 2000 The full definition reads: 1. - (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the
use or threat o f action where-(a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed 
to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section o f the public, and (c) the use or 
threat is made for the purpose o f advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls 
within this subsection if  it- (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage 
to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that o f the person committing the action, (d) creates 
a serious risk to the health or safety o f the public or a section o f the public, or o f the public, or (e) is 
designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
64 N. Whitty, T. Murphy and S. Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Act Era 
(Butterworths, 2001) p. 126. This figure obviously excludes the British citizens killed on September 
11th 2001.
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political groupings and newspapers outside the Arab world.65 As a result of this, the 
main protagonists have tended to be countries such as Libya, Palestine, Syria, Iran and 
Iraq. Various trends have developed over the years with regard to the means used to 
perpetrate acts of international terrorism. Plane hijackings were particularly popular 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s; indeed there were sixty such incidents with Middle 
Eastern connections between 1968 and 1973 in various countries all around the 
world.66 The prevalence of such attacks led to a tightening of airport security and 
increased searches, which contributed to a decline in this form of terrorism.67 Though 
of course, the events of September 11 2001 serve to exemplify the extent to which 
airport security can still be breached and that this method resulted in the worst ever 
act of terrorism.
In the UK, international terrorism has often been played out on a very public stage, 
with incidents involving diplomatic personnel and the hijacking of embassies 
conducted under the glare of massive publicity. In April 1980, six terrorists declaring 
themselves to be part of a group known as the Democratic Revolutionary Front for
/TO
Arabistan took 26 hostages in the Iranian embassy in London in protest at the 
oppressive regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The siege lasted for five days only 
ending when the SAS stormed the building, killing all but one of the terrorists.69 
Another such incident was the death of WPC Yvonne Fletcher and the wounding of 
eleven others when shots were fired on to an anti-Gadaffi protest, allegedly with the
70permission of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gadaffi, from the Libyan People’s 
Bureau in London. Diplomatic relations were broken off with the country and the 
embassy staff allowed to leave the country freely. However, Libya finally accepted 
“general responsibility” for the incident and offered to pay compensation to the family 
of WPC Fletcher in 1999.7'
Wilkinson, n. 51 above p. 36.
66 Jewish Virtual Library, A Division o f  the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Terrorism/incidents.html
67 Wilkinson, n. 51 above p. 24.
68 Otherwise known as the Iranian province o f Khuzestan.
69 Six Days o f Fear, BBC News, 26th April 2000.
70 The Times, 6th April 1984 p. 1.
71 Diplomatic Links with Libya Restored after Compensation Deal for Dead PC’s Family”, The 
Guardian, 7th July 1999.
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The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 is probably the most well known incident of 
international terrorism to occur on British soil, but 1986 saw an attempt at what might 
well be classified as almost a precursor to that tragedy. The attempt to blow up the 
plane was conducted by Syrian Nizar Hindawi who smuggled a bomb on board an El 
A1 flight from London, in the luggage of his pregnant girlfriend. Fortunately, the 
device was discovered and the tragedy averted. However, the Syrian embassy then 
attempted to smuggle Hindawi from the country, providing more than enough 
suspicion of state-sponsored terrorism to justify the expulsion of the Syrian embassy 
staff from the UK.72 December 21st 1988 saw the worst act of international terrorism 
ever to occur in Great Britain. A semtex bomb stored in the forward hold of flight 
103 exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie mid-flight killing all 259 people on 
board and eleven people on the ground. The explosion ultimately proved to be the 
work of a Libyan intelligence operative, Abdelbasset al-Megrahi, who was found 
guilty of murder in January 2001,73
An international terrorist phenomenon which first emerged in the late 1970s and 
which is of massive concern today is terrorism emanating from religious extremism. 
It has been said that over one third of active terrorist groups in the world fall in to this 
category. This brings in to play a devastating notion, which makes the actors 
involved in such terrorism particularly dangerous, namely suicide terrorism.74 This
thiconcept was demonstrated to the world, centre stage, on September 11 2001, with 
the use of four hijacked planes as, essentially, guided missiles. Indeed, it posed the 
question of how to stop such terrorists who believe such actions to be a holy mission 
which will certainly result in their admittance to heaven.75
The attacks of July 7 2005 in London demonstrated the use of suicide bombers for 
the first time in Western Europe. Four bombs were detonated in London; three on the
t bUnderground and one on a bus. 52 people were killed and over 700 injured. On 19 
September 2005 A1 Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks for the first time in a
72 Wilkinson, n. 51 above p. 30.
73 Lameen Fhimah was acquitted o f all charges.
74 Wilikinson, n. 51 above p. 25.
75 Ibid.
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video-taped message featuring the organisation’s deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahri.76 
Two weeks later on 21st July 2005 four would-be suicide bombers attempted to 
detonate devices again on the London transport network. Three bombs were to have 
been detonated on the Underground with a fourth planned to explode on a bus. 
Fortunately all four bombs failed to detonate. The four suspected bombers were 
arrested and charged as were numerous other individuals in relation to the failed 
attacks. These incidents highlight the fact that the country continues to remain at risk 
from international terrorism particularly that stemming from religious 
fundamentalism. In comparison with the effect that thirty years of terrorism 
emanating from Northern Ireland had on the UK, international terrorism has played a 
much smaller part in British terrorist history. However, the events of September 11th
i L
as well as, more recently, July 7 , demonstrated all too clearly the effect that the 
phenomenon and the response to it can have on a state, in terms of both the national 
security of the country as well as with regard to the status of fundamental rights and 
liberties.
The United Kingdom’s Response to the Terrorist Threat prior to 2000
The ongoing terrorist history in the United Kingdom, especially that in relation to 
Northern Ireland, resulted in the enactment of a great deal of emergency legislation in 
various forms. In relation to the province itself, such legislation can be traced back to 
the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922, which enacted such provisions as 
internment, proscription of assemblies and certain books as well as the imposition of 
curfews. This piece of legislation which was originally enacted for one year, was 
renewed annually until 1928; then renewed for five years. It became permanent in 
1933 and was utilised until 1972. This prolonged use of temporary legislation is a 
pattern which can be seen throughout the UK’s use of anti-terrorism legislation. In 
Northern Ireland this Act was succeeded by the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act (EPA) 1973, 1978, 1987 and 1996. In addition the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, 1976, 1984, 1989 and the Criminal
76 Two earlier claims of responsibility were made by the Secret Organisation Group o f Al-Qaeda o f  
Jihad Organisation in Europe on 7th July 2005 and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade on 9th July 2005.
Both are said to have links to A1 Qaeda.
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Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 applied to the whole of the United 
Kingdom.
Whilst the legislation had the 1922 Act and the 1939 Prevention of Violence 
(Temporary Provisions) Act as its provenance, the notion of “legislating for the last 
atrocity” can be said to have played a part with regard to the enactment of this 
emergency legislation with terrorist attacks and increased violence creating a climate 
conducive to the introduction of extreme measures. This cycle of action and reaction 
can be seen in relation to the increased violence in Northern Ireland in 1972, the 
Birmingham pub bombings of November 1974 and the Omagh bombing in August 
1998. This tendency highlights the role that symbolism plays in this area and this is 
so in a way which does not tend to arise with other criminal acts. This need to be seen 
to be doing something is deemed almost more important than what is actually done.
A final and yet important point to be made about British anti-terrorism law is the 
duplication of many of the provisions of the ordinary law which resulted in the 
creation of a dual system of criminal justice. A large part of the Act was specific to 
terrorism and as such was far removed from the ordinary criminal law; however, a 
great deal of it had the effect of extending the powers available to the authorities. 
This prompted the United Nations Human Rights Committee to comment “ ...that the 
powers permitting infringements of civil liberties, such as of extended periods of 
detention without charge or access to legal advisers, entry into private property 
without judicial warrant, imposition of exclusion orders within the United Kingdom 
are excessive.”77 Indeed such powers had the effect of placing the individual in 
somewhat of a void where rights and liberties were at best precarious and at worst 
abused.
Arrest and Detention
One of the most important provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
70  #
Provisions) Act was the power of arrest provided in section 14. This section
77 U.N. Human Rights Committee concluding observations: United Kingdom o f Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (27/05/95) CCPR/C/79/Add.55.
78 The power o f arrest and detention was originally provided in section 12 of the PTA’s 1974 and 1976.
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provided the police with three separate grounds for arrest without warrant; “ ...a 
constable may arrest without warrant a person who he has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting to be
(a) a person guilty of an offence under section 2, 8, 9, 10, 11...;
(b) a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism to which this section applies;
(c) a person subject to an exclusion order.”79
However, it was widely recognised, indeed by the Home Office itself, that section 14 
provided the only access to a procedure of extended detention unavailable to the 
police in any other way.80 Therefore the extent of its use is not surprising; indeed 
with regard to Northern Irish terrorism, between implementation in 1974 and repeal in
Q 1
February 2001, arrests under Section 14 totalled nearly 3000 , with particularly high 
use made of it in 1975 and 1976 with 437 and 254 arrests respectively. Amendment 
to subsection (a) occurred with the passing of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and 
Conspiracy) Act (CJTCA) in 1998 so as to bring the law in Northern Ireland in line 
with that in Great Britain. Section 3(1) of the CJTCA had the effect of making 
membership of an organisation proscribed in Northern Ireland an offence arrestable 
under the PTA. Due to the fact that the list of such organisations contained in 
schedule 2 of the EPA was much more extensive that than under the PTA, this 
extended the ambit of the section 14 arrest power and therefore was seen to have 
sharpened the teeth of the Act.
As has been mentioned previously and was often offered as one of the main 
justifications for retention of the power of arrest in the PTA, arrest under section 14 
acted as a gateway through to a system of detention quite unlike that which exists 
under PACE. Section 14(4) provided for a period of detention of 48 hours following 
arrest under the Act. However, this was subject to section 14(5) which allowed the 
Secretary of State to extend this initial period by up to a maximum of a further five
79 Section 14(1) PTA 1989. The grounds for arrest under subsection (c) will be dealt with from page 
45.
80 Circular 26/1984 see P. Hall, “The Prevention o f  Terrorism Acts” in A. Jennings (ed), Justice Under 
Fire. The A buse o f  Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland (Pluto Press, 1990) p. 171.
81 Figure relates to arrests in connection with Northern Irish terrorism.
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days. This was considerably longer than the maximum period of detention for a 
serious arrestable offence under PACE, which stands at 96 hours.82 However, of 
more importance still is the requirement that detention beyond 36 hours under PACE 
must be approved by the Magistrate’s court.83 This shift to include a judicial element 
with regard to a maximum period of 96 hours stands in stark contrast to the purely 
administrative system which authorised a maximum period of detention of 168 hours 
under the PTA. The length of detention and the system regarding the authorisation of 
detention caused much commentary and formed the subject of much case law. 
Perhaps the most notable of these cases is Brogan and Others v UK84 because of the 
European Court’s finding of a violation of article 5(3) against the UK and because of 
the resultant international criticism sparked by the UK’s response to the Court’s 
finding.
The context of the terrorist struggle faced by the UK played a pivotal role in 
determining whether the UK was in breach of its article 5(3) obligations. Indeed it 
was this which led the majority of the European Commission of Human Rights to 
conclude that “the struggle against terrorism may require a particular measure of 
sacrifice by each citizen in order to protect the community as a whole against such 
crimes”85 and as such led to the conclusion that extended detention of five days could 
be justified within the context of terrorism. Whilst mindful of the background to the 
applications, the majority of the court emphasised the purpose of article 5 and its role 
in protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the state with his right to 
liberty. In this way emphasis was given to the meaning of the word “promptly” in 
particular in comparison to the urgency inherent in the use of the word “aussitot” in 
the French text. This led to a finding that flexibility with regard to the interpretation 
of the word “promptly” must be limited. Whilst the degree of promptness must be 
assessed in each individual case, the court stressed that consideration of the special 
features of each case must never be stretched to the point of negating the state’s
82 Section 42 PACE.
83 Section 43 PACE.
84 (1989) 11 EHRR 117.
85 Ibid. para. 106.
86 Ibid. para. 58.
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obligation to ensure a prompt appearance before a judicial authority or a prompt 
release.87
The question for the court essentially amounted to whether, whilst acknowledging the 
problems faced by the government as a result of terrorism, the release of the
Q Q
applicants was “prompt” for the purposes of article 5(3). In declaring a violation of 
this article, the court accepted that the situation caused by political violence relating to 
Northern Ireland did have the effect of prolonging the length of detention available to 
the authorities subject to sufficient safeguards, before introducing oversight by a 
judicial authority. However, the situation created by terrorism did not permit the 
government to dispense with “prompt” judicial control altogether and to find 
otherwise would import in to article 5(3) a serious weakening of a procedural 
guarantee to the detriment of the individual. Therefore the court found that even the 
shortest period of detention, four days six hours, was in violation of article 5(3). 
However, in deciding this the court did not go so far as to indicate what would amount 
to the maximum period of detention permitted under the Convention.
The response of the government to this finding was to derogate from article 5 under 
article 15 by declaring there to be “an emergency threatening the life of the nation.” 
This had the effect that the maximum period of detention permitted under the PTA 
remained unchanged and importantly no element of judicial oversight was introduced. 
Moreover, scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights was hereby shifted to 
examination of the continued necessity for the derogation. Acceptance of the regime 
under section 14 by the court came in the decision of Brannigan and McBride v UK89 
where the government’s derogation from article 5 was upheld. This of course had the 
effect of legitimising a system of detention under anti-terrorism legislation which was 
both inadequate from the point of view of the detainee as well as removed from the 
system under PACE. In contrast, a breach of article 5(3) was found despite a 
derogation under article 15 in Demir v Turkey90 where the threat posed by terrorism,
87 Ibid. para. 59.
88 Ibid. para. 60.
89 (1993) 17 EHRR 539. The derogation was continued by the Human Rights Act 1998 (section 14 and 
Sch.3).
90 (2001) 33 EHRR 43
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though of great seriousness, could not be used to justify extended detention of 16 and 
23 days without contact with a judicial authority.91
The effects of extended detention on the individual under the legislation was 
exacerbated by the fact that the right to have access to a solicitor as well as the right to 
have somebody informed of their arrest could be delayed for up to 48 hours where 
the officer concerned reasonably believed that exercise of either right would either:
(a) lead to interference with the gathering of information about the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; or
(b) by alerting any person, make it more difficult
(i) to prevent any act of terrorism; or
(ii) to secure the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person in 
connection with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of
93terrorism.
Allegations of ill treatment arose many times over the years, but rather than providing 
protection, it was the law which initially placed those detained in such a vulnerable 
position and then exacerbated that vulnerability. The European Court of Human 
Rights is the most obvious forum for dealing with such allegations given the specific 
prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment contained in article 3. 
The most well known case in this area is probably Ireland v UK94 in which the court 
found that the “five techniques”95, utilised by the UK government as interrogation 
techniques, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.96 The same finding was 
established more recently in Tekin v Turkey97 where the court held that the applicant’s 
treatment whilst in detention, namely being kept in sub-zero temperatures, a lack of 
blankets, blindfolding, a diet of only bread and water and subjection to treatment 
which left wounds and bruises on his body, amounted to inhuman and degrading
91 See also Sakik v Turkey [1998] I.N.L.R. 357 (ECHR).
92 Sections 56(11) and 58(13) provided reasons in addition to those in section 56 o f PACE regarding 
delay in the case of serious arrestable offences, for delaying such access for up to 48 hours.
93 Full discussion o f this area can be found in chapter 7.
94 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25
95 Namely lack o f food, deprivation o f sleep, subjection to continuous noise, forced standing and 
hooding.
96 In this case the European Commission o f Human Rights found that use o f the five techniques 
amounted to torture.
97 (2001) 31 EHRR 4
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treatment.98 The development of the ECHR and the case law of the court became 
clear in Selmouni v France."  The court, in its finding that allegations of torture were 
substantiated, reiterated the fact that the fight against terrorism, and other such serious 
circumstances, can never justify the use of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.100 
Further the court emphasised the flexibility of the Convention as an instrument of 
protection by highlighting its position as a “living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions” and that therefore treatment which 
would once have amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment could be classified 
differently in the future.101 “It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being 
required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the 
fundamental values of democratic societies...”102
Despite the criticism which detention under section 14 inspired, the extended 
detention provisions were justified on the grounds of the advantages said to result 
from them. The thread running through the official reviews was one of retention of 
the seven-day detention period. Indeed Jellicoe and Colville both recommended
1 OTthis despite Jellicoe’s conclusion that “there can be no clear proof that the arrest 
powers [and therefore the powers of detention which flow from them] in the PTA are, 
or are not, an essential weapon in the fight against terrorism.”104 The thrust of the 
argument seems to have been the need for extra time to overcome the anti­
interrogation techniques employed by some terrorists, placing emphasis on cases in
i L  4.U 1
which admissions were made on the 4 or 5 day. More objectionably, Jellicoe 
also argued that an additional four of five days could help in obtaining evidence with 
which to charge the detainee.106 However, official statistics regarding the amount of 
charges brought following detention tend to contradict this. Indeed between 1974 and
98 See also Tomasi v France (1993) 15 EHRR 1
99 (2000) 29 EHRR 403
100 Ibid. para. 95.
101 Ibid. para. 101.
102 Ibid.
103 Jellicoe, Review o f  the Operation o f  the Prevention o f  Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976, 
(London: HMSO Cm. 8803, 1983) para. 62. Colville, Review o f  the Prevention o f  Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, (London: HMSO Cm. 264, 1987) paras. 5.1.6 and 5.1.7.
104 Jellicoe, ibid. para. 55.
105 See Shackleton Report Review o f  the Operation o f  The Prevention o f  Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Acts 1974 and 1976 (Lomdom: HMSO Cm. 7324, 1978) para. 72 and Jellicoe para. 57.
106 Jellicoe, n. 103 above para. 58.
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2000107 over 7,500 people were detained under the PTA in relation to terrorism 
related to Northern Irish affairs under sections 14 and 16, with 2684 of these detained 
under section 14. Of this figure, 794 detainees had their detention extended beyond 
48 hours. In 1974, 183 out of 486 detentions were thus extended and in 1979 almost
10Shalf of all section 14 detentions were extended beyond 48 hours. More contentious 
however is the number of charges resulting from detentions under the Act. Indeed 
between 1974 and 2000, of the 7565 detentions only 714 resulted in any charge being 
brought (9%) with only 238 of these charged with an offence under the PTA itself; a 
mere 3%. Such statistics add great weight to the argument that detention under the 
PTA was utilised for intelligence gathering rather than with the intention of bringing a 
criminal prosecution.
Exclusion Orders
Described as the “most disturbing feature of the legislation,”109 the power to exclude a 
person from one part of the United Kingdom was long debated as the legislative 
measure most contrary to the civil liberties of the individual. Yet, despite this, or 
even because of it, the power remained on the statute books until it was abolished in 
the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 4(1) provided that the Secretary of State could 
generally make use of this power if it appeared expedient to him to prevent acts of 
terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.110 Such an order could be 
made to exclude a person from being in, or entering Great Britain,111 from being in, or
119entering Northern Ireland, or from being in, or entering the United Kingdom as a
1 1 3whole. So that such an order could be made, the Secretary of State had to be 
satisfied that the person concerned either was or had been involved in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or that the person 
concerned was attempting to enter the area from which exclusion was sought with a
107 Including the first 7 weeks o f 2001. The Terrorism Act 2000 came in to force on 18th February 
2001 .
108 183 out o f 284 detentions.
109 D. Bonner, “Combating Terrorism in Great Britain: The Role o f Exclusion Orders” (1982) Public 
Law 262.
1,0 Section 4(2).
111 Section 5.
112 Section 6.
113 Section 7.
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view to being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism regarding Northern Ireland.114 Sections 5(3), 6(3) and 7(3) provided that in 
considering whether to make an exclusion order against a person, excluding them 
from the area in which they were normally resident, the Secretary of State had to have 
regard to whether that person had a sufficient connection to any other country so as to 
make it appropriate that exclusion be ordered. Failure to comply with an order was an 
offence under section 8(1), and section 8(2) made it an offence for any third party to 
have knowingly been concerned in arrangements for securing or facilitating the entry 
in to the territory in question of a person whom the third party had reasonable grounds 
for believing to be an excluded person, or indeed for a third party to knowingly 
harbour such a person in the excluded territory.
The only limits on the exercise of the power of exclusion were founded on the 
grounds of citizenship and residence. Section 7(4) made it so that an exclusion order 
could not be made excluding a British citizen from the whole of the UK, neither could 
an order be made excluding from Great Britain somebody already subject to an order 
regarding Northern Ireland115 or indeed the reverse.116 The second restriction on the 
power of exclusion was based on the notion of “ordinary residence.” Prior to 1984, it 
was the case that a person could not be excluded from a territory if he had been 
ordinarily resident there for 20 years or more. However, it was seen that this 
reinforced the notion of Northern Ireland as a “terrorist dumping ground” as well as 
exacerbating the power’s already severe effect on civil liberties, and as such this was 
reduced to ordinary residence for a continuous period of three years in the PTA 
1984.117
Exclusion orders potentially violated several of the rights protected in the ECHR. 
Perhaps the most obvious article upon which to base a claim was article 5, the right to
/ /  Rpersonal liberty. In Guzzardi v Italy the confinement of a Mafioso to a particular 
island was found to be a breach of article 5 because of the imposition of such 
conditions and restrictions as police supervision, a curfew and the need for permission
114 Section 5(1) (a) (b).
115 Section 5(4)(b).
116 Section 6(4)(b).
117 Jellicoe, n. 103 above para. 182.
118 (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 333.
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to do certain things. It was said that “The difference between deprivation of liberty 
and restriction upon liberty is.. .one of degree and intensity, and not one of nature and 
substance...”119 It can be said therefore that the effect on liberty engendered by an 
exclusion order is not so severe as to amount to a deprivation of liberty on a scale 
similar to that in Guzzardi. Indeed, restrictions upon liberty are not governed by 
article 5, instead falling within the realm of article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention 
to which the UK has not subscribed. However, article 5 could have come in to play 
with regard to the period of extended detention possible both before and after the 
making of an order, which could extend in to a matter of weeks if the subject 
exercised the rights available under schedule 2 paragraph 3(1).
A second potential ground of challenge under the Convention was based on article 8, 
as a result of the inevitable effect exclusion had on the private life of the excludee and 
his family. However, challenges under this head proved no more successful, 
particularly due to the existence of the exceptions contained in article 8(2), namely 
national security and the prevention of crime. It has been shown to be the case that 
the effect on family life must be so severe as to break up a dependent family unit. In 
Ryan v UK,120 the European Commission of Human Rights found no breach of article 
8 due to the fact that independent children left in Britain could travel to the Republic 
to visit the excludee and dependent siblings.121 Indeed the commission in 
McCullough v UK noted that relationships between adults would not necessarily
acquire the protection of article 8 unless evidence was shown of further dependency,
/ 2 ?involving more than the normal, emotional ties. However, in Boughanemi v France 
the court found that an interference with article 8 had taken place, due partly to the 
fact that the deportation had severed the applicant’s ties to his siblings and parents.
Aside from the insufficient availability of means with which to challenge the 
exclusion system and the failings of the adviser system as a form of review, much can
119 Ibid  para. 94.
120 App. No. 9202/80
121 See also Mooney v UK Appl. No. 11517/85. See also C. P. Walker, “Constitutional Governance and 
Special Powers Against Terrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Prevention o f Terrorism Acts” 
(1997) Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 1 pp. 13-18 regarding potential challenges under other 
articles.
122 (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. CD34.
123 (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 228.
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be said with regard to the philosophy behind such a measure as well as its general 
effect. The arguments in favour of exclusion focused on the ability of the power to aid 
the prevention of terrorism, in particular by removing dangerous terrorists from 
mainland Britain and also by diminishing the effectiveness of terrorists by disruption 
to information, contacts and travel arrangements.124 Lord Jellicoe also commented 
upon its use as the only means available of dealing with cases of great sensitivity. 
The opinion that exclusion materially contributed to the safety of the public in the UK 
was surely a compelling one in convincing a frightened populace of its validity in the 
aftermath of the Birmingham tragedies and beyond. Whilst it can be said that to act in 
such a pre-emptive manner was questionable due to the potential for dubious 
evidence, this of course was one of the main attractions. Indeed to be able to take 
action against a suspected terrorist using evidence that would have been insufficient to 
stand up at trial was a huge advantage to the security forces in the fight against 
terrorism. Having said this however, it cannot be said that exclusion was relied on to 
any huge extent during its lifetime. Indeed, following an initial flurry of orders 
granted at the end of 1974 and in 1975, the use of the power declined steadily until 
1995 when no new orders were made and by October 1997 no exclusion orders 
remained in force at all. Even at its peak exclusion orders were the result of only 6% 
of detentions under the Act, and between 1974-2000, exclusion orders were issued
1 'y c
following detention in only 5% of all cases.
The logic of moving suspected terrorists from one area of a country to another is 
somewhat dubious; indeed, a suspected terrorist remains so despite a post-code 
change and as such, it seems questionable to have claimed the prevention of terrorism 
as the foundation of this measure, particularly with regard to exclusion to Northern 
Ireland where terrorism was more prolific. This argument goes further with regard to 
the assertion that exclusion had the effect of treating Northern Ireland as a dumping 
ground for terrorists, which implied that what was of real importance was stopping 
terrorist outrages in Great Britain.
124 See Jellicoe, n. 103 above para. 176 for the case for exclusion.
125 Source: The Home Office. These figures are based on detentions under sections 14 and 16 o f the 
PTA.
48
Chapter 2: The Terrorist Threat and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom Prior to 2000
Proscription
Part I of the PTA126 provided the Secretary of State with the power to proscribe “any 
organisation that appears to him to be concerned in, or in promoting or encouraging, 
terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom and connected with the affairs of Northern 
Ireland.”127 Similarly, any organisation which was specified in schedule 1 to the Act 
was also so proscribed for the purpose of the Act, as was any organisation of a name 
mentioned in schedule 1 regardless of its relationship (if any) with any organisation of 
the same name.128
Proscription of a terrorist organisation opened the door to an array of related offences. 
Under section 2(1 )(a) belonging or professing to belong to a proscribed organisation 
was an offence with the latter being easier to prove than the former given the secretive 
nature of such organisations; indeed no charges were ever brought under this head of
1 9Qthe PTA. Soliciting or inviting support for a proscribed organisation other than
support with money or other property was prohibited in section 2(1 )(b). Prior to the
1989 re-enactment of the Act, this head had included soliciting for financial support
as well as making or receiving financial contributions or otherwise to a proscribed
organisation.130 Under this section there were seven prosecutions for soliciting or
receiving money for a proscribed organisation between 1974-1986 of which two
1^ 1
resulted in a finding of guilt and imprisonment for one year or less. No other such 
prosecutions followed. The final offence under section 2 was contained in subsection
(c) as arranging or assisting in the arrangement or management of, or addressing, any 
meeting of three or more persons (whether or not it was a meeting to which the public 
were admitted) knowing that the meeting was
(i) to support a proscribed organisation
(ii) to further the activities of such an organisation; or
(iii) to be addressed by a person belonging or professing to belong to such an 
organisation.
126 Part III EPA.
127 Section l(2)(a) PTA 1989 Section numbers provided relate to the PTA 1989.
128 Section 1(1) PTA 1989.
129 Source: The Home Office.
130 This was then dealt with in Part III PTA 1989. See C. P. Walker, The Prevention o f  Terrorism in 
British Law, (Manchester University Press, 1992) p. 111 onwards with regard to section 10 o f the Act.
131 Source: The Home Office.
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The 1989 Act had the effect of doubling the maximum sentence possible for such
offences. Under the 1984 Act a conviction on indictment for an offence under section
1 '1')2 could result in imprisonment for up to five years. Section 2(3) provided a 
defence to the offence of belonging or professing to belong to a proscribed 
organisation. A person was not guilty of this offence if he showed
(a) that he became a member when it was not a proscribed organisation under [the 
Act]; and
(b) that he [had] not, since he became a member, taken part in any of its activities 
at any time while it was a proscribed organisation under [the Act].
This had the effect of avoiding accusations that the Act constituted retrospective 
legislation which would have violated article 7 of the ECHR. This resulted in a 
reversed burden of proof which placed the accused in the difficult situation of having 
to prove a lack of involvement in the activities of the organisation- a virtually 
impossible burden to discharge.133 However, the complete lack of prosecutions for a 
section 2(1 )(a) offence in the lifespan of the Act meant that the operation of the 
offences and therefore this defence were never considered in anything other than a 
theoretical manner.
A natural corollary to proscription of terrorist organisations was the offence of 
publicly displaying support for the organisation in question. This was contained in 
section 3 of the 1989 Act and was drafted so that an offence was committed on the 
wearing of any item of dress, or on the wearing, carrying or display of any article in 
such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable apprehension that the 
person concerned was a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.134 
Successful prosecution of this offence could have resulted in six months
1 o r
imprisonment on summary conviction, or a fine, or both. Between 1974-2000 there
I
was just one such prosecution for which the defendant was fined.
132 Section 2(2)(a) On summary conviction the Act accounts for imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 6 months, or a fine, or both section 2(2)(b).
133 See Hall, n. 80 above p. 53 for a more detailed critique o f the statutory defence.
134 Sections 3(1 )(a) and (b) PTA 1989.
135 Section 3(1) PTA 1989.
136 Source: The Home Office.
50
Chapter 2: The Terrorist Threat and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom Prior to 2000
As mentioned previously, the 1989 PTA created a new offence with regard to 
contributions to the resources of proscribed organisations. Section 10 prohibited the 
solicitation or invitation, lending or otherwise making available of any money or other 
property for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. Subsection (b) similarly made it 
an offence to give, lend or otherwise make available or receive or accept, any money 
or other property for the benefit of a proscribed organisation or (c) to be concerned in 
an arrangement regarding money or property for the benefit of such an organisation. 
This was the result of the removal of the financial support element from section 2(1) 
in the re-enactment of the PTA in 1989. It had the effect of extending the scope of 
such offences beyond the financing of acts of terrorism directly in to the more routine 
realm of publicity or funds for families of members by the use of the words “for the 
benefit of.”137 The 1989 Act also had the effect of extending the concept of 
“proscribed organisations” to encompass organisations proscribed under the EPA with 
regard to offences under section 10.
A consequence of the repression of terrorist organisations as a result of proscription 
was the effect on the liberties of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland. This was true of 
members of such groups whose right to freedom of association was hampered and was 
also the case with regard to supporters of legitimate Republican groups due to the 
difficulty of differentiation.138 However, Republican politics were not suppressed 
completely and the growth of Sinn Fein as a political force has been said to have 
countered this adverse effect on the discussion and dissemination of republican
1 TOpolitics. This impediment to the expression of political views in the Province, and 
indeed on the mainland, was a point with which both Jellicoe and Colville had a great 
deal of sympathy.140 Indeed Jellicoe stated that “if one were starting with a clean 
slate, proscription would...be low on the list of priorities for inclusion in counter­
terrorism legislation.”141 However, despite the argument that this stifling of political 
debate outweighed any potential benefits accrued by proscription, the fear of negative 
reaction if the provision were abolished overrode the effect on the liberties of the 
individual.
137 See Walker, n. 130 above p. 111.
Ibid  p. 63.
139 C. A. Gearty and J. A. Kimbell, Terrorism and the Rule o f  Law, (Civil Liberties Research Unit,
1995) p. 40.
140 Colville, n. 103 above para. 13.1.5, Jellicoe, n. 103 above para. 209.
141 Jellicoe, ibid para. 209.
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In addition, proscription ultimately rendered the prevention of terrorism harder to 
achieve by forcing such groups underground. This made security operations much 
more difficult by cutting off a valuable source of information. It cannot have been 
imagined that such long-standing passionate groups as the IRA would fold at the first 
hint of illegitimacy; indeed it was acknowledged at the time that “it will...be rather 
more than less difficult as a result of the banning to apprehend the terrorists.”142 
However, the desire to appease won through and the symbolism of action overcame 
any concerns with regard to the adverse effect that such a measure would have on the 
operational effectiveness of the security forces, as well as on the freedom of the 
individual.
The provisions relating to proscription and related offences in both the PTA 1989 and 
the EPA 1996 were compounded by the passing of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism 
and Conspiracy) Act (CJTCA) 1998 following the Omagh bombing. The effect of the 
CJTCA was to ease the conviction of those accused of belonging to terrorist 
organisations by certain evidentiary changes contained in sections 1 and 2 of the Act 
which inserted sections 2A and 2B into the PTA and section 30A into the EPA. The 
CJTCA was not concerned with all proscribed groups in the UK. Rather its focus 
rested on organisations categorised as “specified” in accordance with the Northern 
Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. The concept of specification was designed so as to 
clarify those proscribed organisations which continued to be concerned in terrorism 
related to Northern Ireland143 and which had not established or maintained a complete 
and unequivocal ceasefire.144
Section 1 of the CJTCA allowed the admission into evidence of the opinion of a 
police officer, of at least the rank of superintendent, that the accused was a member of 
a specified organisation. This had the effect of legitimising evidence which would 
previously have been classified as hearsay as well as potentially allowing inadmissible 
evidence in through the back door. The introduction of such opinion evidence placed 
the police officer in the realm of the expert witness. However, a person could not be
142 HC Debs, vol. 882, col. 746, 28th November 1974 Mr Lyon MP.
143 Section 3(8)(a) NISA 1998.
144 Section 3(8)(b) NISA 1998.
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committed for trial, or found to have a case to answer, or be convicted solely on the 
basis of such opinion evidence.145 The examinability of such evidence also caused 
problems with the potential that public interest immunity would often be claimed due 
to the sensitivity of the information on which the opinion might have been based. If 
public interest immunity was granted the defence was unable to examine the basis of 
the opinion evidence. This could result in a breach of article 6(1) of the ECHR if a 
significant part of the prosecution evidence was not heard or tested in open court.146
The 1998 Act also continued the erosion of the accused’s right to silence, begun by 
the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988147 and the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994.148 Again, by amendment to the PTA 1989 and the EPA 1996, 
the CJTCA provided that the jury could draw inferences from an accused’s failure to 
mention a fact which was material to the defence and which he could reasonably have 
been expected to mention, when considering whether the accused belonged to a 
specified organisation.149 The drawing of inferences from a suspect’s silence has a 
very negative effect on the rights of the accused. The consequent shift in the burden 
of proof resulted in a compulsion to speak even though there was no requirement that 
questioning take place in the presence of a lawyer. This situation was exacerbated by 
a desire for the sources of information to remain secret which may have prevented 
accusations from being clarified or backed up by additional information. Moreover, 
the fact that the PTA provides for extended detention of up to seven days placed the 
suspect in a particularly uncomfortable position. In the same way as with the opinion 
evidence of a police officer, an accused could not be committed for trial or found to 
have a case to answer just on the basis of interferences drawn from silence,150 though 
it was of course possible that such inferences could act as corroboration for the 
opinion evidence of a police officer and vice versa. The Act provided that the suspect 
must have been permitted to consult with a solicitor so as to overcome the risk of a 
breach of article 6 of the ECHR.151
145 Section 2A(3)(b) PTA.
146 C. P. Walker, “The Bombs in Omagh and their Aftermath: the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and 
Conspiracy) Act 1998” (1999) 62 M.L.R 879 p. 885.
147 SI 1988/1987 (N I20) articles 3, 4.
148 Sections 34-37.
149 This applied to silence during interrogation and at trial. Section 2A(6)(a) PTA 1989.
150 Section 2A(6)(b) PTA 1989.
151 Murray v U K( 1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 29.
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The compatibility of the CJTCA 1998 and resultant evidentiary changes with 
Convention rights was, however, questionable. The notion of a fair trial and related 
rights protected by article 6 of the ECHR manifested itself in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights not in the form of pronouncements on specific 
elements of a trial, but rather by way of a general desire for equity. In this way the 
limitations placed on the defence by way of the requests of the prosecution regarding, 
for example, public interest immunity, were balanced so that such evidence would
i
play a smaller role in the trial if the effect on the defence were particularly adverse. 
Article 6(3) of the ECHR provides the accused with the right “to examine, or have 
examined, witnesses against him ...”, however, this is at risk of infringement due to
the notion of public interest immunity which, if granted, allows non-disclosure of
1evidence by the prosecution. The use of the opinion of a police officer as evidence 
under the CJTCA posed particular problems with regard to the position of the 
defence. The likelihood of a claim of public interest immunity was very high due to 
the common use of informants with regard to the situation in Northern Ireland. This 
had the effect that the defence was unable to examine the original source of the 
information, whilst also resulting in a situation where the defence was potentially 
labouring under an illusion of credibility which was added to the evidence by the 
officer delivering it. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the role 
of the national judiciary in balancing the protection of the witness against any 
detriment to be suffered by the accused and it seems to be the case that this balancing 
act performed by judicial authorities is seen as a means of mitigating any adverse 
effect suffered by the defence. As mentioned previously, of importance was the 
probative value afforded to such evidence and as indicated that was of course likely to 
be low because of the fact that it was not possible to examine the source itself and the 
grounds underlying it. In this way, whilst a grant of public interest immunity was 
unlikely to result in a breach of article 6, this would change if the conviction were 
based mainly on such opinion evidence. The CJTCA reduced the chances of this by 
inclusion in the PTA of section 2A(3)(b) which limited the consequences for the
152 C. Campbell, “Two Steps Backwards: the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998” 
(1999) Criminal Law Review 941 p. 947.
153 See K. D. Kent, “Basic Rights and Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Can Britain’s Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 Be Reconciled with its Human Rights Act?” Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 2000 Vol. 33, No. 1 223 pp. 240-242 for more detail on Public Interest 
Immunity.
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accused regarding the use of such evidence without corroboration. However, as 
previously stated, the strength of corroboration evidence required was unclear, with 
the possibility that inferences drawn from the silence of the accused could have been 
sufficient.
Despite the fact that the European Court of Human Rights has recognised that “the 
right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against self­
incrimination are generally recognised standards which lie at the heart of the notion of 
fair procedure under article 6”154 the foundation of the right to silence in the UK has 
not, in recent years, been as firm as was once the case. Murray v UK established that 
the discretion to draw inferences from the accused’s silence could only be entertained 
if the evidence presented required some sort of explanation.155 Moreover, in the 
fashion of examining the fairness of the case generally it was deemed that no breach 
of article 6 had occurred due to the drawing of such inferences, primarily because of 
the safeguards in place in the UK. A breach of article 6 was however, found on the 
basis that the applicant had been refused access to a lawyer for over 48 hours.156 In 
line with this, the CJTCA only allowed use of such evidence following consultation 
with a lawyer, although the lawyer was not permitted in the interview room itself. In 
this way the Act was therefore unlikely to fall foul of article 6 in the same way as 
occurred in Murray. Furthermore, the Court in Murray stated that the right to silence 
would be infringed if a conviction were based solely or mainly on the accused’s
1 ^ 7silence which was again in line with the requirements of the CJTCA. In addition, it 
seems therefore that a combination of the two kinds of evidence would also have 
resulted in a breach of article 6.
Internment
In relation to Northern Ireland specific provision was made for the power to intern 
individuals. This was first enacted in 1922 under the Civil Authorities (Special 
Powers) Act and this formed the basis of its notorious application in August 1971
154 Saunders v U K {\991) 23 EHRR 313 para. 68
155 (1996) 2 E.H.R.R. 29 para. 51.
156 Ibid para. 48.
157 Ibid para. 47.
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against the IRA. Operation Demetrius began on August 9th 1971 with the aim of 
arresting and detaining as many IRA terrorists, and those involved with the IRA as 
possible. In the months preceding, lists of those to be arrested were prepared by the 
police and the Army. Those arrested were sent to one of three regional holding 
centres for interrogation and those to be detained were sent to either the Crumlin
thRoad, prison, Belfast or the prison ship “Maidstone.” Between August 9 1971 and 
December 5th 1975 1,981 people were detained.
Adjustments were made to the power of internment in the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 following the recommendation of Lord Diplock, on 
the basis of concerns relating to the involvement of the military in arresting and 
detaining those concerned. Instead the EPA enacted a procedure of interim custody 
orders under section 10 whereby detention of a suspected terrorist without charge or 
trial could be ordered by the Secretary of State provided there existed a prima facie 
case of the individual’s involvement in terrorism and that he posed an ongoing danger 
to the community. Following satisfaction of these elements, an interim custody order 
for up to 28 days could be imposed. At the end of that period the individual had to be 
released unless the case was referred for determination to a Commissioner. The 
individual was detained pending such determination, which could amount to many 
months of detention. The Commissioner could make a detention order of unlimited 
duration if satisfied that the individual had been concerned in the commission or 
attempted commission of any act of terrorism or the organisation of persons for the 
purpose of terrorism and that his detention was necessary for the protection of the 
public. In the form of rights afforded the individual, at least seven days prior to the 
determination hearing the individual had to receive a written statement concerning the 
terrorist activities to be investigated by the commissioner. Counsel was also 
provided. Evidence could be withheld from the individual and his lawyer, though 
information had to be provided, as far as possible, of matters dealt with in camera on 
grounds of security but there was no right to test such evidence. The individual could 
be required to answer questions but had no right to examine witnesses against him.
As is discussed in chapter 7, the implementation of internment in Northern Ireland 
was an unmitigated failure. Rather than reduce the levels of violence in the province 
and weaken the influence of the IRA the opposite occurred. The resultant
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infringement on civil liberties cannot be justified on the basis of effective counter­
terrorism policy and served to undermine the perception of the government as one 
able to deal with the threat.
Suspension of the Right to Trial by Jury
A notorious feature of the anti-terrorism framework enacted in Northern Ireland, and 
one of great longevity was the suspension of the right to trial by jury. Known as
1 f O
“Diplock Courts” after the chairman of the 1972 Commission which propounded 
their use, this form of tribunal was enacted under the EPA 1973 and continues to 
endure, although it is planned that their use will be phased out as part of the peace 
process.
Trial without jury was introduced into the Province in an attempt to deal with the 
perceived problems of witness and juror intimidation and biased juries.159 The nature 
of the enacted measures was the utilisation of juryless trials for various scheduled 
offences. A scheduled offence was defined as “those crimes which are commonly 
committed at the present time by members of terrorist organisations.”160 The 
commission of such an offence gave rise to the withdrawal of the right to trial by jury. 
It was possible for an offence to be certified out of this procedure by the Attorney- 
General where the crime in question had been committed in circumstances 
unconnected to a paramilitary organisation. An inherent right of appeal existed for 
any individual convicted by a Diplock court.
The use of such tribunals raises important questions with regard to the ability of the 
defendant to have a fair trial. Indeed, trial by jury is an important safeguard in terms 
of the due process afforded the individual. Removal of the jury causes concern both 
in relation to the issue of “case hardening” as well as the amalgamation of the role of 
the judge as tribunal of law and the traditional role of the jury as tribunal of fact. The 
former refers to the danger of the judge becoming increasingly cynical of similar
158 Report o f  the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in 
Northern Ireland.Cm. 5185. (London: HMSO, 1972).
159 Ibid. paras. 17, 37.
160 Ibid. para. 6.
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defences offered by one defendant after another as well as preferring to take the 
version of the police and security forces over that of the defendant. However, 
notwithstanding the concerns raised in relation to juryless trials it has been held by the 
European Commission of Human Rights that whilst in some states trial by jury is an 
important element in ensuring fairness in the criminal justice system, article 6 of the 
ECHR does not specify trial by jury as one of the elements of a fair trial.161
Other changes to the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland, in conjunction with 
the use of Diplock courts, placed the individual at a disadvantage. These changes 
were in the form of the admissibility of confessions obtained through coercive 
interrogation introduced so as to overcome the perception that the common law rules 
relating to the admissibility of confessions was hampering the course of justice in the
1 A?province, as well as the use of “supergrasses.” In addition the erosion of the right 
to silence further weakened the position of the individual. Such modifications to the 
criminal justice system exacerbated the diminishing confidence held by the public in 
the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. Indeed in a period of less than five 
years following the introduction of Diplock courts, 82% of the public sought a return 
to jury trial. Whilst introduced in order to facilitate convictions and reduce the 
reliance on the power of internment in existence in the province, the power to intern 
remained in force and indeed was actively used until 1975. Moreover, such 
provisions proved ineffective at reducing the levels of violence in the Province with 
the overall effect being that of diminished confidence in the operation and institutions 
of justice.
Conclusion
The long history of domestic terrorism in the United Kingdom and the prolific nature 
of the Troubles exemplifies the situation in which a country deems existing anti­
terrorism measures to be inadequate in the face of a terrorist attack which results in a
161 X  and Y v Ireland (1980) 22 DR 51, 73. Callaghan and Others v United Kingdom (1989) 60 DR 
296, 301.
162 Ibid. para. 87.
163 G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland, (Manchester University Press, 
1989) p. 105.
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relationship of action and reaction between the terrorist actors and the state. 
However, such legislative reaction does not always increase security and instead can 
have the effect of inciting increased violence. The experience of the UK with regard 
to Northern Ireland serves as an example of the way in which legislative measures to 
counter terrorism can have the converse result. Indeed the legislation had the effect of 
restricting certain fundamental rights and with regard to the province itself, the brunt 
of its application to the Catholic minority had the effect of undermining the 
democratic principle of equality of treatment. Such a result served to inflame 
nationalist passion and in turn increased the membership of terrorist organisations and 
exacerbated levels of violence.
The effect on democracy was felt differently in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
The interference with fundamental rights and liberties was a notable effect on the 
British mainland. The enactment of provisions which cause such an impact can be 
claimed by some as a terrorist victory in prompting the state to respond to the threat in 
a way which restricts democratic values. Moreover, enactment of extensive powers 
and interference with the rights and freedoms of the individual over a prolonged 
period will have an inevitable corrosive effect on the society affected. This was seen 
by the discrepancy between the number of those arrested under the PTA and the 
number of those subsequently charged.164 Moreover, the normalisation of emergency 
measures into the ordinary law as well its acceptance by the populace demonstrates 
that fact that democracy did not emerge completely unscathed from the United 
Kingdom’s prolonged terrorist struggle. However, in the case of Great Britain the 
stability of the state was not threatened by either the violence itself or the measures 
taken in response. There was no interference with the ability of the mechanisms of 
state to function effectively and as such the terrorist threat did not cause irreparable 
damage to the fabric of democracy, though it may be said that such an experience 
creates an atmosphere with the potential for further repression.
The same cannot be said with regard to Northern Ireland. Indeed, the effect of the 
provisions enacted in relation to the Province went further than the erosion of rights 
experienced in Great Britain to a loss of public confidence in the administration of
164 A further example is the use o f Diplock courts in Northern Ireland for cases unrelated to terrorism.
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justice and the institutions of the state. In consideration of the fact that the measures 
enacted were often not effective against the terrorist threat and in some instances 
served to exacerbate it, it is hard to justify these measures on the grounds of their 
efficacy. The effect of these measures was to undermine certain democratic 
principles, though it cannot be said that this occurred to such an extent that democracy 
in Northern Ireland was negated completely.
The use of extraordinary emergency powers in fighting terrorism has always given 
rise to arguments and concerns, not just from civil libertarians but also from the public 
in general, with regard to the repressive nature of the law. The relationship between 
civil liberties and anti-terrorism law has always been tense, due to the fact that the 
fight against terrorism seemingly requires the sacrifice of the former in order to 
strengthen the latter; to deprive freedom in order to restore liberty is an irony not lost 
in this debate. Moreover, the argument that it is defensible to curtail the rights of the 
masses in order to secure the conviction of a few grew to rest uneasily given the 
protracted life span of the PTA, and EPA, regime. The extent and longevity of the 
Acts placed the individual in a position of vulnerability and also served to exacerbate 
the pressure caused by such legislation on society, democracy and the rule of law.
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The Terrorist Threat and Anti-Terrorism Measures in the United States Prior to
1996
In comparison to the well-known Irish Nationalist terrorist struggle in the United 
Kingdom, it was often assumed that the United States was a country touched only 
very rarely by terrorism. Whilst attacks against American citizens and property 
abroad became more prolific,1 it was often felt that the United States was somewhat of 
a safe haven from this growing phenomenon. Indeed, with regard to international 
terrorism, the first major attack on US soil did not occur until the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Centre. However, the often common assumption of the US as a country 
with a lack of domestic terrorism is a gross misconception. Indeed between 1954- 
2000 domestic terrorism accounted for 79.7% of US terrorist incidents, and 88.4% of 
terrorist fatalities.2 Though an ongoing issue, terrorism in the United States, prior to 
the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of this, never reached such levels 
as to seriously threaten the stability of the nation. The same can be said with regard to 
international terrorism directed at the United States abroad. This is reflected in the 
response undertaken to the phenomenon which addressed the threat by way of policy 
decisions across the political spectrum as well as through reliance on the criminal law. 
The enactment of emergency measures did not prove necessary with the effect that 
some degree of balance was achieved between the security of the nation and 
democratic values.
Domestic Terrorism in the United States
There exists a great difference in the source of domestic terrorism in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Whilst the vast majority of terrorism in the UK finds 
Irish Nationalism at its root, there is a huge diversity between groups responsible for 
domestic terrorism in the US. Indeed the high saturation of Irish Nationalist violence 
has resulted in a form of word association when Northern Ireland is mentioned. This
1 The FBI had declared that typically 20-30% of international terrorism incidents which occur annually 
worldwide involve US interests. See Terrorism in the United States 1999 p. 16.
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is however not the case with the United States because of the multiplicity of groups 
responsible. Moreover, domestic terrorism in the US has tended to occur in waves, 
with no one cause being dominant for any continuing period. In what has been 
termed the swing of the pendulum, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have 
categorised domestic terrorism as falling broadly into three main classes. Left-wing 
extremism was predominant from the late 1960s to the early 1980s and was then 
followed by a shift in the late 1980s to right-wing extremism. The 1990s saw a 
continuation of this in the form of a more factionalised right wing movement focused 
in particular on militias and patriot groups. A threat was also faced from special 
interest groups, in particular animal rights and environmental activists in the mid to 
late 1990s.
Left-wing Terrorism
The atmosphere of unrest in 1960s America spawned by both the civil rights 
movement as well as the war in Vietnam, was the catalyst for the first major post-war 
wave of terrorism in the United States. These issues as well as the notion of socialist 
revolution ignited the student population to such an extent that the roots of many of 
the prominent left-wing terrorist groups were to be found in the radical student 
movement and in particular such organisations as the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS). The anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist stance of the movement called for 
a participatory democracy in post-Vietnam America in an attempt to right the social 
and political wrongs brought about by the government. Whilst the SDS has been said 
to have at one time boasted an official membership in the realms of 100,000,4 this 
commitment to the cause was not sustainable and despite the fact that the issues which 
had originally fuelled the New Left had not been resolved and a socialist revolution 
had not been forthcoming, this parent organisation fractured in 1969 giving way to 
militant leftist organisations such as the Weather Underground5 and, though not a 
direct descendant, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA).
2 See C. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America. From the Klan to Al Qaeda (Routledge, 2003) 
p. 15
FBI Report, n. 1 above p. 29.
4 Hewitt, n. 2 above p. 32.
5 Originally known as the Weatherman, political correctness guided the change in nomenclature.
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The more radical methodology employed by the Weather Underground (WU) was 
influenced by both the experience gained through the SDS but more importantly by 
the revolutionary hubs of Cuba and Vietnam. Of course the issues which fuelled the 
New Left such as the desire for social change, originally also formed a large part of 
the motivation of the WU, however the desire to right these social inequalities was 
overtaken by the war in Vietnam and the notion of “bringing the war home.” In the 
same way that the focus of the organisation was not static, the ideology of the WU 
also fluctuated. This was in response to both factors in the US as well as shifts in the 
ideological guidance of the group from the Cuban revolution and such influences as 
Regis de Bray and Che Guevara to the revolution in China and thus a more Marxist- 
Leninist bent. However, despite the often contradictory doctrines of the group, the 
goal of the WU remained “ ...the destruction of US imperialism and the achievement 
of a classless world: world communism.”6
The shift in motivation from a social to political stance inevitably led to the use of 
armed struggle and this commitment to violence underscored the schism between the 
originally non-violent SDS and the direction of the WU. However, although the most 
active domestic terrorist group at the time, the campaign of the WU was never one of 
massive onslaught in the same way as that of Irish Nationalist terrorism in the UK; 
indeed though dedicated to a campaign of guerrilla warfare the WU did not look to 
achieve its objectives through massive numbers of casualties or fatalities. Targets 
symbolic of the state were most common, and this policy of avoiding civilian targets 
meant that the WU, despite its official status as a terrorist group, did not inspire the 
same atmosphere of fear amongst the population, as was the case in Northern Ireland 
during the Troubles.
The campaign of the Weather Underground began in October 1969 with an explosion 
which destroyed the Haymarket Riot statue, erected as a tribute to the officers who 
were killed during the riots of 1886, in Chicago’s Haymarket Square and which 
signalled the beginning of an uprising which was to last four days and ultimately
6 You don’t need a Weatherman to know which way the wind blows, Statement made by alienated 
members o f SDS, June 18th 1969.
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resulted in the arrest of 287 people. No fatalities occurred during the “Days of Rage”, 
however the aggression of the organisation was left in no doubt as 59 police officers 
alone sustained personal injury ranging from abrasions to human bites.7 Indeed, the 
level of violence to which participants were required to commit was blamed for the 
poor turnout of what was supposed to have been the start of a mass revolution by the 
people.8
Whilst mixed reports exist as to the success of the “Days of Rage”, it is the case that 
the riots failed in their objective as a catalyst for revolution and also damaged the 
radical leftist cause to a certain extent. The outcome of this initial stage to the WU 
campaign was to encourage the establishment of an underground movement to which 
hundreds of members flocked. However, a major contributory factor to this decision 
was more likely the desire of those arrested to avoid the legal repercussions of their 
actions. The deaths of three WU members in March 1970 whilst constructing a bomb 
intended for an army dance in Fort Dix, New Jersey compounded this decision and it 
was from this increasingly subversive position that the WU continued to wage its war 
against the state.
The police were to prove to be a common target for the WU and were attacked in 
many different guises, ranging from symbolic destruction such as the Haymarket 
Square bronze to the bombing of police cars in various parts of the United States over 
the years. In 1970 the focus shifted to police stations, with attacks occurring at both 
the police headquarters in New York in June in which eight people were injured, and 
the Golden Gate Park branch of the San Francisco police department in February. 
Several were wounded in this attack which claimed the life of one officer, the only 
death for which the group was responsible during its campaign. However, 
responsibility for the Golden Gate Park attack was never officially claimed by the 
WU, presumably due to the tragic consequences which the organisation usually 
sought to avoid.
7 See FBI Weather Underground Summary 20th August 1976 Part lc  p. 7.
8 T. Wells, The War Within: America’s Battle Over Vietnam (Berkely, CA: University o f California 
Press, 1994).
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The revolution at the core of the WU cause failed to materialise to a large extent due 
to a lack of support by the masses. A repetitive list of targets and tired accompanying 
communiques could be said to be in part responsible for failing to capture the 
attention of the population. Indeed, commendable though the organisation’s policy of 
avoiding civilian targets was, the absence of a culture of fear so fundamental to 
terrorism also contributed to a national feeling of indifference to this left-wing 
struggle. Indeed, this is true even with regard to two attacks by the organisation of 
very high-profile targets. The US Capitol was the target of an attack by the group on 
1st March 1971. No injuries were sustained and although an estimated $300,000 of 
damage was caused, most of this was focused on a restroom. This building was 
selected as a world renowned symbol of the imperialist government attacking 
Indochina,9 yet the fact that the group only succeeded in destroying a menial facility 
goes some way in explaining lack of public support for the WU as well as the fact that 
this infiltration of the heart of the American government was quickly forgotten. A 
similar example is the bombing of the Pentagon in Arlington, West Virginia in May 
1972, which read a similar story with no casualties and little impact on the memory of 
the country. Publication in 1974 of the tract Prairie Fire: The Politics o f  
Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism reiterated the stance of the organisation as 
“communist men and women” yet despite the continued revolutionary rhetoric, the 
militant days of the group were numbered with a great deal of members returning to 
non-violent political activism.
The left-wing struggle against anti-imperialism did not end with the decline of the 
Weather Underground, with those remaining members unwilling to give up joining 
with other leftist groups to continue the fight. One such group, formed in the late 
1970s, was the May 19 Communist Organisation (M19CO) so called due to the 
shared birthday of Ho Chi Minh and Malcolm X, the membership of which 
represented the remaining vestiges of left-wing terrorist organisations. Described as 
one of the most violent left-wing organisations,10 M19CO’s campaign consisted of 
three objectives: to free political prisoners held in US prisons and to perpetrate a
9 FBI Report, n. 1 above.
10 W. C. Mullins, A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism. An Analysis o f  Issues, 
Organizations, Tactics and Responses, (Charles C. Thomas, 1997) p. 182.
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series of bombings and attacks which would be funded by criminally acquired 
capitalist wealth.11
Black Liberation Army leader JoAnne Chesimard and leader of the Armed Forces of 
National Liberation (FALN) William Morales were both beneficiaries of the first 
stage of the M19CO campaign. The former was rescued from New Jersey State 
Prison in 1979, and the latter from Bellevue, New York, hospital, whilst recovering 
from injuries sustained during the preparation of a bomb for the FALN. Perhaps the 
crime for which M19CO was best known was committed as part of the organisation’s 
second objective, namely the robbery of a Brinks armoured car in Nyack, New York 
in October 1981. The crime netted the group $1.6 million and resulted in the deaths 
of two police officers and one Brinks guard. Of the twelve-strong gang, eight of the 
perpetrators escaped but the four captured represented a core of activists who had 
eluded the law for over a decade. They received sentences which exceeded 170 years 
between them. The fact that the money stolen in the Brinks robbery was subsequently 
recovered did not hinder stage three of the campaign; indeed, using various aliases, 
M19CO was responsible for many bombs between 1982 and its last attack in February 
1985. Targets ranged from the FBI offices in Staten Island, New York, to the Capitol, 
and the National War College in Washington D.C.12 However, the decline of socialist 
inspired leftist terrorism was complete by the mid 1980s, leaving behind only 
memories of the student radicals and little in the way of actual achievement.
A facet of left-wing terrorism which has persisted in the United States is terrorism 
emanating from the status of Puerto Rico as a commonwealth of the United States. 
Following the American Spanish war of 1898 Puerto Rico was annexed by the US as 
an “unincorporated territory.” US citizenship was granted to the inhabitants of Puerto 
Rico in 1917 and commonwealth status was granted to the island in 1952 following 
legislative authorisation by Congress for the creation and adoption of a constitution. 
Plebiscites in 1967, 1993 and 1998 resulted in the majority of voters supporting the 
continuation of this arrangement. However, it is the issue of Puerto Rican
11 B. L. Smith, Terrorism in America. Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, (State University o f New York 
Press, 1994) p. 101.
12 Ibid., above p. 103.
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independence which has been at the root of a great deal of political violence in the US 
in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Opposition to the status of Puerto Rico as a commonwealth of the US has existed
since its establishment as such, with movements supporting the inclusion of the island
as the 51st state as well as those advocating full independence. The independence
movement was first brought to the forefront of the public consciousness in 1950 with
an unsuccessful assassination attempt made against President Truman by two Puerto
Rican extremists. This was followed in 1954 with the injury of five Congressmen
when four Puerto Rican nationalists opened fire from the gallery of the House of
Representatives. With these attacks, terrorism was directed against US interests on
1the US mainland with the purpose of affecting US policies for the first time.
Of the six main nationalist terrorist organisations aligned with Puerto Rico, it was 
only the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) which focused its operations 
on the US mainland, predominantly in Chicago and New York. The FALN appeared 
in 1974 and has been credited with being the most prolific terrorist group in US 
history,14 with 150 terrorist incidents attributed to it.15 The organisation rose to 
prominence in 1975 with the bombing of Fraunces Tavern in New York which killed 
four and injured fifty-four. New Years Eve 1982 was marked by five bombs in New 
York City. The choice of targets were representative of the anti-imperialist bias of the 
FALN with bombs going off at the federal courthouses in Brooklyn and 26 Federal 
Plaza and at 1 Police Plaza. Two further devices exploded near the federal courthouse 
at Foley Square before they could be disarmed. Three police officers were injured.
With the same political aims as the FALN but with a different operational base, the 
remaining Puerto Rican terrorist organisations focus their desire for independence on 
the island itself. From this pool of many, the Macheteros and the Organisation of 
Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP) emerged in 1978 to complement 
and indeed later succeed the nationalistic efforts of the FALN, selecting military 
targets in Puerto Rico in particular. The ambush of a Navy bus in December 1979
13 J. D Simon, The Terrorist Trap, (Indiana University Press, 2001) pp. 51-52.
14 G. Martin, Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives and Issues (Sage Publications, 2003) 
p. 325.
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which resulted in the deaths of two Navy personnel and the wounding of nine others 
acted as a precursor to what has been described as one of the most daring terrorist 
attacks in US history. 16 On 12th January 1981 the Macheteros bombed nine military 
planes at a National Guard base on Isla Verde, Puerto Rico; fortunately there were no 
casualties. The OVRP was dominant in late 1984 and 1985 with a spate of bombings 
on the island, with particular focus on Army recruiting offices. These organisations 
often joined forces and in this capacity were responsible for the assassinations of 
various military and establishment figures, as well as a rocket attack against the
1 7federal courthouse in San Juan in 1985. Between, 1980-1989 the Macheteros and
1 ftthe OVRP alone were responsible for 44 terrorist incidents.
The operational capacity of these organisations was greatly eroded due to effective 
detection by various law enforcement agencies particularly, in the case of the 
Macheteros and the OVRP, following several attempted and successful robberies of 
Wells Fargo armoured trucks which resulted in the indictment of nineteen 
participants. However, despite this diminishment in the strength of Puerto Rican 
nationalist terrorist organisations, the FBI in 1999 stated Puerto Rican terrorism to be 
one of the remaining vestiges of left-wing terrorism in the US.
Right-wing Terrorism
The United States witnessed the rise of a new wave of terrorism in the 1980s. Whilst 
the notion of rightist violence was not a completely new phenomenon to the country 
given the history of violence perpetrated by such groups as the Ku Klux Klan, the 
threat faced in the 1980s and 1990s was very different to that posed by left-wing 
extremism in the preceding decades. Whilst the purpose here is not to critically 
examine the variations between left-wing and right-wing terrorism, one of the 
important differences which goes some way in explaining the assortment of groups on 
the right is the lack of a universal ideological foundation. The left is characterised by 
the influence of Marxism which provides a link between leftist organisations
15 Hewitt, n. 2 above p. 61.
16 Smith, n. 11 above pp. 115-116.
17 Mullins, n. 10 above p. 184.
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throughout the world.19 This is not the case with right-wing groups and as such 
explains the mixture of organisations on the right, linked sometimes tenuously only 
by notions of nationalism and racism. The basic foundation of the right-wing 
movement is the notion of racial supremacy, which of course encompasses intense 
racism, nationalism and in particular a hatred of Jews as well as more widespread 
xenophobia. In this way the descent from fascism is clear. This extends further on 
the far right to include anti-government sentiment which ranges from dissatisfaction 
with what is perceived as a liberal Congress, to the belief that the country is actually 
run by a Zionist occupation government which aims to destroy the true Aryan race.
Such right-wing beliefs have long featured in US history and were manifested most 
infamously in the actions and beliefs of the oldest terrorist group in the US, the Ku 
Klux Klan. The Klan itself was not directly responsible for the violent right-wing 
extremism of the 1980s, rather it acted as a precursor for the later right-wing groups 
whilst providing a solid membership base. Various factors have been identified as 
contributing to the resurgence of the 1980s, inter alia, the growth of women’s rights, 
the introduction of more relaxed immigration laws, racial equality and affirmative
9 0action. This plethora of causal influences as well as the lack of a universal binding 
philosophy had the effect of spawning a vast number of right-wing organisations 
inspired by various factors and therefore committed to differing levels of violence.
Whilst it is the case that there is no universal ideological influence on the right-wing 
movement, religion has provided a bond to some of the organisations of the late 
twentieth century in the form of Christian Identity. This originates in “Anglo- 
Israelism” which espouses the belief that white Anglo-Saxons are the true “chosen 
people” due to Christ’s Aryan ancestry. This goes further to denounce Jews as the 
spawn of Satan and anyone of non-Aryan descent as “mud people.” Anti- 
governmental sentiment can also be traced to the belief that corruption of the 
Constitution and consequently the contamination of the citizenry of the United States 
was the work of an illegitimate federal government through the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which grants citizenship to anybody bom in the States and not
18 FBI Report, n. 1 above pp. 54-61.
19 Martin, n. 14 above p. 165.
20 Mullins, n. 10 above p. 185.
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just Aryans.21 This extends further in to the notion of postmillennialism, whereby the 
white race must re-establish itself by overthrowing the Zionist controlled government,
99to enable the second coming of Christ. A cornerstone of the far right, in both 
secular and Christian identity groups is the belief in Armageddon and it is preparation 
for this final battle which has prompted some degree of militancy in even the least 
violent groups by way of paramilitary training and weapons caches.
Violence on the right tended to be far more sporadic and inconsistent than the 
longstanding campaigns of the revolutionary left or the Irish Nationalists, nevertheless 
several organisations moved past ideology and rhetoric into the realms of terrorist 
violence. One such group, the Order was established in 1983 with the aim of 
overthrowing the federal government: “We from this day forward declare that we no 
longer consider the regime in Washington to be a valid and lawful representative of 
all Aryans who refuse to submit to the coercion and subtle tyranny placed upon us by 
Tel Aviv and their lackeys in Washington...Let friend and foe alike be made aware. 
This is War!” As is the case with all terrorist organisations, ultimately crime pays and 
as such, much of the criminal activity of the Order was related to the funding of the 
revolution by way of both robbery and counterfeiting. Indeed it was the theft of $3.6 
million during the robbery of a Brinks truck in July 1984 which ultimately led to the 
collapse of the organisation following indictments for various offences in 1985. 
Although the operational lifespan of the group ultimately proved to be little over a
9Tyear, twenty-one incidents were attributed to the Order including robbery, 
bombings, arson and murder. However, the organisation gained notoriety following 
the murders of a state trooper in Missouri and Jewish talk-show host and critic of 
Christian Identity, Alan Berg; indeed these violent tendencies were further 
underscored when demonstrated internally through the execution of Walter West, an 
unreliable and therefore dispensable member of the Order.
A group of similar standing and with which the Order became linked was the 
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA). Established more as a refuge for ex­
convicts and drug addicts in 1971, the 224 acre compound became a survivalist camp
21 See H. W. Kushner, Terrorism in America. A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist 
Threat, (Charles C. Thomas Publisher Ltd., 1998) pp. 59-64 regarding Christian Identity.
22 Mullins, n. 10 above pp. 187-188.
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and paramilitary training centre for the far right. In this way, the CSA represents an 
earlier version of the militias which were to come to prominence in the 1990s. The 
militancy of the group grew in the early 1980s as somewhat of a parallel to the actions 
of the Order, whilst links were also formed with other violent Christian Identity 
organisations such as the Aryan Nations. What is of particular interest regarding the 
CSA is not necessarily the actual violence perpetrated, which did not amount to a 
great deal. Rather, it is the potential for mass destruction which marked this 
organisation out from the violence of other right-wing groups. Indeed, in its quest to 
aid the second coming of Christ, the CSA masterminded a plan to poison the water 
supply of a major North American city and actually went to far as to amass thirty 
gallons of cyanide. The bombing of a gas pipeline in Arkansas also exemplifies the 
terrorist mindset of this organisation. Though minimal damage was caused, the 
potential for destruction was enormous.
The prosecutions and subsequent collapse of many of the more prominent right-wing 
groups of the 1980s, did not lead to the outright disintegration of the movement as a 
whole. However, it was not until the early 1990s that the anti-government sentiment 
of the movement was sufficiently roused so as to prompt the formation of the patriot 
and militia movements; two distinct, yet overlapping factions built on the foundations 
of the American right. Two catalytic events were responsible for this development 
which is said to have claimed over 50,000 members at its peak. In 1992, the siege at 
Ruby Ridge provided ample evidence of the danger posed by the government, when 
the actions of white separatist Randy Weaver resulted in an eleven-day siege and the 
deaths of Weaver’s wife and son and one federal agent. The siege at the Branch 
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas in 1993, in which over eighty people died further 
reinforced the notion of a tyrannical federal government and led to the belief that the 
people must be allowed to arm themselves against this danger. This hatred and indeed 
fear of federal government is compounded by an abundance of conspiracy theories 
ranging from the belief in the existence of concentration camps to deal with true 
patriots, to the positioning of invasion coordinates on the back of road signs to aid the 
imposition of the New World Order.24 It is this paranoia which has led most militias 
and patriot groups to establish survivalist compounds and paramilitary training camps
23 Hewitt, n. 2 above p. 61.
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so as to be sufficiently prepared for the coming apocalypse. Moreover, a form of 
judicial legitimacy is provided to such anti-government beliefs in the form of 
Common Law Courts, which act in defiance of genuine law enforcement authorities 
and courts, often targeting political opponents in “trials” as well as absolving 
adherents of any legitimate legal burdens and obligations. Whilst closely connected 
to the militia movement and therefore deemed a threat, common law courts more 
readily engage in fraud and financial crime by issuance of bogus liens and cheques. 
This form of “paper terrorism” has become such a problem in some states as to result 
in the drafting of legislation outlawing such activity.25
The militia movement rose to worldwide prominence in 1995 following the bombing
i L
of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19 , a date 
chosen to coincide with the FBI assault in Waco, Texas. The perpetrators of this 
attack, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols whilst acting alone with no particular 
affiliation with any terrorist organisation, were said to have both been adherents of the 
patriot movement, with alleged attendance at militia meetings. The bombing in 
Oklahoma City claimed the lives of 168 people and remains the worst act of domestic 
terrorism in the United States. Indeed, initially the horror felt at the bombing resulted 
in a reduction in militia members with several groups closing down.26 However, this 
was not followed with a reduction in the threat posed by right-wing extremism, with a 
number of bank robberies and bombings directed at abortion clinics carried out in 
1996 by a group known as the Phineas Priesthood, an off-shoot of the Christian
97Identity movement. The prevention of several acts of terrorism planned by militia 
groups such as the Mountaineer Militia and the Freemen Organisation highlight that 
the threat posed by such organisations continues.
Special Interest Terrorism
Despite the inclusion of special interest terrorism in some classifications of left or 
right wing terrorist movements and organisations, groups espousing special interest
24 Martin, n. 14 above p. 314.
25 FBI Report, Terrorism in the United States 1997 p. 11.
26 Kushner, n. 21 above p. 116.
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causes, such as animal rights or anti-abortion beliefs represent a unique form of 
terrorism. This is due to the fact that, rather than seeking to achieve wide-spread 
political change akin to, for example, the desire for socialist revolution by the 
Wecther Underground, special interest groups aim to change only the law and/or 
policy surrounding the subject of concern. Three main issues have been at the root of 
the special interest terrorism faced by the United States; animal rights, the 
environment and the anti-abortion question.
Animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism are causes which stem from the 1980s but 
which rose to prominence in the 1990s under the label “specific issue terrorism.” 
Many groups dedicated to the protection of the environment or committed to stopping 
animal abuse exist, and several have engaged in violent tactics and terrorism on 
differing levels in an attempt to bring these causes to the forefront of public awareness 
and to achieve their underlying objectives. Of the organisations active, not only in the 
United States but internationally, the most infamous and indeed the most prolific are 
the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF).
Though with different roots and a different driving force, both groups are very similar
in structure as well as in deed. The use of direct action is a common tactic in both 
organisations as a means of achieving the respective objectives of bringing about the 
end of all animal abuse, and preventing the destruction and exploitation of the natural 
environment. In both cases, this direct action is perpetrated through the common 
guerrilla tactic of autonomous cells operating independently and anonymously so as to
| minimise the potential for infiltration and detection by law enforcement agencies.
!
! It is the policy of both the ALF and the ELF to take all basic precautions so as to
[
■ avoid causing harm to life, both human and animal and it can be said that the vast
majority of terrorist actions by both organisations have not resulted in numerous 
deaths and injuries. However, any such harm which occurs as a result of an operation 
is seemingly justified as a necessary sacrifice in the overall struggle, as has been the 
case when ALF actions have resulted in the deaths of lab animals.28 In contrast to 
terrorist organisations which seek to achieve the biggest death tolls in an attempt to
27 FBI Report, Terrorism in the United States 1996 pp. 4-5.
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achieve objectives and gain publicity, these special interest groups generally focus on 
economic sabotage and financial loss as an effective weapon in driving companies 
and laboratories out of business. Incendiary devices and arson are among the most 
popular methods chosen by these organisations, particularly with regard to ALF 
attacks on university laboratories due to the fact that the destruction of years of 
research is an effective means of discouraging further work; indeed the first terrorist 
incident recorded by the FBI as perpetrated by special interest extremists was an 
attack by the ALF on a laboratory in the University of Davis, California in 1987 
which caused damage in the region of $5.1 million. Other such attacks have occurred 
steadily since 1984 on targets such as meat and poultry distribution companies, fast 
food restaurants and hospitals.
The ELF caused over $12 million of damage with an arson attack at a ski resort in 
Vail, Colorado in 1998 in protest at proposed expansion which would have allegedly 
destroyed the best natural habitat of the Canadian lynx in the state. This attack 
underlined the difference in tactics between the ELF and its founding organisation the 
British Earth First movement; indeed it is believed that the lack of militancy in the 
parent organisation prompted the formation of a splinter group prepared to use 
violence to further the cause. Further arson attacks have taken place on such targets 
as US Forest Industries facilities, university laboratories researching genetically 
engineered products and companies responsible for deforestation and destruction of 
ecosystems. The ELF was particularly active in 2003 causing an estimated $50 
million of damage in the arson of an apartment complex in San Diego, California in a
7 0stand against “rampant urban development” as well as targeting several car 
dealerships in Los Angeles to demonstrate against pollution and fuel consumption. 
Indeed the ELF claims to have caused damage in the region of over $100 million 
since 1997. As is the case in the United Kingdom, with animal rights extremism, 
specific issue terrorism is a growing phenomenon in the United States. The on-going 
campaign of such groups is clear on consideration of statistics regarding domestic
28 C. C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, (Pearson Education, Inc, 2003, 3rd ed.) p. 166.
29 Seth Hettena, (2003), Earth Liberation Front Claims Responsibility for San Diego Arson, The 
Mercury News 18th August.
30 ELF Strikes Against Urban Sprawl in San Diego: Four Houses Burned to the Ground in Action 
Against "Development Destruction" September 19, 2003. 
http://www.earthliberationfront.com/news/2003/091903.shtml [23/09/03].
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teirrorism; indeed animal rights or environmental activists were responsible for eight
T 1o f the twelve domestic terrorist incidents to occur in the US in 1999.
A further manifestation of special interest terrorism, common to the United States 
stems from the anti-abortion issue. Violence perpetrated against abortion clinics and 
women’s care centres dates back to 1977, but the emotiveness of the issue concerned 
has meant that such violence was not labelled terrorism for many years. Furthermore, 
it was often mistakenly believed that such violence was the work of impassioned 
individuals working alone, rather than with the support of extremist organisations. 
However, the fundamentalist religious foundations of organisations such as the Army 
o f God, known to encourage violence against those involved in abortions, have 
resulted in the connections between groups of this ilk and the far right. The staunch 
pro-choice stance of the Clinton administration, exemplified clearly by such action as 
the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrance Act of 1994 would have easily pushed the 
anti-abortion movement into a closer alliance with the anti-government stance of the 
right, so that Christian beliefs were not the only cornerstone of this shared
T9foundation.
Anti-abortion terrorism has often occurred in trends; butyric acid attacks were the
T Tweapon of choice in the early 1990s, arson has also been a common favourite, as has 
vandalism and harassment. These trends have been punctuated by differing tactics, 
for example the kidnapping of an abortion provider and his wife in Illinois, who were 
held hostage for eight days. However, a clear escalation is evident in the level of 
violence used by pro-life terrorists, particularly in the 1990s. The use of bombs 
increased as the amount of care taken to avoid casualties decreased; indeed forty such 
attacks are said to have been committed on abortion clinics between 1993-1998. 
Individual abortion providers also became increasingly vulnerable to the sniper’s gun, 
with the murders of five such workers attributed to anti-abortion terrorism in the 
1990s.
31 FBI Report, n. 1 above p. 30.
32 See Hewitt, n. 2 above pp. 38-41, 125-126. See also F. Rich, 1995, Connect the Dots, in F. 
McGuckin, Terrorism in the United States (The H. W. Wilson Company, 1997) pp. 14-15 on this 
connection.
33 E. Smeal, 1995, Antiabortion Extremists: Organized and Dangerous, in McGuckin, ibid. p. 70.
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International Terrorism
International terrorism has been very much a double-edged sword for the United 
States over the years; indeed the relative dearth of international terrorist incidents in 
the US has to be balanced against the frequency of attacks against US citizens and 
property abroad. The Cuban terrorist group Omega 7 represented the majority of 
international terrorist activity on US soil in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Scores of 
attacks against Cuban targets and representatives between 1974 and 1983 credited the 
organisation with being the most active international terrorist group in America during 
this period.34 However, it was not until the 1990s that Americans were specifically 
threatened by international terrorism within the borders of the US. International 
terrorism overseas posed a much greater threat to Americans; this has been said to 
result from several factors, in particular the high visibility of American targets across 
the world and the guaranteed media coverage which resulted from such attacks. 
Furthermore, the policies of the United States, such as involvement in the Middle
o r
East, was seen as an impediment to the political objectives of many terrorist groups.
Essentially the targeting of Americans overseas began in 1970 with the hijacking of 
four planes en route to New York by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP). This hijacking was a large-scale extension of the common terrorist tactic of 
the 1960s, but this represented the first major international incident directed 
specifically against the US. This however, was not representative of the attacks 
against US targets which varied a great deal in location, perpetrator, method and 
target over the years. One of the most popular tactics for international terrorists 
across the world was the targeting of American embassies and diplomatic staff. This 
was not a new phenomenon; indeed the late 1960s and early 1970s were punctuated 
with sporadic attacks on US diplomatic personnel in various countries, ranging from 
kidnap to murder. The threat faced by such personnel was brought home in the US 
embassy hostage crisis of 1979 in which 53 diplomats were held hostage for more 
than a year. This terrorist incident, played out on the world stage, highlighted the
34 Smith, n. 11 above p. 134.
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effectiveness of terrorism as a political tool not simply because of the length of time 
the Americans were imprisoned but because it highlighted the way in which a country 
as powerful as the United States could also be held captive; indeed the Iranian radicals 
were essentially responsible for the downfall of the Carter administration. This 
incident also exemplified the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism, of which Iran 
was one of the main proponents for many years.
Although at risk from terrorist attack in a great many countries of the world, 
America’s involvement in the Middle East laid the foundations for the majority of 
terrorism overseas which the US experienced. Indeed it was on the Middle Eastern 
stage that America suffered some of the worst assaults, particularly because the US 
military presence in the region increased the choice of American targets for groups
T f isuch as Hizb’allah. Mortar and grenade attacks against US troops became a 
common occurrence but the most effective weapon proved to be the suicide bomb. 
This was first used against a US target by Hizb’allah on April 18th 1983 when a truck 
carrying 20001bs of explosives crashed in to the American embassy, killing 63 people, 
seventeen of which were Americans.37 The effectiveness of this weapon was 
highlighted again in an attack on the US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 
which killed 242 Americans. The ultimate withdrawal of the US from Lebanon in 
1984 obviously led to a lessening in the amount of terrorist attacks against US targets 
in the region. However, the risk to Americans remained in other parts of the world. 
Attacks occurred in such places as Greece and Mexico, and groups such as Hizb’allah 
continued to act as a threat to the US in other areas, as demonstrated by the bombing 
of a restaurant in Spain in April 1984 which was often frequented by US citizens; 
eighteen American servicemen were killed and 83 others were injured. The 
interception of communications between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in East 
Germany authorising the bombing of a known haunt of US servicemen, the LaBelle 
disco in West Berlin, in which two people were killed and 230 were injured, finally 
provided the US with enough reason to retaliate against this known sponsor of 
terrorism. However, this incident and the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 on the night
35 J. Brent Wilson, “The United States’ Response to International Terrorism” in D. A. Charters, The 
Deadly Sin o f  Terrorism. Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, (Greenwood 
Press, 1994) p. 174.
36 Also known as Islamic Jihad.
37 Simon, n. 13 above p. 175.
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of December 21st 1988 in which 270 people, including 189 Americans were killed 
demonstrated that the reach of international terrorism, and in particular state 
sponsored terrorism, extended far beyond the borders of the Middle East.
High profile incidents in 1985 such as the hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Lebanese 
terrorists as well as the hijacking of the cruise ship Achilles Lauro by Palestinian 
terrorists, in which two Americans were murdered, kept international terrorism very 
much in the public eye in the 1980s. However, the tactic of choice in this decade was 
a return to kidnapping, which proved to be a most effective weapon in the Middle 
East, and indeed the many hostage takings which occurred periodically throughout the 
decade came to personify international terrorism at the time. Citizens of several 
countries fell victim to this ploy, which proved effective, in a similar way to the Iran 
hostage crisis of 1979-1981, due to the prolonged nature of the tactic which affected 
many countries worldwide. Seventeen Americans were held hostage between 1982 
and 1992, with claims that as many as 90 foreigners were abducted in Lebanon during 
this period.38
US interests continued to be the most common targets of international terrorism in the 
1990s. However, the backdrop of the majority of international terrorism directed at 
the US in the late 1980s and early 1990s shifted from the Middle East to South 
America; indeed in 1989 64% of all anti-US terrorism occurred in Latin America.39 
Anti-American sentiment provided a common bond for the many terrorist groups in 
the region, and the majority of this was directed at American property, in particular 
American owned companies. The majority of attacks in 1989 consisted of bombings 
against US owned oil pipelines. Peru was noted as a particularly dangerous place for 
any foreigner but specifically Americans due to the violent tendencies of Sendero 
Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Abduction also proved a 
popular tactic in the region in the 1990s, particularly in Colombia where the ransoms 
paid were used to fund criminal actions, specifically the rife drug trade in the country. 
Kidnappings of US citizens by groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) continued steadily throughout the 1990s. It was not until 1993 that
38 Amnesty International (1997) Israel's Forgotten Hostages: Lebanese Detainees in Israel and Khiam 
Detention Centre, AI INDEX: MDE 15/018/1997 Available from:
http://web.amnestv.org/librarv/Index/ENGMDE 150181997?open&of=ENG-ISR [15/09/03].
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Latin America lost the dubious title of being the region of the world witness to the 
most terrorism.
The 1990s witnessed the evolution of a reinforced strain of anti-American feeling. 
This was nurtured to full strength by Osama bin Laden and A1 Qaeda. Such was the 
part played by this organisation in the 1990s in international terrorism, and in 
particular anti-American violence, that bin Laden is viewed by many as the 
personification of terrorism itself. A1 Qaeda aims to rid the Middle East of Western 
influence so as to establish fundamentalist Islamic regimes in the countries of the 
region. The virulent anti-American feeling stems, from the imperialism of the US 
government and its presence in the Middle East which is seen as impeding the 
establishment of Muslim rule. The bombing of a US military housing facility, Khobar 
Towers, in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia in June 1996, in which nineteen US servicemen 
were killed and 515 others were wounded, is a prime example of an attempt to rid the 
region of the US military. Whilst, no direct connection to bin Laden was made, 
indeed indictments were returned in 2001 against fourteen members of Hizb’allah, 
intelligence indicates increased cooperation between these two very dangerous 
organisations, particularly in the sphere of anti-American action. A1 Qaeda’s 
commitment to the removal of the US military in the Middle East was left in no doubt 
following the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 which killed 17 sailors and 
injured 39 others.
Though officially formed in 1988, with roots dating back to the 1970s and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, A1 Qaeda did not rise to prominence, particularly in the eyes 
of the public, until the 1990s when the large scale, high profile attacks of the 
organisation and the resultant mass casualties guaranteed a place in the public 
consciousness. The simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya 
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7 1998 in which over 250 people were
killed and over 5000 injured exemplifies the desire of the organisation to claim as 
many lives as possible. Indeed the original intention had been to place the bombs 
beneath the embassy buildings to achieve maximum damage and increase the death
39 Patterns o f Global Terrorism: 1989.
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toll. There can be no better example of this tactic than the attacks on the United 
States on September 11th 2001.
As mentioned previously whilst terrorism directed at US citizens abroad continued 
unabated in the latter years of the twentieth century, international terrorism took on a 
new twist in the 1990s in the form of attacks against Americans in America. The first 
example of this occurred in 1993 with the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New
t f iYork on 26 February by Islamic extremists, in which six people were killed and over 
1000 injured. 12001bs of fertilizer-based explosives were packed into a rental van 
which was parked in an underground parking garage. The plan, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, was to topple one tower in to the second with the intention of killing the 
fifty or so thousand people believed to be in the complex at the time. The symbolism 
of the attack was as important, if not more so, than the ultimate outcome: terrorism 
had finally struck at the heart of America, dispelling the aura of invulnerability which 
had existed in the United States for so long.40 As of that day, Islamic extremism 
became synonymous with terrorism, so much so that the immediate assumption 
following the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in 
Oklahoma City, in which 166 people were killed, was that it was the work of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorists. However, whilst some worrying parallels did exist between 
the perpetrators of these two tragedies, in particular the fact that both were the work 
of so-called freelance terrorists rather than those with obvious links to known terrorist 
organisations,41 the automatic assumption that terrorism related to the Middle East 
had struck again on US soil was proved to be incorrect. Rather, it was determined 
that the attack had been perpetrated by individuals with connections to domestic right- 
wing extremism.
The final vestiges of America’s invulnerability were destroyed on the morning of 11th 
September 2001 as four planes, hijacked by members of A1 Qaeda were used both as 
literal and symbolic missiles against landmarks representative of the American 
heartland. Over 3,000 people were killed in the attacks on the twin towers of the 
World Trade Centre, the Pentagon in Washington and on a fourth plane which crashed
40 The following year four Islamic militants were convicted o f  the bombing and sentenced to 240 years 
each. Two further men, one, Ramzi Yousef, is believed to have masterminded the plot, were convicted 
and sentenced for their part in the bombing in 1998.
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into open countryside in Pennsylvania, but which is believed to have been heading for 
either the White House or the Capitol building.
With hindsight, the attacks of the 1990s, both on American soil and abroad, 
particularly those perpetrated by A1 Qaeda, can be seen as a prelude to the worst 
terrorist attack ever to occur. In the space of a few short hours, it became clear that 
2001 would stand as a watershed between terrorism in the twenty first century and the 
phenomenon as it existed previously. The attacks of September 11th changed more 
than just the physical landscape of the United States. For the first time ever, America 
was deemed to be under attack and this manifested itself in the aftermath of the 
atrocity not only militarily but also legislatively.
The enactment of two pieces of anti-terrorism legislation in 1996 and 2001, in 
response to major terrorist attacks was reminiscent of the United Kingdom’s response 
to its terrorist struggle. Indeed legislating for the last atrocity was a recognised 
feature of British anti-terrorism law but was not a contributory factor to the legislative 
landscape of the US until the country was faced with terrorism of great magnitude on 
home soil. In the past the terrorist threat was such that the criminal law was deemed 
sufficient in investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences. This is no longer the 
case and the terrorism of recent years, as well as a fear of what the future holds has 
resulted in the enactment of specific legislation, which has been accused of 
unconstitutionality due to the potential for infringement of civil rights. The nature of 
the phenomenon is such that the issues arising from anti-terrorism legislation are 
essentially the same in both the United Kingdom and the United States, despite the 
fact that the legislation was enacted in response to different manifestations of the 
phenomenon. Indeed despite having witnessed the United Kingdom’s prolonged 
struggle to balance security and liberty, the United States found these conflicting 
concepts no easier to reconcile.
41 See Kushner, n. 21 above pp. 40-53 regarding the growth o f this phenomenon in the US in the 1990s.
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The United States Response to the Terrorist Threat Prior to 1996
As has been seen, the United States has faced a sustained terrorist threat over the 
years, both domestically and more prolifically from international actors, mainly 
abroad. In response the US utilised a raft of measures in an attempt to counter the 
growing threat. These measures were wide-ranging and extended across the political 
spectrum.42 An extensive framework of policies and organisations was established by 
the executive branch and was subsequently amended and built upon in effecting US 
counter terrorism policy. This began with the establishment of the Cabinet 
Committee to Combat Terrorism, the role of which was to coordinate government 
response, collect information and determine the response to be taken in the event of a 
terrorist attack. Changes were made to this structure by subsequent administrations. 
Under President Carter the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security 
Council undertook supervision of various agencies in their roles, such as the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) responsibility for aircraft hijackings, the State 
Department’s responsibility for overseas incidents and the joint role of the 
Department of Justice and FBI regarding domestic incidents. The Reagan 
administration established an Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism which dealt with 
international cooperation, diplomacy efforts, legislation, research and training 
exercises. Further amendments occurred later with the establishment of the FBI as the 
lead agency for domestic terrorism and the primary supporting agency for 
international incidents and the establishment of the role of a national coordinator for 
security, infrastructure protection and counter terrorism.
The threat posed to US citizens and installations overseas resulted in international 
cooperation forming a pillar of US policy in this area. This has included bi-lateral and 
multilateral agreements, such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism 1937, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents 1973 and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 2000. 
United States anti-terrorist policy also extended so as to make use of military strikes,
42 For a detailed discussion o f these measures see Laura K. Donohue, In the Name o f  National Security: 
U.S. Counterterrorist Measures, 1960-2000. BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-6, ESDP Discussion Paper 
ESDP-2001-04, John F. Kennedy School o f Government, Harvard University, August 2001.
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such as those utilised against Libya in 1986 in response to the bombing of the La 
Belle disco in Berlin as well as coercive practices by the FBI and CIA with regard to 
suspected international terrorists such as Fawaz Younis. In making use of the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti- 
Terrorism Act US authorities arrested Younis in international waters off Cyprus in 
1987. In addition to the use of the military for retaliatory strikes the Department of 
Defence also established a counter-terrorism unit following the 1977 Mogadishu 
hijacking, known as Delta Force. Following the failed rescue mission of the US 
hostages held in Teheran in 1980, the Joint Special Operations Command was created, 
with the remit of establishing a more unified special forces approach to the terrorist 
problem which was utilised in both an operational and advisory capacity. Steps were 
also taken to improve airport and aeroplane security as well as the security of federal 
buildings within the US and its embassies and installations abroad. This includes sky 
marshals, improved security apparatus, more security officers, passenger profiling, 
roadblocks and tighter security checks on airport and federal staff. The need for 
increased airport security prompted the enactment of legislation such as the 1974 Air 
Transportation Security Act requiring the implementation of improved security 
standards as well as US involvement with international treaties such s the Montreal 
Convention 1971.
In addition to the above measures, the United States utilised the law as a means of 
addressing the terrorist threat. However, in contrast to the United Kingdom’s 
specialist anti-terrorist legislation, the US relied predominantly on the ordinary 
criminal law. The successful investigation and prosecution of terrorist incidents such 
as the World Trade Centre bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, 
through reliance on ordinary investigative practices and criminal procedure rules, 
underlined an approach which was consistent with the level of threat as well as with 
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The threat faced by the US was not sufficient to 
justify enactment of measures such as internment, extended or coercive detention and 
interrogation or adjustments to the criminal justice system, as occurred in the UK. 
Moreover, the Constitution has acted as a buffer preventing enactment of such 
provisions as extended detention or trial without jury. This approach contrasts to that 
of the United Kingdom, whereby the anti-terrorism package enacted provisions
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specific to countering terrorism as well as amending basic elements of criminal 
procedure, such as arrest and detention, so as to create a wholly separate regime.
In order to make it easier to use and secure prosecutions under the criminal law, 
various pieces of legislation were enacted in the US. For example the 1974 Anti­
hijacking Act and the Air Transportation Security Act authorised universal baggage 
screening and led to the establishment of the FAA anti-hijacking program. The 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act 1986 established jurisdiction for 
US courts over extraterritorial attacks against US nationals. The Antiterrorism Act 
1991 sought to deal with the financial workings of terrorist organisations and 
provided a statutory right to American victims of international terrorism to seek civil 
redress, by enabling victims to seize assets of terrorists who are within jurisdictional 
reach. Additional legislation was enacted in the form of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1987, 
which, as somewhat of a precursor to the AEDPA, prohibited US citizens from 
receiving any assistance, financial or otherwise, except informational materials, from 
the PLO. In addition, the Act proscribed the establishment of offices and similar 
facilities which sought to further the interests of the PLO. In a similar vein to the 
provisions relating to the designation of foreign terrorist organisations and the 
provision of material support to such groups under the AEDPA, this provision of the 
1987 Act43 raised questions with regard to its compatibility with the First 
Amendment. Such a provision enacted in the name of national security in order to 
prevent the PLO a platform in the United States from which to operate, potentially 
restricted the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and assembly of those 
individuals wishing to associate with and advocate on behalf of the PLO. In keeping 
with the cases which arose in relation to the provisions of the AEDPA, it was held in 
the case of Mendelsohn v Meese44 that the Act does not violate the First Amendment 
and that any incidental restriction on freedom of speech was outweighed by the 
overwhelming governmental interest in national security.45
43 Section 1003 Anti-Terrorism Act 1987. 22 USC 5202.
44 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S. D. N. Y. 1988) Further discussion o f this case and the provisions of the Act 
can be found in L. A. Harke, “The Anti-Terrorism Act o f 1987 and American Freedoms: A Critical 
Overview” (1989) University o f  Miami Law Review, Vol. 43, pp. 667-719.
45 The test utilised by the court was that laid down in the case o f United States v O ’Brien 391 US 367 
(1968). This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6 with regard to freedom o f expression and the 
provisions o f  the AEDPA. The four elements to be satisfied in the test are as follows: 1) that enactment 
o f the provision is within the constitutional power o f the government, 2) that it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest, 3) that the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
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Conclusion
It is important to remember that the measures discussed are those prior to the 
enactment of the AEDPA 1996 and the USA PATRIOT Act 2001. The events of 
September 11th and the subsequent response cast a shadow over preceding measures 
and the less prevalent terrorist history experienced by the US within its borders. 
Certain observations can be made regarding this period in the history of the United 
States’ experience with terrorism. Firstly, the terrorist threat was not sufficient to 
draw the United States into a cycle of reaction to the same extent as occurred in the 
United Kingdom. That is not to say that steps were not taken in response to terrorist 
attacks. The military strikes taken against Libya in 1986 and the measures taken to 
improve airport security exemplify the use of counterattack and adaptation in answer 
to questions asked of the US. However, the nature of the threat faced by the United 
States was never such as to prompt legislative reaction, as was often the case in the 
United Kingdom.
Secondly, save for the aforementioned provision of the 1987 Anti-Terrorism Act 
relating to freedom of expression which, due to satisfaction of the test in O ’Brien, was 
held not to violate the First Amendment, it can be said of these counter-terrorism 
measures that any consequent restriction on the rights and liberties of the individual 
was minimal. Indeed, at no point did terrorism or the country’s response to it damage 
the fabric of democracy. In comparison to the prolonged and concentrated threat 
posed to the UK by Irish Nationalist violence, it seems that the threat to the US, both 
domestic and international, was not of such strength as to provoke far-reaching and 
intrusive measures. Prior to the high-profile attacks of 1995 and 2001, terrorist 
incidents within the US were not of the prevalence or intensity as to place the US in 
the position of a country under attack. As such it was not deemed necessary to curtail 
liberty in order to protect freedom. This may be attributed to the counter-terrorism 
measures put in place, or to the nature of US society which espouses the ideals of 
freedom of expression and political dissent to such an extent as to dissipate the 
tensions which can ignite terrorist violence. In consideration of the measures enacted 
in the past it may be the case that it is a combination of both factors to which the
free expression and 4) that the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
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relative dearth of attacks can be attributed. Indeed, in enacting measures which on the 
whole left fundamental rights intact and kept the ideals of democracy as a foundation, 
the United States achieved some degree of the requisite balance between security and 
liberty which protected democracy and the security of the country.
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
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Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Privacy of the Individual
thThe events of September 11 2001 acted as a catalyst for new legislative measures
affecting the privacy of the individual, revealing a shift in the methods employed in 
countering the current terrorist threat. In the United Kingdom emphasis is placed on 
data retention and disclosure of information in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, whilst the USA PATRIOT Act contains numerous provisions concerning 
surveillance and data collection. This plethora of measures represent an attempt to 
confront the technological advances which have occurred in mobile and internet 
communications in recent years and which have become a common feature of modem 
life. These advances, as well as the nature of the 9/11 attacks perpetrated by “sleeper 
cells” of terrorists with no known affiliations residing in the country, acted as a 
catalyst for provisions which have resulted in an increase in the interference with the 
right to privacy by measures enacted to counter terrorism.1 Of course, international 
terrorism was a threat faced by both countries prior to the events of 9/11, yet in 
seizing the legislative opportunity posed, by extending the powers of the state with 
regard to surveillance of and information gathering about individuals, the 
governments in both countries have taken advantage of the intense vulnerability felt 
by the populace at the time.
Privacy in the United Kingdom
Although it was once the case that there was said to be no explicit right to privacy in 
the UK, the law in this area has developed to such an extent that it can now be 
asserted that such a right does exist in English law, albeit somewhat lacking in 
clarity. However, even prior to these developments and the enactment of the Human
1 Previously, the privacy o f the individual had been affected by anti-terrorism provisions in the form of  
measures such as house searches, particularly in Northern Ireland. See for example, sections 17, 18, 20 
and 23 EPA 1996.
2 “It is well known that in English law there is no right to privacy...” Kaye vRobertson [1991] F.S.R.
62 p. 66.
3 R Singh and J. Strachan, Privacy Postponed, (2003) EHRLR 12. See Campbell v MGN Ltd. [2004] 
UKHL 22.
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Rights Act it was not the case that privacy was afforded no protection. Indeed, several 
international instruments have provided recognition and protection to the privacy of 
the individual. The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
both of which provide that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”4 This is reinforced by the European Convention on Human 
Rights under which “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.”5 The notion of “private life” is said to be broader
f\ 7than that of privacy encapsulating, inter alia, sexual orientation sexual activity, 
personal information,8 and parental contact.9 Seemingly, this notion of private life as 
a broader concept than simply the “right to be let alone” is reminiscent of the 
penumbral quality of the right to privacy in the United States.
Qualification to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is contained 
in subsection (2) which provides that any interference with this right by a public 
authority must be in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society and 
carried out in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well­
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.10
The parameters of the right to privacy in the context of covert surveillance and 
national security were outlined in the case of Klass and Others v Germany.11 This 
concerned a challenge to legislation which permitted covert surveillance of mail, post 
and telecommunications in order “to protect the free democratic constitutional order 
or the existence or security” of the state. In its judgment, the European Court of 
Human Rights found that legislation of this kind constitutes a direct interference with
4 See article 12 Universal Declaration on Human Rights and article 17 ICCPR.
5 Article 8(1)ECHR.
6 Smith v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493.
1ADT  v UK (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 33.
8 MG v U K (2003) 26 E.H.R.R. 3.
9 Sahin v Germany (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 43.
10 Article 8(2) ECHR.
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the privacy of all users and potential users of such telecommunications networks, as 
guaranteed by article 8.12 The court stated that the “menace of surveillance” of 
citizens is “tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for 
safeguarding the democratic institutions.”13 The court observed that in light of the 
proliferation of terrorism as well as the technical advances made in the fields of 
espionage and surveillance techniques, democratic societies must be able to order the 
covert surveillance of subversive elements of society so as to counter such threats 
effectively. However, the operation of any system of surveillance must be 
accompanied by the existence of safeguards as a guarantee against abuse. It was 
stated that this assessment is one of relative character, depending on all the 
circumstances of the case such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible 
measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities involved in 
carrying out and supervising such measures as well as the kind of remedy provided by 
domestic law.14
In Klass the contested legislation provided numerous limitative conditions to be 
satisfied in relation to any surveillance undertaken. Judicial control of the 
surveillance was not provided, and whilst such a form of supervision was said to be 
preferable in an area in which abuse was potentially so easy on the basis that the rule 
of law implies that interference with an individual’s rights by the executive should be 
controlled by judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence and 
impartiality, the nature of the safeguards provided were held to be sufficient so as to 
keep the “interference” resulting from the legislation from exceeding the limits of 
what may be deemed necessary in a democratic society.15 These safeguards included 
the approval of surveillance by a statutory commission, supervision of implementation 
by an official qualified for judicial office and a requirement that the Minister make 
regular reports on the use of the legislation to an all-party parliamentary committee. 
These were found to amount to effective and continuous control ensuring that 
surveillance was not ordered irregularly or without due and proper consideration.
11 (1979) 2 EHRR 214.
12 Ibid  para. 37.
13 Ibid. para. 42.
14 Ibid. para. 50.
15 Ibid. para. 56
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The nature of covert surveillance dictates that it is carried out without the knowledge 
of the individual concerned, thereby precluding him from any review proceedings 
which take place and indeed negating any recourse to the courts which may, in 
principle, be available once surveillance has ceased. It was held by the court that in 
some cases subsequent notification may well jeopardise the purpose which prompted 
the surveillance as well as reveal the operational methods of the intelligence services; 
“ ...in so far as the “interference” resulting from the contested legislation is in 
principle justified under Article 8(2), the fact of not informing the individual once 
surveillance has ceased cannot itself be incompatible with this provision since it is this 
very fact which ensures the efficacy of the “interference.””16 In light of these 
considerations, the court stated that failure to inform the subject of the surveillance 
once it had ceased was not incompatible with article 8. However, due to the fact that 
the logistics of covert surveillance prevent the individual from seeking an effective 
remedy of his own accord, the adequacy and efficacy of safeguards is essential in 
preventing abuse and protecting the rights of the individual. Ultimately, the values of 
a democratic society must be followed as closely as possible in respecting the rule of 
law and ensuring a balance is achieved between the exercise of the individual’s right 
to privacy guaranteed under article 8(1) and the necessity of surveillance for the 
protection of society as a whole.
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
tViThe events of September 11 resulted in the enactment of a plethora of measures in 
the United States with the potential to interfere with the constitutionally protected 
right to privacy. This was not an isolated phenomenon. Indeed, the equivalent 
legislation in the United Kingdom also raised questions about the compatibility of 
certain provisions with the right to respect for private life contained in article 8 of the 
ECHR, as conferred by the Human Rights Act 1998.
16 Ibid. para. 58
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Part XI Retention of Communications Data
i  y
Part XI of the ATCSA provides for the retention of communications data by 
requiring communication providers to hold communications data beyond the period 
for which such information is necessary for business purposes. The Act only governs 
retention of the data, access to which falls under the regime established under the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. The aim of Part XI is said not 
to be to extend the fields of data retained by such providers but to encourage retention
IQ t
for longer than would be necessary for commercial reasons. Communications data
is defined in section 21(4) of RIP A and amounts to data emanating from telephone,
Internet and postal communications. This includes such information as that
concerning the subscriber, details of calls made, emails sent or websites visited and in
the case of mobile phones, the geographical position of the user.19 Whilst this does
not extend to the content of the communication, the information is such that it is
20  • • •possible to build up a complete dossier on an individual’s private life. Whilst this is 
a concern in itself, it is exacerbated by the fact that Part XI provides for blanket 
retention of such data, resulting in such profiles on thousands of people.
Section 102 of the Act provides for the issuance of a code of practice by the Secretary 
of State regarding the retention of communications data for an extended period, stated 
at paragraph 16 to be twelve months.21 This provides that retention of data for 
extended periods is necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security or for 
the purposes of prevention or detection of crime or the prosecution of offenders which 
may relate directly or indirectly to national security.22 The Bill originally provided for 
such retention in relation to any criminal activity, a scope which met with great 
opposition in the House of Lords and eventually led to a last minute amendment
17 Currently governed by the Telecommunications (Data protection and Privacy) Regulations 1999.
18 Retention o f  Communications Data Under Part 11: Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
Voluntary Code o f Practice: The Home Office.
19 T. Owen, (2002) Police Powers, Surveillance and Privacy Intrusions, Justice Conference, Terrorism. 
Mapping the New Legal Framework, London, 28th June.
20 C. Walker and Y. Akdeniz, “Anti-Terrorism Laws and Data Retention: War is Over?” (2003) NILQ 
54(2) 159 p. 162.
21 A draft o f the code o f practice was published in March 2003 and is available at 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2003/draft/5b.pdf
22 Code o f practice para. 2 See also section 102(3) ATCSA.
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requiring that retention for the purpose of the prevention or detection of crime be 
connected to national security either directly or indirectly.23 However, whilst it is the 
case that retention of data is necessary for purposes of or related to national security, 
access to such data is not constrained in this way. “The Government do not consider 
that the fact that data is held by communications service providers under the code of 
practice for national security purposes should in itself prevent the police or other 
public authorities having access to that data for another purpose. It is considered that 
this would be wrong as a matter of policy and that legally no such automatic 
restriction exists.”24 The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) was nonetheless 
satisfied that sufficient safeguards were in place so as to comply with the requirements 
of article 8 of the ECHR.25
Described as “ ...one of the more insidious elements of the Bill” the notion of such 
data retention has raised many questions and generated a great deal of criticism with 
regard to the privacy of the individual. Indeed, retention of communications data as 
provided for in the Act does not comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 
1998, most notably that personal data shall not be further processed in a manner 
incompatible with the purpose for which it was retained and shall not be kept for 
longer than is necessary for that original purpose.27 Indeed, the Law Society has 
stated that the Government has failed in the first serious test of its commitment to data 
protection. However, the code of practice can be said to be in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act on the grounds that such retention is necessary for the purposes of 
national security, as provided in section 28 of the 1998 Act.
23 HL Debs vol. 629, col. 1474, 13th December 2001.
24 Letter from Rt Hon David Blunkett MP, Secretary o f State for the Home Department, to the Chair of 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 30th October 2003, submitted as written evidence to the 
Committee’s Sixteenth Report available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.Uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtrights/l 81/18102.htm
25 For example the requirement that such access be authorised by a designated person bound to refuse 
an authorisation unless he or she believes that the requirements o f necessity and proportionality are met 
on the facts o f each particular case, as well as the availability o f judicial review and the need to comply 
with the principles o f the Data Protection Act 1998. See JCHR 16th Report ibid. para. 25.
26 HL Debs, vol. 629, col. 255, 27th November 2001, Earl o f Northesk.
27 Sch. 1 Data Protection Act 1998.
28Underpinning Security, Safeguarding Liberty, A Memorandum to the Home Affairs Select Committee 
on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 available at 
http://www.lawsocietv.org.uk/dcs/pdf/immigration underpinning.pdf [20th April 2004]
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In light of this circumvention of data privacy principles, it is increasingly important to 
balance the need for what is considered to be an effective tool in the war against 
terrorism and in law enforcement generally against the implications which arise with 
regard to the privacy of the individual. On a slightly different note, it is entirely 
possible that knowledge of the existence of such a vast database would have a 
detrimental effect on freedom of expression given the fact that the individual may 
adjust her behaviour, albeit completely innocent, due to concern regarding access to 
personal communications information by the state. Indeed, it is the employment of 
blanket data retention described as being kept for an “investigatory rainy day” which 
essentially leads to the creation of a suspect community, as opposed to data 
preservation on the grounds of reasonable suspicion of involvement in a criminal 
activity31 which is extremely unpalatable given its resemblance to a police state.32
Much debate has centred on the status of communications providers. Section 6 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 requires that all public authorities act in a manner compatible 
with the Convention; however concern has arisen with regard to whether a 
communications provider falls within this category. In answer to the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, the Home Secretary declared that it is the opinion of the 
government that retention of data under Part XI is considered to be "a private function 
that arises out of the commercial service that the communication services providers 
provide".33 This of course would have the effect that such providers are not bound by 
the requirements of section 6. In contrast, it has been suggested that in retaining data 
in accordance with the code of practice, a communications provider could be said to 
be exercising a function of a public nature so as to bring it within the notion of a 
public authority contained in section 6(3)(b) of the 1998 Act.34 The narrowly drawn 
criteria applied in determining whether a body is likely to be held to be a public body 
performing public functions is problematic with regards to human rights protection
29 See paras. 5-10 code o f practice.
30 C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, (OUP, 2002) p. 157.
31 In Klass and Others v Germany (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 214 there had to exist certain factual indications 
for suspecting a person o f planning, committing or having committed certain serious criminal acts.
32 See Walker and Akdeniz, n. 14 above p. 177.
33 JCHR, 16th Report, n. 18 above para. 11.
34 See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Retention and Disclosure o f Communications Data 
Summary o f Counsels’ Advice available at
http://www.privacvintemational.org/countries/uk/surveillance/ic-terror-opinion.htm [18th April 2004].
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and has led to an examination of the meaning of “public authority” as developed since 
the Human Rights Act came in force by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.35 In 
light of this clarification on the matter it is indeed arguable that a communications 
provider may fall within the notion of a “functional public authority” given its
36exercise of a power of a public nature directly assigned to it by statute. Also, 
influential though singularly not determinative is the public interest, namely national 
security and the detection and prevention of crime, in the function performed as well 
as the motivation of serving the public interest as opposed to any financial 
motivation.37
The desire that measures and procedures which have the potential to interfere with the 
rights of the individual, are balanced, proportionate and in conformity with human 
rights standards, is vastly increased when the practice in question is inherently covert, 
as discussed in the context of Klass. The provisions contained in Part XI have 
generated a great deal of concern with regard to compliance with article 8: "The 
proposed provisions could have a significant impact on the privacy of individuals 
whose data are retained.”38
Possible justification under article 8(2) first requires that the interference be in 
accordance with the law. The fact that implementation occurs through a code of 
practice may be problematic, however the provision ultimately derives from the 
ATCSA, and combined with the option of giving directions by way of statutory 
instrument if deemed necessary under section 104, results in a prima facie satisfaction 
of this requirement. However, this requirement encapsulates two further criteria, 
namely that the law is accessible and sufficiently precise so as to be foreseeable in its 
consequences. With regard to the former, it can be said that the code of practice sets 
out the legal rules applicable to retention of data as well as provision for oversight by 
way of the Data Protection Act 1998 which is in turn subject to supervision by the
35 Seventh Report on The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act 1998 available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/it200304/itselect/itrights/39/3902.htm [21st April 1998].
36 Ibid. para. 40.
37 Ibid.
38 News Release, Information Commissioner Contributes To Scrutiny o f  Anti-Terrorism Bill, 13 th 
November 2001, available at
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Information Commissioner.39 Moreover, the fact that the opportunity for public 
consultation was given prior to publication of the draft code as well as publication 
itself would be sufficient to give to the individual an indication of the legal rules 
applicable. With regard to foreseeability, the European Court of Human Rights has 
stated that this requirement may vary according to context, for example in cases of 
covert surveillance, “ ...the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens 
an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which 
public authorities are empowered to resort to...secret and potentially dangerous 
interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence.”40 Given 
that the code of practice authorises blanket retention of all communications data for 
twelve months, the circumstances and conditions of retention leading to an 
interference with an individual’s privacy should be sufficiently, though worryingly 
clear.
The purpose of data retention under Part XI is said to be for the safeguarding of 
national security or for the prevention or detection of crime or the prosecution of 
offences which relate directly or indirectly to national security. As such it is clear that 
the requirement that an interference with the right to respect for private life must 
pursue a legitimate aim is satisfied. However, establishing whether interference such 
as this is necessary in a democratic society is problematic. Of course the fact that 
such a provision has been enacted in the first place indicates that it has been deemed 
to be necessary in a democratic society. However, this requires a finding of 
proportionality as well as the establishment that the interference results from a 
pressing social need. Whether blanket data storage of essentially all citizens on the 
off chance that such information may one day be of use in an investigation amounts to 
a pressing social need to protect national security is certainly debatable. This is 
particularly so given the special emphasis afforded by the court with regard to 
protection of personal data,41 despite the wide margin of appreciation normally 
afforded states with regard to national security. Indeed it was recently stated in the
wvAv.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/131101 %20anti%20terrorism.pdf \ 19th 
April 2004].
39 Code o f Practice, n. 12 above para. 29.
40 Malone v U K ( 1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 14 para. 67.
95
Chapter 4: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Privacy o f  the Individual
European Court of Human Rights that “ ...there has to be at least a reasonable and 
genuine link between the aim invoked and the measures interfering with private life 
for the aim to be regarded as legitimate. To refer to the more or less indiscriminate 
storing of information relating to the private lives of individuals in terms of pursuing a 
legitimate national security concern is, to my mind, evidently problematic.”42 
However, even if it can be successfully argued that such a practice is in accordance 
with a pressing social need, serious questions are raised with regard to the 
proportionality of such a measure. Whilst a balance must be sought between the right 
to respect for private life contained in article 8(1) and the need to protect the whole of 
society by the use of covert surveillance under article 8(2),43 it has been stated that 
“ ...States do not enjoy unlimited discretion to subject individuals to secret 
surveillance or a system of secret files. The interest of a State in protecting its national 
security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with an 
applicant’s right to respect for his or her private life.”44 Indeed, it is under this head 
that it can be argued that data retention under Part XI is incompatible with article 8.
As previously mentioned, Part XI provides only the framework for the retention of 
communications data, access to this information is governed by the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The code of practice states that the purpose of data 
retention is so that it is available to be acquired by relevant public authorities under 
chapter II of Part I of RIPA. Section 22(2) RIPA provides that data may be obtained 
where necessary:
(a) in the interests of national security;
(b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder;
(c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom;
(d) in the interests of public safety;
(e) for the purpose of protecting public health;
41 See M Sv Sweden (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 313 para. 41 and Z vF in lan d(  1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 371 para. 
95.
42 Rotaru v Romania Application No. 00028341/95 4th May 2000, concurring opinion o f Judge 
Wildhaber available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
43 Klass v Germany (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 214.
44 Ibid.
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(f) for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other 
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department;
(g) for the purpose, in an emergency, of preventing death or injury or any damage 
to a person's physical or mental health, or of mitigating any injury or damage 
to a person's physical or mental health; or
(h) for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (g)) which is specified for 
the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of State.
The effect of this is such that although the retention of data under the code of practice 
has national security at its root, it is possible for access to be gained under RIPA for 
any of the above purposes, which are clearly far wider than the concept of national 
security. It is the indiscriminate use of data, which makes such a vast database of 
personal information such a dangerous concept. It has been identified as telling that 
section 22(2) was not incorporated into Part XI as grounds for data retention, and it 
can be thus deduced that the intention was that communications data should be 
retained only on national security related grounds rather than the far broader purposes 
listed under RIPA.45 It is this “disparity of purpose”46 which raises serious issues 
regarding the proportionality of Part XI and its compliance with human rights 
standards. It may be possible to argue that retention of communications data for 
twelve months and the subsequent interference with the privacy of the individual is 
proportionate to the interests of the state in protecting national security. However, the 
balance of proportionality is tipped firmly away from the state due to the fact that it is 
possible to gain access to personal information for reasons far less legitimate than the 
security of the nation. Indeed “Parliament’s decision not to follow the terms of 
section 22(2) RIPA, and instead to restrict the statutory purposes under section 102(3) 
ATCSA to cases involving national security is, in Counsel’s view, powerful evidence 
that it did not consider those less pressing public interests to be sufficiently weighty to 
justify a general requirement for the extended retention of communications data.”47 It 
is this discrepancy and consequent disproportionate effect which appears to make Part 
XI incompatible with article 8. Moreover, in consideration of the jurisprudence of the
45 Summary o f Counsels’ Advice, n. 28 above para. 14.
46 Ibid. para. 17.
47 Ibid. para. 19.
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European Court of Human Rights, in which such importance is given to the 
incorporation of safeguards in relation to state interference with the privacy of the 
individual, the provisions concerning retention of communications data are notably 
lacking in this regard. Indeed, in Klass whilst it was stated that the rule of law implies 
that such an interference by the executive should be subject to effective control, which 
should normally be assured by the judiciary as the best guarantee of independence, 
impartiality and proper procedure, it was found that the nature of the supervisory and 
other safeguards in place were sufficient and not outside the bounds of what may be 
deemed to be necessary in a democratic society. With regard to retention of 
communications data under the ATCSA, the lack of sufficient supervision and control 
is, as such, notably lacking.
Part III Disclosure of Information
Clear following the investigation into the attacks of September 11th 2001 was a sense 
of betrayal resulting from the knowledge that the perpetrators of the attacks had been 
residing legally in communities across the United States. As a result of this, section 
203 of the PATRIOT Act facilitated cooperation between domestic law enforcement 
and foreign intelligence operations so as to allow access to information, which may 
otherwise have been unavailable to those investigating potential terrorist threats.49 
This awareness of the power of information and data collection is also reflected in the 
ATCSA. Part III of the Act provides for the extension of existing disclosure powers 
as listed in schedule 4 to the Act, so as to encourage the disclosure of information by 
public authorities. Section 17(2) provides that each of the provisions listed in 
schedule 4 shall have effect, in relation to the disclosure of information by or on 
behalf of a public authority, as if the purposes for which the disclosure of information 
is authorised by that provision included each of the following:
48 Klass v Germany (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 214.
49 Note the position in the US whereby an individual is deemed to “voluntarily” reveal information 
when documents or data are provided to third parties. As a result o f this notion o f individual “consent”, 
the holders o f such data may pass the information on to the government without falling foul of the 
Fourth Amendment. See P. P. Swire, Katz is dead. Long Live Katz, January 20th 2004, Forthcoming, 
Michigan Law Review, available at http://ssm.com p. 6.
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(a) the purposes of any criminal investigation whatever which is being or may 
be carried out, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere;
(b) the purposes of any criminal proceedings whatever which have been or 
may be initiated, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere;
(c) the purposes of the initiation or bringing to an end of any such 
investigation or proceedings;
(d) the purpose of facilitating a determination of whether any such 
investigation or proceedings should be initiated or brought to an end.
Section 19 of the Act provides for the disclosure of information which is held by or on 
behalf of the Inland Revenue or Customs and Excise for the above purposes, as well 
as allowing disclosure for the purpose of facilitating the performance of any of the 
functions of any of the intelligence services.50
Whilst this notion of data sharing was welcomed by the Home Affairs Select 
Committee51 it met a great deal of opposition in both Houses as well as from non­
governmental sources. A recurring argument during the passage of the Bill was 
“...that this is emergency legislation concerning terrorism, not general legislation 
concerning criminality”52 and as such of massive concern is the breadth of the 
provision which allows disclosure for the purpose of “any criminal investigation... or 
proceedings whatever” whether carried out in the UK or further a field. However, this 
goes further in that disclosure can be made for the purpose of determining whether or 
not to initiate an investigation in the first place. This raises serious privacy concerns 
given its resemblance to the notion of a fishing expedition through personal 
information held by various public authorities.
The argument behind such a broad provision is that information about crimes 
seemingly unrelated to terrorism might lead investigators to find information 
connected to terrorism. “Those activities involve other criminal activities that could 
lead one to terrorists. There is no alternative way to start an investigation involving
50 Section 19(2)(a) ATCSA.
51 Home Affairs Select Committee, First Report, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001, HC 
351, para. 55.
52 HL Debs. vol. 629, col. 402, 28th November 2001, the Earl o f Onslow.
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terrorism other than by looking more widely.” However, the argument that such a 
wide provision is necessary because it may not be immediately clear that a terrorist 
offence has been committed or that the investigation will become a terrorist 
investigation54 does not go very far to allay reasonable fears that the privacy of the 
individual will be run roughshod over in the name of fighting terrorism. The 
inclusion of a test of proportionality to be satisfied by the public authority prior to 
disclosure was said to respond to fears of blanket disclosure with regard to any 
crime,55 and at least incorporates one of the fundamental standards of the Convention 
into this part of the Act. However, in spite of this, concern was expressed that the 
proportionality of disclosure will not in practice be properly considered prior to the 
making of the disclosure but only if the disclosure comes to the attention of the 
individual or those concerned who subsequently make a complaint.56 The fact that 
those concerned may well remain unaware of the fact that a disclosure has been made 
is reminiscent of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act under which law enforcement 
officers are able to access personal records without the knowledge or consent of the 
individual concerned. However, whilst under section 215 the record holder is 
prohibited from disclosing the fact that such a search was made, it is seemingly the 
case in the UK that the individual has the right under the Data Protection Act to 
enquire about any disclosures made. This still requires a proactive stance by the 
individual concerned to actively enquire as to the status of his personal information, 
but is preferable to the situation in the US. However, the utility of a challenge to 
disclosure by a public authority is minimal given that the disclosure itself will have 
been made by then.
cn
Schedule 4 contains 66 pieces of legislation, which can be added to by order, under 
which disclosure can be made. However, the breadth of the provisions in Part III is 
shown not only in the quantifiable provisions contained therein but rather in the vast 
range of legislation listed. Indeed, the list extends to include such legislation as the 
Cereals Marketing Act 1965 and the Diseases of Fish Act 1983, both of which can be
53 HL Debs. vol. 629, col. 401,, 28th November 2001, Lord McIntosh o f Haringey.
54 Ibid. col. 410, Lord McIntosh of Haringey.
55 See HL Debs vol. 376, col. 1421, 13th December 2001 Lord Rooker.
56 Law Society, n. 22 above p. 7.
57 Section 17(3) ATCSA.
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said to have a very dubious connection with terrorism and the protection of national 
security. The power to disclose is not dependent on a suspicion of terrorism but rather 
of criminal activity in general, begging the question why such measures were pushed 
through as emergency legislation? The ATCSA was seemingly deemed a suitable 
vehicle for this power of disclosure following the failure to enact such provisions the 
previous year.58 This point is supported by the government argument that Part III 
serves to clarify for public authorities the situations in which disclosure is permitted, 
and as such codifies existing disclosure provisions across the board rather than those 
connected solely with terrorism or indeed, serious crime. Moreover, a codification in 
this way which includes legislation such as the Telecommunications Act 1984 and the 
Health Act 1999 raises serious privacy concerns given the wealth of information that 
is stored and therefore potentially disclosable about the individual. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that disclosure is not limited to the confines of the United 
Kingdom and can indeed be made to authorities investigating or prosecuting a 
criminal offence overseas, which of course raises concerns with regard to the use and 
protection of information once disclosed to authorities abroad. Under section 18 the 
Secretary of State has the power in certain circumstances to prohibit disclosure for the 
purpose of any overseas proceedings, although such a direction shall not prohibit the 
making of a disclosure by a Minister of the Crown or by the Treasury, or in pursuance 
of a Community obligation.59 However, this provision does nothing to lessen 
legitimate concerns with regard to the use and protection of information once 
disclosed to authorities abroad. Reassurance by the government that protection is 
provided by way of the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act has been 
condemned by the Privy Counsellor Review Committee as “illusory” due to the fact 
that the onus for action rests with the individual despite the fact that he may be 
completely unaware of the fact that a disclosure has been made.60 It is for this reason 
that the absence of any form of independent oversight is particularly glaring and has 
been highly recommended.61
58 Similar provisions were originally part o f the Criminal Justice and Police Bill 2001, but were 
removed following intense criticism.
59 Section 18(4)(a)(b) ATCSA.
60 Privy Counsellors Review Committee, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Report, 12th 
December 2003, p. 46 available at www.atcsact-review.org.uk/lib/documents/18_12_2003/Report.pdf
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The provisions of Part III have raised many concerns with regard to its compatibility 
with the Convention, with the Joint Committee on Human Rights concluding that 
there remains a risk that disclosure under Part III violates the right to respect for 
private life under article 8.62 The importance given to the protection of personal 
information by the European Court of Human Rights requires strong justification for 
any interference with the right of the individual to privacy on the part of the state. The 
status of Part III as part of primary legislation makes clear the fact that the interference 
is “in accordance with the law” as required under article 8(2). With regard to the 
requirement of accessibility the average citizen is arguably able to determine the 
relevant rules applicable under the ATCSA, given its availability in the public 
domain. However, it can be said that the breadth of the purposes contained in section 
17(2) for which disclosure is permitted coupled with the diverse range of legislation 
authorising disclosure contained in schedule 4 has resulted in a vast and unclear 
legislative minefield for the individual to navigate. It is certainly arguable that an 
individual may be unlikely or unable to foresee that information gained under the 
Agricultural Marketing Act 1958 is liable for disclosure to authorities abroad for the 
purpose of determining whether or not to initiate an investigation in to a criminal act. 
It was stated by the court in Malone v UK that “ ...the law must indicate the scope of 
any... discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise 
with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, 
to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.”64 In this 
respect section 17 can be said to be lacking given the fact that the absence of 
guidelines65 for public authorities to follow in determining the necessity and 
proportionality of a disclosure leaves the discretion fully in the hands of the disclosing 
authorities. This is exacerbated by the lack of any form of independent oversight.
It is arguable that the breadth of the purposes listed in section 17(2), in particular 
subsection (d), namely the purpose of facilitating a determination of whether any such
61 Ibid. pp. 46-47.
62 Joint Committee on Human Rights, 5th Report, 5th December 2001, para. 24 This conclusion was 
endorsed by the Privy Counsellors Review Committee at para. 165.
63 MS v Sweden (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 313,, Z v  Finland( 1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 371.
64 (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 14 para. 68.
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investigation or proceedings should be initiated or brought to an end, are not sufficient 
to indicate a pressing social need for such a restriction on the privacy of the 
individual. Ironically, had the government been swayed to accept the proposed 
amendments to limit disclosure to terrorism rather than crime in general, the case for 
the existence of a pressing social need would have been vastly strengthened. 
Although, the symbolism of a piece of emergency legislation as the vehicle of 
enactment for such provisions as well as the existence of a margin of appreciation 
may well serve to aid in the satisfaction of this requirement.
In contrast to the regime for the retention of communications data in Part XI of the 
Act under which data is stored for the purpose of national security but could then 
potentially be disclosed for a completely unrelated subject, the reverse is the case here. 
Part III provides for the disclosure of information gained for an entirely benign 
purpose such as that obtained by the Sea Fish Industry Authority66 but which can 
subsequently be used for the purposes of any criminal investigation or proceedings 
anywhere. In the same way as proportionality is an issue in this area under Part XI, it 
can similarly be argued that disclosure of information obtained for one purpose and 
then disclosed, potentially abroad, for another purpose is disproportionate and an 
interference with the right to respect for private life of the individual. Moreover, it 
can further be argued that disproportionality arises from the enactment of blanket 
disclosure due to a concern that there was a need to “make it simple for public
cn
officials to understand what they are supposed to disclose.” Of course, should it be 
established that interference with the right to privacy corresponds to a pressing social 
need, it is still arguable that such vast powers of discretionary disclosure unfettered by 
safeguards or oversight cannot be said to be proportionate to the aim of protecting 
national security or preventing crime. Indeed, whilst the need for balance between the 
privacy of the individual and the protection of society as a whole has been 
acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights, this must be accompanied
65 The Inland Revenue Code o f Practice on the Disclosure o f Information came into effect on 11th 
February 2002. However, this is no more explicit with regard to the test for proportionality, though it 
does set out the legal and administrative safeguards in place.
66 See Privy Counsellors Review, n. 53 above para 154.
67 HC Debs, vol. 375, col. 794, 26th November 2001, Ruth Kelly MP.
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with adequate and independent safeguards if the measures enacted are to be 
considered necessary in a democratic society.68
The Right to Privacy and the Fourth Amendment
Described as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilised 
men”69 the fact that the “right to be let alone” or the right to privacy, as it is more 
commonly known, has no explicit constitutional basis is surprising. Legal 
consideration of the right to privacy can be traced to an article published in 1890 in 
which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis claimed that, in appropriate cases, the 
foundation of actions such as those in contract, trust, confidence or property was the
7 0right to privacy. “The principle which protects personal writings and any other 
productions of the intellect of or the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has 
no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal 
appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relations, domestic or otherwise.” 
However, it was not until the case of Griswold v Connecticut71 in 1965 that the 
Supreme Court recognised privacy as a constitutional right. It was established that the 
right to privacy resides in the “penumbras” of specific guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights, in particular the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments72 due to the 
fact that “various guarantees create zones of privacy.”73 The breadth of such a 
foundation has led to the development of a comprehensive as well as often 
controversial right to privacy, the nature of which is both positive and negative. 
Indeed, the individual is entitled to be free from governmental or other invasion in to 
their private life as well as the right to freedom with regard to personal choices such 
as sexual behaviour74 and abortion.75 Over time this has developed to the extent that
68 See Klass v Germany (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 214.
69 Olmstead v US 277 US 438, 478 (1928), Mr Justice Brandeis (dissenting).
70 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review vol. IV December 15th 1890 
No. 5 .
71 381 US 479(1965).
72 The Ninth Amendment states “The enumeration in the Constitution o f certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
73 Griswold v Connecticut n. 63 above p.484, Mr Justice Douglas.
74 Lawrence and Garner v Texas No. 02-102. Argued March 26, 2003—Decided June 26, 2003.
75 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973).
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privacy in the United States is considered to be a “fundamental personal right, 
emanating ‘from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.’”76
As a result of the fact that the right to privacy pervades many areas of life, it therefore 
has a broad constitutional basis. However, it is the Fourth Amendment in particular 
which has become synonymous with individual privacy, particularly in the sphere of 
law enforcement, stating:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Almost certainly formulated with the judgment of Lord Camden in Entick v
77Carrington in mind, the Fourth Amendment was described in 1886 as providing 
protection against all governmental invasions “of the sanctity of a man’s home and the
7ftprivacies of life.” More recently the limits imposed on search and seizure powers 
were said to exist so as to “prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by
7Q •enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” This 
has inevitably required the Supreme Court to undertake a balancing act in reconciling 
the competing interests of the government and law enforcement in crime prevention 
and investigation with the privacy interests of the individual.
In determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a particular case, it is 
necessary primarily to establish the scope of the protection provided. The obvious 
distaste with which the English practice of general warrants was viewed along with 
their eventual common law condemnation motivated this guarantee of protection from 
governmental interference. It is clear from such an impetus that the focus of the
o n
guarantee is property, a notion clarified by the Supreme Court. The protection 
guaranteed is further emphasised in the Amendment itself, in the explicit citation of 
entities notable for their tangible nature, namely “ ...persons, houses, papers,
76 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479,494 (1965), Mr Justice Goldberg (concurring).
77 (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
78 Boyd  v US 116 US 616, 626-627, 630 (1886).
79 US v Martinez-Fuerte 428 US 543, 554 (1976).
80 Boyd  v US, 116 US 616, 627 (1886).
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effects...” It was due to this that the first cases alleging a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment as a result of wiretapping and surveillance to come before the Court were 
unsuccessful.81 This somewhat narrow interpretation was extended so as to include 
conversation within the purview of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment in
o ->
Silverman v US. Here, the Supreme Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection 
extends to the recording of oral statements, “overheard without any technical trespass 
under... local property law,” as well as the seizure of tangible items. This was more 
emphatically stated in Warden v Hayden84 by way of a declaration that it is privacy 
rather than property which falls within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. As 
such “the premise that property interests control the right of the government to search
O f
and seize has been discredited.” Indeed, “...once it is recognised that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not simply ‘areas’...it becomes clear that the reach of 
the Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure.”86
In establishing whether protection under the Fourth Amendment arises, it is necessary 
to determine whether there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of 
the individual concerned. Given the acknowledged focus of the Fourth Amendment, 
namely the person rather than the place, it is the case that even in a public place that
87which the individual seeks to preserve as private may be constitutionally protected.
In this vein, a two-stage test was formulated, in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Harlan, in order to establish the existence of protection under the Fourth Amendment. 
For the privacy right to merit such protection it was said that there had to be a 
demonstration of an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy on the part of the 
individual, coupled with a recognition by society that such an expectation is
O D
reasonable.
81 See Olmstead v US 277 US 438 (1928).
82 365 US 505 (1961).
™ Ibid. p. 511.
84 387 US 294(1967).
85 Silverman v US 365 US 264, 33 (1967).
86 Katz v US 389 US 347, 353 (1967).
™ Ibid. p. 351.
88 Ibid. p. 361. See more recently, Minnesota v Carter No. 97-1147 decided December 1st 1998.
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Fundamental to the Fourth Amendment is the requirement of a warrant so as to act as 
a buffer between the individual and the actions of law enforcement and the 
government. This warrant requirement is premised on the concept of probable cause, 
the purpose of which is to “...keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas
o n
until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed...” 
This requirement has been defined as a “reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by 
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief 
that the party is guilty of the offence with which he is charged.”90
An important facet to the warrant requirement is the inclusion of judicial oversight, 
which introduces an element of independence and neutrality in the determination of 
whether a warrant to search the home of an individual is justified. Whilst judicial 
office is not a pre-requisite in the issuance of warrants, the Supreme Court has stated 
that issuance requires neutrality and detachment as well as the ability to determine the 
existence of probable cause on the part of the issuer.91 The importance of this 
requirement was reaffirmed in the case of United States v United States District 
Court92 which concerned assertions on the part of the government that warrantless 
surveillance was lawful as a reasonable exercise of presidential power in order to 
protect national security. The legislation relied on was Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act which contains a provision stating that nothing in the 
law limits the constitutional power of the President to protect against the overthrow of 
the government or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or 
existence of the government. This was taken to mean that Congress recognised the 
authority of the President to conduct surveillance related to national security without 
prior judicial approval. However, the court disagreed stating that the duty of the 
government to safeguard domestic security must be weighed against the potential 
danger that unreasonable surveillance poses to individual privacy and freedom of 
expression. “These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if
89 Berger v New York 388 US 41, 59 (1967).
90 Stacey v. Emery 97 US 642, 645. This has also been stated as a standard of evidence less than that 
which would justify condemnation. Lock v US 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813) See also Brinegar v US 338 
US 160, 173 (1949).
91 Shadwickv City o f  Tampa 407 US 345, 354(1972).
92 407 US 297(1972).
93 18 USC 2511(3).
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domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the 
Executive Branch.. .[without the judgement of] a neutral and detached magistrate.”94
The validity of a warrant depends not only upon a finding of probable cause but also 
on a requirement of particularity in the warrant, namely a description of “the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”95 This specification reflects the 
Framers’ abhorrence for the practice of general warrants from which they were trying 
to escape; indeed the purpose of the requirement is the avoidance of “a general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”96 Sufficient particularity means
07that nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
Whilst not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Fourth Amendment, it has been 
deemed by the Supreme Court that the rule that notice of a warrant is given, known as
A O
the “knock and announce” rule, is a constitutional requirement. Indeed in Wilson v 
Arkansas" the Supreme Court declared that the rule forms part of the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness inquiry. That is not to say however that notice must be 
given before the execution of every warrant. It is recognised that delayed 
announcement will be justified in certain circumstances, inter alia, where there is a 
threat of physical violence or where it is believed that evidence will be destroyed if 
notice is given.100 Indeed, there is an appreciation on the part of the court that the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment not be so inflexible as to ignore or inhibit law 
enforcement interests.101 Given the circumstances narrowly prescribed by the court in 
which it is possible to delay notification of a warrant, questions under the Fourth 
Amendment are raised with regard to section 213 of the PATRIOT Act. This creates 
a  new exception to the rule of announcement, namely that delay is possible when 
notice would create an “adverse result.”
9,4 US v US District Court 407 US 345, 317-318 (1972).
95 US Constitution, Amendment IV.
9.6 Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 US 443, 467 (1971).
9.7 Marron v US 275 US 192, 196 (1927).
9.8 Ker v California 374 US 23 (1963).
9.9 514 US 927(1995).
"00 Ibid., Richards v Wisconsin 520 US 385 (1997).
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Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
Technological advancement in the communications arena raised new issues 
concerning the privacy of the individual and the Fourth Amendment; indeed it has 
been said that “few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by
1 ft9eavesdropping devices.” Previously, the intangible concept of privacy had always 
related to and derived from interference with tangible effects, as explicitly referred to 
in the text of the Fourth Amendment. The proliferation of electronic and covert 
surveillance as a tool of law enforcement introduced the courts to previously 
unexplored ground.
The first case challenging use of electronic surveillance to reach the Supreme Court 
was Olmstead v US,103 which was essentially confined to establishing whether the 
introduction of evidence obtained by wiretapping, in this case of the defendant’s 
private telephone conversations, violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. A 
narrow majority of the court relied on the emphasis on material effects in determining 
that wiretapping and the fruits obtained by such interception did not fall within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. It was deemed to be a reasonable assumption 
that the intention of one who installs a telephone in his home is to project his voice to 
the outside world by way of the connecting wires beyond the boundaries of the 
home.104 The decision was premised on a dual platform. Firstly, protection under the 
Fourth Amendment was intended for actual property and as such a physical invasion 
of the property was required before there could be said to have been a violation. 
Interception of the wires running from the property did not amount to an unlawful 
trespass. Similarly, the placing of a device against an office wall so as to enable 
eavesdropping was held not to amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment due to 
the fact that there was no physical trespass on to the property concerned.105 This can 
be contrasted to Clinton v Virginia106 in which attachment of a device to a wall by a
101 Wilson v Arkansas 514 US 927 (1995).
102 Berger v New York 388 US 41, 63 (1967) Mr Justice Clark.
103 277 US 438(1928).
m  Ibid  p. 465.
105 Goldman v US 316 US 129 (1942). See also On Lee v US 343 US 747 (1952).
106 377 US 158(1964).
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107drawing pin was found to amount to a physical trespass. Secondly, the Court relied 
on the intangible nature of conversation as opposed to the material emphasis in the 
text of the Amendment, in holding that wiretapping did not amount to an
10Kunreasonable search and seizure under the Constitution.
However, it is notable that the assertions made in dissent, showing a foresight 
unappreciated by the majority, were to eventually provide the foundation of the 
court’s position in this area. In expressing his distaste for the invasion of privacy 
caused by wiretapping due to the far-reaching impact on the privacy of a much wider 
class, Justice Brandeis emphasised the dynamic nature of the Constitution. “Time 
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a 
principal to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which 
gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of Constitutions...in the application of a 
Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may 
be.”109 In this way, his appreciation of the future advancement of scientific 
developments produced a judgment ahead of its time, not only technologically but 
also with respect to the protection afforded to the right to privacy.
The rationale of Olmstead was explicitly overruled in 1967, following gradual steps 
towards its negation in subsequent cases. Katz v US110 concerned the placement of a 
device on the top of several telephone boxes in order to intercept the conversation of 
Katz, believed to be transmitting gambling information by telephone across state lines. 
The government asserted that unlawful entry of the area concerned had not occurred 
and that as such there was no search and therefore no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. However, the “trespass” doctrine of Olmstead was set aside by the court 
in establishing that the Fourth Amendment protects people not places and that in this 
way the presence or absence of a physical intrusion was no longer pivotal to its 
application. The privacy upon which Katz relied in using the telephone box was
107 See also Silverman v US 365 US 505 (1961).
m lbid. p. 511.
109 Olmstead v US 277 US 438, 473-474 (1928).
110 389 US 347(1967).
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violated by the interception and as such constituted an unlawful search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.111
The decision in Katz has recently come under scrutiny from the Supreme Court in the
11^context of new technology and its position with the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo v
1 1 7
US concerned the use of thermal imaging equipment on a home by the police so as 
to confirm the use of high-intensity lights, as often used in the growth of marijuana. 
The Supreme Court declared that the use of such equipment amounted to a search 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. However, the court went further than this 
and reconsidered its decision in Katz and its implications. Essentially, Kyllo 
reaffirmed the position that physical trespass is not a necessary prerequisite of a search 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment. However, in placing special emphasis on the 
sanctity of the home, namely that aiming a thermal-imaging device at a house could 
reveal intimate details otherwise unobtainable, the judgment conflicts with the 
fundamental notion that the Fourth Amendment protects people not places. In 
response, it has been suggested that reconciliation of Katz with the special emphasis 
afforded the home is possible by way of the private nature of the phone call rather 
than the location of the telephone box. Indeed the “place” that warranted protection 
was the “cyber space” occupied when making a phone call as opposed to the physical 
location of the booth.114 Broadly speaking, Kyllo established that for the purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment, a search is conducted whenever information is gained by the 
government through the use of “sense-enhancing technology”, which could otherwise 
only have been obtained by way of a physical search.115 This was enjoined by the 
caveat that this was the case at least where the technology at issue was not in general 
public use. However, this caveat was not elaborated upon further and so does create 
the potential that the protection of privacy by the Fourth Amendment will lessen as 
technology is advanced.116 The effect of this decision remains to be seen.
1,1 Ibid, p. 353.
112 See D. A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz and Common Law, Mississippi Law Journal, 
Forthcoming, available at http://ssm.com. for a detailed discussion o f this decision and its implications.
113 533 US 27 (2001).
114 Sklansky, n. 104 above p. 39.
U5 Ibid p. 26.
116 Ibid. p. 41.
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117The suggestion in Silverman v US that Fourth Amendment protection extends 
beyond the seizure of tangible items to include the recording of oral statements
1 I  o
independent of physical or even technical trespass was expressly confirmed in 
Berger v US.119 The Supreme Court struck down a state wiretapping statute as 
unconstitutional on the ground that it authorised “indiscriminate use” of electronic 
devices of such a broad scope that a comparison was drawn with the general warrants 
condemned in Entick v Carrington. Conversation was explicitly held to fall within 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment, and its interception by way of electronic device
1 9 0was said to amount to a search within the meaning of the Constitution. Of great 
importance was the court’s acknowledgement that to invade the privacy of an 
individual in this way was not unlawful provided there was sufficient probable cause 
to justify the grant of a warrant by an independent party, as is the case with regard to 
conventional warrants for the search and seizure of material effects.121 The 
constitutional requirements of probable cause and particular description in preventing 
governmental “fishing expeditions” have been afforded equivalent status and 
application with regard to search and seizure of oral as well as material evidence. 
This is the case so that surveillance is so narrowly circumscribed as to ensure “...no 
greater invasion of privacy [is] permitted than [is] necessary under the
1 99circumstances.” The compatibility of such jurisprudence with the provision of a 
legally “roaming” wiretap, as enacted in section 206 of the PATRIOT Act, raises 
some interesting constitutional questions.
Despite its potentially precarious status due to the lack of explicit protection provided 
in the Bill of Rights, the right to privacy is as fundamental in the United States as 
those rights expressly provided in the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. 
Indeed the overlapping nature of privacy with many of the rights guaranteed perhaps 
entrenches its position further. The nature of law enforcement has long posed a 
challenge to individual privacy, requiring a balancing act on the part of the courts. 
However, the threat posed by terrorism today and the subsequent legislative response,
1.7 365 US 505 (1961).
1.8 Ibid. p. 511.
119 388 US 41 (1967).
] 20 Ibid. at 51.
121 Ibid. at 57.
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particularly in the area of surveillance, search and seizure, arguably poses the greatest 
threat to individual privacy in the United States to date. The extent to which these 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act will withstand constitutional scrutiny remains 
to be seen.
The USA PATRIOT Act 2001
A notable feature of the PATRIOT Act, particularly in comparison with previous anti­
terrorism legislation and its British counter-part, are the extensive changes wrought in 
the field of surveillance and access to communications data.
The introduction, in Title II of the PATRIOT Act, of some extensive and controversial 
changes to this area of the law, in both domestic and foreign arenas, has the potential 
to impact severely on the privacy of vast numbers of citizens and non-citizens alike in 
the name of national security. This in turn has resulted in a plethora of commentary as 
well as fears of a return to the past when the practices of American law enforcement 
ran roughshod over the rights of the people.
Section 215 Access to “tangible things”
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act is one such provision, which has inspired not only 
academic commentary and public protest but also legal action123 in the backlash 
against its scope and potential unconstitutionality. In amending the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 1978, section 215 expands the power of the 
government in accessing personal records so that it is possible for the FBI to require 
the production of “...any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, 
and other items)...” The magnitude of this provision can be more readily appreciated 
when considered in the light of 50 USC 1862 which was stricken and replaced by
1221bid.
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section 215. This previously provided access to certain business records for foreign 
intelligence and international terrorism investigations, stated to be those held by a 
common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility or vehicle 
rental facility.124 This is obviously far removed from its successor’s provision of 
access to essentially anything. There may be some argument that the nature of 
international terrorism has changed with the advent of “sleeper cells” of terrorists 
residing in the US, such as the perpetrators of 9/11, and as such that access to personal 
documentation and material would be of assistance to the authorities. However, the 
breadth of this provision which, as will be seen, extends to cover books borrowed and 
purchased, coupled with a low standard of certification has the potential to interfere 
with the privacy of a large number of people in a disproportionate way. In addition it 
can be questioned how much intelligence can be gleaned from literature choices.
Of further concern is the fact that the key to a provision of such breadth is certification 
that the investigation is for the purpose of protecting against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities. In addition an application need only specify that 
the “...records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation conducted...to 
obtain foreign intelligence information...or to protect against international terrorism or
1 ' y c
clandestine intelligence activities.” This loose standard of certification is 
seemingly more a gesture than an opportunity for rigorous examination of the reasons 
and proof underlying that which has the potential to result in a huge intrusion into a 
person’s private life. Indeed, any attempt to describe the system in place as one 
involving an element of judicial oversight would be farcical given that the judge to 
which the application is made has no power to refuse the application and so represents 
a “rubber stamp” rather than meaningful review by an independent authority. 
Obtaining a warrant from an independent magistrate upon a finding of probable cause 
is one of the most fundamental safeguards of the American criminal justice system, 
and yet the effect of section 215 is the erosion of the protection afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment. This deficiency is all the more serious given the fact that the reach of
123 The ACLU filed the first lawsuit challenging section 215 on 30th July 2003. The suit was filed on 
behalf o f six community groups who contend that they are investigative targets because o f their 
religion, ethnic origins or political associations.
124 50 USC 1862 (a)(1). Definitions for these terms can be found at 50 USC 1861.
125 Section 215, inserting section 501(b)(2).
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section 215 stretches beyond those involved in terrorism and encompasses potentially 
everybody so long as it can be shown that at the root of the request lies an authorized 
investigation. This is in further contrast to the more particular requirement in 50 USC
17A1862 that each application for access to certain business records stated that there 
were specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom 
the records pertained was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. It is hard to 
justify the extent of section 215 on the basis of any kind of practical benefit. Of 
course arguments can be made that the ability of law enforcement to keep track of 
citizens’ activities and interests may allow the opportunity for pre-emptive prevention 
of a terrorist attack. However, even if such an argument were to prove successful the 
power could be limited without compromising its effectiveness by inclusion of an 
objective standard that the individual concerned is actually involved in such activities. 
Indeed a return to the pre-PATRIOT Act standard would act as an improvement on 
that which is currently in place. At present, the provision potentially infringes the 
First Amendment activities of all individuals and interferes with activities which 
should be protected by the Fourth Amendment to such an extent that it essentially 
amounts to surveillance of the populace without sufficient justification on the grounds 
of terrorism prevention.
Seemingly in acknowledgement of the dubious actions of the FBI in the past in 
placing citizens, most notoriously Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., under extensive 
surveillance due to involvement in legitimate political dissent, section 501(a)(2)(B) 
FISA provides that a United States person shall not be investigated solely on the basis 
of activities protected by the First Amendment. On this basis a small measure of 
respect is afforded the First Amendment and the freedoms it protects. However, a 
chilling effect may still be felt for example by a US citizen of Arab descent, recently 
returned from a visit to his home country, who is dissuaded from expressing his 
feelings on the war on terror at a local meeting or by way of a letter to the editor of his 
local newspaper for the very reason that it may make him vulnerable to such scrutiny. 
This combination would be sufficient to negate the prohibition against First 
Amendment investigations and as such illustrates that this “safeguard” rests on a very
126 50 USC 1862(b)(2)(B)
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insubstantial foundation. Moreover, no such protection exists with regard to non­
citizens, even permanent resident aliens, who may therefore have their private lives 
subjected to extreme examination solely on the basis of a book they read or a 
conversation they had.
What makes this provision even more objectionable is the fact that a person subject to 
FBI scrutiny under section 215 would never be aware of the fact. Section 501(d) 
provides that “no person shall disclose to any other person (other than those necessary 
to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.” Section 215 
therefore not only infringes the privacy of the target of the order and potentially their 
First Amendment rights with regard to the reason for the surveillance, it also affects 
the freedom of expression of the record holder in prohibiting disclosure concerning 
the government’s interest to anybody. However, in the context of jurisprudence 
emanating from the European Court of Human Rights, it has been held that failure to 
inform an individual of surveillance after the event is not in principle incompatible 
with article 8(2) of the Convention due to the sensitivity of operational methods as 
well the risk that to provide notification could jeopardise the long-term purpose of the 
surveillance.127 Seemingly, similar arguments could be found to justify the lack of 
notification inherent in section 215. However, in contrast to the existence of 
numerous safeguards providing effective and continuous control of the measures in 
Klass, section 215 is utilised without any meaningful standard of review or protection 
for the individual.
The security interest claimed by the government is obviously of great importance and 
the intrusion into the life of the individual concerned is serious, though arguably not 
as serious as physical intrusion. It is exacerbated however, by the delay in informing 
the subject that a search has taken place, as well as the minimal oversight and the low 
test to be initially satisfied. Reasonableness might be more readily achieved by 
employment of a more exacting test requiring evidence that the person is involved in 
activities threatening national security or the requirement that a statement of relevance
127 Klass v Germany (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 214.
116
Chapter 4: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Privacy o f  the Individual
with regard to the foreign intelligence investigation be provided. This would improve 
the balance sought as would increased oversight, particularly if the policy of non­
disclosure is required to remain.
Reminiscent of the FBI’s controversial Library Awareness Programme, the aim of 
which was to discover the reading and research interests of Eastern Europeans, the 
extension of FBI surveillance by section 215 into areas such as books purchased or 
borrowed from a library has inspired a fierce backlash, culminating in legal as well as 
legislative action. Given the existence of the prohibition on disclosure in the Act, it is 
impossible to obtain a compete picture of the extent to which this provision has been 
utilised, however some indication is possible. A survey undertaken by the Library 
Research Centre of the University of Illinois found that 85 out of 1028 (8.3%) 
nationwide libraries surveyed reported having been approached by federal or local law
tVienforcement to request information about patrons since September 11 , a telling 
figure given that the survey was completed in the early months of 2002.128 Moreover, 
a further chilling effect is the opportunity for library staff to adopt the mantle of law 
enforcement by way of surveillance and reporting of patrons and their reading 
materials on a voluntary basis. Indeed in a survey conducted in October 2002, 4.1% 
of library staff revealed having voluntarily reported patron records or behaviour to
1 0Qauthorities in relation to terrorism. Of concern is the standard against which 
“suspicious” patrons are tested. To be reported to the FBI on the basis of a whim or 
unsubstantiated subjective impression of a third party undermines the principles of 
freedom of expression and individual privacy to a great extent. The fact that 8.3% of 
patrons disclosed having reported concern about the behaviour of another patron in 
relation to suspected terrorist activities, 32.6% of which were made to outside 
authorities, appears to represent a variation of the much criticised Operation TIPS 
(Terrorist Information and Prevention System.) This government proposal to recruit
128 In the year after the attacks, Federal and local law enforcement officials visited at least 10.7% of 
libraries to ask for these records, o f which 3.5% of such visits were from the FBI. Public Libraries' 
Response to the Events o f  September 11th, 2001 , Library Research Centre o f the University o f Illinois 
available at www.lis.uiuc.eduHeiqhe/02PLA.ppt [15th April 2004]. See also
http://www.ala.0 rg/ala/oif/if1ssues/usapatriotactlibrary.htm#analysis
129 Public Libraries and Civil Liberties: A Profession Divided, The Library Research Center, 
University o f Illinois, available at http://alexia.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/civil liberties.html [5th April 
2004],
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one million volunteers to spy on fellow citizens sparked so much outrage that its 
implementation was prohibited in section 880 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
i L
However, it seems clear that since the events of September 11 and the enactment of 
the PATRIOT Act that the individual has much to fear not only from the government 
but also from his fellow countrymen in terms of surveillance of even the most 
common hobbies or tasks.
Whilst section 215 has resulted in a great deal of attention since its enactment, an 
equally invasive provision to the same end has inspired very little debate. Perhaps it is 
due to the fact that the concept of “national security letters” was pre-existing in the 
law enforcement armoury of the United States that it has emerged so far unscathed 
from the onslaught of post-PATRIOT Act criticism.130 Section 505 compels the 
production of personal records from third party holders by the issuance of a national 
security letter, a device previously used only in cases of espionage. However, this has 
now been extended so that access to personal records is possible even in cases in 
which the target is not suspected of any crime, and where no foreign government or 
agent is involved. In line with section 215 such a provision lies in contravention of 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause and in fact goes 
beyond this due to the fact that the process is wholly executive in nature with no 
judicial element whatsoever. The combination of this provision with section 215 
ensures that the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not so rigorous as might once 
have been the case with regard to personal records and access to them by law 
enforcement.
Subsequent to the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, a great deal of legislation has been 
forthcoming. Some has sought to expand on the powers in the Act, however it is in 
response to the provisions affecting privacy and in particular sections 215 and 505 that
n i
a plethora of legislation has been introduced in both Houses. With regard to section 
215 and proposed amendments, the themes running through the amending legislation
130 In September 2004 a federal judge in the Southern District o f New York ruled section 505 to be 
unconstitutional on the basis o f First and Fourth Amendment violations. See John Doe et al. v Ashcroft 
et a lM  Civ. 2614 (VM). 28th September 2004.
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are either an exemption for libraries and booksellers with regard to obtaining an order 
from the FISA court for access to any tangible thing, or indeed a return to the pre- 
PATRIOT standards utilised in obtaining an order under FISA for such access. 
Whether any of the amendments become law remains to be seen, however it is clear 
that any consensus on the part of the public that privacy was an acceptable sacrifice in 
the name of security is diminishing. This assault on the fundamental guarantees of 
privacy and freedom of expression is set to continue beyond the original expiry period 
of the provision following renewal of the PATRIOT Act in July 2005. Section 215 is 
now subject to a ten year sunset period.
Section 213 “Sneak and Peek Searches”
Whilst the Supreme Court has held that providing notice of a search forms part of the
1 'I')Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements, the notion of delayed notice of 
the execution of a search warrant has long been a part of the criminal justice system in 
the United States. No mention is made of the notice requirement in the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, and use of clandestine surveillance and search orders form 
part of FISA 1978. However, section 213 of the PATRIOT Act represents the first 
statutory provision of delayed notice applicable generally in the criminal law.
Section 213 of the Act provides that notification may be delayed if “the court finds 
reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of 
the warrant may have an adverse result.”134 Adverse result is defined as endangering 
the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction of or 
tampering with evidence, intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise seriously 
jeopardising an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.135 Whilst not a new 
phenomenon, having first been introduced by FISA in 1978, the notion of a “sneak
131 Freedom to Read Protection Act (HR 1157), Library and Bookseller Protection Act (SI 158),
Library, Bookseller and Personal Records Privacy Act (SI507), Security and Freedom Ensured Act (S 
1709, HR3352) and Protecting the Rights o f Individuals Act (SI 552).
132 See Ker v California 374 US 23 (1963). Wilson v Arkansas 514 US 927 (1995).
133 Rule 41 governs search and seizure.
134 18 USC 3103a(b)(l) as amended by section 213 USA PATRIOT Act.
135 18 USC 2705 (2)(A)-(E).
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and peek” search as expounded in section 213 is contentious due to its extension 
beyond that originally intended in FISA, whereby the target had to be a foreign power 
or its agent suspected of involvement in terrorism, into the realms of the ordinary 
criminal law. This results from the fact that there is no requirement that the 
investigation to which the search is related be connected to terrorism in any way. On 
this basis, it seems as if the enactment of section 213 provides an example of the state 
taking advantage of the legislative opportunity of an emergency situation to extend the 
criminal law under the guise of countering terrorism. In addition, the fact that this 
extension from foreign agents involved in terrorism to any crime where notice may 
create an adverse result, increases the potential target pool of such searches to every 
citizen and non-citizen in the country as well as beyond. Whilst acknowledged by the 
court as a necessary reality in some cases, this extension of delayed notification, 
beyond the confines of a narrow exception, has the effect of essentially negating this 
part of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements in potentially every 
case.
However, though raising serious questions under the Fourth Amendment, there is 
much debate as to whether section 213 can actually be deemed unconstitutional. 
Indeed, it is due to the inconsistency of the case law on this subject and the resultant 
uncertainty that the Department of Justice has justified the enactment of section 213
I ' i / r
as providing a degree of uniformity to this area. Although the Supreme Court has 
not explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of covert warrants, it has been accepted 
that in the interests of law enforcement, notification of a search may be delayed in
/  ?7certain circumstances. Richards v Wisconsin established that entry without prior 
notice is justified in instances where the police have a reasonable suspicion that 
knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous or futile, or that it would 
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence. “This standard—as opposed to a probable cause requirement- 
strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at
136 See Department o f Justice, Field Guidance on New Authorities Enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation..
137 520 US 385 (1997).
120
Chapter 4: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Privacy o f  the Individual
issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected
1 - 5 0
by no knock entries.”
The decisions of other federal courts on the issue of covert warrants have not made
clarification possible and instead have only contributed confusion to this grey area. In 
/ ?0Villegas v US the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “Certain types of 
searches or surveillances depend for their success on the absence of premature 
disclosure...When nondisclosure of the authorized search is essential to its success, 
neither rule 41 nor the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry.” More recently, it 
was stated in US v Simons140 that “The Fourth Amendment does not mention notice, 
and the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution does not categorically 
proscribe covert entries, which necessarily involve a delay in notice.” In contrast the 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals held in Freitas v US141 that the failure to provide notice 
of the warrant violated both the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41. Whilst 
acknowledging that not all covert entries are unconstitutional, the court stated “the 
absence of any notice requirement in the warrant casts strong doubt on constitutional 
adequacy.”142 As seen, the case law has not clarified the balance which needs to be 
struck between the needs of law enforcement and the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Yet it is of course the case that such a balance must be struck. It stands 
to reason that law enforcement agencies must have the power of covert entry in 
executing search warrants in cases where this proves necessary. However, section 213 
has the effect that the broad reasons for covert entry, in particular seriously 
jeopardising an investigation or unduly delaying a trial, are now applicable to anybody 
in any criminal matter, without the incorporation of additional safeguards so as to 
ensure the proper use of such an intrusive power. Whilst uniformity may have been 
gained by section 213, uniformity should not need to be achieved at the sacrifice of 
reasonable safeguards or necessity.
138 Ibid. See also Dalia v US 441 US 238 (1979).
139 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2nd Cir. 1990).
140 206 F.2d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) See also US v Pangburn 983 F.2d 449, 455 (2nd Cir. 1993) “The 
Fourth Amendment does not deal with notice o f any kind.”
141 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
142 Ib id  p. 1456.
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It is important to note that whilst it is possible to delay notice of a search, notice 
cannot be deferred indefinitely; indeed the Department of Justice has stated that “it 
would be a violation o f the USA PATRIOT Act to fail to provide notice. ”143 The 
Supreme Court has never upheld a government search for which notice is never 
provided.144 Section 213 provides that notice be given within a reasonable period of 
the execution of the warrant, a period which may be extended by the court on a 
showing of good cause.145 A lack of statutory clarification as to what amounts to a 
“reasonable period of time” however, has resulted in reliance on conflicting 
jurisprudence once again. Whilst the notion of a “reasonable period” is said to be a 
flexible standard according to the circumstances of the individual case,146 the 
consensus appears to be that a delay of seven days, subject to additional extensions, 
amounts to a reasonable period.147 However, much longer periods of delay have been
148held as reasonable for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, highlighting the 
developing nature of jurisprudence on this issue. A more satisfactory position would 
be a declaration of what amounts to a reasonable period of time, with the possibility of 
extension if certain criteria are met. This would provide clarification and an element 
of legal certainty.
Congressional distaste for the PATRIOT Act, and in particular section 213, was 
clearly demonstrated in 2003 when the “Otter Amendment”, a provision seeking to 
prohibit the use of federal funds to conduct such searches, was passed in the House of 
Representatives by 309-118. However, whilst this represented the apprehension with 
which the Act and several of its provisions are viewed and certainly seems to tell of 
the unease felt for the PATRIOT Act, the Senate and House leaders refused to put the 
amendment into the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2004 due to go before Congress.
143 Department o f Justice written objection to the Otter Amendment, July 25th 2003, emphasis in 
original, available at http://www.cdt.org/securitv/usapatriot/030725doj.pdf [1st April 2004].
144 This can be contrasted to the jurisprudence o f the European Court o f Human Rights in Klass v 
Germany regarding failure to inform the subject o f surveillance after the event, as discussed earlier in 
the chapter.
145 18 USC 3103a (b)(3).
146 Villegas v US 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2nd Cir. 1990).
147 Ibid. Freitas v US 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). US v Pangburn 983 F.2d 449, 454-455 
(2nd Cir. 1993).
148 See US v Simons 206 F.2d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) where a delay o f 45 days was held not to affect the 
constitutionality o f a search.
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The lack of an explicit ruling by the Supreme Court on the constitutional validity of 
covert warrants make it very difficult to accurately assess the outcome of such a ruling 
were the question to come before the court. The court has long appreciated the needs 
of law enforcement and has thus recognised that the practice of “sneak and peek” 
warrants is sometimes necessary in narrowly circumscribed situations. An argument
tVicould easily be made due to the events of September 11 and the subsequent war on 
terror that such a practice would be condoned and held not to be in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment on the grounds of national security. Moreover, the power to delay 
notice of a search developed prior to the PATRIOT Act and there is no indication that 
the concept of delayed notice has been abused to the extent that delayed notice has 
become the rule rather than the exception. However, it is equally arguable that the 
enactment of section 213 was not strictly necessary due to the fact that delayed notice 
of a search was already available to law enforcement agencies prior to 9/11, and as 
such represents as expansion of the criminal law in the guise of countering terrorism. 
Moreover, the wide scope of section 213, coupled with the fact that the concept of 
“adverse result” is so vague as to potentially fit any situation, could have the effect 
that warrants issued under section 213 do become the norm. This would essentially 
negate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and could result in the court 
finding section 213 to be in violation of the Constitution.
The Legal Framework Relating to Electronic Surveillance pre-PATRIOT Act
Despite the use of virtually identical techniques and technologies in obtaining 
information, the purpose for which the information is sought, crime prevention or 
intelligence gathering, dictates the legal regime under which the surveillance is 
authorised. The phenomenon of terrorism, however, blurs this distinction by way of 
the fact that an investigation into terrorism can be concerned at once with both 
national security and law enforcement.149 A brief discussion of the law relating to 
surveillance prior to the enactment of the PATRIOT Act will serve to emphasise the 
changes wrought in 2001 and their impact.
149 W. C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority fo r  National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 1,93 (2000).
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Interceptions for the Purpose of Law Enforcement
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act150 was enacted in 1968 in response 
to the landmark decisions of Katz and Berger the preceding year. The law governing 
wiretapping was enacted in Title III of the Act, and it is by this name that federal law 
in this area is often referred. Primarily, Title III provides that it is a crime for any 
person to intercept or disclose the contents of any wire, oral or electronic 
communication.151 This is however, subject to the exception that a court order has
been issued on the grounds that there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
1offence, as listed in section 2516, has been, is being or is about to be committed.
18 USC 2516 lists certain “predicate crimes” for which a wiretap could be ordered, to 
which section 201 of the PATRIOT Act added crimes of terrorism or production or 
dissemination of chemical weapons, and section 202 added a “felony violation of 
section 1030 (relating to computer fraud and abuse)." Title III was amended in 1986 
with the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) which 
extended the scope of the wiretap law so as to extend to electronic communications as 
well. However, in contrast to the standard in section 2516(1) whereby applications 
and orders for interception are made on the ground that the interception may provide 
or has provided evidence of any of the offences listed, with regard to interception of 
electronic communications, the standard employed is that the interception may
i  r i
provide or has provided evidence of any Federal felony. The Supreme Court’s 
recognition that the protection of the Fourth Amendment is applicable to electronic 
surveillance is evident through the criteria enacted in Title III. For example, the 
inclusion of enumerated crimes for which surveillance can be ordered, the principle of 
“minimization” under which surveillance must be limited to the potentially 
incriminating communications of the target alone, as well as the fact that evidence 
obtained through an unlawful interception may be suppressed.
150 Codified as amended at 18 USC 2510-2522.
151 18 USC 2511.
152 18 USC 2518.
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Interceptions for the Purpose of Intelligence Gathering
Whilst Katz established that electronic surveillance for the purpose of law 
enforcement was subject to the Fourth Amendment, it left untouched the issue of 
warrantless surveillance on national security grounds. This was dealt with in 1972 in 
United States v United States District Court154 in which the Supreme Court prohibited 
security surveillance which did not conform with the safeguards of the Fourth 
Amendment.155 “These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if 
domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the 
Executive Branch.”156 Instead the court invited Congress to establish a legal regime, 
distinct from that under Title III, but also compatible with the Fourth Amendment, to 
govern intelligence surveillance, as opposed to surveillance for the purpose of law 
enforcement.157
In 1978 Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This
1 ^ 8established a panel of judges, known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC), to review and grant159 applications to undertake electronic surveillance160 in 
the United States, for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information. The 
proceedings of the court take place in camera and the records and files are classified. 
Whilst in a criminal case the standard applicable is probable cause to believe that a 
crime has been committed and that the person is using facilities sought to be 
monitored in connection with the crime, in a foreign intelligence case an order under 
FISA requires rather a finding of probable cause that the target is a member of a 
foreign terrorist organisation or an agent of a foreign power and that the facilities 
sought to be monitored are being used by an agent of a foreign power.161 In contrast, 
if the target is a US citizen or a permanent resident alien, there must be probable cause
153 18 USC 2516(3).
154 407 US 297 (1972).
155 Ibid  p. 320.
156 Ibid  pp. 316-317.
151 Ibid pp. 322-323.
158 See 50 USC 1803. Originally, section 103 o f FISA designated 7 judges to sit on the Court. This 
was increased to 11 by section 208 o f the PATRIOT Act 2001.
159 An order must be granted provided that the application is in compliance with the requirements of the 
Act 50 USC 1805(a).
160 This was extended to include covert physical searches in 1994 and pen register and trap and trace 
orders in 1998 see 50 USC 1821-1829 and 1841-1846.
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to believe that the target is knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities 
for, or on behalf of such a foreign power, which involve or may involve a violation of
1 ff)the criminal statutes of the United States. This has enabled the government to 
assert that the PATIOT Act has not eroded the probable cause standard. However, in 
relation to foreign intelligence surveillance the probable cause standard applied is far 
removed from the traditional interpretation of the term. Indeed as it stands, no 
protection is offered by way of the probable cause standard in foreign intelligence 
cases.
The difference between the procedure under Title III and FISA is highlighted by the 
fact that the omission of the traditional probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment in the regime under FISA was replaced by an undertaking that the 
primary purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 
This was to act as a safeguard for American citizens against covert surveillance. 
However, this was changed in 2001 by the introduction of a less stringent standard in 
section 218 of the PATRIOT Act, which amended FISA so that foreign intelligence 
gathering need now only be a “significant” purpose of the surveillance. This has the 
effect that it is now possible for US citizens to be subject to covert surveillance, as 
granted by a secret court subject to no public accountability so long as foreign 
intelligence can be said to play some part in the investigation. In 2002 the FISC 
rejected a Department of Justice proposal that provided for information sharing 
between prosecutors and investigators which would have had the effect that FISA 
would be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose. “ .. .law enforcement officials 
shall not make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning the initiation, 
operation, continuation or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances.”164
This blurring of domestic and foreign intelligence gathering circumvents the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment and Title III by way of the fact that evidence so 
obtained may now be used in a criminal prosecution where it would once almost
161 See 50 USC 1801 for definitions.
162 50 USC 1801(b)(2)(A).
163 50 USC 1804(a)(7)(B).
164 In Re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, May 17th 2002, p. 27 
This was however overturned by the FISA Appeals Court in November 2002.
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always have been subject to exclusion.165 This possibility was foreseen by the Court 
of Appeals in 1991 when it stated that “The [A]ct is not to be used as an end-run 
around the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of warrantless searches.”166 The 
alternative is of course, that unless the information obtained is used in a prosecution 
the citizen is never informed of the fact that they were a target of such covert 
surveillance; arguably an equally chilling prospect in terms of the right to individual 
privacy.
Section 206 “Roving Wiretaps” Multi-Point Authority
An important part of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is the
requirement of specificity in any warrant of the place to be searched, which of course
equates in terms of wire or electronic surveillance to the particular phone to be
intercepted. This was originally the case in Title III, however the position was
changed with the enactment of the ECPA 1986 which authorized that the requirement
of specificity contained in 18 USC 2518 (l)(b)(ii) did not apply where it was shown
that the target was acting with the intent of avoiding surveillance. This was amended
further in 1998 in section 604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act 1999,167 which
stated that specification of the nature and location of the facilities to be intercepted
need not be provided where probable cause exists that the target’s actions could have
168the effect of thwarting interception. This essentially provided the FBI with the 
power to engage in “roving wiretaps” in criminal cases, whereby the interception 
authorised is of a person rather than a particular phone.
Despite the gradual relaxation of the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, the use of roving wiretaps was limited to use by law enforcement. This 
however changed with the passage of the PATRIOT Act, in which section 206 
extended FISA to permit use of roving wiretaps to intercept the communications of 
intelligence targets. This has the effect that not only are the intelligence services able
165 See Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, A Year o f  Loss, (2002) p. 9 available at www.lchr.org
166 US v Johnson No. 90-2010 Published 19th October 1992 p. 11.
167 A provision which did not appear in either version o f the Bill which passed the House or the Senate.
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to follow an intelligence target from location to location intercepting the 
communications from any telephone or computer used by the target, but also this is 
authorised by the FISC in secret and without a showing of probable cause. By its 
nature this negates the provision in 18 USC 2518(12) that law enforcement officers 
must ascertain that the target is actually using the line to be intercepted before the 
surveillance begins, thereby removing a degree of protection for those innocent users 
caught in the surveillance.
The constitutional questions raised by roving wiretap surveillance are numerous. The 
importance of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment has been 
emphasised by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. In Berger v New York, it 
was stated that to name "...the person or persons whose communications, 
conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded...does no more than 
identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 
"particularly describing" the communications, conversations, or discussions to be 
seized. As with general warrants this leaves too much to the discretion of the officer 
executing the order.”169 Furthermore, the court in Stanford v Texas170 found the 
words of the Fourth Amendment to be “ ... precise and clear. They reflect the 
determination of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation 
should forever "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" from intrusion 
and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled authority of a general warrant.” 
However, the issue of the constitutionality of roving surveillance has not yet come 
before the Supreme Court. Instead, current authority rests with lower Federal courts 
with regard to the use of roving wiretaps.
171The constitutionality of Title III roving interception of oral communication under
i yy
18 USC 2518 (1 l)(a) was addressed in US v Bianco and was found to adhere to the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Rejecting a literal interpretation 
of the Amendment, the Court instead followed the flexible approach taken by the
168 18 USC 2518(11 )(b)(2) emphasis added.
169 388 US 41, 59 (1967).
170 379 US 476,481 (1965).
171 As opposed to wire or electronic communication under section 2518(1 l)(b).
172 998 F. 2d 1112 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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Supreme Court “ ...designed to keep pace with a technologically advancing society” 
reiterating the contention that the prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures “ ...must be interpreted in light of contemporary norms and conditions.”
7 7?Moreover, the court found compelling the reasoning used in US v Silberman in 
which an order issued under section 2518(1 l)(b) was upheld as constitutional on the 
grounds that roving surveillance was justifiable if it was determined that the target 
was deliberately evading detection. This was applied to an order under section 
2518(1 l)(a) on the grounds that deliberately thwarting surveillance was sufficient to 
serve as an example of impracticality as required by section 2518(1 l)(a)(ii). In 
combination with the requirement in subsection 12 that it be ascertained that the target 
is actually using the line to be intercepted, this was deemed sufficient to fulfil the 
particularity requirement of the Constitution. US v Gayton174 followed the earlier case
1JC
of US v Petti in which the court relied strongly on section 2518(1 l)(b)(ii) in stating 
that a lack of specificity with regard to location was acceptable if it was established 
that the target has attempted to evade surveillance. The developments in 
communication allow those involved in matters of crime and espionage to use 
technology to evade law enforcement by way of multiple mobile phones and SIM 
cards as well as numerous anonymous email accounts. As a result of this reality, the 
opinion of roving surveillance as a necessary weapon of law enforcement held by the 
lower courts is understandable.
However, whilst upheld in the lower courts as a necessary weapon of contemporary 
law enforcement it is impossible to escape the resemblance of roving wiretaps to 
general warrants. The argument that the requirement of particularity is satisfied by the 
specific targeting of a person rather than a place is only superficially attractive. This 
is particularly so because the concept of roving surveillance of a target’s phone calls 
or email communications, by its very nature, will result in the interception of 
communications of thousands of innocent parties. The nature of roving surveillance is 
such that it conflicts with a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This is
173 732 F.Supp 1027 (S.D.Cal. 1990).
174 74 F. 3d 545 (5th Cir. 1996).
175 973 F. 2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
176 See US v Hermanek where it was stated that roving wiretaps are an appropriate tool since the advent 
of cellular technology. No. 99-10092 Filed May 15th 2002 P. 7079 (9th Cir. 2002).
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particularly so if one agrees with the suggestion in Katz that it was the fact that Katz 
was engaged in a communication which warranted privacy and that the “place” to be 
protected was “cyber space”177 as opposed to the physical location of the telephone
i  no
box. Furthermore, should the target enter the home of an innocent third party, the 
phone line can be tapped or if the target uses an Internet cafe, the communications of 
all users of the cafe can be intercepted covertly. This has massive implications for the 
privacy rights of thousands of individuals caught in roving surveillance, particularly 
since the expansion of FISA to grant roving wiretaps has removed the requirement in 
section 2518(12) that it be ascertained that the target is actually using the 
communication device concerned. Indeed, the phone line of a house could be 
legitimately intercepted even if the target is a guest for only a short time and does not 
even use the telephone. This negation of the particularity requirement coupled with a 
massive element of discretion on the part of law enforcement and intelligence service
1 7 0officers, for which the Supreme Court has made clear its abhorrence, certainly 
provides the seeds for a ruling that roving surveillance is in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Deemed necessary as a tool of law enforcement, there is logistically 
some sense in not requiring the authorities to apply for a new warrant so as to 
intercept every phone or computer in question. However, it is hard to justify the 
potential infringement on the right to privacy which emanates from the provisions on 
this basis. It is the case that the broad scope and meagre safeguards interfere with the 
privacy of an infinite number of people such as to amount to disproportionality.
The Supreme Court has identified that in cases involving national security it is the 
task of the court to balance “ ...the duty of Government to protect the domestic 
security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual 
privacy and free expression.”180 It is certainly arguable that national security interests 
will be held to supersede those of individual privacy, particularly in the current
1 O  1
climate and given the jurisprudence emanating from the US Court of Appeals.
177 Cyber space has been described as “that place you are in when you are talking on the telephone.”
See Sklansky, n. 104 above p. 39.
178 Ibid.
179 See Stanford v Texas 379 US 476,481-485 (1965).
180 US v US District Court 407 US 297, 314-315 (1972).
181 See N. C. Henderson, “The PATRIOT Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct 
Electronic Surveillance o f Ongoing Domestic Communications”, (2002) 52 Duke L. J. 179, p. 198.
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However, in United States v United States District Court the Supreme Court 
emphasised the position of the Bill of Rights as the instrument to protect the privacy 
of citizens, even when faced with the vital interest of safeguarding society in general 
and the security of its people. In so doing the court emphasised the importance of the 
role played by the warrant requirement in balancing these competing interests and 
found that warrantless surveillance was not justified even in the interests of national 
security. Though decided prior to the enactment of FISA, there is not a large gulf 
between warrantless surveillance and the system of review of FISA applications by 
the FISA court. It is therefore arguable that the court would uphold the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment as a buffer between government power and individual 
privacy, particularly given the fact that to uphold the constitutionality of roving 
wiretaps could be construed as gutting the Fourth Amendment of its intended 
significance.
Conclusion
The increased threat from Islamic fundamentalism and the events of September 11 
signify a change in the focus of anti-terrorism measures. In the past the privacy of the 
individual had not been an area affected as extensively as others by anti-terrorism 
provisions. Measures enacted to deal with the Northern Irish troubles provided 
powers which had a greater impact on the freedom of expression and association, 
liberty and due process rights of the individual. Data retention and the use of such 
information were not techniques utilised in the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, at least not to the extent currently employed. In addition, traditionally in the 
United States ordinary investigative practices were utilised by police to notable 
success in investigating terrorist attacks, such as the World Trade Centre bombing in 
1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. This begs the question whether these 
countries actually need such measures in order to be able to counter the threat from 
Islamic extremism effectively? Or is it the case that the governments of both 
countries took advantage of the legislative opportunity presented to enact extensive
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provisions which are not limited to terrorism but extend into the realm of the ordinary 
criminal law?
With regard to the measures contained in the ATCSA, both the retention of 
communications data and the disclosure of information can be said to achieve 
questionable satisfaction of the requisite criteria in assessing a valid limitation on a 
fundamental right, in particular the requirement of necessity. Indeed, it is fair to say 
of both measures that they lack sufficient proportionality to the end to be achieved. It 
is acknowledged that Part III includes a test of proportionality, yet concerns exist with 
regard to the extent to which the proportionality of the disclosure will be considered 
prior to the act. In addition there is arguably no pressing social need for the measures 
given the far-reaching and indiscriminate nature of the provisions. The questions 
raised concerning satisfaction of the necessary criterion tend towards the conclusion 
that these measures were not necessary in order to counter the threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism effectively and instead can be said to be an extension of the criminal 
law enacted as emergency legislation. This is borne out by earlier unsuccessful 
attempts to enact the provisions relating to disclosure of information.
The utility of these measures is also questionable. The argument that information 
relating to terrorism may be uncovered through disclosure of other information can be 
criticised on several fronts. Such a technique cannot be said to amount to efficient 
and effective investigative practice. This leads on to the point that inherent 
interference with the privacy of innumerable individuals cannot properly be justified 
on the basis of the utility of the provision in question. Similarly, the blanket retention 
of data such as to essentially profile the individual is hard to justify on the basis that 
such information may be of use to an investigation should an individual be identified 
as a terrorist suspect. In addition any safeguards which might have minimised the 
interference with the right to privacy are notably absent.
The provisions enacted in the PATRIOT Act differ from the information retention 
provisions of the ATCSA to provisions primarily concerned with data collection. 
This portrays a desire to be in a position of knowledge with regard to those living 
within US borders, perhaps understandably, given the fact that the 9/11 hijackers lived
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and took flight lessons in the United States for long periods prior to the events of 
September 11th.
Of the measures enacted in the PATRIOT Act it is section 213 relating to “sneak and 
peek” searches, which can be said to be supported by an objective justified in its 
utility. Covert entry and delayed notification are powers of acknowledged use in law 
enforcement, both generally and in the field of terrorist offences. The utility of such a 
measure in relation with the investigation of terrorism is clear with regard to locating 
incriminating documentation as well as the paraphernalia connected with the making 
of explosives. This is particularly so when dealing with the phenomenon of suicide 
bombers when any notice may provide the opportunity for detonation. However, the 
necessity of section 213 must be questioned given the fact that law enforcement 
agencies already had the power of covert entry and delayed notification in certain 
circumstances.
However, whilst covert entry is sometimes necessary in relation to crime generally, 
the effect of section 213 and the broad definition of “adverse result” increases the 
potential for its use so that delayed notification becomes more a rule than an 
exception. The cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the 
importance of the government’s aim coupled with the logistical advantage of secrecy 
in certain circumstances, particularly cases concerning terrorism, tends to justify the 
intrusion. However, the reasonableness achieved through the utilisation of covert 
entry as a tool in exceptional circumstances is dissipated by the potential for delayed 
notice searches to become of almost general application. This situation could be 
improved by a narrower definition of “adverse result”, as well as the establishment of 
a set period of time so as to provide a degree of certainty. Covert searches are 
obviously required by law enforcement in certain circumstances however the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment need not be entirely negated.
It is with regard to the provisions of section 215, access to tangible things and section 
206, relating to the use of roving wiretaps, that the balance required in the Fourth 
Amendment can be said to be tipped towards unreasonableness. With regard to the 
former the provision combines a wide scope with a lack of any meaningful oversight,
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which cannot be justified on the basis of any practical benefit. It is not the case that 
satisfaction of an objective standard of suspicion justifies access to tangible items; 
rather the effect of the provision is general surveillance of the population without 
adequate justification in connection with the prevention of terrorism. In addition, the 
breadth of the provision is such as to encourage and in turn rely on the unsubstantiated 
suspicions of the public. Similarly, whilst advances in technology have assisted 
criminal actors with regard to means of contacting associates and evasion of detection, 
roving surveillance the scope of which was expanded by section 206, has the effect of 
removing the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This essentially 
allows interception of communications generally and leaves a great deal of discretion 
to law enforcement and intelligence services officers. Of course the law must keep 
pace with advances in science and technology but the scope of section 206 is so broad 
that it is hard to justify the intrusion to the privacy of potentially thousands of people, 
even having regard to the national security concerns of the country.
These powers in both the UK and the US can be said to form a large part of a 
proactive attempt to “root” out terrorist threats pre-emptively rather than focus on 
identifying the culprit in the aftermath of another atrocity. Whilst an understandable 
sentiment, there is something unpalatable about legislation which essentially treats the 
whole community as suspect and is able to infringe the privacy of individuals on a 
virtually discretionary basis without satisfying objective standards. This effect is not 
mitigated by the inclusion of adequate safeguards. Indeed, it can be said of both the 
measures in the ATCSA and the PATRIOT Act that they combine insufficient, and in 
some cases a complete lack, of independent oversight with a purview which extends 
into the criminal law rather than solely relating to terrorist investigations. These 
measures represent a severe assault on the privacy of the individual. What is notable 
about these provisions is that this assault on privacy cannot be said to be justified by 
the utility of the measures in investigating terrorist offences, save for section 213 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act in relation to covert searches, the utility of which is not 
confined to terrorist investigations but extends to the criminal law in general. Whilst 
it can be argued that such measures may prevent terrorist attacks, this would come at a 
price. Indeed, the interference with individual privacy is hard to justify on the basis of 
tenuous claims of counter terrorism success with powers which may be of use in
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preventing terrorism. The effect of these measures has a deleterious effect on 
standards integral to democratic society. These measures represent only part of the 
provisions enacted in each country both prior to and following the events of 
September 11 which curtail individual freedom to some extent. In combination, the 
detrimental effect on the individual as well as on democratic values is clear.
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Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression, though a cornerstone of democracy, has often fallen victim to 
attempts by the state to ensure security in times of emergency or crisis. This has 
occurred in the United Kingdom and the United States through policy decisions such 
as the media ban introduced in October 1988 as well as investigative practices such as 
those undertaken by the FBI in monitoring political activity and affiliations instead of 
investigating criminal behaviour. In addition, previous anti-terrorism legislation in 
the UK has contained provisions, such as proscription, with the potential to interfere 
with the freedom of expression of the individual. Such practices have garnered 
considerable criticism over the years. This criticism has continued with regard to the 
United Kingdom due to the re-enactment of these provisions with permanent status 
under the Terrorism Act 2000. Similarly, interference with freedom of expression and 
the notion of guilt by association has been enshrined in legislation in the United 
States, through the concept of designation of foreign organisations, by way of both the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 and the USA PATRIOT Act 
2001 .
Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom
The importance afforded freedom of expression by the European Convention on 
Human Rights is highlighted in its description as “...one of the essential foundations 
of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man.”1 However, despite this fundamental status, freedom of 
expression in the United Kingdom is not absolute. The grant of the right to freedom 
of expression in article 10 which includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers, is immediately curtailed in the subsequent paragraph in situations where 
the interference is prescribed by law, is necessary in a democratic society and, of 
relevance here, is in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
1 H andyside v U K ( \9 1 6 )  1 E.H.R.R. 737 para. 49.
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safety or for the prevention of disorder or crime.2 Its vital importance coupled with 
this qualified status has resulted in great use of the supervisory function of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
The scope of article 10 of the Convention in the context of terrorist cases was 
considered by the European Commission of Human Rights in Purcell and Others v 
Ireland.3 This concerned alleged restrictions on the applicants’ freedom of expression 
resulting from a ministerial Order made under Section 31 of the Broadcasting 
Authority Act I9604, under which restrictions were placed on the broadcasting of a 
particular matter or any matter of a particular class if it was considered that to so 
would be likely to promote, or incite to, crime or would tend to undermine the 
authority of the State. Of relevance here were interviews with or broadcasts of 
spokesmen of Irish nationalist and loyalist organisations.5 In finding such an Order to 
constitute an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ right to receive and 
impart information and ideas, various statements were made by the Commission in 
reference to the justification of such an interference under article 10(2) of the ECHR. 
The Commission determined that the Order prohibited the use of the media for the 
purpose of advocating support for organisations which seek to undermine, by violence 
and other illegal means, the constitutional order and the fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In so doing it was found that by allowing, in 
Article 10(2), certain restrictions on the exercise of the freedom of expression, the 
Convention recognises the principle that no group or person has the right to pursue 
activities which aim at the destruction of any of the rights and freedom enshrined in it.
Freedom of expression was said to constitute one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society, but it was also emphasised that the exercise of that freedom 
"carries with it duties and responsibilities" and that the defeat of terrorism is a public 
interest of the first importance in a democratic society. In a situation where politically 
motivated violence poses a constant threat to the lives and security of the population 
and where the advocates of such violence seek to utilise the media for publicity
2 This is in addition to the right to freedom o f expression in article 19 o f the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and article 19(2) o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3 Application No. 15404/89
4 As amended by Section 16 o f the Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act 1976.
5 These were the IRA, Sinn Fein, the UDA, the INLA and any organisation proscribed under the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.
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purposes, it was acknowledged to be particularly difficult to strike a fair balance 
between the requirements of protecting freedom of information and the importance of 
protecting the state and the public against the threat posed by the advocates of 
violence. Ultimately, it was found that the balance was tipped in favour of the 
promotion of national security on the basis that protection of the democratic order 
safeguards freedom of expression and other fundamental rights for all.
Establishing justification of an interference with the right to freedom of expression on 
the grounds of national security has been greatly eased by the decision in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Rehman6 in which the House of Lords defined the 
term in an extremely broad manner. In Rehman the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) upheld the appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to 
deport Rehman, a Pakistani national, on the basis that he was a danger to national 
security. It was the definition of national security and the determination of what 
could be said to be in the interests of national security which occupied the court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords. The SIAC defined national security as engaging in, 
promoting, or encouraging violent activity which is targeted at the United Kingdom, 
its system of government or its people and found that Rehman could not be said to 
have acted contrary to national security on the facts before the Commission. This 
definition was submitted by the government to be too narrow. Indeed an exhaustive 
definition of what is in the interests of national security would bind the executive 
when dealing with changing circumstances, risk assessments and politics. Moreover, 
what is in the interests of the national security of the UK was said to go further than 
those acting against the UK and included those within the UK taking action against 
foreign states. This was on the basis of protecting the collective security of the 
community of nations as well as in an attempt to foster a relationship of reciprocity 
with other nations in combating terrorism and safeguarding the security of the state.
However, in an area such as this where the executive acts with a wide discretion, a 
narrow approach would be preferable. A circumscribed approach is particularly 
important where a finding that an individual is a danger to national security can result 
in deportation and have an adverse effect on his enjoyment of protected rights.
6 [2003] 1 A.C. 153. Hereinafter Rehman.
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However, the House of Lords held that the interests of national security could be 
threatened not only by direct action against the United Kingdom, its system of 
government or its citizens, but also by an indirect threat to another state, a definition 
exacerbated by its application at the executive’s discretion. Such an approach will 
clearly have the effect that justification for an interference with Convention rights will 
be far easier to establish. Whilst it was held that the definition itself fell within the 
ambit of judicial determination as a question of law, whether an issue falls as being in
n
the interests of national security is a question for the executive. The result of this 
therefore was that SIAC could not disagree with the Secretary of State’s opinion that 
terrorism against a foreign state was contrary to the interests and security of the
o
United Kingdom. This had the effect that whilst SIAC was said to have full appellate 
jurisdiction,9 an issue such as national security was not one which could be properly 
decided by a judicial tribunal at all.10 However, this of course would have the effect 
of defeating the purpose for which SIAC was established. This was recognised by 
Lord Hoffmann and as such, he provided three examples of situations in which SIAC 
could review matters of national security:
1. The factual basis for executive opinion that deportation would be in the 
interests of national security must be established by evidence which could be 
reviewed by SIAC.
2. Whether the decision of the Secretary of State was Wednesbury unreasonable 
was reviewable.
3. An appeal to the Commission may turn on issues which do not lie within the 
ambit of executive discretion such as whether deportation interferes with 
rights under the ECHR.
Whilst this has the effect of delineating the roles of the judiciary and executive in this 
area, it also reduces the level of judicial review to which such decisions can be 
subjected. This approach is in keeping with the postscript Lord Hoffmann added 
following the events of September 11th which underlines the need for judicial 
deference to the executive in such matters on the basis of access to information and
7 Ibid., para. 50 .
8 Ibid., para. 53.
9 Section 4(1) Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.
10 Rehman, n. 3 above para. 52.
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the expertise held by ministers as well as the notion of democratic accountability. 
However, to reduce the role of the courts in the area of national security in this way 
leaves this area and those individuals caught therein in an extremely vulnerable 
position. Whilst this may have provided some degree of clarity to the ambiguity 
surrounding questions of law and politics regarding national security, this clarity has 
come at a high price which is in keeping with an increase in judicial deference post 
9/11.11
The Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
Freedom of expression was long a casualty of the anti-terrorism regime under the 
PTA and the EPA, and the situation has not improved under the permanent status of 
the Terrorism Act 2000, nor under the most recently enacted Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001. Primarily, this is due to the fact that Part II of the Terrorism 
Act replicates, and moreover extends, those provisions which have the potential to 
restrict the freedom of expression and association of the individual, and which derive 
from the power to proscribe organisations as terrorist.
Proscription and Related Offences
The gateway to several offences contained in the Terrorism Act is the power of 
proscription as contained in section 3 of the Act. Since its initial enactment, the power 
to proscribe has raised concerns under the banners of freedom of expression and 
association, however the Terrorism Act has brought about two further important and 
troubling consequences. Whilst this power to proscribe remains essentially the same 
as that under the PTA, its scope extends beyond the affairs of Northern Ireland to 
include other domestic organisations as well as foreign terror groups. This obviously 
has the effect of increasing the potential for infringement of freedom of expression 
and association far beyond that which existed previously. Secondly, the status of the 
Terrorism Act is such that the potential for interference with these fundamental rights 
is now a permanent feature of the British legal landscape.
11 See Suresh v Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.
140
Chapter 5: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Freedom o f  Expression
Despite questions raised as to the effectiveness, as opposed to the symbolism, of 
proscription, the decision was taken to re-enact this power in the Terrorism Act, 
notwithstanding misgivings regarding its compatibility with the rights contained in the 
ECHR. Proscription is no longer the purely executive power it was under the 
previous regime, due to the establishment of the Proscribed Organisations Appeal 
Commission (POAC), which allows an organisation to appeal against the decision of
the Secretary of State not to deproscribe the group. Provision is made in the
1 ^
Proscribed Organisation Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2001 for a special 
advocate to represent the interests of the appellant in the hearing due to the fact that 
the exclusion of the appellant and his legal representative from proceedings may be 
ordered. This enables the POAC to consider all evidence pertaining to the matter in 
camera, including that obtained by way of intercepted communications. The special 
advocate may make written and oral representations to the Commission and may cross 
examine witnesses. However, once material has been disclosed to the special 
advocate by the Secretary of State, there may be no communication with the appellant 
or his legal representative unless permission is obtained from the POAC. This 
obviously prevents any form of effective refutation of the material by the appellant. 
Whilst this situation is of course disadvantageous to the appellant, the difference 
between this and the comparable scenario before the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC), discussed in chapter 7, with regard to the detention of suspected 
international terrorists, is that the proceedings before POAC are not concerned with 
the liberty of an individual. As a result of this the evidential and procedural 
disadvantages to the appellant are not as objectionable as is the case with proceedings 
before the SIAC.
Proscription of an organisation causes interference with the freedom of expression of 
a group far wider than the membership of the organisation concerned. Indeed, to ban 
a particular organisation inhibits political discussion in the community at large. This 
impact can be seen in the case of R (On the Application o f the Kurdistan Workers'
12 SI 2001/443.
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Party and Others) v Secretary o f State for the Home Department,13 in which it was 
stated that proscription of the PKK had the effect of smothering the only outlet for 
political expression had by a great number of the Kurdish community and essentially 
suppressed all political debate. Such an effect undermines democratic values and 
therefore plays into the hands of terrorist organisations. Moreover, such a stance 
seemingly subverts the aim of proscription as denying terrorist organisations so 
designated the “oxygen of publicity” by potentially drawing more attention to the 
organisation and its cause.
This case dealt primarily with jurisdiction; however it was found that the claims made 
with regard to the infringement of the claimant’s rights under the Convention were 
arguable, giving credence to the assertion that proscription and the offences 
consequent to that power restrict rights protected by the ECHR. Interestingly, 
parallels may be drawn between this case and the European Court of Human Rights 
case of Yazar, Karatas, Aksoy and the People’s Labour Party v Turkey.14 Of concern 
in Yazar was the People’s Labour Party (HEP), which supported the aim of self- 
determination of the Kurdish people and was dissolved as being a threat to the 
territorial integrity of Turkey. In finding a violation of article 11, the court made a 
number of important pronouncements. It was stated that article 11 must be considered 
in light of article 10 due to that fact that the protection of, and freedom to express 
opinions is one of the objectives of freedom of association as enshrined in article l l . 15 
That applies all the more in relation to political parties in view of their essential role 
in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.
In determining whether a violation of the Convention had occurred, the court found 
that the restriction on the article 11 rights in question was prescribed in law by way of 
the relevant articles of the Turkish constitution as well as by certain sections of a 
domestic law on the regulation of political parties.16 Furthermore, it was found that 
the dissolution of the party pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of
13 [2002] EWHC 644 at para. 42. This case concerned the proscription of the PKK, the People’s 
Mojahedin Organisation o f Iran (PMOI) and Lashkar e Tayyabah (the LeT). Hereinafter known as 
PKK.
14 (2003) 36 EHRR 59 Hereinafter known as Yazar.
15 Ibid., para. 46.
16 Ibid., para. 35.
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territorial integrity and of national security.17 However, it was in its assessment of 
whether the government action could be said to be necessary in a democratic society 
that a number of important statements were made. Democracy thrives on freedom of 
expression and if it were deemed that by promoting the same principles as a group 
which utilised force as a means of achieving its aims, that a political group was 
supporting acts of terrorism, democratic debate would be diminished. This would 
have the effect of allowing armed movements to monopolise support for the principles 
concerned, as well as being contrary to the spirit of Article 11 and the democratic 
principles on which it was based.18 Moreover, the right to freedom of expression 
contained in article 10 extends to not only that which is favourably received but also 
to the protection of expression which offends, shocks or disturbs, and therefore the 
opinion of the minority. Pluralism requires that public debate extend to ideas which 
are not necessarily in conformity with government policies in an attempt to resolve 
problems without the use of violence.19 Ultimately, dissolution of a political party is 
an extreme measure which in the circumstances amounted to an unnecessary 
interference with the freedom of association of the applicants.
The fact that proscription gives rise to such a serious interference with the rights of an 
organisation and its supporters means that a correspondingly compelling justification 
for the proscription will have to be advanced. In noting the chilling effect on freedom 
of expression, the court in PKK made clear its appreciation of the fact that 
proscription can constitute an interference with the rights protected by articles 10 and 
11 of the ECHR. Using the traditional formula of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the restriction was legislatively prescribed by the Terrorism Act, and 
establishment of pursuing a legitimate aim would not be hard to establish in the name 
of national security, particularly given the assertion in Rehman that in the 
contemparary world the security of a foreign state may be capable of affecting the 
national security of the UK. However, the importance placed on freedom of 
expression as a fundamental human right and its key role in the maintainance of 
healthy democracy means that establishment of the necessity of such an interference 
is harder to achieve than the former conditions. Whether banning these three foreign
17 Ibid., para. 38.
18 Ibid., para. 57.
19 Ibid., para. 40.
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organisations could be said to satisfy a “pressing social need” is debatable, 
particularly given the conflicting claims made by the organisations in rebuttal of the 
statements made by the Secretary of State with regard to their terrorist actions. Of the 
three, only the PMOI acknowledged the use of violent means in pursuit of democratic 
aims, and this was said to have been a path forced upon the organisation which was 
allegedly tempered by the fact that only military and security targets were focused 
upon.21
In this vein, the criteria which must be considered in making a proscription order as 
laid down by the Home Office consist of the following:
(a) the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities,
(b) the specific threat it poses to the UK,
(c) the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas,
(d) the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK, and
(e) the need to support other members of the international community in the 
global fight against terrorism.22
It can be questioned to what extent an organisation on ceasefire and with a negligible 
presence in the UK, such as the PKK, can be said to satisfy the first four of these 
requirements to the requisite standard, given the level of restriction on the right to 
freedom of expression and association which ensues from an order for proscription. 
Of course, as the European Court of Human Rights has noted, a declaration of 
ceasefire is by no means an iron-clad guarantee that terroristic activities have been 
totally renounced. However, the level of deference shown to the executive and at 
European level, the wide margin of appreciation afforded to states with regard to 
terrorism and threats to national security suggests that ministerial assertions about the 
organisations would be respected, despite claims to the contrary. Moreover, in the 
context of the post-9/11 situation and the subsequent “war on terrorism” the banning 
of foreign organisations with no history of terrorism in the UK, and the resultant 
interference with freedom of expression, it seems would likely be treated with more
20 Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. para. 48.
21 PKK  [2002] EWHC 644 para. 25.
22 Home Office Press Release 28th February 2001.
23 See Hogefeld v Germany Hudoc Application No. 35402/97 20/01/00.
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deference than might once have been the case. This is particularly so in light of the 
remarks of Lord Hoffman in Rehman in which he espoused the need for judicial 
deference to the executive in dealing with threats to national security on the grounds 
of the expertise of the Minister and the information to which he is privy as well as the 
legitimacy conferred to his decisions by way of the democratic accountability of the 
office.24 However, proscription of groups with no history of terrorism in the UK can 
be questioned with regard to the proportionality of the action. The assertion that there 
is arguably no “pressing social need” to justify proscription of such groups as the 
PKK remains.
Another important issue gleaned from the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights in assessing whether a restriction on freedom of expression is justified 
is consideration of the status of the person or people affected who claim an 
interference. In Hogefeld v Germany25 journalists were prevented from interviewing 
Ms Hogefeld, a prominent member of the Red Army Faction. The refusal was 
premised on her status as one of the “main representatives” of the organisation, it 
being asserted that even vague statements by her could potentially be construed by 
supporters as an appeal to continue the activities of the organisation. As such, the 
restriction of her freedom of expression was found to have been justifiable and the 
application was therefore declared inadmissible. It was the case that the RAF had 
ceased violent activities several years earlier in 1992 and as such it can be questioned 
whether the interference with freedom of expression met a pressing social need. Of 
course declarations of ceasefire by such groups have traditionally been dealt with with 
some scepticism and activities could have been recommenced. Of interest here is the 
fact that the refusal to allow the interviews affected not just Ms Hogefeld’s freedom 
of expression but also that of the journalist concerned as well as those members of the 
public who were denied the opportunity to consider the content of the journalistic 
item.
In R v Attorney General’s Reference No. 4 o f2002 a question as to whether article 
10 placed any constraints upon a prosecution for belonging or professing to belong to
24 [2003] 1 A.C. 153 para. 62.
25 Hudoc application no. 35402/97 20/01/00.
26 [2003] H.R.L.R. 15
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a proscribed organisation27 was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in an almost 
cursory manner: “ ...we find it difficult to see how this could ever be the case.”28 The 
court stated that section 11 does not interfere with any person’s right to express 
himself freely except in the specific situation of professing membership to a 
proscribed group. In the view of both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, 
criminalizing the profession of membership of a proscribed organisation is both 
necessary and proportionate. The message in taking a stand against terrorist groups is 
clear and it is the case that in spite of the provision of section 11, opportunities for 
dissent continue to exist. However, following and in contrast to the commentary in 
relation to Hogefeld v Germany, section 11 has the effect of including even nominal 
membership in its scope, so that a vague statement as to membership by an individual 
on the peripheries of a proscribed organisation would be sufficient to result in 
conviction under the Act. Perhaps an improvement would arise through inclusion of 
some additional element such as a requirement that the individual concerned intended 
to further the aims of the proscribed organisation concerned. Moreover, the provision 
carries with it a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Given these points it 
may be argued, despite the legitimate aim, that section 11 and its effect is 
disproportionate.
It is not just members of proscribed organisations who are affected by proscription 
with supporters similarly suffering an interference with their right to freedom of 
expression due to the proscription of the group. This was a point raised particularly in 
relation to the PKK where it was stated that the organisation has a vast body of 
supporters in favour of the self-determination of the Kurdish people, notwithstanding 
the use of violence in pursuit of that aim. It can be said that membership of and 
support for a proscribed organisation can be difficult to prove given the nature of 
terrorist groups. However, proscription of an organisation and the resultant offences 
flowing from such an order do have the effect of confronting the individual with the 
unenviable choice of committing a criminal offence by expressing support for the 
organisation in question, or having to engage in self-censorship in an attempt to avoid 
prosecution. An exacerbating factor is the fact that there is often no other outlet for 
political expression for those supporters of a proscribed organisation. It seems
27 Section 11(1) TA.
28 [2003] H.R.L.R. 15 para. 43.
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difficult to argue that to restrict the freedom of expression of potentially thousands of 
people due to the fact that they support the objectives, but not the means, of a 
particular organisation is proportionate to the aim pursued. This is particularly so 
given the degree of self-censorship required in order to ensure compliance with the 
law. Whilst for active members of a group, proscription could be said to act as 
encouragement to use democratic values such as the right to dissent, for those who 
simply support the aims, but not the violent means, of a proscribed group, proscription 
can have the opposite effect and stifle the values which promote democracy as an 
antidote to terrorism. It has been judicially asserted that the fact that proscription 
gives rise to such a serious interference with the rights of those involved with an 
organisation and its supporters means that a correspondingly more compelling 
justification for the proscription will have to be advanced. In light of cases such as 
Hogefeld and Zana v Turkey,30 it can be said that due to the potential restriction on the 
freedom of expression of those who do not advocate the use of violence or whose 
position is not likely to incite violence, that the power to proscribe organisations could 
be found to be lacking in its compatibility with article 10.
Flowing from the power to proscribe an organisation in the Terrorism Act are related
criminal offences. Aside from the offence of membership of a proscribed
organisation contained in section 11(1) of the TA, section 12 contains three related
offences which are not contingent on membership of a proscribed organisation.
Section 12(1) makes it an offence to invite support for such an organisation, which is
1 1
not, or is not restricted to, the provision of money or other property, and as such 
criminalizes even the most trivial espousal of support for the objectives of a 
proscribed organisation.32 Given that it is the status of the group itself which triggers 
the offence this has the effect that even support for completely lawful activities 
undertaken by the organisation in question would result in the commission of an 
offence. The broad nature of this provision goes further than the comparable 
provisions in the US legislation, the purpose of which is said to be to prohibit material 
support and not advocacy of the beliefs supported by the group in question. A more
29 [2002] EWHC 644 para. 89.
30 (1997) 27 E.H.R.R. 667.
31 Section 12(2) TA.
32 Support in the form of money or other property is criminalized in section 15TA, which criminalizes 
any such support for the purposes o f terrorism and as such does not require the proscription o f the 
organisation.
147
Chapter 5: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Freedom o f  Expression
tightly drawn provision in the Terrorism Act 2000 could prohibit provision of 
financial or other support to proscribed organisations whilst not curtailing freedom of 
expression of individuals with regard to support for the ends rather than the means 
utilised by the group. Whilst it is understandable to want to restrict financial support 
which assists groups in pursuing and carrying out violent activities, support for lawful 
activities is also prohibited. Some form of demarcation would be preferable though 
perhaps hard to achieve in practice. However, an attempt to allow support for lawful 
activities may be viewed as sending conflicting messages to the public with regard to 
the organisations in question given that the point of proscription is said to be to 
condemn particular groups for participation in violent and illegal activities. In 
addition, there may be some merit to the argument that infringement of pure speech as 
expression, regarding support for the ultimate objectives of a proscribed group is less 
justifiable than prohibiting the provision of financial or other such support as 
expression due to the ultimate use to which donations can be put.
Furthermore, the vague nature of inviting support for a proscribed organisation has 
potentially serious implications on the freedom of the press, given that a certain slant 
on an article written on the humanitarian activities of such an organisation could be 
deemed to amount to support of an organisation, or could be construed as likely to 
incite support in others. Such a possibility could have a detrimental effect on the 
notion of freedom of expression on both the part of the journalist and the ideal of a 
free press and on the part of those receiving such information. Indeed, as was 
acknowledged in the PKK case, the mere existence of legislation prohibiting an action 
can constitute a continuing interference with Convention rights which could be 
challenged in a pre-emptive fashion.33 Arguably the choice between self-censorship 
or possible prosecution would be sufficient to challenge the restriction of the right to 
freedom of expression resulting from section 12(1) of the Terrorism Act. However, 
with regard to domestic challenge there is a strong indication, despite an 
acknowledgement that the circumstances of a particular case may give rise to a 
disproportionate interference with an individual’s rights,34 that such a restriction
33 [2002] EWHC 644 para. 90.
34 Ibid., para. 91.
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would be deemed to be justified on the grounds of national security and “the manifest 
public interest in the suppression of terrorism.”
Section 12(2) provides that it is an offence for a person to arrange, manage or assist in 
arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is-
(a) to support a proscribed organisation
(b) to further the activities of a proscribed organisation, or
(c) to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed 
organisation.
(3) A person commits an offence if he addresses a meeting and the purpose of his 
address is to encourage support for a proscribed organisation or to further its 
activities.
The right to freedom of expression extends not simply to an individual’s right to hold 
opinions and to express himself but also beyond that to the right to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by the State. The offences in section 12, 
however, are capable of considerable impact on this right, as well as the right to 
freedom of association enshrined in article 11. Moreover, whilst the aim of such 
provisions is to deny terrorist organisations and their members the opportunity to 
legitimise the cause, the practical effect has much more far-reaching implications. 
This was acknowledged by Earl Jellicoe in his review of the PTA where it was stated 
that it expected a great deal of the police “to apply these provisions fully to proscribed 
organisations...while not affecting the free expression of views about Northern 
Ireland.”37 Indeed, to ban the arrangement, management or address of a meeting of 
three or more persons undeniably chills the freedom of expression of both the general 
public to receive such information and the press to report on such matters. This is due 
to the fact that a journalist arranging a meeting with members of a proscribed 
organisation for the purposes of investigative journalism would fall within the scope 
of the provision. Surely the realistic nature of terrorist organisations is that any 
meeting concerning the operational plans, capacity and management of a terrorist 
group would be held in utmost secrecy and as such it would be unlikely that the
35 [2003] H.R.L.R. 15 para. 42.
36 Article 10(1) ECHR.
37 Earl Jellicoe, Review o f  the Operation o f  the Prevention o f  Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1976. Cm. 8803. (London: HMSO, 1983) para. 212.
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authorities would have any knowledge of it taking place. Rather a more likely 
scenario is that the situations in which prosecutions under section 12 would arise and 
subsequent interference with freedom of expression or association would occur would 
be those meetings held for reasons of investigative journalism, public concern or 
indeed on an unrelated subject held in the public domain. Concerns such as this were 
raised in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords regarding the choice 
between the risk of prosecution or restriction of the rights enshrined in articles 10 and 
11 to which the response was that prosecutions under section 12 would be undertaken 
at the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions. However, the utilisation of 
discretion as opposed to a tangible rule on this matter will inevitably chill freedom of 
expression, regardless of whether a prosecution ensues or is even likely to do so.
Moreover, whilst there is no offence of attending such a meeting as appears in section 
12, section 12(2)(c) criminalizes the arrangement of a meeting which is to be 
addressed by a member of a proscribed organisation, even if the subject matter of the 
meeting is to be totally benign. It may be possible to argue that to restrict a speech or 
meeting intended to support or further the activities of a proscribed organisation, is 
justifiable on the grounds of national security and that denial of the “oxygen of 
publicity” is the precise aim of proscription. Indeed it has been argued that the right 
to freedom of association should not be interpreted as including the right to associate
o  o
for the purposes of committing a criminal act. However, to extend this to addressing 
a meeting on a topic completely unrelated to terrorism or a proscribed organisation 
infringes the right to freedom of expression of both the speaker as well as the public 
in a far-reaching manner. Furthermore, this dilutes the principle of legal certainty 
given the fact that the average lay person is unlikely to be aware that to arrange a 
meeting at which a member of a proscribed organisation speaks on an inoffensive 
subject could, albeit unlikely, result in prosecution for an offence which carries a 
possible sentence of up to ten years imprisonment. A statutory defence exists in 
section 12(4) whereby such a person can prove that he had no reasonable cause to 
believe that the address mentioned in subsection 2(c) would support a proscribed 
organisation or further its activities. However, this applies only in relation to private 
meetings and is of no relevance with regard to a meeting of benign subject matter. In
38 Draft Response o f the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to the UK Government’s White 
Paper “Legislation Against Terrorism” (Cm. 4178, 1998) para. 5.2.
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such a case, the discretion of the DPP with regard to prosecution is likely not to 
provide a great deal of confidence.
Potential for further restriction of the right to freedom of expression exists within 
section 13 of the Terrorism Act, under which an offence is committed if a person in a 
public place (a) wears an item of clothing, or (b) wears, carries or displays an article 
in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse suspicion that he is a member or 
supporter of a proscribed organisation. The impetus for this offence was the affront 
caused to the public by paramilitary displays at the funerals of members of such 
groups as the IRA. Though a fairly peripheral offence in terms of the armoury of 
British anti-terrorism law, it can be said that the scope of article 10 extends so as to 
include dress within its parameters,39 and that such a criminalisation could be 
construed as an interference with the right to freedom of expression. This offence is 
essentially an exact replica of section 3 of the PTA 1989 under which there was one 
prosecution between 1974 and 2000. It must therefore be questioned whether 
inclusion of this offence was necessary, particularly given the fact that it is unclear to 
what extent it differs from that contained in section 1 of the Public Order Act 1936. 
Section 1 prohibits the wearing of an uniform signifying association with any political 
organisation or with the promotion of any political object by any person in a public 
place. Perhaps the dearth of prosecutions under section 1340 make this a theoretical 
point, however, for this reason its place on the statute book must be questioned, 
particularly given the fact that whilst the provisions may not be used a great deal, 
interference with freedom of expression occurs through self-censorship. It is 
submitted that this provision cannot be said to be justified on the basis of any practical 
benefit as shown by the lack of use, save perhaps for the fear of negative public 
reaction if the offences flowing from proscription were to be abolished. Moreover, it 
can certainly be said that the paramilitary displays in Northern Ireland which 
catalysed the need for this provision, are much less a part of the landscape of the 
province since the peace process and as such the “pressing social need” could well be 
found to be lacking. Furthermore, the requirement that the reasons for a restriction be
39 See Stevens v U K ( 1986) 46 D.R. 245.
40 There has been just one prosecution initiated under this section since the enactment o f the Terrorism 
Act.
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both “relevant and sufficient”41 are seemingly much harder to make out than was the 
case 25 years ago.
Disclosure of Information
Due to the “unpleasant ring [it has] about it in terms of civil liberties,”42 the repeal of 
the section 18 PTA offence of withholding information was greeted in the most part 
as a positive development. Indeed, the controversial notion of a legal duty to aid the 
police and the dubious practice of targeting the families of those involved in terrorist 
activities, as well as its questionable practical effect all contributed to its demise. This 
is not to say that the use of compelled disclosure was removed completely from the 
anti-terrorist armoury; rather the Act retained the slightly more tightly formulated 
provision of requiring the disclosure of information gained during the course of a 
trade, profession, business or employment concerning the commission of an offence 
related to terrorist property.43 However, despite the careful analysis which had led to 
its repeal only a few months before, the offence was reinserted into the Terrorism Act 
via section 117 of the ATCSA in virtually identical terms as had appeared in the PTA, 
save its now international scope.44
Section 38B(1) of the Terrorism Act applies where a person has information which he 
knows or believes might be of material assistance-
(a) in preventing the commission by another person of an act of terrorism, or
(b) in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of another person, in 
the United Kingdom, for an offence involving the commission, preparation or 
instigation of an act of terrorism.
Placed alongside the previously mentioned offence contained in section 19 of the 
Terrorism Act as well as the offence of collecting information in section 58 of the 
Act, this area raises some very serious concerns regarding freedom of expression, in
41 See Jersild v Denmark [1994] 19 E.H.R.R. 1 para. 31.
42 Shackleton report, Review o f  the Operation o f  the Prevention o f  Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Acts 1974 and 1976. Cm. 7324 (London: HMSO, 1978) para. 133.
43 Section 19 TA 2000.
44 A number o f individuals have been charged with the offence under section 38B(1) following the 
events o f July 7th and July 21st 2005.
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particular the freedom of the press, in the UK. One of the acknowledged pillars of a 
healthy democracy is that of a free press, which in turn is premised on investigative 
journalism. To require disclosure of information gleaned not only places the 
journalist in question in potential danger from terrorist reprisals, but also weakens 
democracy by undermining the critical role of the press. Indeed, as has been 
acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights “the protection of journalistic 
sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom.”45 As such these legislative 
provisions place the journalist in the unenviable position of risking prosecution and a 
possible five year term of imprisonment or risking his professional credibility by the 
inability to guarantee the confidentiality of his sources. Moreover, this runs the risk 
of stifling democracy further by the possible reluctance of journalists to investigate 
issues in the first place. This form of self-declared prior restraint would be 
particularly harmful given the fact that it would have the effect that certain matters of 
public interest may never be brought into the public arena. As a result of this the 
House of Lords pressed for a specific exclusion with regard to journalists46 so as to 
protect both free speech and the integrity of the press. However the duty owed to 
society was considered to override these concerns and the provision passed 
unamended.
The existence of a statutory defence contained in section 38B(4), namely that it is a 
defence for a person to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for not making the 
disclosure, has been hailed as an important safeguard in this area.47 However, the 
admission was made that it was not possible to “give a cast-iron assurance that 
protecting sources will always be a reasonable excuse” and this in itself offends the 
principle of legal certainty and can act as a deterrent to investigative journalism. 
Moreover, this seems to fly in the face of the European Court’s statement in Goodwin 
that the confidentiality of a journalist’s sources was fundamental to the notion of a 
free press. It seems that the argument that there should be no journalistic exemption 
because such a loophole would carry a risk of making it easier to launder terrorist 
money through press and media companies is arguably without foundation. Indeed it 
is such businesses as public houses and filling stations which tend to operate as a
45 Goodwin v U K { 1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 para. 39.
46 This was in fact the case with regard to section 19 TA 2000, but the same point remains.
47 Lord Falconer o f Thoroton, Report Stage, vol. 614, col. 187, 20 June 2000.
48 Lord Bassam, HL Debs. vol. 613, col. 653, 16 May 2000.
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cover for illegal activity in the province49 and as such this unwillingness to provide an 
exemption for journalists in relation to this duty and the consequent interference with 
article 10 is based on tenuous grounds. It is submitted that had the amendment passed 
it would have greatly strengthened the protection of freedom of expression and the 
press whilst not posing any serious harm to the public interest. Although of general 
public interest, protection of sources is of course not absolute. However rather than 
create a general duty on journalists to disclose information gleaned, perhaps a more 
proportionate response would have been to make use of section 10 of the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981. This provides that the court may order a person to disclose a source 
of information if it is satisfied that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or 
national security or for the prevention or disorder or crime, and as such offers a means 
of protecting the public interest where necessary whilst also maintaining the freedom 
of the press.
European jurisprudence has not looked favourably upon direct attempts by the state to 
suppress publication of matters deemed to be a threat to national security. This is due 
to the fact that “citizens must be permitted to receive a variety of messages, to choose 
between them and reach their own opinions on the various views expressed”50 and 
this has led to vigorous scrutiny by the court. Moreover, whilst unrelated to terrorism 
and national security, the importance given to non-disclosure of journalistic sources 
was made clear in the case of Goodwin v UK where the court stated: “if journalists 
are forced to disclose their sources the role of the press in acting as a public 
"watchdog" could be seriously undermined because of the chilling effect that such 
disclosure would have upon the free flow of information.”51 However, whilst the 
point stands, of concern here was disclosure in the interests of justice as opposed to 
national security which given the wide margin of appreciation afforded the state in 
such matters is often deemed to constitute a pressing social need. The fact that 
sections 19 and 38B are re-enactments of earlier offences under the PTA, in no way 
lessens the potential interference with article 10, however the dearth of prosecutions 
of journalists is telling. The potential certainly exists for a chilling effect on freedom 
of the press and investigative journalism and were this to result in a press blackout of
49 K. Maginnis HC Debs vol. 341, col. 198, 14th December 1999.
50 Cetin v Turkey Hudoc. 00040153/98 ; 00040160/98 para. 64. See also Ozgur Gundum v Turkey 
(2001)31 E.H.R.R. 1082.
51 (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 para. 3.
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matters concerning national security, European supervision of the exercise of the 
margin of appreciation would almost certainly result, given the awareness that a 
healthy democracy is the best weapon against terrorism.
Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment
Freedom of expression has been described by the Supreme Court as "the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." However, despite 
the fundamental status accorded it, freedom of expression as is more often than 
otherwise the case in many countries, has faced recurrent challenge particularly at 
times when national security is threatened from both domestic and external sources. 
This is not a recent phenomenon; indeed the first example of such governmental 
interference came in the form of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, a series of four 
pieces of legislation which, inter alia, made it a crime for any person to:
write, print, utter or publish, or...cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or 
published, or...knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or 
publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the 
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, 
or the President of the United States.. ,54
The next era in which the political and security climate was deemed to warrant 
interference with the right to freedom of expression was that of World War I, and it 
was at this time, in 1919, that the first case asserting a violation of freedom of speech 
due to legislative fiat was heard by the Supreme Court. It was in this case of Schenck 
v United States,55 that the “clear and present danger” doctrine was first mooted as a 
standard against which restrictions on freedom of expression could be tested. The 
court stated “The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they 
will bring about the substantial evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”56 In 
upholding the validity of the Espionage Act 1917, and disregarding the applicant’s
52 Purcell v Ireland App. No. 15404/89.
53 Palko v State o f  Connecticut 302 US 319, 327 (1937) Benjamin Cardozo.
54 Section 2 The Sedition Act 1 Stat. 596 Approved July 14th 1798.
55 249 US 47(1919).
56 Ibid., p. 52, Justice Holmes.
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contentions of a legislative violation of freedom of speech, the Supreme Court began 
a line of case law which took a very firm, though not always unanimous, stance in 
favour of governmental restriction of freedom of expression when justified by the
cn
need to protect the country from a “clear and present danger.”
Freedom of expression was once again under threat due to the cold war, the 
phenomenon of McCarthyism and in particular due to the enactment of three pieces of 
legislation, namely the Smith Act 1940, the Subversive Activities Control Act 195058 
and the Communist Control Act 1954. Such was the controversy surrounding these 
enactments that the McCarran Act 1950 was actually vetoed by President Truman on 
the ground that it would “make a mockery of our Bill of Rights.”59 Challenges to this 
legislation allowed the court the opportunity to further consider the still embryonic 
doctrine of clear and present danger. This proved to be a period in which the 
balancing act necessary in each case was more than apparent given the 
unpredictability of decisions fluctuating between the court as champion of civil rights 
and as defender of Congressional enactments.60 However, it was not until 1965 and 
the case of Lamont v Postmaster-General61 that a declaration of unconstitutionality 
was made with regard to an Act targeting Communist propaganda, in which it was 
stated that the Act was contrary to the “‘uninhibited, robust and wide-open’ debate 
and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment.”
Though an enduring feature of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding the 
First Amendment and in particular freedom of speech, the clear and present danger 
test was modified and extended, particularly in dissent, so as to embrace a 
requirement of imminence. It was in Abrams v US62 that one of the main proponents 
of the clear and present danger test, Mr Justice Holmes, stated that “ ...we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
57 Frohwerk v United States 249 US 204 (1919), Debs v United States 249 US 211 (1919), Abrams v 
United States 250 US 616 (1919), Git/aw v New York 268 US 652 (1925), Whitney v California 274 US 
357(1927).
58 Also known as the McCarran Act.
59 The United States Capitol Historical Society www.uschs.org/ last accessed January 15th 2004.
60 See Scales v United States 367 US 203 (1961) and Noto v United States 367 US 290 (1961).
61 381 US 301 (1965).
62 250 US 616 (1919) at 630 emphasis added. See also Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927)
Justice Brandeis, concurring, at 372 onwards regarding the requirement of “imminence” in the clear 
and present danger test.
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and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check 
is required to save the country.” However, it was not until the 1969 case of 
Brandenburg v Ohio that the requirement of imminence gained the full recognition 
of a unanimous court, and even resulted in the express rejection of the clear and 
present danger test by some.64 Here the principle espoused was that “ ...the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid 
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”65 Given that these issues have not been addressed by 
the Supreme Court since 1969, it is this requirement of imminence which currently 
stands. The extent to which this will continue remains to be seen. The nature of the 
terrorist threat as it currently stands, has seen the development and use of the concept 
of “sleeper cells” of terrorists settling in a country and waiting, sometimes years, to 
strike. This practice of course has the effect that any advocacy intended to incite or 
cause such terrorist violence is likely to have taken place a long time in advance of the 
ultimate act. As such a test of imminence may be less useful than in the past. It is 
plausible that in post-9/11 America, it could well be the case that the protection 
afforded freedom of expression by the ruling in Brandenburg will be diluted to 
previous standards due to the realisation of the vulnerability of the United States.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 and the USA 
PATRIOT Act 2001 
Designation of Foreign Organisations and Related Offences
In a similar vein to the role played by the power to proscribe in the UK, a great deal of 
America’s anti-terrorist legislation relies on the designation of foreign organisations 
as terrorist as the key to many offences related to the support and membership of such 
groups.
63 395 US 444(1969).
64 Ibid., see concurring opinions of Justice Black and Justice Douglas p. 459 onwards.
65 Ibid.,p. 447.
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Title III of the AEDPA 1996 was enacted with the purpose of providing the federal 
government with the fullest possible basis to prevent persons within the United States, 
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or 
resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.66 Section 302 
contains the procedure for designation of organisations as terrorist on the basis that 
the Secretary of State finds that:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 
212(a)(3)(B)); and
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States 
nationals or the national security of the United States.
As was the case with regard to the power to proscribe under the Terrorism Act 2000, 
many of the same arguments stand with regard to the designation power, in particular 
the effect that such an action can have on constitutionally protected rights. Indeed it 
goes without saying that prohibition of an organisation raises questions with regard to 
free speech and association. Indeed, as previously discussed in relation to the 
Terrorism Act, there is an undeniably chilling effect on the individual’s right to 
freedom of speech and association simply due to the self-censorship which the 
existence of the provisions can cause.
However, an important distinction has developed in the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court between expression as pure speech and conduct as expression. Known as 
intermediate scrutiny, O ’Brien v U.S.67 established that “when "speech" and "non­
speech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify
yfO
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms...” In questioning the 
constitutionality of a provision under this test it must be established that enactment of 
the provision is within the constitutional power of the Government, that it furthers an
66 Title III section 301(b) AEDPA 1996.
67 3 91 US 367, 376-377 (1968) per Mr Chief Justice Warren.
68 Ibid.
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important or substantial governmental interest, that the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression and that the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest. It can be said that none of the above elements would be particularly 
difficult for the government to satisfy. This test of incidental infringement has the 
potential to interfere with the freedom of expression of a great number of people.
This distinction was utilised in a challenge to the successive designations of the 
People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran to the US Court of Appeals in which it was 
held that the AEDPA is aimed at controlling conduct rather than communication. 
Indeed, relying on the earlier case of Humanitarian Law Project v Reno69 the court 
reiterated that neither membership nor promotion of a designated group is prohibited 
by the statute, rather, prohibited is the giving of material support to such an 
organisation. “There is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving 
terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions. 
Nor, of course, is there a right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy 
weapons and explosives...this interest is unrelated to suppressing free expression 
because it restricts the actions of those who wish to give material support to the 
groups, not the expression of those who advocate or believe the ideas that the groups 
supports.” Unless and until this issue is dealt with by the Supreme Court, there is no 
doubt that a challenge to the provision of designation under the AEDPA on First 
Amendment grounds will be given short shrift.
Section 303 of the AEDPA prohibits the provision of material support or resources to 
a designated foreign terrorist organisation. Material support is defined in section 323 
as currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other 
physical assets, with the specific exception of medicine and religious materials. In 
accordance with intermediate scrutiny, and the fact that “no governmental interest is
69 No. 98-56062 (9th Cir. March 9, 2000).
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more compelling than the security of the Nation”70 there is seemingly little chance of 
success in challenging this provision on the grounds of the standard in O ’Brien.
The provision of designation is said to be aimed at controlling conduct rather than 
communications and case law has established that association, communication with 
and advocacy of the aims of a terrorist group remains lawful. However, the definition 
of “material support” includes “personnel.” This begs the question whether 
membership could be prohibited and prosecuted as the provision of material support. 
If this is the case the “speech” element of the First Amendment freedoms would likely 
be swallowed by the “non-speech” element of providing “material support.” It is 
possible that “personnel” would be defined as active personnel, but no such restriction 
exists in the statute and so the potential for this to occur exists.
The curious effect of designation, and indeed the British equivalent of proscription, is 
the fact that support for the lawful activities of a designated organisation is prohibited 
whereas support for the violent activities of a non-designated organisation is perfectly 
lawful. Elfbrandt v Russell stated that a "blanket prohibition of association with a 
group having both legal and illegal aims would pose a real danger that legitimate 
political expression or association would be impaired."71 On this basis the 
constitutionality of this prohibition on material support for the lawful or humanitarian 
activities of designated organisations could legitimately be challenged on First 
Amendment grounds. Indeed it can be argued that prohibiting the provision of 
support for the humanitarian activities of such organisations was the purpose of the 
legislation given that fundraising and contributions to the terrorist activities of a group 
was already prohibited.72 Such a challenge arose in Humanitarian Law Project v 
Reno.73 The first contention of the plaintiffs concerned the rule laid down in NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co74 namely that “for liability to be imposed by reason of 
association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful 
goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.” On 
this basis it was argued in HLP v Reno that the prohibition of material support
1Q Haig v Agee 453 US 1, 307 (1976).
71 384 US 11 (1966) Per Mr Justice Douglas at 15 quoting Scales v US 367 US 203 (1961) at 229.
72 18 USC 2339A.
73 98-56062 (9th Cir. March 3, 2000).
74 458 US 886, 920 (1982) Per Justice Stevens.
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regardless of the intention of the donor contravened the above rule as well as the right 
to freedom of association under the First Amendment. This however, was dealt with 
by the court on the grounds that the AEDPA does not prohibit membership of an 
organisation, praise or even the advocacy of support, rather it proscribes the provision 
of material support, there being no constitutional protection for the assistance of 
terrorism.75 This stands to reason. However, it arguably misses the point with regard 
to support for the lawful aims and activities of a designated organisation. American-
76Arab Anti-Discrimination Commission v Reno established the point that the 
government must establish a specific intent to further unlawful aims in order to punish 
advocacy. An attempt to equate the provision of material support with advocacy, 
which would as a result have been subject to the “clear and present danger” test, by
reliance on this point fell on the ground that the act of fundraising does not enjoy the
11
same strength of First Amendment protection as advocacy and pure speech. It was 
held to be the case that regardless of the donor’s intentions, he has no control over the 
ultimate use of his donation and the fungibility of money means that a donation in 
support of the lawful activities of a designated organisation has the effect of 
redistributing other resources so as to aid the group’s unlawful objectives.78 This 
causes difficulties with regard to legal certainty. An average lay person providing 
humanitarian aid would not necessarily be aware of any connection to a designated 
group, nor of the fact that in providing charitable aid in the field of education as an 
example, they may be laying themselves open to prosecution for the provision of 
material support. Technically this assertion with regard to the fungibility of money 
may be fair, yet a member of the public wishing to make a donation towards 
educational assistance in a particular country, which may be distributed by a branch of 
a designated group, may well feel frustrated and stifled by this reasoning. Moreover, 
there is some incongruity between being able to vocally support and praise a 
designated group and its pursuit of violence but not be able to provide charitable 
support and aid to a particular country.
The fact that the aim of section 303 is to prohibit aid to terrorist groups rather than to 
inhibit protected expression has the effect that the provision is again subject to the
75 98-56062, p. 2362 (9th Cir. March 3, 2000).
76 70 F. 3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).
77 H LPv Reno p. 2363.
78 Ibid., pp. 2367-2368.
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79standard of scrutiny as laid down in O ’Brien v US In Arab-American Anti- 
Discrimination Commission v Reno it was established that section 303 is justified in 
accordance with the above test and as such was upheld as constitutional. Argument 
has been made to the effect that material support by members of an association is 
fundamental to its existence and that such a prohibition makes the right to associate 
with a chosen group an “empty formalism.”80 However, it seems inconceivable that 
provision of support to a group such as A1 Qaeda would be permitted because of this 
weakening of the right to freedom of association. The Supreme Court has long been 
conscious of the fact that "while the Constitution protects against invasions of 
individual rights, it is not a suicide pact"81 and this awareness is likely to be even
thmore acute since the events of September 11 2001.
Deportation and Exclusion
Deportation and exclusion of foreign nationals on the grounds of terrorism and 
terrorism-related offences82 existed prior to these recent legislative enactments. 
However, in amending the provisions which existed previously, both the AEDPA and 
the USA PATRIOT Act extend the grounds upon which deportation and exclusion are 
possible with regard to aliens and in doing so make further inroads into those rights 
protected by the First Amendment. A corollary to the designation procedure in the 
AEDPA is the provision that any member or representative,83 regardless of status of 
involvement in lawful activities, of a foreign terrorist organisation as designated by 
the Secretary of State is ineligible to receive a visa and gain admission to the United 
States. This is further extended in the USA PATRIOT Act where section 411 
redefines the notion of representing a terrorist organisation so that it extends to a 
political, social or other similar group whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist 
activity the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States efforts to
79 391 US 367, 376-377 (1968).
80 J. X. Dempsey and D. Cole, Terrorism and the Constitution, (The First Amendment Foundation, 
2002 2nd ed.) p. 142.
81 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 160 (1963). Mr. Justice Goldberg.
82 See 8 USC 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).
83 “Representative” is defined in section 411 as including an officer, official, or spokesman o f an 
organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its 
members to engage in terrorist activity.
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reduce or eliminate terrorist activities. This extends beyond the need for official 
designation of an organisation and as such the spectrum of organisations which could 
be affected is greatly increased by the fact that satisfaction of the legal criteria 
required for designation is unnecessary.84 Moreover, the inclusion of social groups 
creates the potential that representatives of organisations affiliated with the 
humanitarian objectives of terrorist groups, such as the Humanitarian Law Project, 
could be subject to these immigration procedures. Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act establishes endorsement, espousal or persuasion by an alien of others to support 
terrorist activity or a terrorist organisation as a ground for removal as well being the
o c
spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this section. The reach of 
these immigration procedures is further extended by the definition of a terrorist 
organisation as an organisation designated under section 219, an organisation listed in 
the Federal Register by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization, after finding 
that the organization engages in the commission, incitement, preparation or planning 
of a terrorist activity, or gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity, 
or that the organisation provides material support to further terrorist activity, or is a 
group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in the 
above activities. These measures extending the grounds for removal seem to be 
aimed at easing removal of those such as the perpetrators of 9/11. However, had they 
been in place prior to September 2001 their enactment would not have brought about 
the deportation of the 19 hijackers on the basis that they had no known political 
associations or affiliations and did not act in such a way as to fall within the ambit of 
the definition.
84 The legal criteria for designation of an organisation are: It must be a foreign organization, it must 
engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) o f the INA (8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or 
terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) o f the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
1988 and 1989 (22 USC § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity 
or terrorism and the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security o f US 
nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) o f the 
United States.
85 Section 411 USA PATRIOT Act 2001. The latter is dependent on the activity which caused the 
inadmissibility having occurred within the last five years, and is subject to the exception that the spouse 
or child did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity causing the alien to be found 
inadmissible under this section; or whom the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable 
grounds to believe has renounced the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this 
section.
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Essentially, this has the effect that a resident alien may be deported or excluded on his 
return to the US, for exercising rights protected by the First Amendment. It may be 
the case, that a foreign national could be denied entry to the US because of his 
peaceful endorsement of the aims of, for example, the PKK in seeking to exercise the 
right of self-determination. These provisions therefore have the effect of enshrining 
guilt by association in the legislation. In addition, these provisions re-introduce 
exclusion on the basis of ideology as opposed to the actual acts of the individual. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act 1990 repealed those provisions allowing ideological 
exclusion in the McCarran-Walter Act so as to ensure that denial of visas was 
premised on actual involvement in terrorist activities rather than protected advocacy 
of beliefs. All that is required is a determination by the Secretary of State that the 
endorsement or support undermines the efforts of the US to reduce or eliminate 
terrorist activities. Indeed, to continue the example of the PKK, this continues to be 
the case despite the observance of a ceasefire. This interference is wholly executive 
in nature with no judicial involvement and no requirement that legal criteria be 
satisfied to any requisite standard. This allows the government to remove those who 
are vocal in their beliefs due to the fact that deportation/exclusion is carried out on an 
individual basis rather than with regard to a particular group as a whole. Whilst there 
may be some individuals whose support does actually undermine US efforts 
concerning terrorism, this is an uncertain and vague way of removing individuals.
These provisions seemingly draw a distinction between the rights of citizens as 
opposed to those of non-citizen or alien status as some form of justification for 
treating aliens less favourably on the basis of immigration status. However, it is 
asserted that that the construction of the First Amendment is such as to apply to all 
persons. The First Amendment amounts to a constraint on Congress with regard to
thenacting law rather than a constraint on the populace. The words of the 9 Circuit 
Court of Appeals clarify the importance of the protection provided by the First 
Amendment:
[T]he values underlying the First Amendment require the full applicability of First 
Amendment rights to the deportation setting...Because we are a nation founded by 
immigrants, this underlying principle is especially relevant to our attitude toward 
current immigrants who are part of our community.. .Aliens, who often have different 
cultures and languages, have been subjected to intolerant and harassing conduct in our
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past, particularly in times of crisis...It is thus especially appropriate that the First 
Amendment principle of tolerance for different voices restrain our decisions to expel a 
participant in that community from our midst.86
Whilst the rights protected by the Constitution may not extend to foreign nationals 
outside the US, the effect of excluding or deporting a member or representative of a 
group who is deemed to undermine the efforts of the US in eliminating terrorism has 
an impact upon the rights of US citizens to receive information or ideas. This in turn 
can affect democracy by diminishing free debate. The constitutionality of the 
AEDPA was upheld in HLP v Reno despite the contention of the previously 
condemned notion of guilt by association. It can be said however, that such 
government action would arguably not satisfy the criteria laid down in the O ’Brien 
test. Indeed the basis of the removal of aliens amounts to the suppression of freedom 
of expression due to the fact that the foundation of the removal provisions is one of 
guilt by association. As such the third element of the test is not satisfied. A further 
point is that although aliens outside the US are not entitled to the protection of the 
First Amendment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights extends its 
protection to all people. Article 19(2) provides that everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of expression which shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. However, this is 
subject to subsection (3) which provides that this may be subject to certain restrictions 
which are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others or
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or 
morals.
However, the fact that these provisions extend to those involved solely with the 
humanitarian aspects of various organisations raises questions about the 
proportionality of the measures and the interference with freedom of expression on 
national security grounds. This is particularly so given the fact that the immigration 
foundation to the provisions means that domestic terrorism is not addressed in this
86 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm, v Reno 70 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 1995). This 
decision was however overturned by the Supreme Court.
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way. The United States has not entered a derogation under article 19 and for this 
reason the US may be found to be in breach of its international obligations under the 
convention.
thThe fact that the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were all foreign nationals 
seemingly acted as the impetus for the extension of the immigration provisions in the 
PATRIOT Act. However, the measures enacted arguably miss the point in that these 
provisions would probably not have prevented these attacks had they been in place at 
the time. Indeed, the lack of a known affiliation with a terrorist or even political 
group was notable in the case of each of the perpetrators, and as such exclusion or 
deportation on such grounds would not have occurred. Indeed, it is even arguable that 
gaining citizenship in the US might well have been possible which would similarly 
have rendered these provisions redundant. In this way these measures lack legal 
effectiveness in their objective of seeking to prevent terrorism without destroying the 
features of a democratic society by failing in both regards.
Conclusion
With regard to the anti-terrorism legislation in question, it is clear that the like 
procedures of proscription and designation give rise to very similar arguments and 
concerns pertaining to interference with the right to freedom of expression. However, 
with regard to the offences consequent on such designation, it is notable that in the 
UK it is the speech element of freedom of expression which is under threat. On the 
contrary, in the United States, the prohibition on material support and the focus on the 
aim of the legislative provision as a differentiation between “speech” and “non­
speech” allows circumvention of the more exacting standard employed with regard to 
pure speech and advocacy. Indeed, this was likely the legislative intention given the 
nature of the test of imminence as laid down in Brandenburg v Ohio under which pure 
speech would otherwise be tested. The elements of the O ’Brien test essentially equate 
to those considered by the European Court of Human Rights in a challenge under the 
Convention. However, whilst scrutiny under the Convention requires a “pressing 
social need” in order to justify the restriction as necessary in a democratic society, 
under O Brien it must only be established that the interference with the guarantees of
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the First Amendment arises out of an important governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression. The specific aim of the government is likely almost 
never to be the abridgement of speech, and this establishes a much harder hurdle to 
overcome in making a declaration of unconstitutionality.
In the United Kingdom the broad definition of national security, the deference of the 
judiciary towards the executive and the wide margin of appreciation afforded by 
Strasbourg all lean towards justification of an interference with freedom of 
expression. Moreover, the power of derogation contained in article 15 can be utilised 
if necessary to prevent the United Kingdom being held in breach of the Convention. 
However, in the US the Bill of Rights cannot be overridden. Instead, deference to the 
decisions and legislative intentions of the executive is given effect through the 
interpretation of the court. This is highlighted by consideration of the court’s history, 
particularly in times of crisis, in determining the constitutionality of statutes which 
raise issues under the First Amendment.
Proscription and the related offences under the previous legislation were notable for 
their symbolism, namely public condemnation for the actions of terrorist 
organisations. This continues to be the case with regard to the provisions of the 
Terrorism Act, as does the fact that these provisions are perhaps of less practical 
utility than other anti-terrorism provisions. Indeed in considering the necessity of 
such measures any pressing social need in a practical context is debatable with regard 
to organisations connected with Northern Ireland, as well as foreign organisations 
proscribed despite the lack of any discemable presence in the UK. With regard to 
such organisations, it can be argued that proscribing such groups fails to completely 
fulfil its condemnatory aim of deterring individuals from joining the group. 
Proscription does provide notice of the criminal activities of the group and sends a 
message of condemnation. However, those individuals who are sufficiently 
committed to want to join and actively support the group are likely to be aware of any 
illegality and are arguably unlikely to be deterred by an official denouncement of 
criminality. In addition, the symbolic nature of the provisions is highlighted by the 
difficulty which may ensue in trying to prove some of the offences, for example that 
of membership of a proscribed organisation. This difficulty is supported by the dearth 
of prosecutions under these provisions.
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The extent of those potentially affected by an order for proscription, by way of 
suppressing what is sometimes the only outlet for political expression, is such as to 
justify an assertion that the measures are of disproportionate effect. A lack of 
proportionality can similarly be asserted with regard to the fact that the offence of 
professing membership of a proscribed organisation extends to peripheral members 
and not simply those of sufficient standing as to exert some degree of influence over 
recruitment to and the activities of the group. This effect would be mitigated by 
requiring fulfilment of an additional element that the individual actually intended to 
further the aims of the organisation, rather than reliance on the discretion of the 
prosecuting authorities.
The practical utility of proscription as an effective anti-terrorist measure can be 
questioned with its symbolic importance seeming to take precedence. However, 
practical benefit can be seen with regard to restricting fundraising and like activities 
for banned organisations. In the UK, the prohibition on arranging or addressing 
meetings in connection with a proscribed organisation may assist in preventing 
fundraising. However, the Terrorism Act criminalizes support in the form of money 
or other property in relation to terrorism in general in section 15 which is not 
restricted to such support for proscribed organisations. There is a divergence in this 
regard with the comparable provisions of the US legislation which focus on the 
provision of material support to designated organisations. The process of proscribing 
or designating an organisation which is of practical utility in preventing terrorist 
activities is more justifiable in its impact on free speech than measures enacted to 
punish beliefs, advocacy or political dissent. On this basis the provisions concerning 
the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the US interfere with the ideals of the 
First Amendment to a large extent. Whilst the First Amendment applies to resident 
aliens, those outside the US are subject to the protections of the ICCPR which appears 
to be disregarded with regard to these provisions. In addition, these provisions can 
be criticised on First Amendment grounds on the basis that the construction of the 
Amendment arguably prohibits Congress from acting in such a way as to interfere 
with the freedom of expression of all persons, with no restriction as to citizenship. 
Were this semantic argument to fail, deportation and exclusion of aliens affects the 
First Amendment rights of those remaining in the US by disregarding their right to
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receive information and ideas. The exclusion and deportation provisions of the 
AEDPA and USA PATRIOT Act are reminiscent of the now repealed power to 
exclude as existed under the PTA. Interestingly, however, exclusion in the UK 
required actual involvement in terrorism. The provisions in the United States have 
brought about a return to the McCarran-Walter era and the notion of ideological 
exclusion on the basis of the fact that these provisions punish involvement in First 
Amendment activities.
An overriding theme exists in both jurisdictions. Essentially, in balancing the interest 
in national security and the right to freedom of expression, maintaining the health of 
democracy is seen as paramount in defeating the threat posed by terrorism. Tipping 
the balance in favour of the promotion of national security is often deemed to be 
acceptable given the belief that overcoming terrorism by the protection of democracy 
will ultimately safeguard fundamental rights for all.
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Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Liberty and Due Process
In responding to the attacks of September 2001, both the United Kingdom and the 
United States placed the notion of a suspect community on a legislative foundation by 
directing the most severe provisions of the legislation solely at the non-nationals or 
aliens of each country. Indeed, under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 and the USA PATRIOT Act 2001, as well as, interestingly, the Anti-terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, there exists the potential to indefinitely detain 
individuals subject to immigration proceedings. This approach raises interesting 
questions with regard to the notion of due process and the extent to which safeguards 
are in place to minimise interference with the rights of the individual, so as to amount 
to justifiable action by the executive rather than arbitrary and discriminatory 
curtailment of rights and liberties. In addition, the approach of the British 
government in enacting such legislative provisions resulted in a derogation from the 
ECHR, just a few months after the progress of the Terrorism Act had allowed the 
removal of the previous derogation which had been in place since 1989. A 
declaration of incompatibility was issued by the House of Lords in December 2004 in 
A v Secretary of State for the Home Department1 in relation to the detention of 
suspected international terrorists under Part IV of the ATCSA. This prompted the 
enactment of further legislation in the form of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.
Detention Under the Terrorism Act
One of the main rationalisations for the power of arrest in British anti-terrorism 
legislation has long been the fact that arrest acted as a gateway through to a system of 
detention quite unlike that which exists under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE), where the maximum period of detention for a serious arrestable 
offence is 96 hours. Section 41(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides for an initial 
period of detention of 48 hours following arrest under the Act. As was the case under 
the PTA, this may be extended for up to a further five days under schedule 8 to the
1 [2005] 2 A.C. 68.
2 Section 42 PACE.
3 Section 14 PTA 1989.
170
Chapter 6: Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Liberty and Due Process
Act.4 However, in contrast to the administrative approach under the PTA under 
which an extension of detention was authorised by the Secretary of State, the 
Terrorism Act provides that an application for such an extension must be made to a 
judicial authority.5 This remedies the flaws of the approach under the PTA which 
resulted in the European Court of Human Rights finding the UK to be in violation of 
article 5(3) in the case of Brogan and Others v UK.6 Further detention may be 
granted if there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to obtain 
relevant evidence whether by questioning or otherwise or to preserve relevant 
evidence and provided the investigation is being conducted diligently and
n
expeditiously. Part of this regime provides the detainee with the opportunity to make 
oral or written representations to the judicial authority about the application and to be
Q
legally represented at the hearing. However, the judicial authority may exclude both 
the applicant and his legal representative from any part of the proceedings.9 
Furthermore, an officer may also apply to the judicial authority for an order that 
specified information be withheld from the applicant and anyone representing him 
provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that if the information were 
disclosed one of the following consequences would occur:10
(a) evidence of an offence under any of the provisions mentioned in section 
40(1 )(a) would be interfered with or harmed,
(b) the recovery of property obtained as a result of an offence under any of those 
provisions would be hindered,
(c) the recovery of property in respect of which a forfeiture order could be made 
under section 23 would be hindered,
4 Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act was amended by section 306 o f the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which 
extends the maximum period o f detention from seven to fourteen days. The current Terrorism Bill 
2005 contains a clause extending pre-charge detention to a maximum period o f three months. Review 
o f  such detention would take place before a judicial authority on a weekly basis. The Draft Terrorism 
Bill is available at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/home_sec letter.html
5 “Judicial authority” means (a) in England and Wales, the Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate) or 
his deputy, or a District Judge (Magistrate’s Courts) who is designated for the purpose of this Part by 
the Lord Chancellor, (b) in Scotland, the sheriff, and (c) in Northern Ireland, a county court judge, or a 
resident magistrate who is designated for the purpose of this Part by the Lord Chancellor. Para. 29(4)
6 (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 539. As discussed in Chapter 2.
7 Sch. 8 para. 32(1) TA.
8 Ibid.
9 Sch. 8 para. 33(3) TA.
10 Sch. 8 para. 34 TA.
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(d) the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of a person who is suspected of 
falling within section 40(1 )(a) or (b) would be made more difficult as a result 
of his being alerted,
(e) the prevention of an act of terrorism would be made more difficult as a result 
of a person being alerted,
(f) the gathering of information about the commission, preparation or instigation 
of an act of terrorism would be interfered with, or
(g) a person would be interfered with or physically injured.
Whilst of course such provisions hamper the involvement of the detainee in the 
judicial process enacted, it is fair to say that the implementation of an independent 
hearing is an improvement on the previous administrative system, notwithstanding the 
limitations which can be imposed on the proceedings from the point of view of the 
detainee. However, the limitations which can be imposed would, if ordered, have the 
effect that from the individual’s point of view, the procedure enacted under the TA 
2000 differs very little from that under the previous PTA regime. Of course the 
independence and therefore additional safeguard inherent in judicial proceedings 
places the individual in a stronger position than was previously the case. However, in 
contrast to the provision of a special advocate under the ATCSA 2001, under section 
41 and schedule 8 when the detainee and his legal representative are excluded from 
proceedings, no such provision is made. Of course in terms of duration, the potential 
exists, under the ATCSA, for a far more severe deprivation of liberty that that under 
section 41 TA. However, arbitrary interference with an individual’s liberty can occur 
for even short periods and as such safeguards should be in place for protection of the 
individual.
Under schedule 8, a detainee under the Act is afforded the right to consult privately 
with a solicitor as soon as is reasonably practicable, at any time.11 The right to have a 
solicitor present during a police interview in England and Wales was placed on a 
statutory footing by PACE in 1984, however this did not extend to detainees in 
Northern Ireland. This was challenged in R v Chief Constable of the RUC, ex p.
11 Sch. 8 para. 7(1) TA.
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Begley; R v McWilliams12, however the House of Lords declined the opportunity to 
develop the common law right of access to legal advice so as to extend it to the 
interview room. It was stated that the treatment of suspects detained under section 14 
in Northern Ireland was part of a deliberate legislative policy and therefore any 
attempt to extend this right was held to be “beyond the powers of the House of
13Lords.” The position of detainees, particularly in Northern Ireland, was thereby 
strengthened to a large extent by the provisions of the Terrorism Act. As was the case 
under the PTA, the right of access to a legal advisor may be delayed for up to 48 
hours where a police officer reasonably believes that access to legal advice at the time 
at which the detainee desires to exercise that right will have any of the following 
consequences:14
(a) interference with or harm to evidence of a serious arrestable offence,
(b) interference with or physical injury to any person,
(c) the alerting of persons who are suspected of having committed a serious 
arrestable offence but who have not been arrested for it,
(d) the hindering of the recovery of property obtained as a result of a serious 
arrestable offence or in respect of which a forfeiture order could be made 
under section 23,
(e) interference with the gathering of information about the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism,
(f) the alerting of a person and thereby making it more difficult to prevent an act 
of terrorism, and
(g) the alerting of a person and thereby making it more difficult to secure a 
person's apprehension, prosecution or conviction in connection with the 
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.
The right to legal advice is enshrined in article 6(3) of the European Convention, 
amounting to the right to defend oneself, the right to choose legal assistance and the 
right to free legal assistance if one is indigent and if the interests of justice so require, 
applying to pre-trial stages as well as to the trial itself. As such the provisions of the
12 [1997] 1 WLR 1475.
13 Ibid. p. 1481, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
14 Sch. 8 para. 8 TA.
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Terrorism Act delaying access to or preventing private consultation with a legal 
advisor potentially fall foul of the guarantees of the Convention. The overall potential 
length of detention and the severity of the possible penalty exacerbates the detrimental 
effect of delayed access to a lawyer. In Murray v UK15 the court held that in the 
interests of fairness it was imperative that access to a lawyer be allowed at the initial 
stages of police questioning and therefore that the delay in access to a solicitor for the 
first 48 hours of detention was a breach of article 6(1) read with article 6(3).16 In
i 7
Magee v UK the court similarly found there to have been a violation of article 6(1) 
in conjunction with article 6(3)(c) as a result of the denial of access to legal advice for 
48 hours. The court declared that “to deny access to a lawyer for such a long period 
and in a situation where the rights of the defence were irretrievably prejudiced is- 
whatever the justification-incompatible with the rights of the accused under article 
6.”18 In Averill v UK19 the Court held that the denial of access to legal advice for 24 
hours resulted in a violation of article 6(3)(c) in conjunction with article 6(1) because 
fairness required that the accused have such access before being questioned. It has 
been noted that whilst such a denial of access is not an automatic breach of article 6, it 
is likely that a large reliance on evidence obtained during that period at trial will be 
found to be unfair.20 The jurisprudence on this point is therefore clear and such a 
stance is surely correct. The outcomes sought to be avoided in delaying access to 
legal advice are, from the demands of policing, valid as reasons for delay. However, 
given the breadth of the consequences listed as justifying delay, the vulnerability of 
the individual detained should take precedence unless perhaps it can be shown to a 
very high degree of probability that one of the feared outcomes will occur. To have 
otherwise places the individual detained under the terrorism legislation in an 
extremely vulnerable position. It is in attempting to counter the coercive interrogation 
to which an individual can be subjected during extended detention that access to legal 
advice is so fundamentally important.
15 (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 29.
16 This resulted in the passing o f section 58 o f the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
which prohibits the drawing o f inferences at trial where the suspect was questioned without the 
opportunity of consulting with a lawyer.
17 (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 35.
18 Ibid., para. 44.
19 (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 36.
20 S. H. Bailey, D. J. Harris and D. C. Ormerod, Civil Liberties Cases and Materials (5th ed. Reed 
Elsevier (UK) Ltd 2001) p. 592.
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In addition, schedule 8 provides that if there are reasonable grounds for believing that 
if the right of access to legal advice is exercised one of the above consequences will 
occur, it is possible for an officer of at least the rank of Commander or Assistant 
Chief Constable to give a direction that consultation with a solicitor may only take
9 1place in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer. It can of course be argued that 
supervised access to a solicitor is preferable to a complete denial of this right. 
However, supervision can negate the utility of the right by circumscribing the lawyer-
9 9client relationship. In the case of Brennan v UK access to legal advice was delayed 
for 24 hours and the first meeting of the accused with his solicitor was supervised by a 
police officer who warned that no names should be mentioned and that the interview 
would be stopped if it was deemed that anything being said could hinder the 
investigation. It is acknowledged that the right of access could be restricted for good 
cause, such as if there were reasonable grounds to suspect the solicitor of complicity 
in passing information on to suspects still at large or other such conduct. However the 
court stated that the right of the accused to communicate with his advocate out of 
hearing of a third person is part of the basic requirements of a fair trial and follows
9^from article 6(3)(c). The court found that the “presence of a police officer would 
have inevitably prevented the accused from speaking frankly to his solicitor and given 
him reason to hesitate before broaching questions of potential significance to the case 
against him.”24 Therefore the court declared there to have been a violation of article
9 ^6(3)(c) read in conjunction with article 6(1). The power to defer access to legal 
advice causes additional concern when considered in conjunction with article 3 of the 
1988 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order26 (1988/1987) and sections 34-37 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which allow inferences of guilt to 
be drawn from the silence of an accused. This drew comment from Strasbourg, when 
the court drew attention to the importance of legal assistance for the accused early on
9 7in a police interrogation where such a dilemma may arise. It seems from this that it
21 “A qualified officer” means a police officer who (a) is o f at least the rank o f inspector, (b) is o f the 
uniformed branch of the force o f which the officer giving the direction is a member, and (c) in the 
opinion o f the officer giving the direction, has no connection with the detained person's case. Sch. 8 
para. 9(4) Terrorism Act.
22 (2002) 34 EHRR 18 See also 5  v Switzerland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 670.
23 Ibid., para. 58.
24 Ibid,, para. 62.
25 Ibid,, para. 63.
26 SI 1988/1987 (NI20).
27 Averill v U K (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 36 para. 57; see also Murray v U K {\996) 22 E.H.R.R. 29.
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is likely that where such adverse inferences may be drawn that any delay in access to 
legal advice would be found to be a violation of article 6.
Detention of Suspected International Terrorists Part IV ATCSA
After the progression of the Terrorism Act in introducing judicial oversight into the 
extended detention process, Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 represents somewhat of a return to pre-Terrorism Act days, where internment 
was a feature on the legislative landscape and the UK’s fulfilment of its obligations 
under the ECHR was subject to a long-standing derogation under article 5(1). Indeed, 
the core of Part IV, essentially the indefinite detention of non-British citizens 
suspected of involvement in international terrorism, requires a derogation regarding 
article 5(1), due to the coercive nature of the provisions.
The powers in Part IV and the consequent derogation represent an attempt on the part 
of the government to reconcile its obligations under article 5 with those of article 3 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court, whereby a member state is prevented 
from deporting a person suspected of involvement in international terrorism to their 
country of origin or a neutral country if there are grounds to believe that the
individual would face torture, inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to article 3 of
0 8the Convention. This results in a somewhat difficult situation when the government 
is unable to prosecute a suspected terrorist, perhaps due to the sensitivity of the 
evidence involved, is unable to detain him due to the prohibition on arbitrary 
interference with the liberty of the individual and is unable to remove him from the 
UK due to the risk of article 3 treatment. Article 5(1 )(f) contains an exception to the 
provisions of article 5 which provides that “the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” However the 
period of detention contemplated here would be insufficient for the purposes of the 
government, therefore resulting in the derogation to article 5. Indeed, the European 
Court stated in Chahal v UK29 “any deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1 )(f) will
28 See Soering v UK (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439 paras. 90-91 and Chahal v UK (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413 
para. 74.
29 (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413 p. 417.
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be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be 
permissible.”
The starting point to the Part IV power of detention is certification by the Secretary of 
State that the individual concerned is a suspected international terrorist. This is based 
on a reasonable belief that the presence of the individual in the United Kingdom poses 
a risk to national security as well as reasonable suspicion that the person is a
TOterrorist. “Terrorist” is defined as a person who-
(a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts 
of terrorism,31
(b) is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group, or
(c) has links with an international terrorist group.
The term “national security” was defined by the House of Lords in Secretary of State
? ■?for the Home Department v Rehman where Lord Slynn stated that:
...in contemporary world conditions, action against a foreign state may be capable 
indirectly of affecting the security of the United Kingdom. The means open to 
terrorists both in attacking another state and attacking international or global activity 
by the community of nations, whatever the objectives of the terrorist may well be 
capable of reflecting on the safety and well-being of the United Kingdom or its 
citizens.34
The breadth of the definition contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as well 
as that of national security provided in Rehman creates a wide scope for the use of the 
provisions of Part IV. Indeed, aside from the restriction that the powers in Part IV do 
not extend to British citizens, the criteria for designation as a suspected international 
terrorist are such that the potential exists for a large number of people, unrelated to A1 
Qaeda and the events of September 2001, to fall prey to this power of indefinite 
detention. Of further concern is the fact that under the definition of “terrorist” in
30 Section 21(1) ATCSA.
31 In this part “terrorism” is afforded the same meaning as in section 1 Terrorism Act 2000.
32 Section 21(2) ATCSA.
33 [2003] 1 A.C. 153.
34 Ibid. para. 16, per Lord Slynn.
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section 21(2) it is possible to be classified as a terrorist on the grounds that an 
individual “has links with an international terrorist group.” The lack of any 
clarification of this vague criterion prompted the Joint Committee on Human Rights
•i r
to comment on the “risk of arbitrariness” in the application of such a provision. 
This resulted in the insertion of section 21(4) which provides that a person has links 
with an international terrorist group only if he supports or assists it. Whilst this 
obviously removes the risk of certification as a result of social or family connections, 
there remains the possibility that certification and subsequent detention could result 
from the exercise of an article 10 right such as an expression of support for an 
international terrorist group, due to a lack of specification that the necessary support 
be of a material kind. The Joint Committee on Human Rights noted that in order to 
avoid a potential violation of article 10(1) “supports” must be interpreted as meaning 
"supports in a material or active way" which would be in keeping with section 303 
of the AEDPA, as discussed in chapter 5. Given the coercive nature of the 
consequences which flow from certification, more stringent criteria would be 
preferable to ensure that such a severe deprivation of liberty as is possible under the 
Act is not exercised against those uninvolved in acts of terrorism but who fall within 
the peripheries of the definition. As it stands the scope of the provisions go beyond 
dealing with the threat the legislation was designed to meet and therefore cannot be 
said to be proportionate to the aim pursued. Moreover, it is entirely possible that an 
individual could remain in detention even if the organisation to which he is alleged to 
be a member were to renounce all violence.37 Indeed, despite the announcement of a 
ceasefire by the PKK in 1998, the organisation remains a proscribed organisation in 
the United Kingdom, providing some indication that a terrorist organisation will not 
necessarily be deemed to no longer be a threat following the renouncement of terrorist 
activities. In this way, it is entirely possible that individuals alleged to belong to 
certain terrorist organisations could remain detained under section 23 long after a 
ceasefire announcement, if there continues to be no country to which the detainee can 
be removed.
35 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act Bill, Second Report 
(2001-02 HL 37, HC 372, 16th November 2001) para. 37.
36 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Further Report, (2001- 
02 HL 51, HC 420, 5th December 2001) para. 19.
37 H. Fenwick, “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11th 
September?” [2002] 65 M.L.R. 724 p. 736.
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Certification as a suspected international terrorist is the gateway through to the core 
provision of Part IV, namely the power to detain an individual who is subject to action
1  o
under the Immigration Act 1971, despite the fact that his removal or departure from 
the UK is prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) by a point or law which 
wholly or partly relates to an international agreement, such as article 3 of the ECHR, 
or a practical consideration, suggested as being the unavailability of routes to the 
country of intended removal.40 Although the purpose of detention under Part IV is 
said to be detention solely with a view to deportation or removal as soon as a safe 
destination is found, this is not made clear in the Act. Moreover, the way in which 
section 23 is written, providing that removal or departure may be prevented by a point 
of law or a practical consideration, such as a lack of travel documentation, implies 
that detention may continue regardless of whether the detainee has indicated a desire 
to be removed or indeed whether a safe country has been identified. Indeed, should 
the individual concerned opt to leave the UK and risk the possibility of article 3 
treatment or even leave the UK for a country known for example for its support for 
terrorism, there is no clear provision in the Act that this would be possible or 
permitted by the government. If it were the case that the detainee could not exercise 
such a course of action, then detention pending immigration proceedings would seem 
to be an alternative label for “indefinite internment.”41 However, evidence was given 
by the Home Secretary to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, that should a 
detainee opt to be removed to a country, even one with known terrorist connections 
such as Iraq, Libya or Syria, they would be released, thereby providing some degree 
of assurance that detention under the Act is not internment by another name.42 
Indeed, this is supported by the fact that of the sixteen foreign nationals so far 
detained under Part IV, two have voluntarily left the UK for Morocco and France.43 
However, it remains to be seen what will happen in practice should a detainee opt to
38 In particular paragraph 16 o f Schedule 2 to the Act (detention o f persons liable to examination or 
removal) and paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation). Section 23(2) 
ATCSA .
39 Section 23 ATCSA.
40 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001 Explanatory Notes para. 80.
41 JCHR, Second Report, n. 35 above para. 23.
42 Minutes o f Evidence taken before the Joint Committee on Human Rights 14th November 2001, 
question 8.
43 Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Report, 18th 
December 2003, available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/newton_committee_report 2003.pdf para. 183. Also known as 
the Newton Report.
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be removed to a country such as Iraq. It must be said that there seems to be some sort 
of incongruity, particularly given the definition of national security developed by the 
House of Lords, with the notion that an individual must be detained in the UK 
because of the threat posed to the country, however on removal he is free to continue 
potentially terroristic activities which threaten the UK either directly or indirectly. It 
is commendable that the government has not resorted to out and out executive 
detention, however somewhat of a paradox undoubtedly exists.
Despite the large amount of executive discretion involved in the procedures under 
Part IV, certification and detention under the Act are overseen by the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) which was created under the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission Act (SIACA) 1997 and represents the only forum 
for judicial challenge to the decisions of the Secretary of State. Indeed, the ATCSA 
excludes both judicial review and habeas corpus as means of challenging certification 
and instead provides a certified individual with the right of appeal to SIAC as well as 
requiring that the commission conduct a review of each certificate as soon as is 
reasonably practicable at the end of six months beginning with the date on which the 
certificate is issued,44 and then every three months thereafter.45 The exclusion of any 
other form of legal proceedings can be said to be mitigated by the fact that section 35 
of the Act confers upon the commission the status of a superior court of record, 
thereby granting the same powers as the High Court.46 From a decision of SIAC there 
is a right of appeal on a point of law to the Court of Appeal, and from there, with 
leave, to the House of Lords.47
SIAC was created following the adverse judgement of the European Court in Chahal 
v United Kingdom48 where it was held that proceedings for habeas corpus and for 
judicial review in cases of deportation involving national security did not satisfy the 
requirements of article 5(4). This was done in order to remedy the weaknesses of the 
previous system, under which the individual was not entitled to legal representation, 
the adjudicating panel had no power of decision and its advice to the Home Secretary
44 Or starting on the date that any appeal was determined, whichever is later.
45 Section 21(8)-(9) ATCSA.
46 JCHR, Second Report, n. 35 above para. 43.
47 Section 7 SIACA 1997.
48 (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413.
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was not binding.49 To the contrary, SIAC is an independent judicial tribunal which 
can receive sensitive information and which may appoint a special advocate to 
represent the interests of the individual concerned in instances when the individual 
and his legal representation are excluded from proceedings on national security 
grounds. For these reasons the procedure under SIAC goes some way towards 
remedying the defects inherent in the previous system and as such makes the absence 
of provision for judicial review or habeas corpus proceedings less significant than 
might otherwise have been the case.50 However, questions can be asked over the 
suitability of SIAC for its role in relation to suspected terrorists due to the civil nature 
of its original remit. Indeed, the use of SIAC in relation to proceedings concerning 
the deprivation of an individual’s liberty is far removed from the purpose of its 
original inception.
As mentioned, proceedings before SIAC may take one of two forms. Section 25 of 
the Act provides a suspected international terrorist with a right to appeal against his 
certification within three months of issuance. SIAC may cancel a certificate if it 
considers that there are no reasonable grounds for a belief or suspicion fulfilling the 
requirements of section 21(1), or if it considers that the certificate should not have 
been issued for some other reason.51 However, an important proviso to the appeals 
process is contained in section 27(9) which provides that “[cancellation by the 
Commission of a certificate issued under section 21 shall not prevent the Secretary of 
State from issuing another certificate, whether on the grounds of a change of 
circumstance or otherwise.” The vague nature of the words “or otherwise” was drawn 
to the attention of Parliament and indeed conceded up to a certain point by the Home 
Secretary when the Joint Committee on Human Rights stated that such a provision 
“ ...could result in cases being batted backwards and forwards indefinitely between 
the Secretary of State and the Commission, and would not offer adequate protection 
for detainees against arbitrary interference with their right to liberty under Article 5 of 
the ECHR.” However, the wording remains unchanged despite an undertaking by
49( 1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413 para. 130.
50 For discussion o f national security as an exception to open justice see J. Jaconelli, Open Justice: A 
Critique o f  the Public Trial,(OUP, 2002) chapter 4.
51 Section 25(2) ATCSA.
52 JCHR, Further report, n. 36 above para. 18.
181
Chapter 6: Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Liberty and Due Process
the Home Secretary that the term “otherwise” would be considered further.53 Instead, 
assurance was given by Lord Rooker that the “ ...intention is that the Secretary of 
State will issue a fresh certificate only if it is justified. We will rely heavily on SIAC, 
which would rightly take a dim view of any Secretary of State who seemed to be 
ignoring its decision. I am sure that it would cancel any inappropriately made future 
certificates in short order. Furthermore, it might well be a breach of Article 5(4) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and perhaps also of Articles 6 and 13, for a 
Secretary of State to adopt such a course.”54
Section 5(3)(b) of SIACA 1997 and rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure governing 
SIAC provide for hearings to take place in the absence of the individual and his legal 
representative when it is deemed by the commission to be necessary to do so in order 
to ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest, or indeed for 
any other good reason.55 In such an instance provision is made that a special advocate 
may be appointed in order to represent the interests of the individual concerned.56 
However, whilst the special advocate may make written and oral submissions to the 
commission and may cross-examine witnesses, the individual cannot call witnesses 
and contact between the individual, his legal representative and the special advocate is 
limited to instances before material is served to the special advocate by the Secretary 
of State unless permission from SIAC is given,57 meaning that instructions cannot be 
taken in refutation of the material disclosed by the Secretary of State. Indeed, section 
6(4) SIACA provides that the special advocate appointed shall not be responsible to 
the person whose interests he is appointed to represent. Moreover, though the Act 
makes provision for appeal from a decision of the commission, no provision is made 
in either the ATCSA or the SIACA for the special advocate to represent the 
individual’s interests on appeal if excluded from all or part of the hearing on national 
security grounds. The Home Secretary provided reassurance during debates that the 
nominated special advocate would be able to continue his role on appeal to the Court 
of Appeal or, if leave is given, to the House of Lords. However, despite the desire to
53 Minutes o f evidence, n. 42 above.
54 HL Debs. vol. 629, col. 544, 29,h November 2001.
55 See section 5(3)(b) SIACA 1997 and rule 19 Rules o f Procedure SI 1998 (No. 1881), as amended by 
SI 2000 (No. 1849).
56 Section 6(1) SIACA.
57 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003 SI 2003 (No. 1034).
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achieve the “avoidance of doubt”58 this point was not included in the Act, thus leaving 
the role of the special advocate at appeal on somewhat of a discretionary footing. 
Indeed, in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman59 the special 
advocate was asked by the Court of Appeal to appear during closed proceedings. 
However this was not repeated before the House of Lords, thereby demonstrating that 
this safeguard is on a less than solid foundation.60 The protection offered by the 
special advocate in representing the detainee in closed proceedings goes some way to 
mitigating what would otherwise be a process tipped firmly in favour of the state and 
as discussed previously is a vast improvement on the lack of representation in closed 
proceedings which may be ordered under section 41 of the Terrorism Act. However, 
although the special advocate acts in the interests of the detainee, the fact that both 
communication with and disclosure to the detainee and his legal representative is 
severely limited hampers this safeguard. Due to these limitations there is an 
important difference between the relationship between the individual and the special 
advocate, as opposed to the normal client/lawyer relationship. Moreover, the lack of 
transparency in the proceedings has the effect that it is not possible for the detainee or 
his legal representative to determine how the case is handled in closed proceedings 
and how the interests of the detainee are represented by the special advocate. Of 
course, a system such as this is preferable to any completely closed alternative.61
In the face of these due process concerns, it is clear that the balance is not evenly 
weighted between the individual and the state and that the individual is in a 
disadvantaged position before the SIAC. However, it can be said that the fact that a 
full hearing is available before the SIAC with the opportunity to appeal as well as the 
fact that the individual is represented by a special advocate in closed proceedings 
offers reasonable protection to the rights of the individual. In comparison to such 
detention in the United States, it can be said that detention under Part IV is at least 
subject to some safeguards. Indeed, though the central provision is that of detention 
without trial, it is subject not simply to an executive determination as to status, but 
rather to objective criteria as well as restrictions of nationality and immigration
58 HC Debs, vol. 375, col. 3 8 9 ,21st November 2001, Jean Corston.
59 [2003] 1 A.C. 153.
60 JCHR, Further Report, n. 36 above paras. 22-23.
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control. Furthermore, whilst Part IV provides for detention without trial, the role of 
the SIAC has the effect that it is not a process which is entirely devoid of judicial 
oversight. The right of appeal bestowed on the detainee as well as the periodic 
reviews required to be undertaken by the commission provide an important element of 
independent oversight.
Due process concerns continue to arise as a result of the procedure under Part IV and 
the differences between the procedure under SIAC and that of a more conventional 
court. However, the guarantees of article 6 of the Convention play no part in this 
regard due to the fact that detention results from immigration rather than criminal 
proceedings. A sound argument can be made that detention under Part IV is not for 
the purpose of a criminal charge due to the fact that it is precisely because a criminal 
prosecution cannot be sustained that detention is ordered so as to remove the threat 
posed by certain individuals. Article 6 also applies to the determination of civil rights 
and obligations. However, the European Commission of Human Rights has held that 
immigration rights do not fall within the confines of article 6.62 Even if the provisions 
of Part IV were considered to be the determination of civil rights and obligations only 
article 6(1) would be applicable, due to the fact that articles 6(2) and 6(3) are only 
applicable in the determination of a criminal charge.63 It is clear that this form of 
detention under the Act fails to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Indeed, 
primarily, the nature of Part IV is such that the process disregards the fundamental 
presumption of innocence, rather it reverses it so that detention is premised on 
executive certification with the potential that the commission may quash the 
certification on appeal. Furthermore, if the detainee were to waive his right to appeal, 
mandatory review by the SIAC does not take place for six months, amounting to a 
disproportionate exercise of executive discretion. However, the right of appeal 
provides a much needed element of independent examination by way of a properly 
constituted judicial tribunal. It is the case under this procedure that the fact that 
closure of proceedings can be ordered places the detainee at a disadvantage, 
particularly given the difficulty of launching an effective defence in the face of
61 For discussion of the use of SIAC and the role o f the special advocate see House o f Commons 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Operation o f  the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and 
the Use o f  Special Advocates, 7th Report 2004-2005, HC 323-1.
62 A; Y, Z, V and W v UK App. No. 3325/67.
63 Fenwick, n. 37 above p. 751.
184
Chapter 6: Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Liberty and Due Process
unknown evidence, when prohibited from providing evidence on his own behalf or 
from questioning witnesses. The role of the special advocate does not completely 
rectify the inequality of the situation due to the restrictions on contact between the 
various parties to the appeal, as well as the lack of transparency to the whole 
proceeding. However, it seems to be the case that the safeguards provided mitigate 
the obvious effect of the procedural requirements which exist in favour of the state.
Whilst no violation of article 5 could be found due to the derogation which came into 
force on 13th November 2001,64 this was only the case should the derogation itself be 
found to be valid.65 However, the extent to which the necessary criteria were satisfied 
with regard to the derogation was a point of great contention, dominating the debates 
in legal challenges to the validity of the provisions of Part IV, in particular A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.66 Article 15 provides “In time of war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party 
may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are 
not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.”
Despite common references to the “war on terror” the government based the need for 
derogation on the notion of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
rather than on a claim that this is a time of war. The European Court of Human 
Rights has stated that this refers to “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency 
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the 
community of which the State is composed.”67 The need for such a contentious 
measure as detention without trial was said by the government to stem from the threat
thto the country posed by international terrorists following the events of September 11 
2001. The horror of those atrocities was felt the world over. However until the 
bombings in London in July 2005 no international terrorist attacks, let alone any 
perpetrated by A1 Qaeda, had been carried out in the UK since it was deemed 
necessary to enter a derogation to the ECHR. Moreover, at the time it was stated by
64 The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/No. 3644).
65 The derogation was quashed by the House o f Lords in A v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home 
Department in December 2004.
66 [2005] 2 A.C. 68.
67 Lawless v Ireland (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 15 para. 28.
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the Home Secretary that “[t]here is no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific 
threat to the United Kingdom...” However, it was still deemed that the threat was 
sufficient to warrant enactment of measures so coercive that derogation was required. 
The House of Lords as well as the lower courts in this matter found there to be in 
existence an emergency threatening the life of the nation. This was premised on the 
fact that the SIAC, though not the Court of Appeal nor the House of Lords, had 
examined closed material to this effect and given the fact that the commission had not 
misdirected itself as to the law, this was said to be a finding that SIAC, as the fact­
finding tribunal, was entitled to make. Furthermore, the House found that following 
the events of September 11th the government could not be faulted for finding a public 
emergency to exist. The final basis of the House of Lords’ finding was premised on 
the weight to be afforded to the decision of the Home Secretary and Parliament, due 
to the political nature of the issue to be determined. Indeed at the European level, a 
wide margin of appreciation has traditionally been given to states in the determination 
of this criterion “...[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the 
pressing needs of the moment...”69 This notion of deference to the executive was 
asserted in the House by Lord Hoffmann in Rehman in 2003 when he stated that the
thevents of September 11 :
...are a reminder that in matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. 
This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect 
the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for 
terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not 
only that the executive has access to special information and expertise in these 
matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, 
require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons 
responsible to the community through the democratic process. If the people are to 
accept the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by persons whom the
70people have elected and whom they can remove.
In keeping with this there was a broad consensus in the House of Lords that this 
question is one for the executive and Parliament. Indeed, this deference was such that 
even those members of the House who were somewhat hesitant in this regard were
71prepared to give the benefit of the doubt to the Secretary of State’s assessment. The
68 HC Debs vol. 372, col. 925 15th October 2001, David Blunkett.
69 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 553 para. 68.
70 [2003] 1 A.C. 153 para. 62.
71 Para. 154, Lord Scott.
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UK’s earlier derogation from article 5 was upheld in Brannigan v McBride v UK on 
the grounds that the number of deaths, maimings, explosions and bombings in
n'XNorthern Ireland clearly indicated the existence of a state of emergency. This 
situation differs markedly to that of the period between the derogation entering into 
force in 2001 and the quashing of the derogation order in December 2004 in which 
there was a complete dearth of attacks in the UK. However, whilst the existence of a 
state of emergency during this period is questionable, the attacks of July 2005 have 
highlighted the threat posed to the UK by A1 Qaeda.
Lord Hoffmann was the only member of the House to find that this requirement of 
article 15 had not been met. This was on the basis that whilst a threat of similar 
attacks in the UK to those of 9/11 is a real one, it cannot be said to be such as to 
threaten the fabric of society, the mechanisms of government and as such the “life of 
the nation” can be said to remain strong in the face of this adversity. This 
interpretation goes beyond that of the lives of citizens and damage to property and 
instead considers the strength of democracy in the face of a terrorist threat. The 
unattractive aspect to such an interpretation would arise if the country were to be 
confronted with an attack of the strength of that of 9/11. Following those atrocities it 
cannot be said that the institutions of government were imperilled or the existence of 
the US as a civil community was threatened, however, the deaths of over 3,000 people 
in such circumstances could not be considered as anything other than an emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, in spite of the fact that the fabric of democracy 
survived.
It is of concern that it was possible for foreign nationals to be held indefinitely in the 
UK on the basis of terrorist attacks which occurred in another country in 2001. 
Waiting until there is evidence in the form of an atrocity is obviously unacceptable. 
However when dealing with such a measure as a potentially indefinite deprivation of 
liberty, it would preferable for a derogation, which deprives individuals of the basic 
provisions of the ECHR, to be premised on something more substantial than 
“ ...foreign nationals...who are a threat to the national security of the United
72 (1993) 17 E.H.R.R. 539.
73 Ibid., para. 49.
187
Chapter 6: Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Liberty and Due Process
Kingdom.”74 This is because derogation by a state goes further than affecting simply 
that state but also has an effect on the integrity of the Convention as a whole. On a 
different note, a valid argument can be made that the derogation was without 
sufficient grounds on the basis that it was entered not because of a public emergency, 
but because article 3 prevents removal of asylum seekers from the UK who face 
persecution abroad. Indeed, derogation from the Convention in order to circumvent 
the requirements of a non-derogable article is extremely dubious.
Article 15 further requires that the measures in question are strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, which was explained in Ireland v UK as a requirement that 
"[tjhere must be a link between the facts of the emergency on the one hand and the 
measures chosen to deal with it on the other. Moreover, the obligations under the 
Convention do not entirely disappear. They can only be suspended or modified "to the 
extent that is strictly required" as provided in Article 15." 76 The fact that the United 
Kingdom was the only country party to the Convention to have deemed it necessary to
tViderogate from the ECHR in the aftermath of the events of September 11 is telling 
indeed and forces the question of the necessity of the measures enacted. However, the 
UK’s derogation in the early stages of post 9/11 action could possibly be considered 
to have been a demonstration of the UK acting in a forthright manner with regard to 
its Convention obligations. Although, perhaps the United Kingdom’s history with 
derogations from article 5 due to terrorist violence made the post September 11th 
derogation an easy habit to return to. It is however accepted that as the closest ally to 
the United States, the UK is more likely to be under threat than any other European 
country.77
It is important to remember that derogation from Convention obligations is intended 
as a temporary measure which requires permanent review of the need for emergency 
measures. It is the case that between adoption of the derogation as a course of action 
in 2001 and July 2005 there were no international terrorist attacks carried out on UK
74 [2005] 2 A.C. 68.
75 Opinion o f David Pannick QC prepared for Liberty (the National Council for Civil Liberties) on the 
derogation from Article 5(1) o f the European Convention on Human Rights to allow for detention 
without trial 16th November 2001 Appendix to JCHR 5th Report.
76 (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 25.
77 The threat to the UK was eventually borne out in July 2005. However, prior to this, in March 2004 
A1 Qaeda attacked the rail network o f  Madrid, Spain.
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soil. This raises questions with regard to the exigencies of the situation and of the 
threat used to justify the derogation. Moreover, in that lengthy period of time the 
government should have sought to consider measures which would satisfy its 
obligations under the ECHR and allow the derogation to be removed. In addition, a 
derogation should be kept under review whilst in effect and the measures adapted so 
as to continually address the requirements of the situation at hand. It seems therefore 
that an argument can be made that in the over three years in which the derogation was 
in place with no attacks, and also no intelligence of a specific threat to the UK, that 
the “review” system in place should have identified that the derogation did not 
necessarily meet the exigencies of the situation as required as was initially believed to 
be the case. Whilst there may be a good argument for the need for these powers and 
the derogation, the “exigencies of the situation” should not have equated to derogation 
just in case of an attack. The point has been made that the provisions in Part IV of the 
ATCSA went beyond that which was required by the exigencies of the situation on 
the grounds that the broad provisions of the Terrorism Act, such as directing terrorist 
activities under section 56 or incitement to commit terrorist acts abroad, were enacted 
precisely to enable prosecution of suspected terrorists through the criminal process 
where pursuit of a more specific criminal offence was not possible.78
The excess of these provisions is further highlighted by the fact that detention results 
from certification as a suspected international terrorist, with no requirement of
thproximity to A1 Qaeda or the events of September 1 1 . In making the order, the 
government specified that “[t]he derogation is available only in relation to the 
international terrorist threat manifested on 11 September 2001. The Government has 
made that clear and the position has been confirmed by SIAC and the Court of 
Appeal. The derogation does not therefore extend to other forms of international
7Qterrorism.” However, the measures of Part IV extended much further than indicated
by the derogation order and allowed for the indefinite detention of any suspected 
international terrorist. In this way the measures went further than was strictly 
required by the exigencies of the purported emergency and as such sufficient 
proportionality was not achieved. International terrorism is a threat which has existed
78 C. Gearty, First Report o f the Home Affairs Select Committee, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Bill 2001, para. 26.
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for decades, however it never posed such a threat as to justify the provision of 
indefinite detention of such actors. In this way, it is unlikely that the derogation 
would have been accepted as valid had it been so broad in its scope as to encompass 
all suspected international terrorists. However, the fact that the derogation order 
made specified the threat posed as limited to A1 Qaeda and the events of September 
11th meant that the Act actually exceeded the parameters of the order by providing for 
the detention of actors unrelated to those said to be threatening the security of the 
United Kingdom. This wide scope created a power to detain those against whom it 
may have been possible to bring criminal charges rather than detain, or indeed those 
who had committed no offence at all.80 Of course, following the events of July 7th 
2005 there is likely to be more acceptance of a wider-ranging order given the reality 
that the country is under a real and on-going threat. However, preliminary 
investigations have shown the perpetrators to be linked to A1 Qaeda and as such the 
order in its narrowest form would be sufficient for the intended purposes.
A discrepancy exists with regard to the stated objective of the legislation as protecting 
the United Kingdom against acts of terrorism at the hands of A1 Qaeda and the actual 
effect of the provisions of Part IV, under which deprivation of liberty and dilution of 
the protection of due process occurred on a discriminatory basis. This was as a result 
of the fact that the powers contained therein were triggered by immigration 
proceedings and therefore extended only to non-British nationals. Indeed this was 
held to be the case by the House of Lords in A, which resulted in the issuance of a 
declaration of incompatibility.
It was submitted by the government that the measures pursued the legitimate aim of 
protection against terrorism. However, whilst the measures themselves can be said to 
have pursued a legitimate aim it can be questioned whether the difference in treatment 
on the ground of national origin can be said to have had such an aim. It is clear that 
the provisions under Part IV ATCSA treated nationals and non-nationals suspected of 
being international terrorists differently. Indeed, surely, pursuance of an aim such as 
the prevention of terrorism is such as to require no difference in treatment towards
79 Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: A Discussion 
Paper, February 2004 available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/CT discussion paper.pdf
80 Fenwick, n. 37 above p. 737.
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such actors if the threat can be said to emanate from more than one class of persons. 
It is the case that the measures were premised on immigration control which 
inherently forms a distinction between British nationals and non-nationals. The 
argument of the government on this point was accepted by the Court of Appeal in A as 
justifying the difference in treatment of both groups, the justification being founded 
on the distinction between nationals with a right of abode in the UK and non-nationals 
who could not be deported and as such had no right to remain in the UK but rather a 
right not to be removed. This approach however disregards the security context in 
which the legislation was enacted with the purpose of protecting the UK from terrorist 
attacks. Whilst discrimination between nationals and non-nationals may be justified 
with regard to immigration measures the same cannot be said in the context of 
security. Given that the measures in Part IV encompassed any suspected international 
terrorist, the comparison should correctly be drawn between non-national suspected 
international terrorists and those of the same group who have British nationality. 
Indeed Lord Bingham determined British nationals to be the correct comparator group 
due to the shared characteristics of the two groups, namely the fact that the appellants 
in the case were suspected international terrorists who were irremovable from the UK 
with the only difference being nationality. This is in accordance with the SIAC’s 
finding that those who could not be expelled did have a right to remain and as such 
could not be detained unless suspected of committing a criminal offence. Such a 
perspective is attractive given the plethora of wide-ranging provisions contained in 
the Terrorism Act which could be utilised to this end. In addition such an approach 
would not have required a derogation from article 5. The argument that it is only 
foreign nationals who pose a threat to the security of the United Kingdom cannot be 
sustained. The reality is that the security of the UK is threatened not just by those of 
non-British nationality but also by British citizens who fall within the definition of 
suspected international terrorist. This can be supported by the fact that of the 
perpetrators of the London bombings, three had been bom and raised in Great Britain 
and the fourth had lived in this country since he was a child. However, it is the case 
that any British citizen accused of representing a terrorist threat to the country could 
not be detained unless suspected of a criminal offence and rather would be tried under 
any number of applicable provisions according to the requirements of due process and 
the criminal justice system. There does not seem to be sufficient justification for this 
difference in treatment according to nationality, particularly given the fact that the
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state bears a heavy burden of justification in cases of discrimination on the grounds of 
national origin.81 Moreover, this had the effect that the measures did not go far 
enough to meet the threat posed to the UK by all terrorist actors, by the exclusion of 
UK nationals from its ambit. In addition they extended too far in the fact that they 
allowed the certification of non-nationals, for example, for supporting a terrorist 
organisation, but who in all reality posed no threat to the security of the UK. This 
leads to the conclusion that the measures cannot be said to have been strictly 
necessary and indeed failed for lack of proportionality. It is on this basis that 
detention under Part IV of the Act can be said to have been discriminatory on the 
grounds of national origin and therefore in breach of article 14 of the Convention. 
This is supplemented by the fact that no derogation was made from article 14 and as 
such the measures provided in Part IV in breaching this article had the effect that the 
measures were not consistent with the UK’s other obligations under international law 
and as such failed to comport to the requirements of article 15 in an additional way.
Ironically, in trying to ensure proportionality, the application of the measures in Part 
IV had a discriminatory effect and paradoxically overcoming this would have 
required widening the application of the provisions so that British nationals suspected 
of involvement in international terrorism could also be so detained. Of course such an 
approach would have been unattractive due to the fact, as stated by Lord Woolf, that it 
would not “promote human rights”83 and would expand the Act’s intrusive effect to 
an even wider group. The effect of expansion of such measures to UK nationals 
would be the creation of a prison with four walls, akin to internment, as opposed to 
confinement with three walls which has been used to describe the detention of non­
nationals under Part IV. However, given the fact that of those non-nationals so 
detained under the Act only two chose to be removed abroad, this shows that the 
threat of treatment contrary to article 3 which detainees faced abroad was such as to 
add a fourth, albeit invisible, wall to their incarceration. This demonstrates the 
problematic circularity of trying to reconcile these measures with the Convention 
obligations of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the threat of international terrorism
81 Gaygusuz v Austria (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 364.
82 Moreover, measures taken to deal with a pressing social need must accord with the requirements of 
democratic society. This presupposes the notions o f pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. 
Handyside v L/AT (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. 737.
83 [2004] Q.B. 335 para 49.
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faced by the United Kingdom emanates from those of British and non-British 
nationality and in this way the assertion that the legitimate aim of preventing 
terrorism could be achieved by detaining or deporting only non-national suspected 
terrorists raises questions with regard to the legitimacy and extent of the threat 
claimed to exist. This highlights the fact that there was no sufficient basis for 
justifying the difference in treatment of two analogous groups both of which form the 
same threat to the UK. On this basis, the measures were invalid on the grounds of 
discrimination and indeed for failing to meet the exigencies of the situation.
Traditionally a large degree of deference has been shown by the courts in the United 
Kingdom to the government in finding a political resolution for a political problem, 
namely matters of national security. This proclivity has resulted in a jurisprudence in 
which the judiciary have, far from being seen as the defender of rights and liberties, 
been seen as providing the actions of the executive in this regard with judicial 
approval. The case law in this area is well rehearsed. In Council of Civil Service 
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service84 it was stated that “The decision on whether 
the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular 
case is for the government and not for the courts... in any event the judicial process is
o  c
unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security.” In the sphere of executive 
detention on grounds of national security, the Court of Appeal stated in R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Cheblak86 that national security was “the 
exclusive responsibility of the executive.” The case of Liversidge v Anderson87 
similarly forms part of this tradition, in which the majority of the House of Lords 
stated that “Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole 
judges of what the national security requires.” Most recently in Rehman the deference 
accorded to the executive in the area of national security was once again clearly stated 
by the House of Lords, most notably in the words of Lord Hoffmann. The 
unfortunate record in this area is what makes the findings in A so remarkable. 
Particular attention can be drawn to the difference in the position of Lord Hoffmann 
who contrary to his words of extreme deference in Rehman was the only member of 
the House of Lords to find that no state of emergency was in existence in the UK in A.
84 [1984] 3 All ER 935.
85 Lord Fraser at 944.
86 [1991] 2 All ER 319.
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Prior to this case, it is Lord Atkin’s famous dissent in Liversidge v Anderson which 
remains perhaps the most well-known judicial stance taken in defiance of the 
executive’s will in the area of national security: “In this country, amid the clash of
o o
arms, the laws are not silent.” This quotation is befitting the situation which faced 
the House in A and commendably their Lordships followed the stand of its author so 
as to produce a decision in keeping with Lord Atkin’s lone dissent.
The case of A heralded a long awaited example of active judicial oversight in the area 
of national security. The House balanced the security of the country and the 
deference to be shown to the executive in determining the security situation with a 
strong defence of the rights of the individual and the international obligations of the 
country. However, the effect of the case was that, due to the nature of the challenge 
and the powers of the courts under the Human Rights Act 1998, the detainees 
remained in detention for many weeks following the decision. This was in order to 
allow the government to enact further provisions in order to deal with the detainees in 
a way compatible with the UK’s human rights obligations, with the result that the 
country’s comprehensive anti-terrorism armoury is ever increasing. The effect of this 
is the constant need for judicial vigilance.
Addendum
In response to the House of Lords decision in A the government enacted further 
legislation in the form of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, making provision for 
the imposition of “control orders” “for purposes connected with protecting members
O Q
of the public from a risk of terrorism.” The Secretary of State may make a control 
order against an individual if he has been granted permission to make the order by the 
High Court90 and:
(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been 
involved in terrorism-related activity; and
87 [1942] A.C. 206.
88 Ibid,, p. 244.
89 Section 1(1) PTA 2005.
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(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting 
members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order 
imposing obligations on that individual.91
With regard to derogating orders, the Secretary of State must make an application to 
the High Court whereby an immediate preliminary hearing must be held in order to 
determine whether or not to make such an order and if such an order is made, to give
09directions regarding a full hearing to determine whether to confirm the order. The 
preliminary hearing may be held in the absence of the individual, without providing 
notice of the application for the order to the individual and without the individual 
having had the opportunity of making representations to the court. Similarly, the 
full hearing is essentially the same as that provided under Part IV of the ATCSA 
before the SIAC, despite the inherent problems and disadvantages to the individual 
discussed previously.
The nature of the provision places the individual subject to an order under certain 
obligations and restrictions considered necessary for the purpose of preventing or 
restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. The Act 
includes a broad list of such restrictions, which can be added to by the Secretary of 
State. The order may impose, inter alia, a prohibition or restriction on the possession 
or use of specified articles or substances; a restriction in respect of the individual’s 
work or other occupation; a restriction on association or communications with 
specified persons; a restriction as to place of residence; a restriction on movement; a 
requirement to report to a specified person at a specified time every day.94 However, 
there is no requirement of a correlation between the activities of which the individual 
is suspected and the restrictions imposed. Due to the recognition of the fact that such 
an order may curtail the right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR, the Act makes 
provision for two types of order: derogating, made by the Secretary of State and non­
derogating, made following the grant of authority to the Secretary of State by the 
High Court. The opportunity of challenge to a court exists, however, the individual
90 Section 3 PTA 2005.
91 Section 2(1) PTA 2005.
92 Section 4(1) PTA 2005.
93 Section 4(2) PTA 2005.
94 Section 1(4) PTA 2005.
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will only succeed if the court finds the decision of the Secretary of State to have been 
flawed.95 The provisions relating to control orders are currently due to expire in 
March 2006.
Due Process in the United States
The concept of due process finds its roots in Magna Carta in which it was promised 
"No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or his liberties 
or free customs, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we come 
upon him or send against him, except by a legal judgment of his peers or by the law of 
the land."96 This was later enacted in the Statute of Westminster in 1354 as “ ...no 
man, of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands, or tenements, nor 
taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be brought in to
0 7answer by due process of law.” Though without explicit definition, this universal 
notion has been described by the Supreme Court as “...a system of rights based on 
moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to 
be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history. Due 
process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and 
just.”98 Essentially, due process of the law amounts to the application of certain 
fundamental principles so as to curb any arbitrary interference with the rights of the 
individual by the government and to attempt to achieve some notion of parity between 
the individual and the state.
It was originally deemed that “due process” referred simply to procedural 
requirements in court: “The words "due process" have a precise technical import, and 
are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can 
never be referred to an act of legislature.”99 This, of course, circumvented some 
elements of fundamental justice and resulted in a notion dictated by the legislature. 
However, this was complemented, in the 1890s, by the addition of the concept of
95 Section 10 PTA 2005.
96 Chapter 39 Magna Carta.
97 28 Edw. Ill c.3 (1354).
98 Solesbee vBalkcom  339 US 9, 16 (1950).
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substantive due process of law which provides a check on other notions such as 
equality before the law, clarity of law as well as providing a check on the legislature. 
“It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which 
might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the 
executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to 
leave congress free to make any process “due process of law,” by its mere will.”100 
With regard to both procedural and substantive due process, the test for 
constitutionality essentially asks whether the governmental action is arbitrary, 
capricious, unreasonable, irrational, irrelevant or invidious in either content or 
procedure.101
With regard to the Constitution, the notion of due process is incorporated into several 
of the amendments without specific mention, such as the Sixth Amendment which 
states the right of the accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, to be able to obtain witnesses in his favour
i mand to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. However, due process is 
explicitly stated in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, both of which act to protect 
the individual from arbitrary interference by the government with life, liberty or 
property. “The 14th Amendment, it has been held, legitimately operates to extend to 
the citizens and residents of the states the same protection against arbitrary state 
legislation affecting life, liberty, and property as is offered by the 5th Amendment 
against similar legislation by Congress.”103 The former, in conjunction with other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights such as the Sixth Amendment, applies only to actions 
by federal government, and the latter, with the requirements of the Fifth as well as 
other amendments deemed to be inherently contained, provides protection against 
actions by state governments. Although the equal protection clause is contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, discriminatory action by the federal government will, 
depending on the circumstances, fall foul of the due process protection of the Fifth 
Amendment.
99 Alexander Hamilton, The Founders’ Constitution, Volume 5, Amendment V, Document 13 available 
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendV due processsl 3.html
100 Murray v Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. 59 US 272, 276 (1855).
101 H. J. Abraham and B. A. Perry, Freedom and the Court. Civil Rights and Liberties in the United 
States, Oxford University Press, 1994 (6th ed.) p. 96.
102 Amendment VI.
103 H ibbenv Smith, 191 US 310, 325 (1903).
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Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 and USA PATRIOT Act 
2001
Both the AEDPA and the USA PATRIOT Act contain provisions concerned with the 
detention and removal of aliens suspected of involvement with terrorism from the 
United States. This approach is particularly striking with regard to the AEDPA given 
the fact that the Oklahoma city bombing, chronologically the most recent catalyst for 
the enactment of the legislation, was in fact perpetrated by domestic actors.
Detention and Removal of Alien Terrorists
Section 401 of the AEDPA adds a new title to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), which provides for the creation of the alien terrorist removal court. The 
procedure of this is initiated on application by the Attorney-General that the 
individual in question is an alien terrorist who is physically present in the United 
States and who would pose a threat to national security if removed under Title II of 
the Act. For these purposes an alien terrorist is an alien who has engaged, is engaged, 
or at any time after admission engages in any terrorist activity.104 Terrorist activities 
are defined extensively in the Act and include committing or incitement to commit a 
terrorist activity indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, 
preparing or planning a terrorist attack, soliciting funds, membership of a terrorist 
organisation and affording material support to such an organisation.105 The 
application may be supplemented by any other information or testimony, including 
that of a classified nature, and is considered in camera and ex parte. Approval of an 
application by a single judge of the removal court results in a public hearing before 
the five judge court.
The Act makes provision for the individual concerned to be present before the hearing 
and to be represented by counsel, who will be appointed by the judge should the alien 
be unable to afford to obtain it. During the hearing, the alien is provided with the 
opportunity to introduce evidence on his own behalf and to question witnesses. 
However, evidence obtained under FISA shall be admitted and there shall be no
104 8 USC 1227(a)(4)(B).
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suppression of evidence allegedly obtained unconstitutionally or otherwise. 
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the purpose of which is said to be “ ...to 
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth 
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined”106 do not apply in removal 
proceedings.
Any evidence which the Attorney General deems would pose a risk to the national 
security of the country or to the security of any individual on disclosure shall be heard 
ex parte and in camera. This is, however, a broad criterion which could easily be 
satisfied under either head, particularly in the case of the latter where it could readily 
be claimed that the security of an informer would be put at risk were the evidence to 
be disclosed. In instances when this occurs, the government is obliged to submit to 
the court for approval, a summary of the classified evidence which must be “sufficient 
to enable the alien to prepare a defence.” This standard is said to provide necessary 
due process protection to the individual concerned whilst also ensuring the
10 7confidentiality of sensitive information or government sources, a role played by the 
special advocate in the United Kingdom.
In the United States the procedure for a removal hearing includes the provision of a 
judge-appointed special attorney to assist the alien by reviewing the classified 
information disclosed in camera as well as challenging through an in camera
1 ORproceeding the veracity of the evidence contained in the classified information, in 
addition to the provision of an evidential summary. Provision of such a summary is 
preferable to the situation in the UK in which the evidence presented during closed 
proceedings remains a secret to the appellant and his legal representative. In the 
United States disclosure to the alien and his legal representative of classified 
information is prohibited in the same way as in the United Kingdom. However, the 
position of an individual before the alien terrorist removal court is certainly 
strengthened by the provision of an evidential summary. In isolation, the sufficiency
105 8 USC 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
106 Federal Rules o f Evidence rule 102.
107 Statement o f Anti-Defamation League And American Jewish Congress B'nai B'rith International, 
Hadassah, and The Jewish Council for Public Affairs on H.R. 2121 — The Secret Evidence Repeal Act 
Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 23, 2000.
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of a summary could easily be called in to question given the inability to challenge the 
information contained therein as well as the difficulty of mounting an effective 
defence on the basis of abridged information. However in combination with a special 
attorney appointed to challenge the veracity of the evidence, the position of the 
individual is strengthened in reference to the comparable situation in the UK, where 
the ability of the individual to rebut the evidence on which certification is made is 
negligible.
With regard to the provisions enacted in both jurisdictions, certainly some degree of 
balance is provided with regard to the interests of the individual and the state. 
However given the ease with which material can be judged to be sensitive as a result 
of national security interests, particularly with regard to the deferential attitude taken 
towards the executive in such matters, the point can be made that undue interference 
with the individual’s due process rights will occur on a regular basis. Moreover, the 
ease with which information can be classified, or closed proceedings invoked, 
provides the state with the opportunity to “over-classify” information in order to 
attempt to gain an unfair advantage in such proceedings. This has been shown to be 
the case in the United States in the past where the government has based deportation 
proceedings on secret evidence of political and terroristic affiliations, only to disclose 
information previously classified when challenged in court.109
Following receipt of the evidence, the government and the alien are both given “fair 
opportunity” to present argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence as a 
justification for removal. However, as previously mentioned, this “fair opportunity” 
is severely weighted in favour of the government. This is so not simply as a result of 
the fact that the alien must base his case on an evidential summary but also because 
the applicable standard of proof is the lowest civil standard, namely a showing by 
preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the criminal standard of beyond 
reasonable doubt. There may be some foundation to this in light of the holding that 
deportation is not a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the Bill of Rights.110 
However, it has also been held by the Supreme Court that the drastic effect of a
108 8 USC 1534(e)(F).
109 J. X. Dempsey and D. Cole, Terrorism and the Constitution. Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name 
o f  National Security, (First Amendment Foundation, 2002) p. 128-131.
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deportation order should be based on a higher standard of proof than that which 
applies in a case of negligence. Therefore, it has been held that in such proceedings, 
the government must establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.111 It has since been held that with regard to 
expatriation, a showing on the preponderance of the evidence is satisfactory due to the 
civil nature of the proceedings, which therefore does not offend the requirements of 
the Fifth Amendment.112 However, this was stated with regard to the fact that 
expatriation proceedings do not threaten a loss of liberty. Contrary to this, Title IV of 
the AEDPA makes provision for the indefinite detention of any individual against
1 1 Twhom an application for removal under the Act has been made and so application 
of a higher standard than the usual civil standard seems more likely and more just.
A permanent resident alien who is so detained is entitled to a release hearing before 
the same judge, in which release will be granted if the alien can demonstrate that he 
(i) is a person lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, (ii) is 
not likely to flee if released upon such terms and conditions as the court may 
prescribe (including the posting of any monetary amount), and (iii) will not endanger 
national security, or the safety of any person or the community, if released. 
Demonstration of these points, especially the third, will be onerous, given the 
difficulty of proving a negative which is of course exacerbated by the limited 
information provided to the alien regarding the grounds for his detention. Yet this 
flawed system stands in contrast to the prospects of those not eligible for such a 
hearing, such as non-citizens present in the US on the basis of a visa. This could be 
said to be in violation of the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
result of this discriminatory access to a removal hearing. Once removal is ordered, 
the alien, or on refusal, the Secretary of State, will elect a destination country, subject 
to the proviso that removal will not impair any treaty obligations, such as article 7 of 
the ICCPR, nor adversely affect the foreign policy of the United States.114 This of 
course has the same effect as the equivalent provisions in the UK whereby a person 
cannot be deported to a country in which they may face cruel, inhuman or degrading
110 Harisiades v Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 594 (1952).
1,1 Woodby v Immigration Service, 385 US 276, 286 (1966).
112 Vance v Terrazas, 444 US 252, 266 (1980).
113 8 USC 1536.
114 8 USC 1537(b)(2)(A)(B).
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treatment or punishment. The effect of this, however, is that the alien may be 
indefinitely detained even if he has chosen to risk such treatment in his designated 
country, rather than remain detained in the United States.
A supplement to the alien removal procedures contained in Part IV of the AEDPA 
1996, are the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act which essentially provide for the 
preventive detention of non-citizens. Indeed, in conjunction with section 411, as 
discussed in chapter 5 which widened the class of non-citizens deportable on the 
grounds of terrorism, under section 412 the Attorney-General has the power to certify 
any non-citizen as a suspected terrorist and to detain that person, potentially 
indefinitely, on the basis of that certification. The Attorney-General may certify an 
alien if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is:
(a) engaged in any activity to violate any law of the United States relating to 
espionage or sabotage or to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export 
from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive information,115
(b) engaged in any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control 
or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or 
other unlawful means,116
(c) is or has engaged, or is likely to engage in, or has incited terrorist activity, or 
is a representative or member of a foreign terrorist organisation as designated 
by the Secretary of State, or of a political, social or other similar group whose 
public endorsement of terrorist activity the Secretary of State has determined
117undermines US efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activity,
(d) is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the 
United States.118
It is notable that under the AEDPA membership of a foreign terrorist organisation is 
said not be prohibited due to the protection of the ideals of the First Amendment, as
t hconfirmed by the 9 Circuit Court of Appeals in Humanitarian Law Project v
1,5 Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i), section 237(a)(4)(A)(i) Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 8 USC 
1182, 1227.
116 Section 212(a)(3)(A)(iii), section 237(a)(4)(A)(iii) INA.
1,7 Section 212(a)(3)(B), see also section 237(a)(4)(B) INA.
118 Section 236A(a)(3)(B) INA.
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Reno.119 However, under the above provision, membership of such an organisation is 
sufficient to justify detention under the PATRIOT Act. The definition of “terrorist 
activity” in the Act broadly includes the threat or attempt to use a weapon with intent 
to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause
i onsubstantial damage to property. This is broad enough to include the suspected 
involvement of an alien in a pub fight or a domestic dispute and it is on such a basis, 
with this negligible link to terrorism, that such an alien could be subjected to 
prolonged detention by way of executive fiat. Moreover, in a case of impromptu 
violence such as might occur in a pub, the alien could be detained despite the 
spontaneous nature of the incident and the fact that he poses no on-going threat in any 
way, thereby amounting to preventive detention of an extreme kind. Of further 
concern is the fact that potentially indefinite detention is authorised on the basis that 
the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a suspected 
terrorist. This standard however, is only sufficient under American law to authorise a 
stop and frisk,121 as opposed to a full arrest which requires probable cause under the 
Fourth Amendment. On this basis, questions are raised with regard to the use of such 
a low standard as justification for such detention. Whether constitutional challenge 
on this basis would succeed remains questionable on the basis of deference to the 
executive with regard to terrorism and national security. The differing decisions 
emanating from various US courts make any kind of prediction difficult. The 
Supreme Court has previously noted the heightened deference which may be 
applicable with regard to the decisions of the executive concerning national 
security.122 However, it is notable that in the cases challenging the designation as and 
detention of enemy combatants, the stance of the Supreme Court was not deferential 
and instead showed great respect for individual liberty and the requirements of due 
process.
Under the section 412 certification and detention procedure, the Attorney General 
must either commence removal proceedings, charge the alien detained with a criminal 
offence or release him within seven days. However, if removal proceedings are 
commenced the alien shall be detained in custody until his removal from the US is
119 98-56062 (9th Cir. March 3, 2000). See Chapter 5.
120 Section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(b) and (vi) 8 USC 1182.
121 Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968).
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1 J'Kcomplete. The provision provides that detention shall be maintained irrespective of 
any relief from removal for which the alien may be eligible, or any relief from 
removal which has been granted to the alien, until the Attorney General determines 
that the alien is no longer certifiable as a suspected terrorist. This of course has the 
effect of condemning the individual to prolonged detention despite the fact that he is 
legally not removable. The executive nature of this provision and the secrecy 
surrounding the evidence on which the certification is based denies any opportunity to 
examine or challenge the evidential basis of the Attorney General’s determination, or 
indeed the absence of a determination negating the original certification. It must be 
noted however, that the provision is inherently contradictory in that an alien shall be 
detained despite having been granted relief for removal, but it is also stated that “[i]f 
the alien is finally determined not to be removable, detention pursuant to this 
subsection shall terminate.” This could, however, potentially provide some measure 
of protection for the individual so detained if the courts sought to remedy this 
contradiction through reliance on this latter clause, thereby prohibiting continued 
detention following a grant of asylum or some other form of relief from deportation. 
Whether this is so remains to be seen.
The Act contains what is termed a “limitation on indefinite detention” in that it is 
provided that an alien who is detained subject to removal proceedings, but whose 
deportation is unlikely in the reasonable foreseeable future may be detained for 
additional periods of six months, only if the release of the alien will threaten the 
national security of the US or the safety of the community or any person. This is 
supplemented by a six monthly review by the Attorney General under which he may 
revoke certification and release the alien on such conditions as are deemed 
appropriate. In addition, the detainee may make a request in writing every six months 
that the Attorney General reconsiders the certification and may submit documents or 
other evidence in support of that request. This provision of renewing detention in six 
monthly increments as a limitation on indefinite detention as well as six monthly 
review by the Attorney General is certainly preferable to the indefinite detention 
imposed upon the detainees at Guantanamo Bay or citizens such as Jose Padilla. In 
addition, the fact that an individual detained under section 412 is able to submit
122 Zadvydas v Davis 533 US 678 (2001).
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evidence in support of a request to revoke certification on a regular basis also places 
the individual in a stronger position than others detained under US policy. However, 
whilst such provisions represent an acknowledgment by the executive of the 
dangerous potential inherent in such a detention provision, the likelihood that 
“national security reasons” will prevent the alien from being informed of the evidence 
on which the certification is based will negate any utility in allowing the detainee to 
submit evidence in support of a request for reconsideration. Indeed, it is difficult to 
disprove an unknown quantity. Furthermore, increments of six months do not act as a 
bar to indefinite detention. Of course, as mentioned, such a system is preferable to 
indefinite detention as experienced by some in the war against terror, however, the 
ease with which it is possible for detention to be renewed given the secrecy 
surrounding the reasons for certification prevent this from being an effective method 
of restricting prolonged detention. Moreover, in contrast to the position under the 
AEDPA concerning the removal of aliens suspected of terrorist involvement, 
certification, detention and subsequent review fall into the domain of the executive by 
way of the fact that the Attorney General is responsible for all such fundamental 
elements of the procedure. Indeed, at no stage is provision made for independent 
oversight and in this way, though certain measures are in place in order to act as 
safeguards for the individual, the process is fundamentally reminiscent of those 
detained as enemy combatants.
The only form of recourse to the courts for an individual detained under section 412 is 
by way of an action for habeas corpus, with the Act specifically excluding any other 
form of judicial review.124 Appeal is possible only to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, thereby causing untold problems to the detainee 
in any other part of the country both financially and in terms of access to justice. It 
must be said that the role played by the SIAC under the ATCSA provides more 
rigorous scrutiny of detention for the individual than that provided for in the United 
States. However, limited though recourse to the courts in the United States may be, it 
exists nonetheless and therefore may well be considered as satisfying the requirement 
of procedural protections for the detainee.
123 Section 236A (a)(l)(2) INA as inserted by section 412 PATRIOT Act.
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In light of the knowledge that some of the 9/11 hijackers were in violation of 
immigration law for remaining in the US despite the expiry of their visas, section 412 
apparently seeks to rectify the flaws in the previous system by taking a pre-emptive 
approach in extending the powers available for use on immigration grounds. This 
heavy-handed attempt at rectification has the same effect for a known terrorist 
planning a chemical attack, an alien suspected of playing a role in a pub fight and an 
alien guilty of a minor immigration violation. Moreover, the system enacted in 
section 412 is such that it exists at the restriction of due process. Amendment of the 
INA through the PATRIOT Act provides the executive with the power of indefinite 
detention yet omits any form of a prompt and independent judicial hearing and allows 
the detainee no opportunity to examine the evidence on which his detention is based. 
Moreover, no guidance is provided with regard to what must be undertaken by the 
Attorney General in certifying an individual and whilst provision is made for a writ of 
habeas corpus no mention is made of the role of the courts in examining the Attorney 
General’s decision, the standard against which the evidence will be tested, nor the role 
of the detainee in such proceedings. Indeed, perhaps it is an awareness of these 
shortcomings and a fear that these provisions would fail to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny that has prevented use of detention under section 412 thus far.
With regard to the provisions contained in the AEDPA and the PATRIOT Act, a 
constitutional question obviously arises as a result of the potential for the indefinite 
detention of non-citizens, as well as on the ground of the discriminatory nature of the 
provisions contrary to the requirement of equal protection before the law contained in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has made clear the fact that the due 
process clause is applicable to all persons within the United States, including aliens,
1 9 Swhether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent, and therefore 
acts to prevent any deprivation of liberty which is not subject to due process of law. 
The non-punitive nature of the potentially indefinite detention possible under both 
Acts is certainly at odds with the notion of imprisonment for deterrent or retributive 
purposes following trial and conviction for a criminal act. However, indefinite 
detention is permissible in certain narrow non-punitive situations where there is 
special justification for the detention and sufficient procedural protections for the
124 Section 236A (b )(l) INA as inserted by section 412 PATRIOT Act.
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1 9Aindividual detained. A sufficiently narrow non-punitive reason would be where the 
danger posed to the community at large is such that it outweighs the individual’s
1 77constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint, such as in the case 
of “harm threatening mental illness.”128 It therefore is likely that extended detention 
of a suspected terrorist for the purposes of deportation could be held to be justifiable 
as a result of a threat posed by terrorism to the security of the population or to the 
national security of the US.
This is particularly so in light of the Supreme Court’s comment in Zadvydas v Davis, 
where in finding that the Attorney-General was not authorised to detain a removable 
alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or for a period necessary to secure 
removal, the court made the comment that justifying such detention on the basis of 
protecting the community can be upheld only when limited to “a small segment of 
particularly dangerous individuals, say suspected terrorists...”129 Indeed, the court 
made specific mention of the fact that in deciding Zadvydas it gave no consideration 
to “terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made 
for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of
130the political branches with respect to matters of national security.” It seems 
therefore that a suspected terrorist falls into a sufficiently narrow category of 
dangerousness so that detention under either Act would not, on its face, be found to 
fall foul of the Constitution.
The protection of the due process clause is applicable to an alien within the US, albeit 
one subject to a final removal order, and as such detention of this nature which may 
permanently deprive an individual of his liberty, must be carried out pursuant to the 
requirements of due process in order to provide a degree of protection against 
arbitrary detention by the state. It has been suggested that the fact that a case has 
never been brought before the Alien Terrorist Removal Court is due in part to the fact 
that the requirements under the Act, in particular the provision of a summary of the 
classified evidence which is sufficiently detailed so as to enable the alien to build a
125 Zadvydas v Davis 533 US 678 (2001).
126 Ibid
127 Ibid.
128 Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 356 (1997).
129 Zadvydas v Davis 533 US 678 (2001).
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defence, is deemed to be unworkable. This is on the grounds that compliance requires 
that the summary be sufficiently detailed in order to be approved by the judge and yet 
national security could easily be compromised by a report which is too specific in its
131content. Should this be correct, it goes some way towards the condemnation of the
removal provisions under Title IV of the AEDPA in that attempted compliance with
the requirements of due process have made the provision unworkable and as such
these efforts to curb arbitrary detention by the executive cannot be sustained thereby
highlighting the severe nature of the removal provisions. The difficulty of reconciling
these two opposing interests regarding the provision of an unclassified summary of
classified evidence used to deport an alien is highlighted in the case of Kiareldeen v 
1
Ashcroft. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the application was granted with 
the District judge describing the provision of such a summary as “lacking in either 
detail or attribution to reliable sources."133 However, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, though dealing primarily with a claim for payment of legal fees under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act, discussed deportation on the basis on secret evidence 
stating “[t]hat the FBI would be unwilling to compromise national security by 
revealing its undercover sources, is both understandable and comforting. That a court 
would then choose to criticize the FBI for being unwilling to risk undermining its 
covert operations against terrorists is somewhat unnerving.”134 It may be significant 
that the Court of Appeals judgment came after September 11 , with the appeal 
actually being filed on 10th September 2001.
Conclusion
From the outset, the point must be made that if the terrorist threat faced by the country 
is deemed to be so serious that stringent legislative measures must be taken then the 
government is entitled to enact measures such as those found in the ATCSA, AEDPA, 
and PATRIOT Act. However, it is the case that enactment of such provisions must 
take place in light of the rights and obligations enshrined in such documents as the
m Ibid.
131 S. R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use o f  Alien Terrorist Removal Court, February 22nd 2002, 
available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/2-22-02valentine.pdf p. 2.
132 273 F.3d 542 (3rd Cir. 2001).
133 Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.Supp.2d at 414.
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ECHR and the US Constitution. Indeed, the legitimacy and lawfulness of such 
measures as extended or even indefinite detention without trial is premised upon 
proportionality, and the requirements of due process in order to achieve some kind of 
balance between the security needs of the country as well as the rights of the 
individual. Such an approach can be seen in the provisions concerning extended 
detention contained in the Terrorism Act 2000, whereby the incorporation of judicial 
oversight brought the UK in line with the jurisprudence of the European Court and 
allowed the removal of the country’s long-standing derogation to article 5. Questions 
remain however with regard to the rights of a detained individual in particular in 
relation to the compatibility of restrictions on access to legal advice with article 6. 
Due to the vulnerability of the individuals subject to extended detention as well as the 
length of possible detention and the severity of the potential penalty involved, delayed 
access to legal advice will often be found to be incompatible with the rights of 
accused under article 6. The same can be said with regard to supervised meetings 
with a legal advisor. Evidence obtained during this period of denied access is likely 
to be found to be unfair due to the circumstances in which it was obtained. The theme 
in this regard seems to be that whilst the need to counter terrorism is such as to allow 
states a margin of appreciation with regard to compliance with Convention 
obligations, the leeway provided is such as to place the individual in a more 
vulnerable position. This therefore requires strict adherence to the rights of the 
individual protected by the Convention.
With regard to Part IV ATCSA, the questions raised by the derogation from article 5 
have been answered by the House of Lords. Indeed, in finding the derogation to be 
unlawful on the basis of its disproportionate interference with the right to liberty as 
well as the discriminatory effect of the provisions, the House took a refreshingly 
active stance in adjudicating upon the government’s attempt to balance the security of 
the country with the liberties of the individual.
The provisions of Part IV are supplemented by a process of appeal and review by 
SIAC much improved on that which existed previously, and indeed preferable to that 
which exists under the US legislation, particularly in light of the executive approach
134 273 F.3d 542, 552 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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taken under the PATRIOT Act with regard to certification, detention and review, 
which is reminiscent of pre-Terrorism Act days. This can perhaps be attributed to the 
UK’s long struggle with terrorism and experience with anti-terrorism legislation as 
well as, cynically, with the influence of many adverse judgments from the European 
Court of Human Rights on British legislation and policy in its fight against terrorism. 
However, problems exist with the measure of due process that SIAC provides, not 
least because the provisions of Part IV extend the role of the Commission into an area 
removed from its original purpose. This has the effect that the liberty of the 
individual is at stake before a tribunal without the safeguards available in the criminal 
justice system. In addition problems exist with regard to those safeguards in place, 
such as the role of the special advocate.
Preventive detention under the PATRIOT Act is similarly discriminatory. The severe 
nature of these provisions is not mitigated however, by the inclusion of any form of 
independent oversight. Rather, the whole process from certification to review is 
carried out by the Attorney General, with the only form of recourse to the courts being 
limited to an action for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for the District for 
Columbia. Despite the flaws and limitations of SIAC, comparison with this procedure 
in the US shows the measure of due process and the protection given to the rights of 
the individual to be lacking.
Neither the provisions under the AEDPA nor the PATRIOT Act have been used since 
enactment which perhaps indicates an awareness on the part of the administration that 
the provisions may fail to withstand constitutional challenge. This also casts doubt on 
the necessity of such measures in the first place. Due process protections can be said 
to exist on the face of the provisions, albeit at a minimal level which may turn out to 
be inadequate in certain circumstances, should the provisions ever be utilised. As it 
stands, terrorists are deemed to fall into a category of sufficient dangerousness as to 
justify such detention as long, as is the case, as procedural safeguards are in place.
It is of great concern with regard to both jurisdictions that such provisions have been 
enacted without heed to the experience of the UK with internment in the 1970s; 
indeed whilst it seems that the US did not leam from this part of the United 
Kingdom’s policy with regard to Northern Ireland, neither did the UK itself. The
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provisions as enacted, as well as the practice in the US of incarceration under the 
“enemy combatant” label, have the effect of placing the detainees in a similar position 
to the internees of the 1970s. That policy ended in failure prompting a rise in terrorist 
violence and importantly provoking an increase in those joining paramilitary 
organisations. It can be said that internment actually worsened the situation in the 
province, undermining the opinion of the people with regard to the ability of the 
authorities to control the problem. With this experience, it is hard to understand the 
actions of both governments in enacting measures powerfully reminiscent of this 
unfortunate episode in the UK’s anti-terrorist history. Of concern is the possibility 
that rather than act as an effective measure of prevention, these provisions will serve 
to increase the ranks of Islamic extremist, and indeed other terrorist, organisations. In 
addition, such undemocratic and repressive measures undermine the UK and US and 
the principles for which they stand in the eyes of other countries across the world. 
Indeed, it may be seen that if two of the most powerful nations in the world deem it 
necessary and appropriate to detain individuals without trial and adequate adherence 
to due process protections, that such a path is desirable for other less developed and 
democratic countries. These provisions and their effect on important democratic 
values undermine the position of both countries as role model for the rest of the 
world.
The incorporation of procedural protections certainly mitigates the arbitrary 
interference of the state with the rights of the individual, and indeed, may be deemed 
sufficient so as to avoid an adverse ruling regarding these provisions in either 
jurisdiction. It is all too easy to try to justify the existence of such measures in the 
United Kingdom by way of comparison with the United States, or indeed in the US, 
by way of the argument that in comparison to the detention of enemy combatants, an 
individual detained under the Act is in a more fortunate position. Rather, it must be 
considered whether such unpalatable provisions are actually necessary and if so 
whether they are proportionate. With regard to the US a good case can surely be 
made to answer the former question negatively. The House of Lords ruling in A 
forced reconsideration of the provisions resulting in yet more legislation in the form 
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. It can be said that in the years preceding 
this that consideration should have been given to measures which would address the 
situation at hand without going further than required and without requiring a
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derogation from the ECHR. It seems to be the case that both countries should have 
used the benefit of the time that passed following enactment of these provisions to 
reconsider the need for and justification of the legislation in place. The events in 
London in July 2005 have provided another example of legislative reaction. Care 
must be taken in ensuring that these events and those of September 11 do not cast a 
permanent shadow over democracy.
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The events of September 11 not only prompted the enactment of the controversial 
PATRIOT Act, but also triggered what has become known as the war on terror. This 
term has become synonymous with the words “enemy combatant”, an expression 
which has been used to justify the indefinite detention of several hundred people since 
2001. Moreover, the enemy combatant classification places the individual outside of 
the protections of the Constitution and as such deprives the detainee of the basic 
guarantees of due process. Indeed, a military order issued by President Bush makes 
provision for trial by military tribunal for non-citizens, far removed from the due 
process protections required in ordinary civilian trials.1
The term has been applied both to American citizens who are detained on US soil, as 
well as aliens incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Litigation is currently pending 
before the Supreme Court challenging the lawfulness of the detention of a US citizen 
seized in Afghanistan and detained in the US,2 as well as the lawfulness of the 
detention of an American citizen captured and detained on US soil.3 A third case has 
also been brought on behalf of a number of the Guantanamo detainees questioning 
whether US courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the 
detention of foreign nationals in Cuba.4 Previous hearings on these cases have, in 
particular with regard to the cases concerning the detention of US citizens, produced 
conflicting decisions resulting in confusing jurisprudence, requiring analysis of the 
main arguments now facing the Supreme Court.
Though not provided legislatively in the PATRIOT Act, it would be remiss not to 
discuss the utilisation of the label “enemy combatant” in the war on terror. This has 
raised many fundamental questions with regard to the constitutional rights and due 
process of those detained as such, in particular US citizens. Indeed this categorisation 
has given effect to a principle which has lain dormant in the United States since 
World War II, namely that a US citizen may be indefinitely detained upon designation
1 Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial o f  Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, Issued November 13 th 2001
2 Hamdi v Rumsfeld No. 03-6696 Decided on June 28th 2004.
3 Padilla v Rumsfeld No. 03-1027 Decided on June 28th 2004.
4 Rasul et al. v Bush No. 03-334, No. 03-343 Decided on June 28th 2004.
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as an enemy combatant by the President, and consequently deprived of certain rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Executive detention of foreigners in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba and citizens in the United States has raised important questions regarding 
executive authority, judicial oversight and fundamental rights in times of war and 
national security crises. Application of the term enemy combatant to United States 
citizens has resulted in a dual-faceted system of justice. Individuals against whom 
there is deemed to be sufficient evidence can be brought to trial in the usual way,5 
whereas if the individual concerned is believed to be of intelligence value an enemy 
combatant designation places that person outside the scope of the criminal law and 
into detention of indefinite duration and negligible constitutional protection. Two 
cases, currently pending before the United States Supreme Court, fall into this latter 
category. The facts of each case, namely the capture of a US citizen fighting for the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and his eventual transfer to custody in America, and the 
detention of a citizen following his seizure in the United States, are sufficiently 
distinguishable to prevent their amalgamation before the Supreme Court and as such 
provide the opportunity to explore the scope of this executive power in both a foreign 
and domestic theatre.6
The reliance placed on the enemy combatant classification requires a brief 
consideration of the concept and its roots in American law. It is derived primarily 
from the 1942 case of Ex parte Quirin7 which concerned the habeas corpus petitions 
of six German saboteurs, one of whom claimed American citizenship through the 
naturalization of his parents, who were captured and detained in the United States 
whilst on a mission to destroy key war and industry facilities. Following a 
Presidential proclamation on July 2nd 1942 declaring the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals to be applicable to anybody acting under the direction of an enemy power, 
for the purpose of “...committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage,
O '
espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war...” the petitioners 
were tried by military commission. In denying the applications for habeas corpus and 
establishing the authority of the President to create such military tribunals with the
5 For example the prosecution o f John Walker Lindh, US v Lindh 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 E. D. Va , 2002.
6 The detention and status o f enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba will be discussed in the 
following section.
7 317 US 1 (1942).
8 Ibid. p. 22.
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authority of Congress, the Court distinguished the facts of Quirin from those in the 
case of Ex parte Milligan. In this case the Supreme Court held that military tribunals 
“ ...can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the 
government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed”9 on the 
basis of the “enemy belligerent” status applied to the German saboteurs, which was 
held not to apply to the petitioner in Milligan. Indeed, in stating unlawful combatants 
to be subject to capture and detention as well trial and punishment by military 
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful, the Court defined enemy 
combatants as those “ .. .who without uniform come.. .secretly through the lines for the 
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property.”10 The Court pronounced 
such belligerents to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals, as opposed to lawful combatants who may be 
detained as prisoners of war by opposition forces. Despite the fact that this definition 
is tied narrowly to the facts of Quirin11 the case has been used as a precedent to justify 
the deprivation of constitutional rights to American citizens detained indefinitely as 
part of the war on terror.
The root of this enemy combatant term stems from the classification in international 
law of lawful and unlawful combatants. Classification as a lawful combatant results 
in prisoner of war status and therefore the protections of the third Geneva
i <■y
Convention. This is achieved in article 4 of the Convention, paragraph 2 of which 
requires satisfaction of four criteria for members of militias and other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements seeking prisoner of war status, 
namely;
(a) having been commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) having carried arms openly; and
(d) having conducted operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
9 Ex parte Milligan 71 US (4 Wall) 2, 121 (1866)
10 Ex parte Quirin 317 US 1,31 (1942).
11 The petitioners travelled to the US by submarine and landed clandestinely at two separate locations 
on the East coast o f the country in June 1942. Once onshore they buried their German military 
uniforms, changed into civilian clothes and travelled to different parts o f the country with the intent to 
cause destruction to facilities key to the American war effort.
12 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War, art. 4
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With regard to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it has been determined 
by the US Department of State that neither Taliban nor A1 Qaeda detainees qualify for 
prisoner of war status under the Convention. Although the Taliban was not 
recognised as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by either the United States or 
the United Nations, Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva Conventions and as such 
the United States determined that the Convention did apply to the Taliban. However, 
Taliban detainees have been denied prisoner of war status.13 This is due to the fact 
that whilst it may be possible to identify a formal command structure, the Taliban did 
not satisfy the requirements of having a fixed and distinctive sign recognisable at a 
distance, nor did they carry arms openly. Indeed, the Taliban sought, in the same way 
as A1 Qaeda, to make it extremely difficult for opposition forces to be able to 
distinguish them from the civilian population. Such tactics cannot be said to be in 
compliance with the laws and customs of war. As a foreign terrorist group A1 Qaeda 
is not a party to the Geneva Conventions and as such it was held by the US 
government that its members were not entitled to POW status. Even if the 
Convention were applicable, POW status would be denied with regard to non- 
fulfilment of the four criteria. Indeed, the nature of a terrorist group is such that a 
formal command structure is not necessarily discernible and differentiation from the 
civilian population is rarely possible. Moreover, the use of covert tactics and the 
targeting of civilians would amount to contravention of the laws of war.
The US government has declared that despite the fact that Taliban and A1 Qaeda 
detainees do not qualify for POW status they will continue to be treated in a manner 
consistent with the principles of the Convention and as such will be accorded many 
POW principles as a matter of policy.14 However, an important effect of the enemy 
combatant classification is the fact that under a military order issued by President 
Bush on November 13th 2001, any individual who is or was a member of A1 Qaeda, 
has engaged in, aided or abetted or conspired to commit acts of international terrorism 
or has knowingly harboured one or more such individuals shall be subject to trial by
13 Status o f  Detainees at Guantanamo, US Department of State Fact Sheet, 7th February 2002, available 
at http://www.state.gOv/p/sa/rls/fs/7910.htm
14 Ibid. Included amongst the privileges not extended to the detainees are: access to a canteen to 
purchase food, soap, and tobacco, a monthly advance o f pay, the ability to have and consult personal 
financial accounts and the ability to receive scientific equipment, musical instruments, or sports outfits.
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military commission.15 The detention of those held at Guantanamo Bay is currently 
pending before the Supreme Court and will be dealt with in the following section, 
however, the denial of POW status to Taliban fighters and members of A1 Qaeda is 
relevant to the consideration of US citizens detained in the United States as enemy 
combatants.
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a US citizen bom in Louisiana, was captured in Afghanistan 
allegedly fighting for the Taliban shortly after the attacks of September 2001. He was 
taken to Guantanamo Bay and then transferred to detention in the United States when 
it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship. In 
contrast, Jose Padilla, was arrested in Chicago’s O’Hare airport in May 2002. 
Suspected of plotting with A1 Qaeda to detonate a radioactive bomb in the United 
States, he was transferred to military custody as a “grave danger to the national 
security.”16 Both arguably fall within the terms of the November 13th military order, 
Hamdi as an alleged member of the Taliban and Padilla as an individual who is 
alleged to have conspired to commit acts of international terrorism with the aim of 
causing injury or adverse effects to the US and its citizens, if not as a member or 
former member of A1 Qaeda. However, the fact of their American citizenship
1 7exempts them from trial by military commission for their alleged crimes and instead 
places them in legal limbo where they have been held since their capture without any 
of the constitutional protections normally accorded US citizens. Indeed classification 
of Hamdi and Padilla as enemy combatants has placed them outside the protection of 
the Constitution. This stands in contrast to the position of John Walker Lindh or 
indeed even the alleged 20 hijacker, Zacarius Moussaoui, a French national, who 
both find themselves ensconced within the criminal justice system subject to the 
constitutional protections inherent therein.
The Hamdi and Padilla cases raise many similar issues, with both challenging the 
lawfulness of their detention through a habeas corpus petition and seeking an order 
for access to counsel. However, the cases have been dealt with very differently and
15 Military Order, n. 1 above.
16 T. Frieden (2004) US to ask Supreme Court to block release o f suspected terrorist, www.cnn.com. 
January 7th 2004.
17 Military Order, n. 1 above section 2(a).
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have been confined to their individual facts which has resulted in confused 
jurisprudence that has been left to the Supreme Court to clarify.
Detention of US Citizens 
Hamdi v Rumsfeld
Following his transfer from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to the Norfolk Naval Station
Brig, Virginia in April 2002, Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for
1 8a writ of habeas corpus seeking, inter alia, an order for access to counsel. This was 
so ordered by the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. This decision 
was reversed on appeal by the government to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on 
the grounds that the District Court failed to give proper weight to matters of national 
security or foreign policy or sufficient considerations to the implications of such an 
order. The Court of Appeal remanded the case back to the lower court for further 
proceedings to establish whether Hamdi could properly be classified as an enemy 
combatant. In so doing the court acknowledged the deference due the political branch 
regarding military decisions made in the course of combat operations. However it 
refused to dismiss the petition as requested by the government stating that to do so 
would be to embrace “ ...a sweeping proposition -  namely that, with no meaningful 
judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be 
detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so.”19
In its consideration, the District Court was instructed by the Court of Appeals to 
consider the sufficiency of an affidavit from Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,20 regarding the seizure of Hamdi and his 
classification as an enemy combatant, as justification for its continued detention and 
denial of constitutional protections of Hamdi. Whilst acknowledging the deference to 
which the executive is entitled with regard to military designations of individuals and 
the responsibility of the government to protect against further unprovoked attack, the 
court sought to balance this against the importance of meaningful judicial review
18 Hamdi v Rumsfeld 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va 2002) (No. 2:02cv439) (entered June 11th 2002).
19 Hamdi v Rumsfeld 296 F. 3d 278 (4thCir. 2002).
20 Hereinafter the Mobbs declaration.
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when such designations substantially encroach upon the constitutionally guaranteed 
rights of US citizens.21 “It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, 
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties.. .which makes the defense 
of the Nation worthwhile.”22
Having found that Hamdi was entitled to due process of law as provided by the Fifth 
Amendment, the court found that rather than enabling “meaningful judicial review” as 
contended by the government, the Mobbs declaration amounted to “...little more than 
the government’s “say-so” regarding the validity of Hamdi’s classification as an
99enemy combatant.” To accept the assertion in the Mobbs declaration that Hamdi’s 
classification as an enemy combatant is justified, without access to further 
information such as statements made by Hamdi, notes taken from interviews with him 
or the screening criteria used for establishing status, would, according to the court, 
“ .. .abdicate any semblance of the most minimal level of judicial review.. .[and would 
amount to] little more than a rubber-stamp.”24 For this reason the District Court 
refused to find that the government was justified in declaring Hamdi to be an enemy 
combatant on the basis of the Mobbs declaration and made an order for additional 
information to be produced.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit remanded the case with directions to dismiss the 
petition.25 In contrast to the searching enquiry attempted by the District Court into the 
circumstances of Hamdi’s capture and detention and the materials regarding his 
enemy combatant status, the Fourth Circuit took a much more deferential approach. 
Whilst reiterating the fact that the detention of US citizens must be subject to judicial 
review, citizenship was stated not to affect the legality of a citizen’s detention as an 
enemy combatant: "[c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not
9 7relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful.”
21 Hamdi v Rumsfeld 316 F. 3d 450,462 (4th Cir. 2003).
22 Ibid. quoting from US v Robel 389 US 258, 264 (1967).
23 342 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (E.D. Va 2002).
24 316 F. 3d 450,462 (4th Cir. 2003).
25 No. 02-7338 January 8th 2003.
26 Ibid. p. 464.
27 Ibid. p. 475 quoting from Ex parte Quirin 317 US 1, 37 (1942).
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In its consideration of the sufficiency of the Mobbs declaration as justification for 
Hamdi’s detention, the District Court found that meaningful judicial review of 
Hamdi’s detention, at a minimum, must consider whether the government’s 
classification was made pursuant to appropriate authority, whether the criteria used to 
detain a US citizen on American soil met sufficient procedural requirements so as to 
be consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against governmental 
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, the basis on which 
it has been determined that the continued detention of Hamdi without charges or 
access to counsel serves national security and whether a different process is required 
by the Geneva Convention or the Joint Services Regulations. However, the Fourth 
Circuit found that its responsibilities to review Hamdi’s detention would be fulfilled 
simply by identification of the source of the authority relied on by the executive to 
detain the individual and then consideration of the basic facts relied upon to support a 
legitimate exercise of that authority. Both avenues of inquiry were easily satisfied by 
the government. Legal authority was found in the President’s war powers as provided 
in Article II section 2 of the Constitution: “The President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
states, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”28 With regard to 
factual justification for the use of the President’s war powers to detain a US citizen, 
the Mobbs declaration was found to be sufficient, despite the District Court’s concern 
that to accept the affidavit without further information would amount to “little more 
than a rubber stamp” as opposed to meaningful judicial review.
Padilla v Rumsfeld
Jose Padilla was arrested on May 8th 2002 on a material witness warrant29 in order to 
secure his testimony before a grand jury proceeding. Padilla filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus following a presidential order on June 9 2002 designating him as 
an enemy combatant due to that fact that he was deemed to represent “...a 
continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United States, and
28 Article II Section 2 US Constitution.
29 18 USC 3144.
30 Available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf
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detention...is necessary to prevent him from aiding A1 Qaeda in its efforts to attack
'i i
the United States or its armed forces, other government personnel, or citizens;”
Despite finding that Padilla had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the ground 
that as a detainee of the Department of Defense he is not an “accused” in a “criminal 
proceeding,” the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that he be 
allowed to consult with counsel for the purpose of prosecuting his habeas petition, as 
opposed to a general right to counsel. This was based on the fact that Padilla had the 
right to make fact-based arguments as provided in the Habeas Corpus statutes. Indeed 
18 USC 2243 (2000) provides that “The applicant or the person detained may, under 
oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.” 
Furthermore, 18 USC 3006A(2)(B) provides that a court hearing a habeas petition 
may appoint counsel for the petitioner if “the interests of justice so require.” The 
District Court stated: “Padilla’s need to consult with a lawyer to help him do what the 
statute permits him to do is obvious.”32 The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld*3 reversing the order of the District Court providing unmonitored access to 
counsel, was deemed not to impact on the decision in Padilla. This was for the reason 
that equivalent access was not granted as well as the fact that Padilla had been 
allowed access to counsel following his arrest as a material witness, prior to his 
enemy combatant designation “. ..and thus no potential prophylactic effect of an order 
barring access by counsel could have been lost.”34
On appeal to the Second Circuit35 the court departed dramatically from prior decisions 
in both Hamdi and Padilla. It held that Padilla’s detention was not authorized by 
Congress, and absent such authorization, the President did not have the power under 
Article II of the Constitution to detain an American citizen detained on US soil 
outside a zone of combat as an enemy combatant. As a result of this the court 
remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus directing Secretary Rumsfeld to release Padilla from military custody within
30 days.
31 Ibid. para 5.
32 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
33 296 F. 3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
34 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
35 Padilla v Rumsfeld Docket Nos. 03-2235 (L); 03-2438 (Con.) Decided: December 18, 2003 (2nd Cir. 
2003).
221
Chapter 7 : Detention and Due Process in the War on 1 error
The circumstances of seizure and detention in both cases and the fact that the courts 
have stipulated that the judgments are limited to the specific facts of the case in 
question, has resulted in both cases being heard separately before the Supreme Court. 
However, a petition to expedite consideration of Padilla’s case was granted, given the 
related issues and matters of fundamental importance, so that it could be heard on the 
same day as Hamdi’s petition.36
Fundamental to these cases is President Bush’s designation that both Hamdi and 
Padilla are enemy combatants, thereby placing them outside the protection offered by 
the Constitution. Therefore, the authority of the President to make such a 
classification has been called in to question, with the Court of Appeals in both cases 
reaching opposing decisions on this crucial point. Under the separation of powers 
doctrine, the law making function of government rests with Congress, therefore the 
President must demonstrate that the power to indefinitely detain citizens has been 
granted by Congress or is inherent in the constitutionally provided war powers. The 
latter is contended by the government, and indeed was accepted by the Fourth Circuit. 
It is the case that capture and detention of both lawful and unlawful combatants are an 
integral part of war,37 and Hamdi was indeed captured on the ground in Afghanistan, 
although his incommunicado detention in a different country almost three years later 
certainly raises some questions. In contrast Padilla was detained on US soil, far from 
any zone of combat and was initially detained as part of the criminal justice system as 
a material witness. To describe his seizure and detention as an exigency of war can 
certainly be argued as taking advantage of the war on terror so as to seemingly 
designate the United States as a zone of combat. Use of the enemy combatant 
classification to deprive a citizen of his due constitutional rights creates a precedent 
which has the potential to affect thousands of people and damage the credibility of the 
United States internationally.
36 See Motion to Expedite Consideration o f Petition for Certiorari and to Establish Expedited Schedule 
for Briefing and Argument if  Certiorari is Granted, available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/rumspadl 1604usmot.pdf
37 Ex parte Quirin 317 US 1,31 (1942).
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals took the view that the Mobbs declaration was 
sufficient to confirm that Hamdi’s detention is in accordance with a legitimate 
exercise of the war powers provided under article II, section 2 of the Constitution. 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit emphasised the deferential position of the Courts in 
reviewing the exercise of the President’s constitutionally allocated war powers due to 
the view that the Constitution does not specifically contemplate any role for the courts
'XQin the conduct of war. In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
considering the seizure and detention of a citizen on US soil, found that a fundamental 
role exists for the courts where the exercise of the Commander in Chief power is 
challenged on the ground that it collides with the powers constitutionally assigned to 
Congress40
The Second Circuit utilized the threefold framework established by Jackson J in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer41 for reviewing the validity of action by the 
executive. First, when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. Second, when the 
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can 
only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is some degree of overlap in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain. Finally, when the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a 
case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.42 The Second 
Circuit correctly found that the detention of Padilla fell within Jackson J’s third 
category. This was due to the finding that the existence of the “Non-Detention Act,” 
which provides that “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
38 The affidavit from the Special Advisor to the Under Secretary o f Defense for Policy, Michael 
Mobbs.
39 Hamdi v Rumsfeld 316 F. 3d 450, 474 (4th Cir. 2003).
40 Padilla v Rumsfeld 352 F. 3d 695, 713 (2nd Cir. 2003).
41 343 US 579 (1952). In order to avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers which he believed would 
place national security at risk, President Truman issued an Executive Order, based upon the powers 
conferred by the Constitution as President and Commander in Chief, directing the Secretary o f  
Commerce to seize and operate the steel mills.
42 Ibid. pp. 637-638
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United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress”43 amounted to an “explicit 
congressional denial of authority”44 and therefore placed the seizure and detention of 
American citizens on US soil within the third category of Youngstown. The 
government contended that the power to detain Padilla derives from the inherent 
power of the Commander in Chief under article II section 2. However, for the 
President to order the detention of a citizen amounts to a usurpation of the law­
making power of Congress and therefore violates the separation of powers doctrine. 
This was agreed by the court which found that whilst Congress may have the power to 
authorize the detention of American citizens under the circumstances of Padilla’s 
case, the President, acting alone, does not.45
A compelling argument voiced in both cases against an executive power to detain 
citizens is founded on the existence of section 4001(a) of Title 18 of the US Code. 
This was enacted in 1971 in an attempt to purge American history of the taint of the 
internment of Japanese-American citizens, on the basis of Executive Order 9066, 
during World War II. Section 4001(a) came to be enacted as part of the repeal of the 
Emergency Detention Act 195046 which authorized executive detention in time of war 
or internal security emergency of those “as to whom there is reasonable ground to 
believe...will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of 
espionage or of sabotage.”47 However, repeal of the provision would have removed it 
from the statute books, and in its place left a void reminiscent of that which existed 
prior to 1950. Rather, a clear congressional statement on detention of citizens as 
opposed to silence would, under Youngstown, strengthen protection against executive 
internment. This desire to increase congressional control over the detention of US 
citizens certainly stands as an obstacle to the governmental contention that the 
President’s Commander in Chief powers override the provision of section 4001(a) and 
the requirement of congressional authorisation.
In both cases the government contended that section 4001(a) pertains only to civilian 
rather than military detentions. It is asserted that the intention of the repeal of the
43 18 USC 4001(a).
44 352 F. 3d 695, 712 (2nd Cir. 2003). Internal quotation marks omitted.
45 Ibid.
46 50 USC 811-826 (repealed 1971).
47 Emergency Detention Act 1950 section 103(a).
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Emergency Detention Act was to limit the authority of the Attorney General, as a 
civilian, to authorise the internment of civilians. This is said to be supported by the 
placement of section 4001(a) in Title 18 of the United States Code, codifying the law 
on crimes and criminal procedure. Furthermore, section 4001(b)(1) reads “[t]he 
control and management of Federal penal and correctional institutions, except military 
or naval institutions, shall be vested in the Attorney General, who shall promulgate 
rules for the government thereof, and appoint all necessary officers and employees in 
accordance with the civil-service laws, the Classification Act, as amended, and the 
applicable regulations”48 and it is this specific exclusion of military and naval 
institutions which the government contends may also be read in to subsection (a). 
Furthermore, weight was given to the decision in Quirin which established that 
"[c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from 
the consequences of [his] belligerency.”49 It was contended that Congress would have 
made its intentions explicit had it sought to overrule this precedent and provide a bar 
to the seizure and detention of American citizens.50
The Second Circuit in Padilla was not persuaded by the assertion that the placement 
of section 4001(a) in Title 18 restricted its reach to civilian detentions, stating “[n]o 
accepted canon of statutory interpretation permits "placement" to trump text, 
especially where, as here, the text is clear and our reading of it is fully supported by 
the legislative history.”51 The Court also rejected the argument with regard to section 
4001(b)(1) on the grounds that it had been enacted long before subsection (a) and 
consequently shared nothing more than a “common code designation.” Moreover, the 
court found that the absence of any such distinction in section 4001(a) could be read 
to mean that it applies to both civilian and military detentions. The most persuasive 
argument that section 4001(a) prohibits military as well as civilian detention of all 
citizens, absent congressional authorisation, aside from the intention on enactment to 
limit the executive power of arbitrary internment, can be found in the case of Howe v 
Smith.53 In this case, the Supreme Court stated that the “...plain language of section
48 18 USC 4001(b)(1).
49 317 US 1,37(1942).
50 316 F. 3d 450,468 (4th Cir. 2003).
51 352 F. 3d 695, 721-722 (2nd Cir. 2003).
52 Ibid.
53 452 US 473 (1981).
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4001(a) proscribes] detention of any kind by the United States, absent a 
congressional grant of authority to detain.”54
Regardless of whether the power to detain citizens indefinitely can be said to form an 
inherent part of the President’s Commander in Chief powers, the government asserts 
that such detention is lawful under section 4001(a) as provided under the Joint 
Resolution for the Authorization for Use of Military Force.55 Section 2 states that 
“.. .the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” The phrase 
“...all necessary and appropriate force...” is said to necessarily include the capture 
and detention of any and all hostile forces arrayed against US troops.”56 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in finding that the plain language of the Joint Resolution 
contains nothing authorising the detention of American citizens captured on US soil,
en
stated that it may be possible to infer a power of detention in the battlefield context. 
This is seemingly correct given the important role played by battlefield detentions as 
part of the exigencies of war. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Congress would 
authorise the indefinite detention of American citizens in anything less than an 
explicit fashion, given the stain left on American history by the World War II 
detention of Japanese-Americans and the subsequent desire to make amends with 
those affected by way of reparations under the 1988 Civil Liberties Act.
Of crucial distinction between the cases of Hamdi and Padilla is location; indeed 
there is a vast difference between capture and detention in a zone of combat for the 
duration of hostilities and seizure and detention thousands of miles away on US soil 
when the alleged threat posed cannot be said to be imminent. However, whilst it may 
be possible to argue that the initial detention of Hamdi in order to prevent him 
returning to aid the enemy is both necessary and lawful, this is far removed from the
54 Ibid. p. 476. Emphasis added.
55 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) September 18th 2001.
56 Rumsfeld v Padilla Petitioners Brief on Petition for a Writ o f Certiorari p. 15 available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/rumspadl 1604certpet.pdf
57 352 F. 3d 695, 723 (2nd Cir. 2003).
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deprivation of due process and incommunicado detention he has been subjected to 
since his initial detention and subsequent transfer to the United States. Indeed 
notwithstanding the initial place of capture, both Hamdi and Padilla are in 
comparable positions with regard to their indefinite detention within the United States 
without access to counsel or due process guarantees.
It can be contended that the power to detain is a part of the Joint Resolution as a 
logical corollary to the power to use military force. This may be superficially 
attractive, particularly with regard to battlefield detentions as part of the President’s 
war powers, however indefinite detention of citizens on American soil is precisely 
what section 4001(a) was enacted to prevent. Indeed, the purpose of section 4001(a) 
was to require clear congressional authorisation for the detention of citizens and to 
infer this power from a vague Act of Congress defeats this purpose entirely. 
Moreover, in the past the Supreme Court has declined to read broad executive powers 
of detention into military authorisations absent a clear declaration of the power 
claimed: “We must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of 
legislative or executive authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater 
restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language
CO
they used.” Even if the Joint Resolution could be said to act as congressional 
authorisation for detention it could only be deemed so with regard to battlefield 
detentions, and not detention of citizens seized on US soil or indeed to authorise the 
denial of a citizens’ constitutional rights following capture in a zone of combat. The 
use of this power of indefinite detention against citizens within the borders of the US 
represents a serious infiltration of the Commander in Chiefs war powers into the 
domestic arena and as such violates the separation of powers doctrine: “Congress, not 
the Executive, should control utilization of the war power as an instrument of 
domestic policy.”59
Governmental arguments of national security are of course with merit and detention 
of those fighting for the enemy in a zone of combat is a necessary and appropriate 
action in wartime so as to prevent the detainee returning to fight for the enemy.
5hEx Parte Mitsuye Endo 323 US 283, 300 (1944) See also Duncan v Kahanamoku 327 US 304 
(1946).
59 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer 343 US 579, 644 (1952).
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However, it would be a massive exaggeration of the notion of judicial deference to 
government in times of national security crisis for the Supreme Court to allow 
indefinite and incommunicado detention of citizens without recourse to the courts. 
Moreover, this is particularly so given the fact that the nature of the war on terror is 
such that those detained as enemy combatants could conceivably be held for the 
duration of their lives. The argument that those detained during previous conflicts 
were also held for the foreseeable future, is one which cannot be applied to detainees 
of the current war. Firstly, due to the predictable longevity of eradicating the world of 
terrorism and the fact that it is a war fought against many enemies on many fronts and 
secondly the detainees of prior conflicts would have been subject to the protections of 
the Geneva Conventions due to their POW status, something denied to both Hamdi, 
Padilla and those detained at Guantanamo Bay.
Hamdi’s battlefield capture and subsequent detention is accepted as an exigency of 
war. The fact that he is a citizen does not prevent this. Indeed, in In Re Territo60 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that a United States citizen fighting against 
the US for the Italian army could lawfully be held within the United States as a 
prisoner of war.61 As discussed previously, citizenship does not prevent classification 
as an enemy combatant. However, the creation of this legal limbo in which POW 
status has been denied Hamdi and both he and Padilla have been deprived of due 
process is simply a means of circumventing both the Constitution and the criminal 
justice system. It is this isolation from all pretence of justice which makes any 
comparison drawn with Quirin unpersuasive. Whilst the cases may be superficially 
similar, the defendants in Quirin, though classified an enemy belligerents were 
afforded due process rights, such as access to counsel and an independent hearing, far 
beyond that experienced by both Hamdi and Padilla. Moreover, whilst the defendants 
in Quirin were self-confessed combatants working for an enemy government, Hamdi 
continues to dispute his enemy combatant status. Ironically however, while he is 
denied the opportunity of a hearing he is unable to disprove the main contention 
which keeps him detained in this way.
60 156 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
61 Ibid. pp. 146-147.
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The decision of the Fourth Circuit that what constitutes a zone of combat and who 
should be classified as an enemy combatant remain matters for the executive bestows 
a power to detain on the government which is essentially without limit. Indeed, in the 
case of US citizens, the executive has moved from detention of a citizen fighting for 
the enemy in a zone of combat, to indefinite and incommunicado detention of that 
citizen far removed from the battlefield, and then further to the preventive detention 
of a citizen suspected of plotting a terrorist attack. The fact that no charges have been 
brought against Padilla in the two years since his seizure is indeed telling and 
demonstrates the preventive rather than punitive nature of his detention.
Whilst it is contended that as a combatant to hostilities Hamdi will be released when 
US troops no longer have a role to play in Afghanistan, the reality is very different. 
Hamdi, in the same way as the detainees held in Cuba, has not been afforded POW 
status and therefore the protection of the Geneva Convention and as such his prompt 
repatriation following the cessation of hostilities will not necessarily be honoured. 
For the hundreds of detainees on whose behalf legal action has not been brought 
permanent detention is a very real possibility. In the case of Padilla, the disparate 
nature of A1 Qaeda and the fact that the US may never be in a position to declare that 
the organisation no longer poses a threat means that his preventive detention may 
similarly never cease. The importance of judicial oversight and due process in these 
cases is clear.
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba
The term enemy combatant has also been utilized in regard to foreign nationals 
detained as part of the war on terror in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since 2001 nearly 
700 people from 42 countries have been incarcerated there. Despite the release of 
some, the vast majority remain.
ATDescribed as “a prison beyond the law” the establishment of this detention facility in 
Cuba was one of quite specific design. Whilst it could have been established
62 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War article 118.
63 J. Margulies, A Prison Beyond the Law, Virginia Quarterly Review available at 
http://www.virginia.edu/vqr/page.php/prmlD/59
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essentially anywhere, the choice of Guantanamo Bay was no accident. It was leased 
to the United States on a permanent basis on February 23rd 1903, following its 
occupation by the States at the end of the Spanish-American War. America offered to 
end the occupation on the condition that the Cuban government “sell or lease to the 
United States the lands necessary for coaling or naval stations” and Guantanamo Bay 
has, under the terms of an indefinite lease, been in American hands ever since. For 
the annual price of $4,085, a sum that is never cashed by the Cuban government, the 
United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over and within the area, 
whilst ultimate sovereignty rests with the Republic of Cuba.64 It is this anomaly 
which means that Cuban law is inapplicable within the marked boundaries, whilst the 
territory is also beyond the jurisdiction of the US courts.
Rasul v Bush, Al Odah v United States
The Supreme Court is currently considering the consolidated cases of Rasul v Bush 
and Al Odah v US65 which concern the legal actions of fourteen petitioners: two 
Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens. All have been detained at 
Guantanamo Bay since early 2002 and have, through “next friends,”66 challenged the 
legality of their detention given their assertions that they have never been combatants 
against the US, nor engaged in terrorist acts, and have not been charged with any 
offence or allowed access to counsel or any court or tribunal. The question which 
both cases pose is whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider 
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in 
connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay?
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit 
held that the habeas petitions of the detainees could not be heard for lack of 
jurisdiction. This was premised on the Supreme Court case of Johnson v
64 Article III Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease o f Lands for Coaling and 
Naval stations; February 23, 1903.
65 Rasul et al. v Bush No. 03-334. This case was decided on June 28th 2004. The decision o f the 
Supreme Court is discussed in the addendum to this chapter.
66 A petitioner who is unable to act on his own behalf is permitted by federal law to file a petition for 
habeas corpus through a close friend or relative as a “next friend.” 28 USC 2242.
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Eisentrager67 which concerned the habeas corpus petitions of 21 German citizens who 
had been captured by US forces in China, tried and convicted of war crimes by an 
American military commission in Nanking, and incarcerated in occupied Germany. 
The court held that United States courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the habeas 
claims of aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States. This 
forms the basis of the government’s contentions in both cases.
The Supreme Court found six points to be determinative in Eisentrager, namely that 
the detainees were (a) enemy aliens who (b) had never been or resided in the United 
States, (c) they were captured outside the territory of the United States and held there 
in military custody as POWs. Further, they were (d) tried and convicted by a military
tribunal sitting outside the United States for (e) offences against the laws of war
68committed outside the States and (f) imprisoned at all times outside the US. The 
government contends that “the Guantanamo detainees are in all material respects 
indistinguishable from the prisoners in Eisentrager”69 due to the fact that they are 
aliens with no connection to the United States who were taken into the custody of the 
US military abroad and are being held outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States. However, it is possible to discern some fundamental differences between the 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay and those in Eisentrager. It was noted by the Court of 
Appeals in Rasul, that the label of “enemy aliens” in Eisentrager was appropriate, not 
because the detainees had been convicted of war crimes, but because they were 
nationals of a country at war with the US. This can be contrasted with the 
Guanatanmo detainees because some are citizens of countries with which the United 
States is allied. The government contend that the term “enemy alien” applies to any 
forces engaged in combat against the United States, stating that “nothing in 
Eisentrager suggests that an “enemy alien” is limited to a national of a country that 
has formally declared war on the United States.”70 However, to follow this argument 
would create a broad power, exercisable at the discretion of the executive. Moreover, 
of crucial importance is the fact that all the petitioners in Rasul assert that they have 
never been combatants against the United States or ever engaged in acts of terrorism.
67 339 US 763 (1950).
68 Ibid. p. 111.
69 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition p. 12 available at 
http://supreme.lp.find1aw.com/supreme court/briefs/03-334/03-334.resp.pdf
70 Ibid  p. 14.
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It is for this very reason that access to some form of independent hearing or tribunal is 
imperative. Presently, the detainees appear to be denied the opportunity to disprove 
the main allegation which keeps them detained.
A further reason to distinguish Eisentrager is on the basis that the detainees there 
were convicted criminals, who had been tried by military tribunal subject to the 
requirements of due process. This stands in contrast to the petitioners in Rasul who 
have been detained for over two years without trial, or access to counsel. They have 
also been denied the opportunity of a hearing under article 5 of the Geneva 
Convention in order to establish their correct status under international law. Whilst 
the action in Eisentrager was an attempt to seek some kind of justice through the 
civilian courts, provision of a military tribunal, removed from the protections and 
procedures of criminal justice, would be a step forward in the case of those detained 
in Cuba.
To deny the application of the writ of habeas corpus to the Guantanamo detainees 
strips the writ of its purpose, which is acknowledged as being “...to relieve detention
71by executive authorities without judicial trial.” Moreover, the point of the writ is to 
examine the basis of executive detention to which anybody can be subjected, 
regardless of birth or nationality. In this case, of importance is the fact that hundreds 
of people are detained by executive fiat, not that hundreds of aliens are so detained. 
This is reflected in the habeas corpus statute contained in 28 USC 2241 which refers to 
a prisoner, regardless of citizenship, held in custody under or by colour of the 
authority of the United States in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
77United States. It is submitted that the argument that habeas corpus is inapplicable 
because the detainees were seized abroad and have since been detained beyond the 
territory of the US lacks merit. With regard to the argument concerning the status of 
Guantanamo Bay, the Solicitor General, Theodore Olson, has previously described 
the area as within the “territorial jurisdiction” of the United States and “under
77exclusive United States jurisdiction.” Furthermore, an opinion, albeit divided, of the
71 Brown v Allen 344 US 433, 533 (1953).
72 28 USC 2241(c).
73 6 Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel o f the Department o f Justice Counsel 236, 242 (1982) 
(opinion o f Asst. Attorney General Olson). Petitioners brief on the merits Rasul p. 43 available at 
http://supreme.lp.fmdlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-334/03-334.mer.pet.pdf
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Ninth Circuit has found that “at least for habeas purposes, Guantanamo is a part of the 
sovereign territory of the United States.”74 Essentially, if the Supreme Court were to 
find in favour of the government it would gut the writ of habeas corpus of all 
meaning, given that its role has never been more necessary, as well as providing a 
varnish of judicial legitimacy to this form of executive detention. Moreover, a finding 
that US courts lack jurisdiction to hear the claims of the detainees would essentially 
amount to an acknowledged suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by way of 
executive fiat and thus a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Article II 
section 9 clause 2 of the Constitution provides that suspension of the writ may only 
occur by way of congressional authorization and the Supreme Court has often 
reiterated the requirement of a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional
• 7Sintent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. This cannot be said to be the case here. 
Ambiguity surrounds the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force and whether a 
power of detention is thereby conferred, it can be categorically said that no 
congressional pronouncement regarding suspension of the writ has been made.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall be deprived ... 
of...liberty...without due process of law ...” however a constitutional right of action 
for the Guantanamo detainees may be undesirable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
previously rejected the notion that aliens are entitled to certain constitutional 
protections, such as the Fifth Amendment, outside the sovereign territory of the US.76 
It may be possible to make a successful argument regarding the position of 
Guantanamo Bay as part of the sovereign territory of the United States. However, in
77Harris v McRae it was said that when a case may be decided on either constitutional 
or non-constitutional grounds, the latter should be preferred, and so it is more likely 
that the Supreme Court will find a statutory right to habeas corpus under section 2241, 
as opposed to a constitutional right, as the Second Circuit did with regard to the right 
to counsel in the case of Padilla.
74 Gherebi v. Bush 352 F.3d 1278, 1290 (9th Cir. 2003).
75 INS v St. Cyr No. 00-767. Decided June 25, 2001.
76 See US v Verdugo-Urdiquez 494 US 259, 269 (1990), See also Zadvydas v Davis 533 US 678 
(2001).
77 448 US 297, 306-307 (1980).
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The establishment of a detention facility in a territory where “ultimate sovereignty” 
resides with the government of another country in an attempt to place the detainees 
beyond the reach of US courts is one of semantic deception. The attempt to follow 
Eisentrager as closely as possible, has the effect that an area occupied continuously 
by the US for over one hundred years, where American law is applicable to anyone on 
the base78 and prosecutions take place in Virginia, is incorrectly likened to wartime
7QChina. Termed the “Guantanamo fiction” the suggestion that the “ultimate 
sovereignty” of Cuba means anything in practice is certainly an attempt by the US 
government to circumvent the notions of justice and the law by engaging a clause 
viewed by all, particularly the Americans, as essentially worthless. Indeed, were 
Cuba, as the ultimate sovereign, to attempt to assert its authority in and over 
Guantanamo Bay, it would be swiftly and categorically rejected by the US.
If the Supreme Court were to find in favour of the US government a dangerous 
precedent would be created, acknowledging the ability of the government to act 
outside the rule of law and beyond the scrutiny of the courts. Acceptance of the 
situation at Guantanamo Bay essentially lays the foundation for similar action by the 
government both in this regard and in other areas. Indeed, the normalisation of 
repression is a common side-effect of emergency measures. If indefinite and 
incommunicado detention without trial or due process is an acceptable government 
measure in the war on terror, it would arguably also be effective in, for example, the 
“war on crime”, showing that acceptance as an emergency measure risks 
contamination of the whole criminal justice system.
Military Tribunals
On November 13th 2001 President George W. Bush issued a Military Order on the 
detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. 
This made provision for individuals subject to the order to be tried for violations of
78 Marguiles, n. 63 above p. 5.
79 Ibid., p. 6.
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80the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunal. The authority to
establish military tribunals has been provided by Congress in 10 USC 821 and also
forms part of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief under the Constitution.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the jurisdiction of such
tribunals with regard to trials for offences against the laws of war; “An important
incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command
not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary
measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort
81have violated the law of war.” Concern can be expressed however, with regard to 
the breadth of the President’s military order. Whilst it is possible to argue that the 
attacks of September 11 were acts of war and indeed that the Joint Resolution 
provides the President with authorisation to take action against the perpetrators of the 
attacks, the definition of to whom the order applies goes far beyond those involved in 
the September 11th attacks. For the purposes of the order a relevant individual is 
defined as a non-citizen with respect to whom there is reason to believe that he:
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as Al Qaeda;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international 
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or 
have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its 
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harboured one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) 
or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this 
order.
The extension of the order beyond those responsible for the 2001 attacks not only 
attempts to put in place a system of military justice for future acts of international 
terrorism, but also creates the potential that military tribunals will be used for offences 
which do not violate the laws of war. To use such tribunals for unrelated acts of
80 Section 1(e) Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial o f  Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, Issued November 13th 2001, n. 1 above. The terms tribunal and commission are 
used interchangeably.
81 Ex parte Quirin 317 US 1, 28-29 (1942).
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terrorism also potentially places the President’s action within the third category of 
Youngstown, given the fact that there is no congressional authorisation to use all 
appropriate and necessary force against anybody other than “those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or harboured such organizations or 
persons.. Moreover, the draft list of crimes released by the Department of Defense, 
can be said to show some intention to use these tribunals to try acts of terrorism 
unrelated to September 11th, given the inclusion of offences which were not
o 9
committed on that day such as “employing poison or analogous weapons.”
In accordance with the order, on March 21st 2002, the Department of Defense issued
O '!
the regulations which would govern the commissions. The procedures outlined 
represent a process removed from the ordinary justice system. Indeed in answering 
whether the quality of justice envisaged for the Guantanamo detainees complies with 
minimum international standards for the conduct of fair trials, Lord Steyn stated “The 
answer can be given quite shortly: It is a resounding No.” The Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated that establishment of a system which differs from 
both the federal court system and the military court system was the intended result so
o  c
as to deal with the “unusual situation” at hand. However it has been contended by 
critics of the tribunals that such a system is preferred by the government so as to avoid 
compliance with fundamental standards of procedural fairness, international legal 
requirements and constitutional due process requirements. Moreover, the fact that 
access to the federal court system is precluded is of great concern given that the 
process starts with a designation by the president and ends with a requirement for his 
ultimate approval. This concern is heightened by the President’s reference to the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay as “killers,”87 resulting in assertions that the outcome of
82 Department o f Defense, Military Commission Draft Crimes and Elements Instruction February 28th 
2003 available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t02282003 t0228commission.html
83 Department o f Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 March 21st 2002 available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf
84 Lord Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, November 23, 2003 available at 
http://www.fcnl.org/civil liberties/guantanamo.htm
85 D. Rumsfeld, DoD News Briefing on Military Commissions, March 21st 2002, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t03212002 t0321sd.html
86 See Statement In Opposition To The Use o f the Military Commissions Authorized by President 
Bush and the Department o f Defense available at http://www.cnss.org/somc.doc
87 Remarks by the President to the Travel Pool, March 20th 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/Q3/20020320-17.html
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the tribunals is essentially pre-determined and as such that they represent an 
appearance of justice as opposed to an impartial search for the truth. To what extent 
such a procedure would be acceptable if it were applied to US citizens abroad is 
questionable.
The Department of Defense guidelines make provision for a commission which 
consists of at least three, but no more than seven officers, in the US armed forces, 
therefore with no independent fact-finding tribunal. A two-thirds majority of the 
commission must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt to secure a guilty verdict, with 
a unanimous vote required with regard to a sentence of death. It is worth noting, 
however that even if found not guilty of the charges there is no guarantee of release, a
o o
reality acknowledged by the Department of Defense itself. The regulations do 
provide legal representation for the accused. This may take the form of an appointed 
military officer, who is a judge advocate of one of United States armed forces, termed 
a “Detailed Defense Counsel” or the accused has the right to appoint his own civilian 
attorney, at his own expense, provided he has been deemed eligible for access to 
classified information.
Whilst the presumption is towards an open and public hearing, it is within the power 
of the commission to close all or some of the proceedings in order to protect classified 
or sensitive information, the physical safety of participants, intelligence or law 
enforcement sources, methods and activities or national security interests. In the 
event of such a determination, which given the breadth of the grounds for closure is a 
seemingly likely event, both the accused and his civilian counsel will be excluded 
from proceedings even if authorised to hear classified information. Detailed defense 
counsel cannot be so excluded. However anything presented during a closed session 
can not be disclosed to those excluded which has the effect that the accused and his 
civilian attorney may not even be aware of the evidence upon which the charges are 
based thereby hampering the ability to rebut the evidence and launch an effective 
defence. This is even more important given the fact that there is no limit as to what 
can be considered in evidence by the commission, the standard for admissibility being 
simply that it would have probative value to a reasonable person.
88DoD  General Counsel William J. Haynes, DoD News Briefing on Military Commissions, n. 85 
above.
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No independent appellate procedure is provided for in the regulations. Provision for a 
three member review panel has been made, which shall review the record of the trial 
and can return the case for further proceedings if it is determined that a material error 
of law occurred. However, convictions and sentences are not final until approved by 
the President, or if so designated, by the Secretary for Defense as provided in section 
4(c)(8) of the military order of November 13th 2001.
Use of the military tribunals is yet to occur, so it is not possible to assess their impact
O Q
on the individual. However, given the breadth of the military order there is the 
potential that their use will not be confined to the trial of those involved in the 
September 11 attacks. This would take their use outside the scope of Congress’ 
Joint Resolution authorising the President to take action as well as usurping the role of 
the criminal justice system which has been used effectively to bring to justice 
perpetrators of both domestic and international acts of terrorism committed on 
American soil, without violating constitutional requirements of due process. The 
danger of military tribunals is heightened when combined with the fact that those 
potentially subject to the commissions are confined without rights and access to the 
outside world. Given the fact that it is possible and indeed likely that the majority, if 
not the totality, of the tribunals will be held in secret, abuse of the tribunals may well 
be an occurrence of which the outside world is unaware.
A vital point which must be made is the fact that there is no suggestion that the US 
cannot detain people as part of the war on terror. The point is simply that this cannot 
be done solely at the discretion of the executive without any recourse to the courts in 
order to establish the legality of the government’s actions, and indeed to determine 
that those incarcerated deserve to be so for reasons objectively assessed by an 
independent tribunal. The current situation has been described as “ ...a monstrous 
failure of justice”90 and this can only be rectified by the Supreme Court.
89 4 arraignments took place in August 2004. The tribunals were then halted following a ruling by a 
federal judge that the government did not follow proper procedure to determine whether the individual 
concerned in the challenge, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, was a POW. If he was found to be a POW the 
appropriate forum for trial would be federal court and not a military tribunal. On 8th August 2005 the 
Appeals Court ruled against Hamdan. An appeal to the Supreme Court is currently pending.
90 Steyn, n. 84 above.
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Conclusion
Of crucial difference between Hamdi and Padilla is location and this issue is central to 
the question of the lawfulness of their initial capture. As an alleged participant in the 
hostilities in Afghanistan, Hamdi’s seizure on the battlefield is authorised under the 
President’s constitutionally provided war powers as Commander in Chief. These 
powers however, do not authorise the detention, under the enemy combatant 
classification, of a US citizen, already held in US custody.
However, the use of these powers in the domestic arena to ensure the indefinite 
detention of a US citizen who was already held in US custody, amounts to a clear 
usurpation of Congress’ law making powers and is therefore a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine. To suggest otherwise would give the executive an 
extremely broad discretion to designate essentially anywhere a zone of combat so as 
to utilise the enemy combatant classification and the power of indefinite detention. 
Furthermore, section 4001(a) demonstrates a clear congressional intention to prohibit 
such a form of executive detention of citizens. This section is also given force by the 
finding of the Supreme Court that absent clear congressional authorisation to detain, 
the section prohibits “any kind of detention by the United States...”91 Whilst it is 
possible that a power of battlefield detention could be conferred from the Joint 
Resolution authorising use of military force which would undermine this argument 
with regard to Hamdi, the plain language of the Resolution provides no indication 
whatever that it should be treated as authorising the domestic detention of citizens by 
the executive, and as such a strong argument can be made that Padilla’s detention is 
prohibited under section 4001(a). Moreover, whilst it may be found that Hamdi’s 
battlefield capture is not prohibited by section 4001(a) due to a power of detention 
implied in the Joint Resolution, it cannot seriously be contended that his subsequent 
detention in violation of the Constitution has been similarly implied under the power 
to use appropriate and necessary force. Indeed, with regard to both Hamdi and 
Padilla, the nature of their detention and the denial of their constitutional rights 
essentially amounts to an abuse of the current hostilities, the enemy combatant 
classification and the notion of judicial deference. It is highly unlikely that the
91 Howe v Smith 452 US 473 (1981).
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Supreme Court would allow the current situation to continue. To find in favour of the 
government would not only consign Hamdi and Padilla to the potential for detention 
for the rest of their lives but would also render the relevant parts of the Constitution 
devoid of meaning. Indeed, more would be lost than the freedom of two men.
In answering the jurisdictional question posed in Rasul, there are legitimate grounds 
for the Supreme Court to decline to follow the precedent offered by the government in 
the form of Eisentrager, not least the fact that a strong argument can be made 
asserting that Guantanamo Bay is part of the sovereign territory of the United States. 
Moreover, in contrast to the detainees in Eisentrager, who were seeking further relief 
through the civilian courts having already been subject to a military hearing in which 
they had been afforded the requirements of due process, the petitioners in Rasul all 
protest their innocence. However, they will never get the opportunity to offer proof of 
their contentions, should the Court find that the US courts lack the necessary 
jurisdiction to hear any cases emanating from Cuba. The writ of habeas corpus exists 
to deal with situations such as this and denial of its application would essentially 
amount to acknowledgment of executive suspension of the writ.
A finding in favour of the government would create a dangerous precedent. Indeed, 
establishment of the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay represents an attempt by 
the government to deny the jurisdiction of the courts. This negates that which the 
Founders sought to achieve in establishing a tripartite system of checks and balances. 
In the words of James Madison “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands...may justly be pronounced the very
QOdefinition of tyranny.”
Addendum
Since writing, the Supreme Court has ruled in the cases of Hamdi v Rumsfeld, Padilla 
v Rumsfeld and the consolidated cases of Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States.
92 The Federalist No. 47, The Particular Structure o f  the New Government and the Distribution o f  
Power Among Its Different Parts, February 1, 1788.
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Hamdi v Rumsfeld
No. 03-6696. Argued April 28, 2004—Decided June 28, 2004.
t hA majority of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the 4 circuit Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings in the lower court. The 
majority confirmed the right of the government to detain US citizens as enemy 
combatants when they have been seized on the battlefield engaged in active
thhostilities. However, in doing so it was held that the approach of the 4 circuit 
afforded too little protection to Hamdi, and as such the court set out in general terms 
the due process to which a detainee such as Hamdi was entitled.
The majority found the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to be 
explicit congressional authorisation for the detention of individuals who are part of or 
support forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners on the basis that 
detention of those seized on the battlefield fell sufficiently within the conduct of 
military action with which the AUMF dealt. This therefore amounted to satisfaction 
of section 4001(a). It was stated that the AUMF does not authorise detention for the 
purpose of interrogation but rather for the purpose of preventing an enemy combatant 
from returning to the battlefield. While US forces remain in Afghanistan such 
detentions will form part of the use of necessary and appropriate force authorised by 
the AUMF. This however does not address the situation of a detained enemy 
combatant should the war on terror continue following a withdrawal of forces from 
Afghanistan. In addition, acceptance of the AUMF in satisfaction of the requirements 
of section 4001(a) results in a large discrepancy between Congress’ treatment of alien 
terrorists on US soil and that of citizens such as Hamdi. Indeed the PATRIOT Act 
prescribes the process by which an alien terrorist may be detained in the United 
States, limiting detention to seven days without criminal charges being brought or 
deportation proceedings being commenced. Questions therefore arise with regard to 
whether Congress intended to authorise the detention of citizens through the vague 
terms of the AUMF which makes no mention of detention. There is however, a vast 
difference between the terms of enacted legislation and that of a resolution put in 
place only a few days after the attacks of September 11 . On the basis that detention 
is used for the purpose of preventing the return of a combatant to battle there is merit
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to the majority’s opinion that this is an inherent part of the use of force and therefore 
falls within the limits of the AUMF, as authorized by Congress.
The majority adopted the test as laid down in Mathews v Eldridge93 as the balancing 
exercise to be performed on the competing interests of the individual and the 
government, namely consideration of “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function 
involved and the...burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.” In performing this balancing act the majority necessarily considered 
the concerns of the government regarding the impact of additional process on the 
realities of combat and the practical difficulties of involving serving officers in 
litigation and felt them to have been properly taken into account in the due process 
analysis. Arguments that additional process will destroy the intelligence gathering 
function of detention were clearly dealt with by the majority on the basis that 
detention for such a purpose has not been authorised. However, intelligence gathering 
is likely to continue as part of such detention due to the importance of intelligence as 
part of the war on terror as well as due to the ease with which this purpose can be 
disguised as detention in order to prevent a combatant returning to hostilities.
With regard to the due process to which a citizen detainee is entitled it was held that 
such a detainee must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification as an 
enemy combatant. In addition, he must be given a fair opportunity to rebut the 
government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker. Recognition was 
given to the fact that the circumstances may be such to require enemy combatant 
proceedings to be tailored in order to alleviate the burden on the executive in times of 
ongoing combat. Indeed, it was suggested that hearsay may need to be accepted from 
the government as the most reliable available evidence, or that it may be possible that 
the standards articulated could be met by way of a properly constituted and authorised 
military tribunal. In addition, a presumption in favour of the government’s evidence 
was suggested provided the presumption remained rebuttable and a fair opportunity
93 424 US 319, 335 (1976).
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for rebuttal were provided. These suggestions were said to provide an innocent 
individual caught up in hostilities and believed to be an enemy combatant the chance 
to put forward evidence of his innocence and prove military error. These potential 
procedural compromises can be said to go some way to drawing the balance set out in 
Mathews v Eldridge. However, this degree of compromise all seems to rest on the 
side of the individual, resulting in a situation in which the alleged enemy combatant 
must prove his innocence in the face of documentary hearsay such as the Mobbs 
declaration whilst also deprived of the due process requirements of judge and jury. 
Yet in spite of this these proposals would of course represent an improvement to the 
situation in which Hamdi and other enemy combatants have been kept in recent years. 
This position reaffirms the important role of the courts in reviewing individual cases 
and upholding the separation of powers doctrine, contrary to the assertions of the 
government that the limited institutional capabilities of the courts should have the 
effect that review should take place under a very deferential standard. Indeed, in the 
face of its continued applicability the writ of habeas corpus allows the judicial branch 
to carry out such review and ensure this continued balance.
In its opinion the majority have attempted to strike a balance between interference 
with the individual’s right to liberty without due process of law with the interest of the 
government in ongoing military hostilities and the safeguarding of the nation. 
However, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is to allow a detained individual 
to challenge the legality of his detention in order to secure his release should his 
detention be found to be in violation of the constitution or otherwise illegal. In this 
case, Hamdi’s detention has been found to be entirely lacking in the requirements of 
due process and yet the court has remanded the case for further proceedings rather 
than order his release. This belated attempt at due process is not the purpose of the 
writ of habeas corpus and it denies Hamdi the benefit of the remedy he sought. 
However, the fact remains that this manipulation of the writ provides Hamdi with the 
best opportunity thus far of adducing evidence in an attempt to prove his innocence 
and gain release.
Following an agreement between US and Saudi officials, which precluded any 
hearing, Hamdi was released in October 2004 .
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Rumsfeld v Padilla
No. 03-1027. Argued April 28, 2004—Decided June 28, 2004.
Further to previous discussion of this case, some amount of procedural background is 
required with regard to the Supreme Court ruling in this case. Jose Padilla was
i L
arrested in Chicago on May 8 2002, pursuant to a material witness warrant issued by 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Following a month of 
detention in New York City, Padilla was transferred from civilian to military custody 
on the basis of a presidential order to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, which identified 
him as an “enemy combatant.” On 9 June 2002, without the knowledge of his 
lawyer, Donna Newman, Padilla was transferred to a Navy Brig in Charleston South 
Carolina, where Commander Melanie Marr became his immediate custodian. On
thJune 11 2002, Newman filed a habeas petition, naming President Bush, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and Melanie A. Marr, Commander of the Consolidated Naval Brig as 
respondents in the Southern District of New York, challenging the legality of his 
detention.
A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 2nd Circuit Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. It was held that the Southern 
District of New York, where Padilla’s habeas corpus petition had been filed by his 
next friend, lacked jurisdiction over the matter. As a result of this the court did not 
rule on whether the President had the authority to detain Padilla as a US citizen within 
the United States.
The federal habeas statute provides that the proper respondent in such an action is 
“the person” having custody over the petitioner,94 which is further defined as “the 
person” able to produce the detainee’s body before the habeas court.95 Due to the 
applicability of the immediate custodian rule in this case, it was held by the majority 
that the proper respondent was Commander Marr and that this was the case even 
though Padilla’s detention arose from a military order rather than a criminal 
conviction. It was asserted on behalf of Padilla and accepted by the Court of Appeals
94 Section 2242-2243.
95 Wales v Whitney 114 US 564, 574.
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that the immediate custodian rule has been relaxed in cases in which detention stems 
from something other than a federal criminal violation, in which case the proper 
respondent is the person exercising the “legal reality of control” over the petitioner. 
This contention was rejected by the majority. However, the case of Ex parte Endo96 
can be said to support this argument. In Ex parte Endo a Japanese-American citizen 
interned in California sought relief by filing a habeas corpus petition in the Northern 
District of California, naming her immediate custodian as respondent. Following the 
filing of the petition she was moved by the government to Utah with the result that her 
immediate custodian was no longer within the jurisdiction of the District Court. It 
was held by the Supreme Court, however that the Northern District of California 
acquired jurisdiction and that the removal of the petitioner did not cause the court to 
lose jurisdiction where the custodian remains within the district. It was held that the 
assistant director of the War Relocation Authority, who resided in the Northern 
District, would be an "appropriate respondent." This was distinguished however, on 
the basis that where the government removes a petitioner after she has properly filed a 
petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction with 
regard to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to bring about 
the detainee’s release. In contrast, Padilla was moved to South Carolina before the 
petition was filed on his behalf and on this basis the Southern District of New York 
never acquired jurisdiction over his petition.
Had Ms Newman been kept fully informed with regard to the whereabouts of Padilla 
and the proceedings against him she would likely have filed the petition in New York 
prior to his transfer with the effect that Padilla’s immediate custodian would have 
been present in New York at that time and would surely have been deemed to be 
Secretary Rumsfeld. Whether it can be asserted that the government deliberately 
misled Ms Newman or manipulated the situation in order to attempt to prevent a 
successful habeas petition cannot be said for certain, on the basis that there is no 
evidence that the government refused to provide information regarding Padilla’s 
location or his immediate custodian. However as a lawyer appointed by the Southern 
District of New York, Ms Newman’s ability to advise her client was curtailed by the 
government to the extent that further advice was not permitted until February 11
96 323 US 283 (1944).
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2004 and from that point has been at the discretion of the government. Moreover, it 
seems likely that any able lawyer appointed to represent an individual in such a 
precarious situation would, if unable to obtain adequate, if any, information regarding 
her client, would immediately file for habeas corpus in his last known location.
With regard to jurisdiction, the Habeas statute provides that District courts are limited
0 7to granting habeas relief “within their respective jurisdictions.” This has been 
interpreted as requiring that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the 
custodian. In this regard, the traditional rule has always been that habeas petitions 
may be issued only in the district of confinement. Those in dissent asserted that the 
rule governing habeas jurisdiction is a flexible one and the important and unique 
nature of Padilla’s detention should therefore result in the case being treated as an 
exception to the immediate custodian/respective jurisdiction rule. The creation of 
exceptions would potentially result in uncertainty in the District courts in determining 
whether to apply the traditional rule or attempt to find unusual circumstances which 
justify a departure from the norm. However, there is a degree of flexibility with 
regard to habeas jurisdiction, albeit there is no case in which a habeas petitioner has 
been permitted to challenge his present physical custody within the United States by 
naming as respondent someone other than the immediate custodian and filing the 
petition somewhere other than the district of confinement. It seems that any risk of 
uncertainty in the lower courts could have been dealt with by confining the ruling to 
the narrow and unusual facts of the case. Indeed, the court made clear from the outset 
in Hamdi that the ruling was limited to the narrow circumstances of US citizens 
captured on the battlefield and detained as enemy combatants. Surely a similar sort of 
proviso could also have been given in Padilla so as to ensure no wider detriment to 
the general habeas rule. Given the importance of the issues at stake in this case and 
the circumstances and length of Padilla’s detention it seems as though jurisdiction 
could have been established for the Supreme Court to decide this issue in order to 
provide due process for Padilla and clarification of the position and rights of those 
detained in this way as well as wider certainty with regard to authorisation for such 
detention.
97 28 USC 2241(a).
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Those in dissent, having found Secretary Rumsfeld to be the proper respondent, 
asserted that the petition was properly filed in New York on the basis of the decision
QO
in Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court ofKy. In this case it was stated: "So long as 
the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within 
its jurisdiction” requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on 
his claim . . . even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court's territorial 
jurisdiction."99 This was distinguished by the majority however, on the basis that in a 
challenge to present physical detention such as this the immediate custodian rule is 
applicable and whilst the writ can be issued if the prisoner is outside the jurisdiction 
of the court, the case made no reference to a custodian served outside the jurisdiction 
of the court.
Due to the jurisdictional outcome of this case, the merits of the case, namely whether 
the president has authority to detain Padilla militarily was left unanswered. However, 
a ruling on the merits of this case should follow a proper filing in the proper 
jurisdiction. On the basis of the four dissenters in the present case100 as well as 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi there is a minimum body which seems inclined to 
decide the matter in favour of Padilla and order his immediate release. Of course, the 
majority in Hamdi may also add concurrence to this, though whether they would use 
a habeas petition to order due process rather than immediate release, as in Hamdi, 
remains to be seen. Hamdi sets out the basic framework for due process to be 
afforded to a detainee, though questions remain with regard to the implementation and 
use of these in practice. Padilla’s case of course lacks the battlefield context of 
Hamdi’s, and Padilla’s detention has been affirmed as being for the purpose of 
intelligence gathering, which was condemned as being unauthorised in Hamdi: “Our 
interest really in his case is not law enforcement, it is not punishment because he was 
a terrorist or working with the terrorists. Our interest at the moment is to try and find 
out everything he knows so that hopefully we can stop other terrorist acts.”101 On this 
basis, it may well be the case that Padilla’s immediate release is ordered, or at least
98 410 US 484(1973).
99 Ibid., p. 495.
100 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
10' 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573-574 (SDNY 2002) (quoting News Briefing, Dept, o f Defense (June 12, 
2002), 2002 WL 22026773).
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that a detainee such as himself would find himself afforded increased due process 
guarantees in comparison to the basic rights afforded Hamdi.
thPadilla’s case is currently being heard before the 4 Circuit Court of Appeals.
Rasul v Bush. Al Odah v United States
No. 03-334. Argued April 20, 2004—Decided June 28, 2004.
In finding that the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the 
Executive’s detention of individuals held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a majority of the 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Colombia and remanded the case for the District Court to consider the merits of the 
petitioner’s claims in the first instance.
Whilst a great deal of argument in the lower courts had centred on the case of Johnson 
v Eisentrager102 the matter was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of the 
general Habeas statute. The majority of the court found that the petitioners in the 
instant case differed from those in Eisentrager on the basis of the six facts which were 
listed as critical by the earlier court. These were that the detainees were (a) enemy 
aliens who (b) had never been or resided in the United States; (c) were captured 
outside the territory of the United States and there held in military custody as 
prisoners of war. Further, they were (d) tried and convicted by a Military 
Commission sitting outside the United States (e) for offences against laws of war 
committed outside the United States and (f) imprisoned at all times outside the United 
States."103
However, in the instant case, the majority of the court found that the petitioners 
differed from the former detainees in important respects, namely they are not 
nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that they have 
engaged in acts of aggression against the United States; they are not convicted
102 339 US 763 (1950).
103 Ibid., p. 111.
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criminals and rather have never been afforded access to any tribunal; since their 
detention they have been imprisoned in Gunatanamo Bay, a territory over which the 
United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.
Rather than focus on the requirements of Eisentrager and the concept of constitutional 
entitlement to habeas relief, the instant case instead established a statutory entitlement 
to the writ. The majority relied on the case of Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court 
of Ky104 for the point that the prisoner's presence within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the district court is not "an invariable prerequisite" to the exercise of district court 
jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute. Rather, because "the writ of habeas 
corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds 
him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody," a district court acts "within [its] 
respective jurisdiction" within the meaning of section 2241 as long as "the custodian 
can be reached by service of process."105
The respondents argued that congressional legislation is presumed not to have 
extraterritorial application unless such intent is clearly manifested. This was 
dismissed by the majority on the basis that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons 
detained within "the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States.106 The terms of the 
lease with Cuba for Guantanamo Bay provide the United States with complete 
jurisdiction and control over and within the area and as such it was therefore part of 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States even though ultimate sovereignty rests 
with Cuba. The unique status of the area limits the reach of the habeas statute to only 
those places within the territorial jurisdiction of the US. However, there is some 
discrepancy between the court’s statement regarding statutory habeas relief as being 
applied domestically to the petitioners’ custodians: “ No party questions the District 
Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians. Section 2241, by its terms, requires 
nothing more. We therefore hold that §2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction 
to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base” and the determinative status of Guantanamo Bay as
104 410 US 484(1973).
105 Ibid., pp. 494-495.
106 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 US 281, 285 (1949).
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uniquely within United States territory. Indeed, if the right to habeas relief is 
premised upon the jurisdiction of the District courts over the petitioners’ custodians 
that would have the effect of stretching this entitlement to this remedy further afield 
than the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
It is hard to reconcile the reliance on Braden in the instant case, with the refusal of the 
majority to follow it in Padilla. Indeed, despite the fact that ultimately both were 
cases in which the detainees concerned were attempting to issue a habeas writ against 
a custodian outside the jurisdiction of the serving court, the result is a ruling in Rasul, 
Al Odah which makes it much easier for alien prisoners detained as part of conflict to 
file a habeas petition than for domestic detainees to do so. Indeed the lack of a 
judicial district in which to file a petition which could, and in the view of some 
should, have prevented use of the remedy for the Guantanamo detainees, as occurred 
in Padilla’s case following filing in the incorrect district, has been manipulated to 
allow detainees such as those in Guantanamo Bay to file in any of the federal judicial 
districts as opposed to a domestic detainee who is restricted to filing in his district of 
confinement. This discrepancy is curious given the importance and seriousness of the 
issue at hand in Padilla’s case. It seemingly would have been possible for an 
interpretation to have been given to the situation which could have overcome the 
procedural problems which dominated the case and which have thus far prevented 
Padilla from gaining any form of adequate due process.
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Conclusion
The terrorist threat posed and the need to counter it has produced a pattern of action 
and reaction in both the United Kingdom and the United States. In seeking to protect 
the democratic way of life, both countries have sought to use the law as a means of 
protection against terrorism as well as to ensure the continued existence of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. It has been seen however, that a certain amount of 
restriction has occurred with regard to these democratic values.
The circumstances in which emergency legislation is generally enacted can often be 
exploited in an attempt to enact powers unrelated to the emergency at hand. The 
provisions related to surveillance and data collection enacted in both jurisdictions can 
be said to be examples of this occurring. The essence of section 213 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act1 is clearly of practical use to the interests of law enforcement. 
However, delayed notice of a search was already available to law enforcement in 
certain circumstances and so the enactment of section 213 in expanding this exception 
seems to be an example of the state taking advantage of the legislative opportunity 
that arose following 9/11 to extend the criminal law under the guise of countering 
terrorism. The same can be said for the provisions contained in Part XI and Part III of 
the ATCSA. The provisions in both countries represent a serious inroad into the 
right to privacy without sufficient justification on the basis of operational necessity in 
countering terrorism. Indeed it is hard to see that the ability of each country to defend 
itself would be hindered to any great extent without these provisions. However, as it 
currently stands both countries have essentially created a suspect community whereby 
the security of the nation is said to be dependent upon on a reduction in the individual 
privacy of virtually everybody.
With regard to the protection of the right to freedom of expression the formulation of 
the four elements of the test laid down in O ’Brien v US produces a test similar to that
1 Section 213 provides that notification o f a search may be delayed “if the court finds reasonable cause 
to believe that providing immediate notification o f the execution o f the warrant may have an adverse 
result.” 18 USC 3103a(b)( 1) as amended by section 213.
2 Part III is concerned with the disclosure o f information by public authorities. Part XI governs the 
retention o f communications data.
3 391 US 367,376-377(1968).
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utilised by the European Court of Human Rights. However, whilst the elements of the 
O ’Brien test essentially equate to the individual components considered in a challenge 
under the ECHR, an assessment as to the overall necessity of the measure is omitted 
in the US test. Indeed instead of requiring a showing that the measure is required on 
the basis of compelling necessity or is necessary on the basis of a “pressing social 
need”, as in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the test in 
O ’Brien requires only an important governmental interest unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression. As a result the test in O Brien is very difficult for the individual to 
overcome. Restriction on freedom of expression for reasons of practical necessity 
such as the prohibition on material support in the US can invariably be justified as 
opposed to measures which seek to punish political dissent, advocacy and the holding 
of certain beliefs such as the measures relating to the exclusion and deportation of 
aliens on ideological grounds.
The most contentious of the provisions enacted in both jurisdictions are those relating 
to the detention of suspected terrorists. Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
combines potentially indefinite detention with negligible due process protections and 
no independent oversight. The fact that it has not been used thus far in no way 
justifies its continued existence. Rather it should have been repealed in the recent 
renewal of the Act so as to prevent its use in the future by either this administration or 
the next. Due process protections have not only been sacrificed legislatively since the
thevents of September 11 . In addition, executive detention as part of the war on terror 
has shown the commitment to due process of the United States to be lacking. The 
choice of Guantanamo Bay as the place of detention, thereby placing the detainees 
beyond the reach of US courts was no accident and this attempt to negate the 
protections of due process to which the detainees are entitled has been condemned by 
the Supreme Court.4 The actions of the US administration in this regard provide a 
clear example of the disregard which is often given to fundamental standards in times 
of crisis. When compared to the executive detention in the United States and the 
dearth of independent oversight involved with regard to enemy combatants and the 
detention of suspected terrorists, there may be a temptation to declare the comparable 
detention provisions of the ATCSA to be preferable. On a superficial basis this may
4 Rasul v Bush, Al Odah v United States No. 03-334. Decided June 28th 2004.
252
Chapter 8: Conclusion
be so given the opportunity of challenge to, and review by, the SIAC. However, aside 
from the limitations inherent in the use of the SIAC for this role as well as with regard 
to the use of special advocates, the provisions in Part IV ATCSA failed to conform to 
the standards of the ECHR by way of their disproportionate scope and discriminatory 
approach.5 There is no merit in declaring one country’s disregard for the fundamental 
rights of the individual to be preferable to that of another.
The protracted terrorist struggle in the UK prompted the enactment of a great deal of 
specialist legislation, which has been criticised over the years for its negative effect on 
the rights of the individual and democratic values. Despite having been enacted in 
response to a perceived emergency, this legislation became embedded into British law 
and society as part of a wider anti-terrorism system. This entrenchment occurred by 
way of a circular form of justification for the need for such legislation. Indeed any 
period notable for a dearth of attacks could be said to be the result of the legislative 
measures in place, whilst the continued existence of the legislation, or the enactment 
of further legislation, was said to be necessary following a terrorist incident.
A notable effect of the existence of a protracted emergency regime is the consequent 
impact upon ordinary standards. This normalisation of repressive provisions can be 
highlighted no more clearly than by consideration of the existence of the word 
“temporary” in the title of the preceding PTA which was to last for over twenty five 
years. However, even if the Act had been true to its name and had lasted only as long 
as deemed strictly necessary, a sinister aftertaste would have remained by way of the 
contamination of the ordinary law. This permeation of the ordinary law is one of the 
most worrying consequences of such an emergency regime in its distortion of some of 
the most fundamental mainstays of British law. This can be exemplified by the 
extension of the period of detention possible under PACE to 96 hours in light of the 
extended period available under the PTA. Had the PTA been repealed, the standard in 
PACE would still have been compromised and would have remained on the statute
5 A v Secretary o f  State fo r the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68.
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books in its extended form.6 Of great concern is the fact that it is this amended 
ordinary law which then becomes the benchmark for emergency legislation.
A second consequence of anti-terrorism legislation is the tendency to renew and re­
enact such legislation once it has been enacted. The problem with an area as emotive 
as terrorism is the desire not to be seen to be anything other than totally committed to 
combating terrorism. The act of repealing a piece of legislation may been seen as 
symbolic of the fact that it is ineffective against the threat and that the terrorists have 
“won”. This is no doubt compounded by the fear of adverse reaction should a 
terrorist atrocity occur when the full armoury of anti-terrorist law is not in place. The 
continued existence of such powers provides a platform on which yet more provisions 
are enacted.
It is this foundation which formed the basis of the hypothesis that any restriction on 
the rights and liberties of the individual and the values of democracy in the recently 
enacted anti-terrorism legislation would be greater in the United Kingdom than in the 
United States. So far as a direct comparison is possible, examination of those rights 
traditionally affected by measures in this area of the law has not shown this to be the 
case. Indeed the nature of the provisions enacted in the US legislation, in particular 
those in the USA PATRIOT Act, is such that it cannot be said that the restriction on 
the rights considered is any less in the United States. Instead, with regard to the 
provisions concerning detention of suspected terrorists and enemy combatants and the 
subsequent curtailment of due process protections, the restriction on these rights is 
greater in the US than in the UK. The previous experience of the United States with 
regard to domestic terrorist violence was one of an ever-present yet essentially 
minimal threat. At no point was the threat deemed serious enough to require a 
response such as that in the UK or indeed in the US in recent years. The same can be 
said of the more prolific attacks against Americans abroad. This was reflected in the 
measures taken by the state in response to the terrorist threat, with the effect that it 
was not the case that a trade-off between liberty and security was necessitated. As a 
result the rights of the individual were not restricted and democratic values remained
6 Such an effect is troubling in light o f the recent proposal to increase maximum period o f pre-charge 
detention of suspected terrorists to three months. See draft Terrorism Bill available at 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/home sec letter.html
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untouched.7 It was the large scale terrorist attacks within the borders of the US in 
1995 and 2001 which were deemed to threaten the security of the nation to such an 
extent as to justify the enactment of the specialist legislation currently in force placing 
the response of the US in a very similar position to that of the UK. In this way, what 
appears to be significant with regard to the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation in 
the United States, is the experience of a sufficiently serious threat in the domestic 
context. This is similar to the United Kingdom’s experience with, and response to, 
terrorism emanating from Northern Irish affairs, both in the province and on the 
mainland. The enactment of legislation in response to terrorist attacks in the US had 
an effect on individual rights and democratic values in a similar manner to the impact 
experienced in the United Kingdom following the enactment of anti-terrorism 
legislation. However, the effect of anti-terrorism legislation goes further than the 
immediate scope of the provisions however, to the permeation of the law and 
fundamental standards beyond the terrorist issue. It is in this area that an effect can be 
seen as a result of the longevity of the legislation in the UK. Indeed, the continuous 
threat of terrorism and this gradual erosion of fundamental standards has resulted in 
the acceptance of inroads into individual rights and democratic values, as can be seen 
from, for example, the abridgement of the right to silence. It is in this way that the 
experience of the United Kingdom with regard to terrorism and legislative provisions 
in response differs from that of the United States. Whilst the maturity of the UK 
system, and its containment of a long-standing threat, may have prompted its 
consideration as somewhat of a blueprint to the United States, or indeed other 
countries legislating in this area for the first time, the erosion of values removed from 
the terrorist arena serves as a warning for the future.
In comparison to the minimal interference with democratic values in the United States 
in dealing with the previous terrorist threat, there existed somewhat of a dichotomy 
between the situation in Great Britain and that in Northern Ireland. The dominant 
terrorist threat in the UK was that related to Irish Nationalism resulting in the 
enactment of emergency measures in both areas. The nature of the measures was 
such that an impact was felt upon traditional rights and freedoms, often without the
7 The only exception was with regard to the guarantees o f  the First Amendment under the Anti- 
Terrorism Act o f 1987. However, due to the nature o f the jurisprudence in this area the provisions of 
the Act were not in violation o f the Constitution.
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justification of efficaciousness. With regard to Great Britain and the situation under 
the various Prevention of Terrorism Acts the effect of the provisions was notable, 
with the decision to enact such measures, acceptance of such by the public and the 
longevity of the “temporary”, emergency regime being demonstrative of the 
impairment done to democratic values by terrorism. However, throughout the period 
in which the PTA dominated the legislative response to terrorism emanating from 
Northern Ireland, the mechanisms of the state continued to function normally and the 
foundations of civil society remained intact with the result that democracy remained 
viable. However, in the case of Northern Ireland the impact on democracy of some of 
the provisions under the Emergency Provisions Acts went further than interference 
with the rights of the individual and weakened the democratic integrity of the 
province. This was particularly so with regard to the use of internment, which 
succeeded in further alienating an already marginalized community whilst the 
introduction of trial without jury removed a fundamental aspect of the administration 
of justice. Measures such as these undermined public confidence in the actions of the 
government and often succeeded in tipping public support in favour of terrorist
o
organisations. Of course it cannot be said that during this time Northern Ireland was 
wholly undemocratic. This was not the case. However, the measures enacted in an 
attempt to counter the threat did have a detrimental effect on the democratic 
foundation of the province. Long-lasting though this was, progress has been made in 
bringing peace to the area through adherence to the intrinsic principles of democracy.
Several lessons can be learned from the United Kingdom’s experience with the Irish 
Nationalist terrorist struggle and the specialist legislative response. The permanent 
fixture of emergency legislation in the legal system leads to the gradual acceptance of 
special emergency measures into the law as well as every day life, as previously 
discussed. Moreover, somewhat of a pattern ensues. It has been the experience of the 
UK as well as other countries, that legislation does not and cannot prevent every
f hterrorist attack. This is borne out by the bombings in London on 7 July 2005 and the 
attempted bombings there a fortnight later on 21st July, despite the existence of the 
permanent Terrorism Act 2000 and the more recent Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
8 CAIN Web Service available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm
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Security Act 2001. However, each new attack inspires calls to legislate further, as can 
be seen from the reaction to the London bombings, which will be discussed shortly.
A serious lesson in the UK’s anti-terrorist history is the fact that measures taken in an 
attempt to curb terrorist activities can have a converse effect, as occurred with the use 
of internment in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. A rise in violence and a likely 
increase in IRA recruitment levels as well as the disaffection of a large proportion of 
the Catholic population followed the introduction of internment, rendering it a failure 
in anti-terrorist terms as well as with regard to attempting to maintain the social 
cohesion of the troubled province. Ultimately progress has been made with regard to 
the Northern Irish terrorist problem not through legislative or executive security 
measures but by way of political discourse, commitment to equality and increased 
respect for fundamental rights, as well as perhaps a realisation on the part of the 
organisations concerned that their ultimate objectives could not be achieved through 
violent means. This can be seen from the decrease in violence following the signing 
of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and the preceding ceasefires. The utility of 
dialogue in achieving a desirable end to the troubles in the province has been 
recognised by one of the main organisations in the history of the terrorist problem in 
Northern Ireland, with the IRA ceasefire announcement of July 2005 stating the 
organisation’s intent to achieve its objectives using “purely political and democratic 
programmes through exclusively peaceful means.”9
It is this potential for progress through negotiation and discourse which sets the 
United Kingdom’s experience with Irish Nationalist violence apart from the threat 
posed by Islamic extremism and A1 Qaeda. Terrorism is to be condemned in any 
guise and on any scale. However progress was and is possible with regard to 
attempting to bring an end to the terrorist violence associated with Northern Ireland 
due to the political and, in some eyes, reasonable demands of organisations such as 
the IRA and its loyalist counterparts. This differs markedly from the aims of Islamic 
extremist organisations such as A1 Qaeda which seek to drive Americans and 
American influence out of all Muslim nations, in particular Saudi Arabia, destroy
9 See http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/northern ireland/4724599.stm for full statement. 28th July 2005. On 
26th September John de Chastelain made the announcement that the IRA had decommissioned its arms. 
See http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/em/fr/-/l/hi/northem ireland/4283444.stm
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Israel, and overthrow pro-Western governments around the Middle East. These aims 
even go so far as to include the establishment of an Islamic nation, by force if 
necessary, which unites all Muslims under the rule of the first Caliphs, or successors 
of Mohammed. The difficulty in achieving, or even attempting, a negotiated solution 
to such demands is clear. Indeed it seems that the template of political progress used 
with regard to Northern Ireland will be of little use in dealing with militant Islamic 
extremist organisations, due to the ideological battle democracies face. However, the 
possibility of dialogue and political progress with the IRA may once have seemed 
similarly bleak, due to the ruthless tactics and unreasonable demands of the 
organisation. Progress was a slow process which involved an appreciation that the 
United Kingdom would not be defeated by violent means. The lesson of attempting 
to bring peace to Northern Ireland has taught that political progress requires patience 
as well as the fact that the aims of a terrorist organisation do not remain static. What 
the future holds in this regard in relation to the current threat remains to be seen. It 
can be said however, that steps can be taken by democracies in an attempt to contain 
the current threat. A pressing question for the UK in the aftermath of the London 
attacks is what prompted the perpetrators, who had been bom and raised in Great 
Britain to take such a path. It is in consideration of such a question that progress may 
be made. Measures may be taken to undermine the rhetoric which proves successful 
in influencing individuals to join radical groups in an attempt to limit recruitment. 
Some of the proposed provisions of the current Bill appear to be aimed at this 
addressing, inter alia, the encouragement and glorification of terrorism as well as the 
dissemination of terrorist publications.10 In addition proposals have been made with 
regard to expanding the grounds on which decisions to deport and exclude can be 
made to include fostering hatred, advocating violence to further a person's beliefs, or 
justifying or validating such violence.11 In taking such steps democratic values and 
the notion of pluralism are of fundamental importance; repressive or discriminatory 
tactics by the state will only serve to inflame the situation. It seems currently that 
prevention, rather than cure, is the most realistic option for democracies against this 
foe. However, it is hoped that this aim is not pursued at the cost of democratic values 
and fundamental standards.
10 See www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/home sec 1etter.html
11 See http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk_politics/4179044.stm
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Rather than simply posing a threat from abroad, Islamic fundamentalism and the cult 
of the suicide bomber made a dramatic entry onto the British domestic stage on 7 
July 2005 with an attack on the London transport network which left 52 people dead 
and over 700 injured. An additional facet to the feeling of vulnerability experienced 
by the country was the information that at least three of the four bombers were bom 
and raised in the United Kingdom. As has come to be expected following a terrorist 
atrocity, as part of the cycle of action and reaction, calls for new legislation were swift 
in coming. In, addition various changes to executive policy were also proposed. A 
draft Terrorism Bill was published by the Home Secretary on 15th September 2005.12 
The proposed measures focus on those prepared to engage in extremism and are 
founded on the basis that the mood of the country is different following the events of
t h  1 ^7 July with regard to the enactment of more controversial measures. Some 
preliminary observations may be made. Firstly, the attacks on London appear to have 
been used to justify a reduction in the human rights standards to which the United 
Kingdom seeks to adhere. The proposals were accompanied by the statement that 
should legal obstacles arise, the government was prepared to legislate to amend the 
Human Rights Act 1998 if necessary, with regard to the interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This attitude is evident in the proposals for a change 
in executive policy for example, with regard to the deportation of individuals. 
Sending an individual to a country where he may face torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment is contrary to article 3 of the ECHR14. However, the proposed 
measures seek to allow such action on the basis of “memoranda of understanding” 
that the countries concerned will comply with international human rights standards.15 
Efforts attempting to improve the human rights records of such countries are to be 
commended. However these memoranda appear to be aimed at deporting individuals 
with clear conscience. Moreover, such action leaves the individual removed free to 
pursue terrorist activities abroad, often in countries known for their strong terrorist
12 Available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/home sec letter.html
13 The mood of the country is said to be different with regard to both the public as well as members of  
Parliament. Prime Minister’s Press Conference 5th August 2005. Available at: 
http://www.number 10.gov.uk/output/Page8041 .asp
14 Chahal v UK (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413.
15 This issue was recently discussed when the Home Secretary appeared before the Home Affairs 
Committee regarding Counter -Terrorism and Community Relations in the Aftermath o f the London 
Bombings on 13th September 2005. An uncorrected transcript is available at: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/uc462-i/uc46201.htm
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associations. On the basis of the definition of national security given in Rehman16, 
such a measure does not promote the security of the country. Under the draft 
legislation, an extension to the list of proscribed organisations is proposed. One of the 
named organisations is Hizb-ut-Tahira, a group founded in 1986 which states that it 
seeks its objectives through non-violent means. The United States continues to 
monitor the group but has not found a link between it and any known terrorist 
activities, nor is there evidence of its provision of financial support to terrorist 
organisations. In this way this provision is reminiscent of those in the USA 
PATRIOT Act which punish individuals on an ideological basis rather than for any 
criminal act. In addition, an increase in the length of pre-charge detention to a period 
of three months has been proposed despite the existing 14 day provision currently in 
place. This may involve a new pre-trial process which it seems will resemble the 
continental inquisitorial system despite the adversarial nature of proceedings which 
UK judges are trained to handle. It seems this process may well resemble that of the 
SIAC despite the problems inherent with the use of that tribunal for anti-terrorist, 
criminal purposes. The enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was 
fiercely opposed17 due to the coercive nature of the provisions proposed. The 
introduction of the current Bill to the House will serve as an indicator as to whether
t hattitudes really have changed to the extent claimed following the 7 July.
There was once a time when terrorist attacks in the UK killing 54 people would not
thhave triggered a response in the United States. The events of September 11 and their 
aftermath brought an end to those days. Following the July 7 attacks, the mass 
transit system of the US was moved from code yellow (elevated) to orange (high),
1 Rwhere it remained for 36 days. Armed police and explosive-detecting dogs were 
deployed on the subway system, with random searches carried out on a numerical 
basis and plainclothes patrols increased. Civil liberties groups in the US have cried 
foul with regard to this policy on the basis that unreasonable searches and seizures are
16 Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153.
17 During the passage o f the Bill through the House o f Commons there was a substantial rebellion by 
Labour backbencher. The House o f Lords made a number o f amendments to the Bill. These were 
considered by the Commons on March 10th and the subsequent debates resulted in the longest ever
sitting o f the Lords, a duration exceeding 30 hours.18 S. S. Hsu and D. Eggen (2005) Terrorism Alert Level Lowered For Transit. The Washington Post, 
August 13th p. B01.
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prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.19 However, so long as the searches are not 
carried out on a racial basis and are purely random it seems that any such challenge is 
likely to fail. Random searches are an accepted part of travel with regard to flights, 
with it being the case that the individual has a choice about whether to choose such a 
form of transport and submit to a random search or to find an alternative means of 
travel. Flexibility has been shown by the Supreme Court in relation to the 
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as well consideration to the needs 
of law enforcement and on this basis it may well result in the opinion that such 
searches are justified given the nature of the situation.
tViThe events of September 11 changed the legal landscape in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In the United States, the USA PATRIOT Act has recently been 
renewed, extending the sunset periods on many of the provisions to ten years. In the 
United Kingdom, it was deemed necessary to invoke a derogation from article 5 of the 
ECHR once again and in recent months further legislation, in the form of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, has been enacted with a raft of further anti­
terrorism measures likely shortly. Can it be said that these democracies are winning 
their battle with terrorism? The United States has not experienced another terrorist
tViattack within its borders since September 11 . The United Kingdom was similarly
tFifree from such incidents until July 7 2005. In addition, in the war on terror, it is 
estimated that up to 75% of key A1 Qaeda operatives have been captured or killed.21 
However, incidents, casualties and membership levels are not the only considerations 
to be taken into account with regard to the success of a country in countering the 
terrorist threat. Indeed, the objective for the UK and the US is achieving legal 
effectiveness in preventing terrorism without destroying the features of democratic 
society. Damage to democratic values can be evidenced by the decision of the 
government to enact measures which curtail the rights and liberties of the individual 
and indeed by the acceptance of the people of the need for such measures. The
tViaftermath of the July 7 bombings is an example in point with regard to these
19 The new York Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on behalf o f five plaintiffs on 4th August 2005 in 
an attempt to halt the practice o f random bag searches in New York. See NYCLU Sues New York City 
Over Subway Bag Search Policy available at
http://www.ac lu.org/PolicePractices/PolicePractices.cfm?ID= 18885&c= 119
20 As seen in chapter 4.
21 Address o f President Bush to the Republican Party Convention, September 2nd 2004. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/3623344.stm
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consequences with further stringent legislation having been proposed. A further 
example is served by the use of detention without trial by both the UK and US 
following 9/11. As a result of some of the measures enacted in response to this 
terrorist threat it can be said that democratic values have suffered a certain amount of 
curtailment. The cycle of action and reaction continues yet democracy remains viable 
in both countries.
The duty on governments to respond to terrorism is clear and there is no question of 
action being taken, even if it results in interference with rights and liberties so long as 
it is necessary, effective, proportionate and in keeping with fundamental standards. It 
is in ensuring this that the role of the courts is crucial. In both countries the courts 
have shown themselves in recent months to be vigilant and active in upholding these
99standards and the liberty of the individual. This serves as another example of the 
strength of democracy in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in this 
area of the law the scrutiny and protection of the courts must not be taken for granted. 
As has been seen, in the arena of anti-terrorism law the role of the courts can be 
subverted leaving the individual in a position of weakness with regard to attempting 
to challenge the exercise of enacted powers. Moreover, suggestions have recently 
been made that the judiciary should be required to give more weight to national 
security concerns with regard to the deportation of suspected terrorists.23 To attempt 
to exert a degree of influence over the considerations of the judiciary in this way 
undermines the purpose of the Human Rights Act 1998 in allowing judges to find 
against the government when it acts in such a way as to unjustifiably restrict the rights 
and liberties of the individual.
The threat that democracies face has changed in recent years and will persist. The 
price of security is changing and freedom will not always emerge unscathed, as has 
been seen. The balance struck by democratic governments has not and will not 
always be right, however maintaining the health of democratic society is paramount in 
defeating the threat posed by terrorism.
22 In the UK see A v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68. In the US see 
Hamdi v Rumsfeld No. 03-6696 and Rasul et al. v Bush No. 03-334, No. 03-343, both decided on June 
28th 2004.
23 See Judges Face Human Rights Shake-Up 12 August 2005 at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/ukjpolitics/4144186.stm
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